JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This special appeal has been referred to a Full Bench because it involved the decision of an important point which was whether or not the definition of Industrial dispute' as contained in clause (1) of Section 2 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (to be hereinafter referred as the U. P. Act) stands modified by Section 2-A inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 35 of 1965) which came in force with effect from 1-12-1965, It appears that the two Division Benches of this Court expressed divergent views of this matter. In C. S. W. Ltd. v. Dr. B. P. Mohindra. 1971 All LJ 715 a Bench consisting of Oak, C. J. and R. B. Misra, J. held that Section 2-A inserted in the Central Act must be confined to matters governed by that Act and it does not modify the definition of 'Industrial Dispute' contained in Section 2 (1). Another Division Bench consisting of Satish Chandra and K. N. Seth. JJ. in Har Narain v. State of U. P., 1974 Lab IC 318 (All.) took the view that Section 2-A of the Central Act would operate in the U. P. Act also. 2. The definition of 'industrial dispute' as contained in Section 2 (k) of the Central Act is as follows: "'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person." The same expression has been defined in the U. P. Act in clause (1) of Section 2 in these words: "Industrial Dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers. or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terns of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person; but does not include an industrial dispute concerning- (i) any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a Railway Company, or (ii) such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by Central Government, or (iii) banking and insurance companies as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or (iv) a mine or an oil field." 3. It was authoritatively held by the Supreme Court in a number of cases that a dispute between an employer and individual workman did not fall within the definition of 'industrial dispute' as contained in the Central Act or the U. P, Act unless that dispute was - also sponsored by a trade union of workmen of that establishment. and if the workmen of that establishment, had no union of their own, by a union of another establishment belonging to the same industry which. had been joined by some or all of the establishments in which the dispute arose. It is not necessary to refer to all the decisions which have been cited by the learned single Judge in his judgment. Reference may be made only to. Workmen of Indian Express v. Management,. (1969) 1 SCC 228 = (1970 Lab IC 574). 4. Perhaps with a view to get over this interpretation of the expression 'industrial dispute' by the Supreme Court and other High Courts, Section 2-A was inserted in the Central Act with effect from 1-2-1965. This section provides as follows : "2-A. Where any employer discharges, dismisses. retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an Industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other work-man nor any union of work-men is a party to the dispute." 5. The question that arises is whether in view of the proviso to Article 254 (2) of the Constitution this section automatically modifies, the definition of 'industrial dispute' as contained in Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Act. The question that arises is whether in view of the proviso to Article 254 (2) of the Constitution this section automatically modifies, the definition of 'industrial dispute' as contained in Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Act. For this purpose it would be necessary to scan the provisions of the two Acts and to go briefly into their legislative history. 6. The original Central Act being Act No. 14 of 1947 was passed on 11-3-1947 and it came in force on 1st day of April, 1947. This Act though not as detailed or as elaborate as it exists in its present form was even then a self-contained Act. The definition of the expression 'industrial dispute' contained in it which remains unmodified was the same as quoted above. The authorities provided under that Act for the settlement or adjudication of industrial disputes consisted of Works Committee. Conciliation Officers, Board of Conciliation, Courts of Inquiry and Industrial Tribunals to be appointed by appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions contained in Sections 3 to 8 of that Act. Section 10 provides that if any industrial dispute exists, or is apprehended the appropriate Government may, by order in writing refer the dispute to a Board of Conciliation for settlement thereof or refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court of Inquiry or refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication. 7. Subsequently, the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act No. 28 of 1947) was passed which also received the assent of the Governor General of India as provided in Government of India Act, 1935. This Act in its original shape was a skeleton Act which did not stand wholly by itself and had to be supplemented by the Central Act. Most of the definitions including that of 'industrial dispute' were stated to be the same as contained in the Central Act. Section 3 conferred power on the State Government to make provision by general or special order for various matters referred to in that section including the matters relating to appointment of industrial courts or for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in that order. Section. 12 provided that unless any order made under that Act makes express provision to the contrary. Section. 12 provided that unless any order made under that Act makes express provision to the contrary. nothing in this Act shall affect the power to refer any industrial dispute or matters connected therewith or to deal with any report or settlement under the Industrial Disputes, Act, 1947. This shows that originally the intention was that the industrial disputes shall be referred for settlement or adjudication under the provisions of the Central Act to the authorities appointed under that Act unless a provision to the contrary was made in an order issued by the State Government under Section 3 on those matters. 8. In course of time, both these Acts were amended from time to time. Each amendment made to the U. P. Act received the assent of the President of India. It is not necessary to refer to all those amendments. We may however refer to the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. 1956 (Act No. 36 of 1956) which brought about extensive amendments in the Central Act. The important amendments which need be noticed for the purposes of this appeal were that besides the authorities already provided in the original Act for settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes, two more authorities were provided, namely, Labour Court and National Industrial Tribunal. The mode of appointment of these authorities, the qualifications to be possessed by persons to be appointed as Presiding Officers of Labour Court or National Industrial Tribunal were also laid down in the amendment Act. So far as National Industrial Tribunals are concerned it was provided in Section 7-B that they shall be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette for the adjudication of industrial disputes which, in the opinion of the Central Government, involve questions of national importance or are of such a nature that industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested in. or affected by, such disputes. Section 31 of the amending Act then provided that if, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State any Provincial Act or State Act relating to the settlement or adjudication of disputes, the operation of such an Act in that State in relation to matters covered by that Act shall not be affected by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amended by this Act. For the removal of doubts it was however declared that nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the Central Government or the National Tribunal from exercising any powers conferred on it by the Central Act as amended by this Act. From this provision it is clear that besides those disputes which fall within the purview of National Industrial Tribunal the Central Act did not intend to override the provisions of the State Acts including the U. P. Act with regard to the settlement or adjudication of disputes. 9. The U. P. Act was also extensively amended by the U. P. Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957, This amending Act tried to make the U. P. Act also a self-contained Act by giving its own definitions of various terms used in the Act including the "Industrial Dispute" which was defined in clause (1) of Section 2 in terms already quoted in the beginning of this judgment. The various authorities to whom a dispute could be referred for settlement or adjudication were also provided in the Act. They were Conciliation Officer, a Conciliation Board, Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal. The qualifications of the persons to be appointed as members or Presiding Officers of these bodies were also laid down in the Act and so was the mode of their appointment and their powers and functions. In these matters the provisions of the U. P. Act though analogous to those of the Central Act were not identical and there were some ,differences in the provisions contained in the two Acts covering these matters. No such body as a Court of Inquiry or a National Industrial Tribunal was provided for in the U. P. Act though they had been provided in the Central Act. The phraseology of Section 12 of the U. P. Act as originally enacted was also slightly changed by the amending Act of 1956 (Act No. 1 of 1957) though the substance remained the same. The phraseology of Section 12 of the U. P. Act as originally enacted was also slightly changed by the amending Act of 1956 (Act No. 1 of 1957) though the substance remained the same. The amended Section 12 provides: "Unless any order made under this Act makes express provision to the contrary, nothing in this Act shall affect the power of the State Government to refer any industrial dispute or matter connected therewith under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or to deal with any report or settlement in accordance with the provisions of that Act." A new Section 12-A was added which provides : "For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in this Act shall be deemed to preclude the Central Government from constituting a National Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for the time being in force or any such Tribunal from exercising any powers conferred upon it under that Act." 10. This brought the U. P. Act in harmony with the Central Act. These provisions clearly show that both the Parliament and the State Legislature intended that the two Acts should co-exist and remain in force as complementary and supplementary without one supplanting the other. By this time the definition of 'controlled industry' had been introduced in the Central Act in clause (ee) of Section 2 meaning thereby an industry the control of which by the Union has been declared by any Central Act to be expedient in the public interest. The definition of 'industrial dispute' as contained in Section 2 (1) of U. P. Act excludes an industrial dispute concerning such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. 11. It follows from the above provision that so far as disputes relating to those industries which are excluded from the definition of 'industrial disputes' contained in Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Act are concerned, the reference for their settlement or adjudication can be made only under the provisions of the Central Act to the one or the other of the authorities provided in that Act. But so far as the disputes relating to other industries are concerned, there is an overlapping between the two Acts without necessarily there being a competition between them. But so far as the disputes relating to other industries are concerned, there is an overlapping between the two Acts without necessarily there being a competition between them. It is open to the State Government to refer an industrial dispute in the overlapping field either to one or the other of the authorities provided in the Central Act or to any of the authorities provided in the U. P. Act. It is equally open to the State Government to appoint all or any of the authorities, viz, Conciliation Officer, Board of Conciliation, Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal under the Central Act or under the U. P. Act or under both Acts. If the same person satisfies the qualifications laid down for such appointment in each of the two Acts. he can be appointed that authority under both the Acts but the appointment will have to be made with regard to the provisions contained in each Act. 12. For the purposes of this appeal it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether any guidelines have been provided for the State Government to make the reference of a dispute under one or the other Act or it has been left at the sweet-will of that Government. What is significant is that the two Acts have been left to operate simultaneously in relation to industrial disputes covered by both the Acts. In fact, it is in the discretion of the State Government to make a reference of an industrial dispute or not except in the few cases where the dispute relates to a public utility service in which the workers have given a notice of strike, where such reference is more or less compulsory. Again, if the dispute relates to a matter mentioned in first Schedule to U. P. Act, the State Government has a discretion to refer the same either to Labour Court or to Industrial Tribunal. The State Government has also a discretion to refer a dispute either tinder Section 4-K of the U. P. Act or under Section 10 of the Central Act. If the dispute relates to a matter provided in second Schedule to the Central Act, the State Government is again given a discretion to refer it under Section 10 of that Act either to the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. If the dispute relates to a matter provided in second Schedule to the Central Act, the State Government is again given a discretion to refer it under Section 10 of that Act either to the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. It goes without saying that if a dispute is referred for adjudication under Section 10 of the Central Act, all the provisions of that Act shall be applicable for the adjudication of that dispute. On the other hand, if the dispute is referred under Section 4-K of the U. P. Act the provisions of that Act would be applicable to such adjudication. When the two self-contained Acts are in operation simultaneously in the field covered by each, there is no reason to hold that Section 2-A inserted in the Central Act would automatically be deemed to have been inserted in the U. P. Act also so as to modify the definition of 'industrial dispute' contained in Section 2 (1) of that Act accordingly. I am, therefore in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Oak, C. J. speaking for the Bench in 1971 All LJ 715 (supra) that the operation of Section 2-A introduced in the Central Act must be confined to matters governed by that Act and that this section does not modify the definition of 'industrial dispute' contained in clause (1) of Section 2 of the U. P. Act. 13. In 1974 Lab IC 318 (All.) (supra) the industrial dispute had been referred by the State Government under the Central Act and so there was no difficulty in invoking Section 2-A to determine whether that unsponsored individual dispute was an Industrial dispute or ,not. The view expressed in that case that since Section 2-A had been added by Parliament in 1965 in the Central Act which related to a subject in the Concurrent List, it would operate on the U. P. Act also, was in the nature of orbiter. If the two Acts do not operate on the same field and are not mutually exclusive but it is intended that the two Acts should operate simultaneously, there is no question of any repugnancy between them and the proviso to Article 254 (2) of the Constitution is not attracted. If the two Acts do not operate on the same field and are not mutually exclusive but it is intended that the two Acts should operate simultaneously, there is no question of any repugnancy between them and the proviso to Article 254 (2) of the Constitution is not attracted. If the State Government thinks that an unsponsored individual dispute between a workman and his employer is also an industrial dispute in view of Section 2-A, it is open to that Government to refer that dispute under the provisions of the Central Act. But if the reference is made under the U. P. Act there is no good reason to insert Section 2-A in the U. P. Act also and then to construe its provisions accordingly, I am therefore of the opinion that the dispute in this case which was admittedly an individual dispute between the appellants and the respondent No. 4 who was one of the workmen of the appellants cannot be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (1). 14. It was next argued on behalf of respondent No. 4 that the dispute was sponsored by the Bazar Karmachari Sangh of which respondent No. 4 was a member, there being no trade union in the establishments known as Karachi Tailors and Reliable Tailors where he worked as a workman. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that this Bazar Karmachari Sangh was not a union of one industry which could legitimately sponsor the dispute on behalf of respondent No. 4 so as to bring it within the purview of industrial dispute. The learned single Judge noted that the Bazar Karmachari Sangh is a union of such employees as are employed in shops or commercial establishments within the meaning of the U. P. Dookan Aur Vanija Adhishtan Adhiniyam, 1962. The membership of this union is as much open to a salesman in a shoe shop as to the tailors in a tailoring establishment or shop assistants in a wholesale sugar shop or a retail sugar shop or a chemist shop or any other shop. The only common feature is that they are all employees in one shop or commercial establishment or the other of any description whatsoever, without any other common link between them, and without any community of interest between them so far as their individual shops are concerned. The only common feature is that they are all employees in one shop or commercial establishment or the other of any description whatsoever, without any other common link between them, and without any community of interest between them so far as their individual shops are concerned. It is evident that the problems of tailors in a tailoring establishment are different from the problems of barbers or salesmen in a shoe shop. A conglomeration of workers. salesmen, shop assistants, tailors and artisans in various commercial establishments cannot be said to be a union representing one industry so as to be competent to represent respondent No. 4 under sub-section (3) of Section 6-I of the U. P. Act. The Supreme Court has also ruled in (1969) 1 SCC 228 = (1970 Lab IC 574) (supra) that an individual dispute will become an industrial dispute only when it is espoused by a union in that establishment where the individual worker was working and if there is no such union in that establishment, by a union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. The Bazar Karmachari Sangh cannot be said to be a union of tailoring industry to which respondent No. 4 belonged. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to a decision of mine in Writ Petn. No. 861 of 1963, Lucknow Publishing House v. Chairman Conciliation Board decided on 22-1-1970 in which the individual dispute concerning a worker of Lucknow Publishing House which had no trade union of its own but whose cause was espoused by the Associated Journal Employees' Union, was held to be an industrial dispute on the ground that this union was a union of workers employed in printing and publishing industry of Lucknow and its membership was open to such workers. That decision has no application to the facts of the present case in which the Bazar Karmachari Sangh is not a union of the industry in question, viz., the tailoring industry to which respondent No. 4 belonged. I therefore agree with the learned single Judge that merely because the dispute of respondent was espoused by the Bazar Karmachari Sangh it cannot bring it within the definition of industrial dispute as interpreted by the Supreme Court which definition would be applicable to the present case unaided by Section 2-A contained in the Central Act. 16. I therefore agree with the learned single Judge that merely because the dispute of respondent was espoused by the Bazar Karmachari Sangh it cannot bring it within the definition of industrial dispute as interpreted by the Supreme Court which definition would be applicable to the present case unaided by Section 2-A contained in the Central Act. 16. The dispute between respondent No. 4 and the appellants not being an industrial dispute within the U. P. Act, the State Government had no jurisdiction to refer it to a Labour Court under Section 4-K of that Act. The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the order of reference made under Annexures 1 and 3 is quashed. The respondent No. 2 is prohibited from proceeding in the matter of adjudication on the basis of reference made under Annexures 1 and 3. It shall however be open to the State Government to make a reference, if it so likes, under the provisions of the Central Act. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. D. S. Mathur, C.J. - I agree. Prem Prakash, J. - I agree.