MODI, J.—This writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the Commercial Taxes Officer, Jodhpur by which the services of the petitioner were terminated under R. 23(A)(1) of the Rajasthan Service Rules. The petitioner Manoharlal was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the office of the Commercial Taxes Officer, Jodhpur in a temporary capacity on 18-10 1966 vide Ex. R- 1 for one month on the condition that his service shall be liable to be terminated at any time without any prior notice. The term of one month was extended for another one month on 22-11-1966 vide Ex. R. 2. On 18 4 67 the term of his employment was further extended till further orders. The petitioner on 3 2 69 submitted an application for granting him five days casual leave with effect from 3 2-69 to 7-2-69. The leave was refused by the Commercial Taxes Officer. The petitioner then on the same day made another application praying that he may be granted privilege leave for one month with effect from 3 2-69 to 1-3 69. The petitioner after submitting this application for grant of privilege leave left the office. On receipt of the application for privilege leave, the matter was examined by the Commercial Taxes Officer, who on 7-2-69 decided to terminate his services after giving him a months notice. The order to that effect was actually passed on 12-2-69. It reads as under- vksj ls %& okf.kT; dj vf/kdkjh] ^^c** {ks=] tks/kiqj dks %& Jh euksgjyky] dfu"V fyfid] }kjk Jh eaxynRr th nos] czg~eiqjh] xkao dk.kuk iks-vks- dkuku ¼ok;k ckyslj½ Øekad%& LFkk 127 fnukad& 12-2-69 vki Jh euksgjyky] dfu"V fyfid okMZ izFke {ks= ^^ch** tks/kiqj us vius vj[okLr fnukad 3@2@69 vkdfLed vodkk gsrq o mlh fnukad dks nwljh nj[okLr okLrs mikftZr vodkk ekg ,d gsrq isk dh vksj fcuk Lohd`fr ds eq[;ky; NksM+ dj pys x;sA vkis ,slk djuk vkj-,l-vkj- ds fu;e ds izfrdwy gh ugha oju~ dk;kZy; ds fu;eksa ds fo:) gSA vr% vkidks ,d ekg dk uksfVl vkj-,l-vkj- ds fu;e 13 ¼v½ ds vuqlkj fn;k tkrk gS fd fnukad 7@3@69 ls vkidh jkT; lsok,sa VjehusV le>h tkosaA This order is marked as Ex. 1. 1. On the same day i.e. 12-2-1969 another application was received in the office of the Commercial Taxes Officer in which the petitioner asked for grant of medical leave from 3-2-1969 to 21-2-1969 Along with this application a medical certificate of a Vaidya was attached. Yet another application was presented by the petitioner on 22-2-1969 for the extension of leave from 21-2-1969 to 1-3-1969. Along with this application also a medical certificate from the same Vaidya was attached. On 7-3-1969 the Commercial Taxes Officer passed another order terminating the services of the petitioner with effect 7-3-1969. The petitioner protested against this order dated 7-3-1969, and denied having left the Headquater and asserted that throughout the period he was at Jodhpur. The petitioner then filed an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) Commercial Taxes on 9-5-1969 which was disposed of on 1-11-69 holding that the appeal was not maintainable. The petitioner then moved this writ petition and prayed inter alia that the orders dated 12-2-1969, 7-3-1969 and the appellate order dated 1-11-1969 be quashed. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner confined his arguments on two points: firstly, that the temporary services of the petitioner were not liable to be terminated without complying with the provisions of R. 23(A) (1) of the Rajasthan Service Rules viz. either by giving the petitioner one months notice in writing or by making the payment to him of a sum equivalent with the amount of emoluments for the aforesaid notice period. The second contention is that there has been infringement of Art.311 of the Constitution of India for no opportunity to show cause was afforded to the petitioner against the alleged illegal termination of the petitioners services. 3. I take up the second point first: There arc two pre dominating facts in this case: first that the petitioner is a temporary servant whose employment under the terms of the appointment letter Ex. R. 1 was liable to be terminated at any time without any prior notice. In other words, the petitioner had no right to continue in service, and the nature of his service tenure was entirely temporary. The second important fact which deserves to be noted is the order dated 7-3-1969 Ex. R. 1 was liable to be terminated at any time without any prior notice. In other words, the petitioner had no right to continue in service, and the nature of his service tenure was entirely temporary. The second important fact which deserves to be noted is the order dated 7-3-1969 Ex. 3 which runs as under— ^^jktLFkku ljdkj dk;kZy; okf.kT; dhj vf/kdkjh] c {ks=] tks/kiqjA Øekad%& fnukad%& dk;kZy; vknsk Jh euksgj yky dfu"V fyfid dh lsokvksa dh jkT; ljdkj dks vko;drk ugha gSA vr% Jh euksgjyky dks fnukad 7-3-69 ls jkT; lsokvksa ls eqDr fd;k tkrk gSA lgh@& okf.kT; dj vf/kdkjh] {ks=&c&tks/kiqjA From the plain terms of the order Ex. 3 it is evident that this order has been passed in total conformity with the appointment letter Ex. R. 1 and that this order neither casts any stigma on the petitioner, nor does it visit the petitioner with any penal consequences. 4. The main argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the order Ex. 3 dated 7-3 69 if read along with the order Ex. 1 dated 12-2-69 leads to the conclusion that the petitioners termination of services vide Ex 3 is in essence punitive as it is founded directly upon the allegation of misconduct mentioned in Ex. 1 against the petitioner. To my mind, the effective order dispensing with the services of the petitioner is Ex. 3 dated 7-3-69 and it completely supersedes the order Ex. 1 dated 12-2-69. It appears that because the order Ex. 1 attached some sort of stigma which would have affected the petitioners future career, the second order Ex:3 dated 7-3-69 which is wholly innocuous, was passed so that it may not affect the petitioners future career. In any case, there is nothing to suggest that the subsequent order dated 7-3-69 was founded upon the previous order dated 12-2-69. 5. Even if the order Ex. 3 is read along with the order Ex. 1, the question that arises is whether from these two orders an inference can be drawn that the services of the petitioner were terminated by way of punishment? If the answer is in the affirmative, the order terminating the service tantamounts to a removal and it would attract the provisions of Art.311 of the Constitution. But in case the answer is in the negative no question of attracting the provisions of Art.311 arises. 6. If the answer is in the affirmative, the order terminating the service tantamounts to a removal and it would attract the provisions of Art.311 of the Constitution. But in case the answer is in the negative no question of attracting the provisions of Art.311 arises. 6. It is well settled that the mere form of an order is not by itself conclusive and all the attending circumstances in passing the same has to be taken into consideration for determining whether the impugned order is by way of punishment or otherwise. It is again well settled that an order in which the unsatisfactory nature of the work or misconduct of the public servant enters merely as a motive for the termination of his services then such an order is not by way of punishment in the eye of law. It is only where the order is wholly founded on the particular misconduct of the public servant, then it is to be deemed as an order by way of punishment which would attract the provisions of Art.311 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the employment of the petitioner was wholly temporary as it was terminable even without notice. As already pointed out above the effective order Ex. 3, dated 7-3-1969 is wholly innocuous and casts no stigma nor entails any penal consequences to the petitioner. 7. In P.L. Dhingra vs. Union of India(l) their Lordships laid down two tests for determining whether an order was by way of punishment or otherwise: firstly whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank and secondly whether the order visits the servant with evil consequences. In the present case neither of these two tests is satisfied. 8. Several decisions of the Superime Court and various High Courts were cited before me by the learned counsel for the parties. I may refer to some of them. 9. In the present case neither of these two tests is satisfied. 8. Several decisions of the Superime Court and various High Courts were cited before me by the learned counsel for the parties. I may refer to some of them. 9. In P.L. Dhingras case (l) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed— "It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C. J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India (AIR 1956 Bombay 455) (supra) wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 311 is not attracted" 10. The Law enunciated above has never been departed from and rather it was re-affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their subsequant decisions. 11. In State of Punjab vs. Sukh Raj (2) the public servant was given a charge sheet. Serious charges of misconduct were levelled against him. He submitted his reply to the charge sheet. He was, however, reverted back to his post of Superintendent under the Delhi Administration with immediate effect, by an order which was unexceptionable. The challenge on his behalf that the order of reversion was punitive and founded upon a severe allegation of misconduct against him was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. After review of several previous decisions their Lordships laid down the following five tests:— (1) The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. (2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an asscsion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (5) If there be a full sale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article. 12. The case in hand, in my opinion, is directly covered by the first proposition of law laid down by their Lordships. 13 In Ram Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh(3) the appellant Shri Ramgopal Chaturvedi was a temporary Civil Judge in the Madhya Pradesh Service. Complaints were received against him that he was misconducting himself by associating with ng girl The Chief justice of Madhya Pradesh made enquiries into the matter and on February 19, 1954 he admonished the appellant for his disreputable conduct. On his return to Jabalpur on February 23, 1964 the Chief justice recorded a detailed note holding the appellant guilty of misconduct in regard to the girl. No charge sheet was served on the appellant or any enquiry held. However on March 10, 1964 acting on the report of the Chief Justice the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed a resolution recommending that the State Government should terminate the appellants services. Acting on the said resolution the State Government passed an order on March 25, 1964 dispensing with the services of the appellant. The order was challenged on his behalf as being patently punitive and founded directly upon the allegation of misconduct against him but their Lordships rejected the same in these words: "No charge-sheet was served on the appellant nor was any departmental inquiry held against him. On March 10, 1964 the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed a resolution that the State Government should terminate the appellants services. On March 10, 1964 the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed a resolution that the State Government should terminate the appellants services. Having regard to this resolution the State Government passed the impugned order dated March 25, 1964. On the face of it, the order did not cast stigma on the appellant character or integrity nor did it visit him with any evil consequences. It was not passed by way of punishment and the provisions of Article 311 were not attracted." 14. In Union of India and another vs. R. S. Dhaba (4) the respondent R. S. Dhaba had challenged his reversion from the post of Income Tax Officer to that of Officiating Inspector. The impugned order was in these terms: "Establishment of Gazetted Class II Income Tax Officer, Reversion of Shri R.S. Dhaba, Officiating. Income-tax Officer, E-ward, Ludhiana, having been found unsuitable after trial to hold the post of Income-tan Officer, Class II, is hereby reverted as officiating Inspector, Income-tax with immediate effect." It was painted out that this order was founded on demi official letter to the Commissioner of Income-tax holding that because of the large number of camplaints which the Department had received against the integrity of R.S. Dhaba and the bad reports received against him from his superiors, he should be reverted nevertheless their Lordships upheld the impugned order in these words: "In the order of reversion, dated May 22, 1964, there is nothing to show that a stigma was attached to the respondent. No reference is made to the imputation on the integrity of the respondent and the only reason given is that the respondent was found unsuitable to hold the post of Income Tax Officer, Class II. It is well established that a Government servant who is officiating in a post has no right to hold it for all time and the Government servant who is given an officiating post holds it on the implied term that he will have to be reverted if his work was found unsuitable. In a case of this description a reversion on the ground of unsuitability is an action in accordance with the terms on which the officiating post is held and not a reduction in rank by way of punishment to which Article 311 of the Constitution could be attracted." 15. In a case of this description a reversion on the ground of unsuitability is an action in accordance with the terms on which the officiating post is held and not a reduction in rank by way of punishment to which Article 311 of the Constitution could be attracted." 15. There is thus over-whelming authority that wholly innocuous order terminating the services of an entirely temporary employee where an absolute right to terminate his services exists the normal presumption is that it does not attract the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution, even though the innocuous order may have been passed on account of his unsatisfactory nature of services or on account of his misconduct. In such a case the unsatisfactory nature of employees services or misconduct on his part should ordinarily be deemed a mere motive for the order of termination of services and not the foundation of the order. No such presumption would be available if there is conclusive proof to the contrary that the order was deliberately camouflaged in that manner. 16. In the present case, even if the order dated 12-2-1969 is read along with the order dated 7-3 1969 it cannot be said that the alleged misconduct mentioned in the order dated 12-2-1969 was the very foundation in the order terminating the services of the petitioner, nor there is any proof to hold that the order dated 7-3-1969 was deliberately camouflaged in an unexceptionable form. It is further manifest from the two orders Ex. 1 and Ex 3 that the authority exercising its right of termination was fully aware of its power under the Contract & the rules. It is further clear that the authority acted in consonance with the terms of employment and it terminated the services of the petitioner with effect from 7-3 69 with the intent not to punish him. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. I now take up the first contention relating to noncompliance of the provisions of R. 23-(A) (1) of the Rajasthan Service Rules. The contention is that under this Rule one months notice is absolutely necessary and since one months prior notice was not served to the petitioner, the order Ex.3, dated 7-3-1969 is illegal. I am unable to accept the above contention. The contention is that under this Rule one months notice is absolutely necessary and since one months prior notice was not served to the petitioner, the order Ex.3, dated 7-3-1969 is illegal. I am unable to accept the above contention. Section 23-A (l) reads as follows :— "23-A (1) Except as otherwise provided in sub-rule (2), the service of a temporary Government servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. The period of such notice shall be one month unless otherwise agreed to by the Government servant: Provided that service of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay for the period of notice or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of the month or any agreed longer period. The payment of allowances shall be subject to the condition under which such allowances are admissible." This rule provides for termination of services of a temporary government servant by a notice in writing given by either side and also provides that the duration of such notice shall be one month, "unless otherwise agreed to by the Government and by the Government servant." In the present case, the appointment letter Ex. R/l shows that the petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk on the condition that his services shall be liable to be terminated without any prior notice. It was in pursuance of this appointment letter Ex. R/1 that the petitioner joined the department as Lower Division Clerk He, therefore, accepted the condition. I have recently held in the case of Danmal vs. The State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 346 of 1971 decided on 4 10-1974) that where there exists a contract between the parties that the services of the employee shall be terminable without prior notice, there is no non-compliance of Rule 23-A (l), if the employment of the employee is terminated with immediate effect without prior notice as prescribed under R. 23 A (l). In this view of the matter, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner also fails. 18. No other point has been pressed before me. In this view of the matter, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner also fails. 18. No other point has been pressed before me. 19 The writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.