JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for possession over a piece of land specified in the plaint. Though the suit had originally been filed on the basis of general title, through the statement under Order X, R. 2, C. P. C. the plaintiffs confined the case to title based on possession. The statement is to the effect that the plaintiffs claimed title on the basis of possession and possession only. The land is near a temple and the plaintiff is the deity. It was claimed by the plaintiff that it was in possession over this land since more than 12 years prior to its dispossession by defendants 1 and 2. The defence, on the other hand, was that the plaintiff has not acquired any title over this land by being in possession over it for the period required by law. 2. The trial court held that the plaintiff was not in possession for a period sufficient to make it ripen into title before it was dispossessed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2; it also accepted the defendants case that Zamindar was the owner of the land and had executed a lease in respect of it in favour of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. On these findings the trial court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court set aside the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have come up in appeal to challenge the decree. 3. Before the present suit was instituted the plaintiff had filed a suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act on the ground that the plaintiff was dispossessed within six months of the suit. This suit was dismissed on the finding that the plaintiff was not in possession over the land within six months of the suit and had been dispossessed at least as long back as in January 1960. After the dismissal of the suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the present suit was instituted on 12th April 1961. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has advanced two contentions. After the dismissal of the suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the present suit was instituted on 12th April 1961. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has advanced two contentions. First, that the suit is not maintainable after the dismissal of the suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act; and second, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief claimed as he had failed to prove possession of more than 12 years necessary for acquiring title over the land in dispute. 5. There is no merit in the first point raised by the learned counsel. The suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, on the finding of the court was not maintainable in law as the.limitation for filing such a suit was six months and this suit had been filed beyond six months after dispossession. Under Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act, the suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. The present suit is based not on mere possession but on possessory title, that is, on title ensuing from or acquired by long possession. Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act itself says that a suit on the basis of title can be filed. The suit was thus maintainable. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff respondents in reply to the second point urged that 12 years occupation or possession was not necessary for obtaining a decree on the basis of possessory title. He was unable to cite any statutory law justifying his assertion. Under the law of India a citizen is entitled to get certain specific reliefs. Such reliefs which he can get are detailed in the Specific Relief Act. Relief of possession is a specific relief. Secs. 8 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, and Secs. 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provide for relief of possession of immovable property. Sec. 8 of the Old Act has continued without a change and reads as follows :- Sec. 8. "A person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner m prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure." Sec. 9 of the Old Act appears with a slight change as Sec. 6 in the New Act. They run as under: Sec. 9. "A person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner m prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure." Sec. 9 of the Old Act appears with a slight change as Sec. 6 in the New Act. They run as under: Sec. 9. "If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit recover possession thereof, not withstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suiting to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. * * * * * * Sec. 6 of the New Act runs as under :- (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (3) Under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, Sec. 9, to recover possession of immovable property. 7. Under Sec. 3 (now Sec. 8) a specific relief of possession through the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure can be secured only by a person entitled to the possession of the property and not by a person not so entitled. It gives a right to institute a suit for possession of a specific immovable property only to a person who is so entitled under some provision of law. There is no law enacted by legislature which makes a person entitled to possession except on the basis of title acquired in accordance either with the Transfer of Property Act or some other enactment dealing with rights in property. It is only Sec. 9 (now Sec. 6) which protects the possession of a person even if he has no title to hold the property and provides for recovering such possession. But that protection extends only for a period of six months and not beyond it, otherwise, the Law protects only "lawful" possession and not the possession which may not be lawful. But that protection extends only for a period of six months and not beyond it, otherwise, the Law protects only "lawful" possession and not the possession which may not be lawful. Except as provided by Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, a trespasser whose possession is not lawful cannot maintain a suit for possession. Such a suit does not lie under the Code of Civil Procedure unless the plaintiff can establish that he is entitled to possession. (b) against the Government. (3) ...... (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof." 8. Art. 3 in the first schedule of the Limitation Act 1908 had proved :- Part III-Six months. Six Months. When the dispossession occurs. The plaintiff can maintain a suit for possession under Sec. 8 (now Sec. 6) of the Specific Relief Act only if he is entitled in law to remain in possession. 9. Learned counsel relied on the case in Somnath Berman v. Dr. S.P. Raju, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 846, in support of his contention that mere possession was enough to entitle the plaintiff to eject the defendant and get possession. That decision does not lay down any such law. It makes a distinction between a possession which is lawful and one which is not. It is pointed out in para 9 of the judgment : "The defendants who are mere trespassers cannot defeat the plaintiffs lawful possession by ousting him from the suit property. Possessory title is a good title as against every body other than the lawful owner. In Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse, (1893) 20 Ind. App. 99 (P.C.), the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that a person having possessory title can get a declaration that he was the owner of the land in suit and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Therein it was observed that the possession of the plaintiff was a sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant." Prior possession, if lawful, will be good evidence of the possessors title, but a mere trespassers possession will not. What the Supreme Court in Somnath Barman's case and Judicial Committee in Ismail Arif's case lay down is the rule of evidence and not of substantive law, a rule of proving title and not of acquiring title. What the Supreme Court in Somnath Barman's case and Judicial Committee in Ismail Arif's case lay down is the rule of evidence and not of substantive law, a rule of proving title and not of acquiring title. They lay down that a person with lawful possession can claim to be entitled to possession and institute a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure for ejectment of a trespasser; such a suit will be a suit contemplated by Sec. 8 of the Specific Relief Act and will be governed by the provision of the Indian Limitation Act. A mere trespasser cannot institute such a suit. Otherwise if a person who trespasses over a property and remains in possession for a day when he is ousted by another trespasser who continues in possession for a little less than twelve years will be liable to ejectment by the earlier trespasser who is not entitled to remain in possession. This cannot be spelled out from Sec. 8 (now 5) of the Specific Relief Act or any other provision of law. Plaintiff in order to succeed must show that he was in lawful possession of property when he was dispossessed by the defendant. And even such a possession will not give the plaintiff a right to eject the true owner or a person entitled to remain in possession. As laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Somnath Berman v. Dr. S.P. Raju, possessory title is good title against every body other than the lawful owner of the property. 10. In the present case defendant Nos. 3 to 5 were the zamindars of the land in dispute and they had leased out the land on 31-12-1964 in favour of Defendants 1 and 2. Hence, unless it was shown that the Zamindars had lost title and had no right to lease out the land, defendants 1 and 2 will have sufficient title to remain in possession. On the pleadings of the parties an issue had been framed in the trial court to the following effect :- "Whether defendants 3 and 5 executed any agreement in favour of defendants 1 and 2 ? If so, its effect ?. The finding of the trial court on this issue is as follows :- "The original agreement is on record. It has been proved by Jaswant Singh and also Sri Hari Har Narain. If so, its effect ?. The finding of the trial court on this issue is as follows :- "The original agreement is on record. It has been proved by Jaswant Singh and also Sri Hari Har Narain. The issue as such is answered in the affirmative. Its effect is that defendants 3 to 5 being the Zamindars of the land in suit could enter into the agreement and the possession of defendants 1 and 2 on its basis is lawful." 11. The lower appellate court, however, appears to have missed the point, and, thinking that mere possession of the plaintiff before dispossession by the defendants was enough for the suit being decreed, did not apply its mind to the real issue. The findings recorded by the lower appellate court are : (1) that the land had been fenced with barbed wires by the plaintiff about four years before the institution of the suit, (2) that a Tapra had been constructed on a portion of the land about two years back in 1959, (3) that there were three Chakkies existing for more than twelve years on the land in dispute, which originally belonged to Beldars and afterwards became the property of the plaintiff, and (4) that some festivities were observed on the occasion of Basant Panchami, Sharad Purnima and Dasahra on the disputed land and Kirtan and Bhajans were also sung. 12. The law in respect of possessory title is based on Sec. 28 of the Limitation Act read with Art. 144 of the 1st Schedule to the Act. Sec. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act IX of 1908 provides :- "At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished." Article 144 of the 1st Schedule provides a period of 12 years. 13. The fencing of the land will not confer any title on the plaintiff because it had been done only four years before the suit. The mere user of the land for purpose of festivities on different occasions, in which even the real owner could have participated cannot be deemed to be such acts of possession as to deprive the real owner of his title over the land. Such user will not amount to an act of possession and will not be sufficient for acquisition of title by adverse possession. Such user will not amount to an act of possession and will not be sufficient for acquisition of title by adverse possession. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of his contention that the presence and running of Chakkies could also not be an overt act, signifying possession as contemplated by Sec. 28 read with Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, relied on the case of Premji Oursetji v. Goculdas Madhowji, I.L.R. XVI Bom. 338, and the case of this Court reported in Asa Ram v. Ram Chander, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. 161. None of these cases will apply to the facts of the present case. In the Bombay case the user was of a temporary nature which could, according to the court, pass entirely unobserved by the owner of the land in a city like Bombay. It was also found by the court that even if it had been observed, "it could not occur to a native proprietor that it was intended to deprive him of his title over his land." In that case there was an old privy which had no walls. It existed till 1845. Afterwards the land was used for throwing rubbish and placing places of furniture, Scaffolding, building materials, etc. Looking at the conditions in the Bombay City, it was observed in the judgment :- "Such acts are done everyday in almost every part of Bombay, without any claim to ownership being thereby intended." The case of Lala Asa Ram laid down that tethering of cattle and storing of logs on a waste land was not indicative of a possession which was intended to be adverse to the title of the proprietor of the land. The acts done on the land which were considered in these two cases were indicative not of the exercise of a right of possession but of mere use of the land as is done in cases of licence. 15. The user of the land by construction of Chakkies, as in the present case, is of entirely a different character. It involves a manufacturing process which is carried on at a fixed and defined place. It occupies a specified area and necessitates exclusive possession. The running of Chakkies involves the digging of a pit, fixing of a pole in the centre and then running the wheel with the aid of bullocks to crush lime. It involves a manufacturing process which is carried on at a fixed and defined place. It occupies a specified area and necessitates exclusive possession. The running of Chakkies involves the digging of a pit, fixing of a pole in the centre and then running the wheel with the aid of bullocks to crush lime. As it involves a manufacturing process, it cannot be taken that it will go unnoticed by the real owner. The running of Chakkies requires open and hostile possession which will ordinarily be sufficient to be characterised as adverse possession. As they have been in existence for more than twelve years, the plaintiff will be entitled to get a decree in respect of the land occupied by them. 16. The plaintiff will thus be entitled to get a decree of possession in respect of the land occupied by the Chakkies and over no other portion of the suit land. But as there is no finding about the actual area occupied by these `Chakkies' the case will have to be remanded to the first appellate court for passing a proper decree. The lower appellate court committed error of law in thinking that on open land no question of "active possession" could arise. The presumption of possession over an open land is that of the owner and not of a trespasser. A trespasser can acquire title by possession only in respect of that area of land over which he actually exercises actual possession. It is only after the court determines the extent of area of land over which the plaintiff has acquired title by adverse possession that it will be possible for court to pass the decree of possession in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff will be entitled to get a decree only in respect of that much area over which he has acquired possessory title. 17. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree of the court below is set aside and the case is remanded to the first appellate court for decision of the appeal in accordance with law in the light of the observation made above. The costs of this appeal will be on parties. 18. Let a certificate under Sec. 13 of the Court Fees Act be issued to the appellants authorising them to receive back fifty per cent of the amount of fee paid on the memorandum of appeal.