( 1 ) THE appellant is the plaintiff. The suit was for recovery of damages of rs. 1000 for defamation. The defendant-respondent presented a complaint on 28-11-1964 to the Station House Officer, Puttur Police Station, imputing an offence under S. 392 IPC against the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defamatory statements contained in the complaint brought him disrepute and Infamy in society. He alleged that Police Officers came to his house, questioned him about the contents of the complaint and wanted to search his hpusa. He also alleged that he had to go with the police and remain in the Police Station till the evening and had to visit the Police station on several occasions on account of this complaint. The defendant admitted having lodged a complaint against the plaintiff to the police and asserted that the plaintiff along with other parsons mentioned in the complaint petition committed acts attributed to them in the complaint. He also pleaded that the statements mada in the complaint were made in the interests of law and order and to seek justice. The trial Court held that the complaint filed by the defendant is not false or frivolous or vexatious to the knowledgq of the defendant that the plaintiff failed to show that he was defamed in any way by the allegations in the complaint and dismissed the suit without going into the question of quantum of damages. The lower appellate Court held that the imputations made in the complapt petition are defamatory per se. It further held that the defendant's plea of justification by prqof had not been substantiated. But it came to the conclusion that the statements contained in the complaint are protected by absolute privilege and that the question of malice or want of justification does not arise. Hence it confirmed the decision of the trial Court. ( 2 ) THE complaint was enquired into by the Policq and found to be false. Thereafter the Police prosecuted the defendant for filing a falsa complaint and he was convicted but the conviction was set aside in appeal. ( 3 ) IT is contended by Mr. Ganapathi Bhat appearing for the plaintiff- appellant that the statements contained in the complaint filed by the defendant to the Pqlice are not cqvered by absolute privilege and that the defendant could claim only qualified privilege for the same. ( 3 ) IT is contended by Mr. Ganapathi Bhat appearing for the plaintiff- appellant that the statements contained in the complaint filed by the defendant to the Pqlice are not cqvered by absolute privilege and that the defendant could claim only qualified privilege for the same. It is therefore urged by him that the defendant must prove that he made the statements in good faith and that if he succeeds in proving the same then the burden shifts on to the plaintiffs to prove malice and that the finding of the lower appellate Court is erroneous. The question for decision in this appeal is whether the defendant could claim absolute privilege for the statements made in the complaint or only qualified privilege for the same. ( 4 ) IN Watson v. Mcewan, 1905 AC. 480 HL. the question was whether absolute privilege protected a witness against the consequences of statements made to this client and Solicitor in preparing the brief for trial. Lord Halsbury observed as follows at page 487 :"it appears to me that the privilege which surrounds the evidence actually given in a Court of Justice ncessarily involves the same privilege in the case of making a statement to a Solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the conduct of proceedings in Court of justice when what is intended to be stated in a Court of Justice is narrated to them that is to the Solicitor or writer to the Signet. If it were otherwise I think what one of thiei learned Counsel has with great cogetncy pointed out would apply-that from time to time in these variqus efforts which have been made to make actual witnesses responsible in the shape of an action against them for the evidence they have given the difficulty in the way of those who were bringing the action wquld have been removed at once by saying " I do not bring the action against yqu for what yqu said in the witness box but I bring the action against you for what you told the Solicitor you were about to say in the witness box". If that could be done the object for which the privilege exists is gone because then no witness could be called; no one would know whether what he was going to say was relevant to the question in debate betweeen the parties. If that could be done the object for which the privilege exists is gone because then no witness could be called; no one would know whether what he was going to say was relevant to the question in debate betweeen the parties. A witness 'would only have to say, " I shall not tell you anything; I may have an action brought against me tomorrow if I do, therefore I shall not give you any information at all". It is very qbvious that the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards end is part of the administration of justice namely the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they caa prove. It may be that to some extent it seems to impose a hardship but after all the hardship is not to be compared with that which would arise if it were impossible to administer justice because people would be afraid to give their testimony. "in Majju v. Lachman Prasad, AIR. 1924 All. 535. FB. the Full Bench held that in the case of a report made to a Police Officer the question whether it is covered by absolute privilege is governed by the English common law and since the statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged in England they must be held to be absolutely privileged in india following an earlier decision cf the Full Bench of the same Court in ILR 40 Allahabad 341. In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 24 3rd Edn at page 49 it is stated as follows :"89. Absolute privilege: No action lies whether against Judges counsel Jury witnesses or parties for words spoken in the ordinary cqurse of any proceedings before any Court or Tribunal recognised by law. It is manifest that the administration of justice would be paralysed if those who were engaged in it were liable to actions o| libel or slander upon the imputation that they had acted maliciously and not bona fide. Thus all witnesses or parties speaking with reference to the matter before the Court have privilege for their evidence whether oral or in writing relevant or irrelevant malicious or not. The privilege extends not only to words spoken hut also to documents properly used and regularly prepared for use in the proceedings. Thus all witnesses or parties speaking with reference to the matter before the Court have privilege for their evidence whether oral or in writing relevant or irrelevant malicious or not. The privilege extends not only to words spoken hut also to documents properly used and regularly prepared for use in the proceedings. . . . . . "the last sentence in the above quotation is based on the decision in Watson v. Mcewan (1 ). In Salmond on Torts, 15th Edn page 208 it is stated as follows :"judicial privilege. The authorities establish beyond all question this: that neither party witness Counsel Jury nor Judge can be put to answer civilly or criminally tor words spoken in office; that no action of libel or slander lies whether against judges Counsel witnesses or parties for words written or spoken in the coursc cf any proceeding before any Court recognised by law and this though the words written or spoken maliciously without any justification or excuse and from personal ill-will and anger against the person defamed. This absolute privilege has been conceded on the grounds of public policy to ensure freedom cf speech where it is essential that freedom of speech should exist, and with the knowledge that Courts of Justice are presided over by thqse who from their high character are not likely to abuse the privilege, and who have the power and ought to have the will to check any abuse of it by those who appear before them. The privilege extends to all Courts superior and inferior civil and military. . . . . . . The privilege extends not merely to Judges but witnesses parties and Advocates. It includes not merely statements made by a witness in Court but also statements made by him to a party or to the party's Solicitor in the course of preparation for trial. For it would not be| of much use to grant absolute privilege to what is said in Court if a plaintiff could say: ' I cannot sue you for what you said ini the witness-box but I am going to sue you fear what you told your solicitor you were going to say in it'. "here also reliance is placed on Watson v. Mcewan (1 ). ( 5 ) IN Sanjiva Reddy v. Koneri Reddi, AIR. 1926 Mad. 521. "here also reliance is placed on Watson v. Mcewan (1 ). ( 5 ) IN Sanjiva Reddy v. Koneri Reddi, AIR. 1926 Mad. 521. the defendant presented a petition to the Deputy Magistrate praying that the plaintiffs and some others should be bound over under S. 107 of the Crlpc. The Magistrate sent the petition to the Police for enquiry and report. The Police reported after enquiry that there was no foundation for the allegations in the petition. The Magistrate thereafter dismissed the petition. It was held that the statements made tc the Police Officer with a view to their being repeated before the Magistrate were absolutely privileged. It was further held that the petition presentqd under S. 107 Crlpc was invested under the comm on law of England with absolute privilege which attaches not merely to the actual proceedings of any Tribunal exercising judicial functions but to all preliminary steps which are in accordance with the recognized and reasonable procedure of such a Tribunal. The decision in Watson v. Mcewan (1) was followed. In Bapalal and Co v. Krishnaswamy Iyer, AIR. 1941 Mad. 26. it was h)6ld that a complaint to a Police Officer being a statement which the complainant is prepared if called upon tc do so tc substantiate upon oath later is absolutely privileged following tho decision of the Division bench in Sanjivi Reddy v. Koneri Reddi (3 ). In Vatappa Kone v. Muthu karuppan, AIR. 1941 Mad. 538. the Allegations made by the defendants in thqir statement to the village Magistrate were held to be absolutely privileged following the decision in Sanjuvu Reddy's case (3 ). In Madhab Chandra v. Niroo chandra, AIR. 1939 Cal. 477. certain defamatory statements were made by the defendants against the plaintiff in certain reports to the Police. The decision in Watson v. Mc Ewan (1) was followed. The observation by Lord Halsbury to the effect that the overwhelming consideration that a witness must be protected for a preliminary statement or he has no protectiqn at all" was referred to. 477. certain defamatory statements were made by the defendants against the plaintiff in certain reports to the Police. The decision in Watson v. Mc Ewan (1) was followed. The observation by Lord Halsbury to the effect that the overwhelming consideration that a witness must be protected for a preliminary statement or he has no protectiqn at all" was referred to. The contention that witnesses and parties stand on a different footing was rejected and it was observed :"it may be said however that when a party conies to depose on oath there can be no distinction with regard to his liability to answer questions as between him and any other witnesses and the same must be said with regard to statements preparatory to giving evidence on oath. "it was further observed that in a sense the statements made to the Police appear tc be in this respect on a stronger ground than the statements made to the Soolicitor as reported in the English case Watson v. Mcetoan (1) and it was observed as follows :"for statements made to a Solicitor may or may not be followed up by judicial proceeding the matter being at the option of the party consulting such Solicitor in which case the statements would slumber in the office of the Solicitor as Lord Halsbury said: ' But the party lodging information before the Police has no qption and the Police are empowered tc go on with the matter and investigate leading to other results'. "the decision in Sanjivi Reddy's case (3) was followed. In Lachman v. Pyarchand, AIR. 1959 Raj 169. the defendants made a report to the Station House Officer of the Police Station. In a suit filed by the plaintiff against whom defamatory statements had been made in the said report it was held that the statements were absolutely privileged. The decisions in Vattappa Kane's case (5) and Madhab Chandra's case (6) were fallowed and the decision of Blagden J in Mayr v. Rivaz, ILR (1943) 1 Cal. 250. was dissented from. ( 6 ) MR. Ganapathi Bhat relied on the decisions in Gangappagouda v. Basayya, AIR 1948 Bom. 167. Maroh Sadashiv v. Godubai Narayana Rao, AIR. 1939 Bom. 443. The decisions in Vattappa Kane's case (5) and Madhab Chandra's case (6) were fallowed and the decision of Blagden J in Mayr v. Rivaz, ILR (1943) 1 Cal. 250. was dissented from. ( 6 ) MR. Ganapathi Bhat relied on the decisions in Gangappagouda v. Basayya, AIR 1948 Bom. 167. Maroh Sadashiv v. Godubai Narayana Rao, AIR. 1939 Bom. 443. and Mayr v. Rivaz (8) in support of his contention that the report to the Police Officer filed by the defendant is not covered by absolute privilege but that the defendant could only claim a qualified privilege. In Gangappa Gouda's case (9) a Mahalkari holding a preliminary enquiry relating to the conduct of a Police Patil on the directions of the Collector in order to report to the collector recorded the statements of the defendants. It was held that the mahalkari was not acting in a judicial capacity nor was exercising the attributes of a Court and that the evidence given before the Mahalkari in such an enquiry is not absolutely privileged. In Maroti Sadashiv's case (10) it was held that the) defamatory statement made before the Police officer in the course of investigation carried on under the Crlpc cannot be negarded as absolutely privileged but that only a qualified privilege attaches to them. The learned single Judge who decided the case observed that the Police Officer who recorded the statement cannot be stated to have been acting in a judicial capacity or exercising the attributes of a Court and that the statements were not absolutely privileged. The decision in Mayr v. Rivaz (8) was followed and the decision in Sanjivi Reddy's case (3) and bapalal and Co's case (4) were dissented from since the learned single Judge felt that he was bound by the decision of the Division Bench in Gangappa gouda's case (9 ). In Maur v. Rivaz (8) the defendant wrote a letter to the commissioner of Police containing passages admittedly defamatory of the plaintiff. The learned single Judge Blagden J. considered the decision of the division Bench of the same Court in Madhab Chandra's case (6) but did not fallow the same. The decision in Bapalal and Co's case (4) was also disseated from. It was held that the defendant was not protected by absolute privilege. The learned single Judge Blagden J. considered the decision of the division Bench of the same Court in Madhab Chandra's case (6) but did not fallow the same. The decision in Bapalal and Co's case (4) was also disseated from. It was held that the defendant was not protected by absolute privilege. The learned Judge considered two illustrations to show why a complaint to a Police Officer cannot come under the principle in Watson v. Mcewan (1) and should not be considered as absolutely privileged. The first is a easel of the Editor of a newspaper who published a Statement that ab is a murderer and states therein that he would be prepared later to substantiate the statement upon oath in a judicial proceeding which may be taken by AB. In such a case according to the learned Judge if AB takes proceedings against the Editor he can plead absolute privilege if the afore said principle applies. The other illustration referred to by the learned judge is that in case a report to the Police is made which culmintes in a prosecution and the accused is acquitted it is open to the person charged to sue the complainant for maliciqus prosecution and in order to succeed in the suit the plaintiff would have to prove malice; but if the charge appears to the Police to be groundless and no prosecution follows the person against whom the allegations are made in the report to the Police would have no civil remedy at all; if those allegations are absolutely privileged; and it would appear odd that a person whp makes baseless allegations in a complaint to the Police is in a safer position than a personn whose allegations to the Police may be found to be sufficiently justified to result in a prosecution though it may prove unsuccessful. ( 7 ) THE reason why absolute privilege is extended to the statement of a witness made prior to the commencement of a judicial proceeding is based on public policy as stated by Lord Halsbury in Watson v. Mcewan (1 ). ( 7 ) THE reason why absolute privilege is extended to the statement of a witness made prior to the commencement of a judicial proceeding is based on public policy as stated by Lord Halsbury in Watson v. Mcewan (1 ). There is no reason why the principle seated in the said decision should not be extended to a party and the absolute privilege confined only to the statement of a witness under such circumstances v Of the two instances referred to by Blagden J in Mayr v. Rivaz (8) the first refers to the Editor of a newspaper as stated above. But it is doubtful whether the Editor of the newspaper in such circumstances can claim absolute privilege on the basis of the principle laid down in Watson v. Mcewan (1 ). With regard to the second illustration refsrred to by Blagden J. if the complaint to the felicp results in an unsuccessful proseeutior then the person defamed can only claim damages for malicious prosecution and not for defamation. In case the complaint to the Police does not result in a prosecution then also the persons defamed have no remedy in rspect of defamatory statements made in such a complaint to the Police. But if a false complaint is made to the Police the person who makes such a false complaint would be punishable either under S. 182 or S. 211 of IPC. It cannot therefore be said that a person against whom false charges are made in a complaint to the Police even if no further action is taken by the Police authorities on such camplaint. goes scot-free I would therefore prefer to follow the earlier view of the Division Bench of the same High Court in Madhab Chandra's case{6) and the other decisions referred to above which take the view that a coinplaint to a Police Officer is absolutely privileged. ( 8 ) IT must therefore be held that the statements made by the defendant in his complaint to the Police Officer are absolutely privileged. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs in this appeal. --- *** --- .