JUDGMENT Prem Prakash, J. - This rule in revision has been obtained against the order of the Addl. Civil Judge, Faizabad directing that the preliminary decree shall remain unaffected by the commencement of the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. The relevant facts are these:-A preliminary decree for partition was passed between the parties on March 11, 1961. The decree was confirmed in appeal decided on November 22, 1963. Thereafter proceedings for preparation of final decree began and the learned Munsif by an order dated April 10, 1967. Decreed the claim of partition. Against that order appeal was filed by the revisionist. It was contended before the learned Civil Judge that because of the operation of sub-section (2) (a) of Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act not only the appeal and the final decree, which gave rise to the said appeal, but also the proceedings relating to the preliminary decree should abate. A suit, as urged before the lower court, continues till the final decree is passed and it can abate till that contingency happens. The court below has taken the view that the rights between the parties having already been adjudicated through a preliminary decree, which had become final, the proceedings with regard to preliminary decree cannot be deemed to abate under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act. He, therefore directed the abatement of the appeal as also the proceedings relating to the preparation of the final decree but he observed that proceedings of preliminary decree shall remain unaffected by the order which he was making. 3. Feeling aggrieved from the order the revisionists have come up in revision before me and they have reiterated the ground they had taken before the court below. A partition suit, in which a preliminary decree has been passed, is a pending suit; no doubt that the rights of the parties, who are added after the preliminary decree, may be adjusted at a time of a final decree. In Mahabir Singh v. Narain Tiwari, A.I.R. 1931 Alld. 490. A Full Bench of this court has approved, the principle that a suit continues till the final decree is passed and it can abate till the contingency happens. In Mahabir Singh v. Narain Tiwari, A.I.R. 1931 Alld. 490. A Full Bench of this court has approved, the principle that a suit continues till the final decree is passed and it can abate till the contingency happens. But the question is whether a preliminary decree is itself a proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interests within the meaning of the expression used under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act or it does not amount to a proceeding in respect of declaration or rights or interests until a final decree is obtained in the suit. The answer to this question is furnished by the observation of the Supreme Court in Vankata Beddy v. Pethi, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 992. where it was observed: - "A decision is said to be final when, so far as the court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by the resort to such provision of the C.P.C. as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or revision or a review application as is permitted by the code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit for a partition suit, is not tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decree a preliminary decree and a final decree-the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom has though that suits in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made, the decision of the court arrived at the earlier they also have a finality attached to it. Section 27, C.P.C. clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is rewarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree." 4. Section 27, C.P.C. clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is rewarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree." 4. In view of the above Supreme Court I decision although a case may not terminate unless a final decree was passed yet there may be finality to the various stages of that case and in those proceedings there may be a stage where the parties have already obtained a declaration in respect of their rights or interests in any land which is the subject of consolidation proceedings and if that declaration has become final and is no longer pending for its finality, the declaration of rights so obtained in a preliminary decree cannot be affected by a notification made under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 5. I am supported in this view by a single Judge decision of this court in Rudra Pall Singh v. Ram Pal Singh, 1971 R.D. (H.C.) 479. 6. Learned counsel for the revisionists next contended that the Act does not contemplate the statement of proceedings partially. I am unable to agree with the contention that if whole of the suit can abate, a part thereof can also abate, vide Smt. Lalla v. Smt. Ramjhari, 1968 A.W.R. 437. 7. For the reasons stated in the above, I see no reason to interfere with the order made by the court below. 8. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances, no order is made as to the costs of this revision. The record may be sent back to the court below for further proceedings.