JUDGMENT This appeal is at the instance of the defendant and it arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that the suit land as per schedule 'A' to the plaint was allotted to the share of Sm. Jagat Pabani Dasi by the final decree for partition passed in Title Suit No. 51 of 1928 of the 6th Court of Subordinate Judge, Alipore. In terms of the decree, the Receivers of her estate were required to pay some owelty money to the other parties in that suit. In order to recover his share of the owelty money, Shib Chandra Bose, one of the parties to the suit, put the decree into execution and one Brindaban Chandra Basak purchased the 'A' schedule land and the other adjacent lands in auction as benamdar of the present plaintiffs. A sale certificate was issued in the name of Brindaban who took delivery of possession of the suit land through court on November 15, 1953. Thereafter, the plaintiffs began to use and occupy the suit land in khas as a garden. Brindaban executed a deed of release in favour of the plaintiffs on December 23, 1955 disclaiming his interest in the suit land. During Revisional, Settlement Operation, the defendant managed to erect a temporary hut in the 'B' schedule land forming part of the 'A' schedule land and got his name recorded in the R.S. record-of-rights. The defendant is trying to dispossess the plaintiffs from the rest of the 'A' schedule land and accordingly, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for the reliefs aforesaid. 3. The defendant has contested the suit by a written statement. His defence is that his father, late Bhikary Shaw was a tenant in respect of the entire 'A' schedule and under one Sital Bose and had been in possession thereof from 1932 to 1948 and since his father's death he has been in possession there of by erecting structures and ploughing the land. His defence is that his father, late Bhikary Shaw was a tenant in respect of the entire 'A' schedule and under one Sital Bose and had been in possession thereof from 1932 to 1948 and since his father's death he has been in possession there of by erecting structures and ploughing the land. He has denied the title of the plaintiffs in the suit land on the ground that the interests of the plaintiffs have vested in the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as the Act, It is contended that the suit is barred by limitation and plaintiffs not having possession of the suit land within twelve years prior to the institution of the suit, it is not maintainable. 4. It has been held by the learned Munsiff that the plaintiffs are in possession of the entire 'A' schedule land including the 'B' schedule land forming part thereof and that the entry in the R.S. record-of-rights in respect of the 'A' schedule land recording the name of the defendant as a raiyat with occupancy right under the plaintiffs has no foundation at all and it is erroneous. Inspite of the said findings, the learned Munsiff is of the view that the interests of the plaintiffs have vested in the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Act and, as such, the suit was not maintainable at their instance. in that view of the matter, the learned Munsiff dismissed the suit 5. The lower appellate court affirmed the findings of the learned Munsiff on the question of the plaintiffs title and possession, but disagreed with the finding of the learned Munsiff that the interests of the plaintiffs had vested in the State. Consequently, the lower appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. Hence, the Second Appeal. 6. The question whether the plaintiffs have title to the suit land and whether the defendant has acquired title to the same by adverse possession for more than twelve years are questions of fact and the concurrent findings of the courts below on these questions cannot be assailed in second appeal. Moreover, the lower appellate court has found that the interests of the plaintiffs have not vested in the State under the provisions of the Act. Moreover, the lower appellate court has found that the interests of the plaintiffs have not vested in the State under the provisions of the Act. On this point, it has been found by the lower appellate court that after purchasing the raiyati interest of Jagat Pabani Dasi the plaintiffs came into possession of the suit land through their benamdar before the Act came into force. Further, it has been observed that on behalf of the defendant it was not contended that the plaintiffs were intermediaries or that they did, not retain the 'A' schedule land. Upon the said findings, the lower appellate court has reversed the finding of the learned Munsiff that the interests of the plaintiffs had vested in the State. In my opinion, the lower appellate court has taken the correct view in the matter. 7. Mr. Ghose, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant, has placed strong reliance on sub-section (4) of section 44 of the Act as amended by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973. Sub-section (4) before the same was amended was as follows: "Every entry in the record-of-rights finally published under subsection (2) including an entry revised under sub-section (2a), made under section 42A or corrected under section 45 or section 45 A shall, subject to any modification by an order on appeal under sub-section (3), be presumed to be correct until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect." By section 3 of the said Amendment Act, sub section (4) has been amended as follows :- "In sub-section (4) of section 44 of the said Act, words 'until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect' shall be omitted." In this connection, it is also necessary to refer to a new section 57B which has been inserted in the Act by section 5 of the said Amendment Act. Section 578 runs as follows : "57B (1) : Where an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 39 directing the prepartion or revision of a record-of-rights, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application for the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates, and if any suit or application, in which any of the aforesaid matters is in issue, is pending before a Civil Court on the date of such order, it shall be stayed, and it shall, on the expiry of the period prescribed for an appeal under sub-section (3)' of section 44 or when an appeal has been filed under that sub-section, as the case may be, on the disposal of such appeal, abate so far as it relates to any of the aforesaid matters. (2) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to(a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published, revised, made, corrected or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V, (b) a dispute involving determination of the question, either expressly or by implication, whether a raiyat or an intermediary is or is not entitled to retain under the provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such estate, as the case may be; or (c) any matter which under any of the provisions of this Act is to be or has already been, enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the State Government or any authority specified therein, and any such suit or application which is pending before a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, shall abate so far as it relates to all or any of the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c). (3) Any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, who shall dispose of the same in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) Any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, who shall dispose of the same in such manner as may be prescribed. Provided that in deciding a dispute under this sub-section the Revenue Officer shall not re-open any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Government or any authority under any of the provisions of this Act. (4) Any person aggrieved' by a decision of Revenue Officer made under sub-section, (3) may appeal to the prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to payment of such fees as may be prescribed. (5) A decision made by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (4) shall be final. Explanation:-In this section- (i) suit includes an appeal, and (ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an appeal" 8. It is contended that by virtue of the deletion of the words 'until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect, sub-section (4) as amended, should be construed as raising an irrebuttable presumption in respect of every entry in the finally published record-of-rights. In support of this contention, Mr. Ghose has also referred to the provisions of section 44 and has contended that if section 44 is read with the provisions of section 57B it will lead to an irresistible conclusion that the presumption referred to in sub-section (4) is an irrebuttable presumption. It is contended that the name of the defendant having been recorded in the finally published record-of-rights as an occupancy raiyat it raises an irrebuttable presumption and no evidence should be allowed to be adduced or should be considered in rebuttal of that presumption. In other words, it is contended that the evidence furnished by the entries in the finally published record-of-rights in favour of the defendant's tenancy right in respect of the suit land is conclusive" and cannot be allowed to be shaken or tested by other evidence to the contrary. 9. These contentions raised on behalf of the appellant require consideration. The provisions for the preparation of the record-of-rights are contained in Chapter V of the Act. 9. These contentions raised on behalf of the appellant require consideration. The provisions for the preparation of the record-of-rights are contained in Chapter V of the Act. Section 39 (1) provides as follows:- "(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), the State Government may, for carrying out the purposes of this Act, make an order directing- (a) that a record-of-rights be prepared in respect of any district, or part of a district, or (b) that the record-of-rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, in respect of any district, or part of a district be revised, by a Revenue Officer in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and such rules as may be made in this behalf by the State Government." Therefore, the preparation of a record-of-rights or the revision of the record-of-rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act are to be m1de for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The purposes of the Act are be ascertained from tile preamble to the Act which states: "An Act to provide for the State acquisition of estates, of rights of intermediaries therein and of certain rights of raiyats and under-raiyats and of the rights of certain other persons in lands comprised in estates". After the estates and the rights of intermediaries therein vest under the provisions of section 4 read with section 5 of the Act the State has to determine who are the intermediaries. In that connection, it has to decide the rights of raiyats and under-raiyats, but all these are determined for the purposes of acquisition of estates and the rights of intermediaries and of raiyats and under-raiyats. Schedule 'B' to the Rules framed under the Act lays down the procedure for the preparation of revision of a record-of-rights. The most important of such procedure is that contained in paragraph 6 (1) of Schedule 'B'. It, inter alia, provides that disputes regarding the ownership of land, or the ownership of any interest in land, shall be decided by the Revenue Officer in a summary manner and on the basis of present possession or possession during the agricultural year preceding the year in which the date of vesting under section 4 of the Act falls where notification under that section has been issued. Further, it is provided that where revision is being made of a previously prepared record of rights and finally published under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, no fresh entry regarding these details is necessary if they are found to be correct on the basis of present and actual possession or possession during the period stated above where the notification of vesting under section 4 of the Act has been issued. Under paragraph 6 (1), the Revenue Officer decided disputes regarding the ownership of land in a summary manner on the basis of possession only. It is clear that the Revenue Officer does not decide questions of title. Whenever a dispute arises as to the ownership of land he decides the dispute on the basis of possession and not on the basis of title. 10. Sub-section (5) of section 103B of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. also provides that every entry in a record-of-rights finally published shall be evidence of the matter referred to in such entry, and shall be presumed to be correct until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect. Sub-section (5) is almost similar to the provisions of sub-section(4) of section 44 of the Act. Sub-Section (5) came up for judicial considerations in a number of decisions which have been summarised in A.C. Ghose's Bengal Tenancy Act, third edition, at page 835 as follows ; "It does not create any title in favour of any person; raising a presumption is not creating a title, Ram Golam v. Bishnu Pargash, 11 CWN 48, it does not extinguish a right either, Brij Behari v. Sheo Sankar; 2 Pat. L. J. 124. The entry creates no. nor takes away any, right as it is made on the basis of possession, Ahmed Hossein v. Digendra Narain, 62 Cal. 96...; Raj Krishna v. Barbani Coal Concern. 60 C. L. J. 477. At the utmost it is proof of title only in so far as title is based on possession, Ronald Duncan v. Sri Iswar Radha. 62 C.L.J. 10...As the entry does not create title, it does not by itself give rise to a cause of action, Nagendra Kishore v. Brojendra Kishore. 60 C. L. J. 477. At the utmost it is proof of title only in so far as title is based on possession, Ronald Duncan v. Sri Iswar Radha. 62 C.L.J. 10...As the entry does not create title, it does not by itself give rise to a cause of action, Nagendra Kishore v. Brojendra Kishore. 56 C.L.J. 316...nor can it operate as the starting point of limitation, Saraj Kumar v. Umed Ali, 35 C.L.J. 19 ; Uttim v. Arzani, 46 I. C. 229." The same principles which have been laid down in the aforesaid decisions will also apply to sub-section (4) of section 44 of the Act. 11. An entry in the record-of-right is, therefore, not a proof of title nor the record-of-rights is a document of title. It only raises a presumption as to the correctness of the entries. The question now is whether such a presumption is a rebuttable presumption or not. It is argued that as the words' 'until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect' have been omitted from sub-section (4) of section 44 of the Act, it should be construed that the presumption is an irrebuttable presumption. In considering this question, it must not be lost sight of that along with the amendment of sub-section (4) by the deletion of the said words, a new section 57B has been inserted in the Act. Under subsection (1) of 57B, where an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 39 directing the preparation or revision of a record-of-rights, the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred in respect of the following matters: (1) determination of rent, (2) determination of status of any tenant, and (3) incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates. Further it is provided that if any suit or application is pending before a Civil Court on the date of such order, it shall be stayed and' it shall, on the expiry. of the period prescribed for an appeal under section 44 (3) of the Act or when an appeal has been filed under that sub-section as the case may be, on the disposal of such appeal, abate so far as it relates to any of the aforesaid matters. Under subsection (2) the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain any suit or application is barred in respect of certain matters as enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that sub-section. Under subsection (2) the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain any suit or application is barred in respect of certain matters as enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that sub-section. Sub-Section (2) also provides for the abatement of pending suits. Sub-section (4) of section 44 only lays down a rule of evidence. It will not, therefore, be out of place nor improper to refer to the Evidence Act which deals with the law of evidence. Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines the words 'shall presume' as follows : "Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved." It is true that the words 'until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect' have been deleted from sub-section (4) of section 44, but in view of the definition of the words 'shall presume' referred to above and in the absence of any express provision that the presumption will be an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption, it will be quite illogical to hold that the presumption in sub-section (4) is an irrebuttable presumption. If the legislature bad intended that the presumption referred to in sub-section (4) should be an irrebuttable presumption, it could have been laid down in express terms in the sub-section and, in that case, it will not have been necessary for the legislature to insert the new section 57B providing for the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in certain cases. The insertion of section 578 in the Act has dispelled any doubt about the presumption. At has been already noticed that the Revenue Officer in preparing the draft record-of-rights does not decide questions of title when there is a dispute regarding ownership of land but he decides such a dispute on the basis of possession only and that too in a summary manner. A person may have good title to a piece of land, but if he is out of possession at the relevant time the draft record-of-rights is prepared, the Revenue Officer will not be able to recognise the title of that person for the purpose of making an entry in that regard in the record-of-rights. Moreover, very often disputes as to ownership of land, involves complicated questions of title which the Revenue Officer is unable to decide. Moreover, very often disputes as to ownership of land, involves complicated questions of title which the Revenue Officer is unable to decide. In these circumstances, it is difficult to infer that although, question of title are not decided by the Revenue Officer and although an entry does not create any title still the legislature has excluded the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to decide questions of title. Even section 578 does not exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to decide questions of title. The questions whether a person is a tenant or a trespasser in respect of a particular land does not come within the purview of section 57B. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts have been barred only in respect of matters enumerated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 57B. Merely because of words 'until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect have been omitted from sub-section (4) of section 44 of the Act it will be unreasonable to hold that the presumption under that sub-section is an irrebuttable presumption. For these reasons, I am of the view that the amendment of sub-section (4) of section 44 of the Act has not in any way altered the position which was before such amendment. Accordingly, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Ghose that the entry in the record-of-rights finally published under the Act in favour of the appellant bas raised an irrebuttable presumption. No other point has been argued in this appeal. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are affirmed and this appeal is dismissed, but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.