JUDGMENT : A.N. Surti, J. The original plaintiff Smt. Rajanbala Prabhashanker Joshi was aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Rajkot, in Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1970, whereby the learned District Judge allowed the appeal filed by the original defendants, and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. It may be mentioned that the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Rajkot in Civil Suit No. 570 of 1968 had accepted the case of the plaintiff and ordered that the impugned order dated August 18, 1966 passed by the Charity Commissioner terminating the plaintiff's services is illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional, null and void. The learned trial Judge also declared that the plaintiff is continued in service and that she is entitled to all the benefits of service, pay and allowances which she was drawing at the time of termination of service along with all increments etc. as admissible under the Rules governing the service. He also directed the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 3,061.20 p. He also directed the defendants to pay to the plaintiff costs of the suit. As the suit was filed in forma pauperis he directed that the amount of court-fees should be recovered from the defendants. 2. A few relevant facts giving rise to the present appeal may be shortly stated. 3. It is the case of the plaintiff that she was serving as a temporary clerk in the office of the Deputy Charity Commissioner, Rajkot by the order dated June 19, 1965. Originally, the plaintiff was registered with the employment exchange, and thereafter, she was interviewed by the Collector and the Collector by his Memo No. 973 dated December 16, 1964 had directed her to give oral as well as written tests and ultimately, she succeeded in those tests on January 3,1965 and thereafter, her name was selected to be appointed on the divisional level. Thereafter the appointment order was issued in favour of the plaintiff. In course of her services, she had to proceed on leave because of her husband's sickness. 4. By a letter No. 89/66 dated August 18, 1966, the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, informed her that she was relieved from her services from September 20, 1966 as her services were not required in the office of the Charity Commissioner. 5. In course of her services, she had to proceed on leave because of her husband's sickness. 4. By a letter No. 89/66 dated August 18, 1966, the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, informed her that she was relieved from her services from September 20, 1966 as her services were not required in the office of the Charity Commissioner. 5. Thereafter the plaintiff made an application dated September 3, 1966, to the Collector, Rajkot praying that, as she was relieved from the office in which she was serving, she should be appointed in another office protecting her one year's seniority. It is averred in the plaint that the Collector, Rajkot by his reply dated January 2, 1967 informed the plaintiff that she could not be re-employed as the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad had intimated to him that she was dismissed from service as her work and conduct were not satisfactory. It was therefore, submitted in the plaint that the order dated August 18, 1966 of the Charity Commissioner terminating the services of the plaintiff was in fact a punishment to the plaintiff for the alleged misconduct during the employment and it ultimately debarred her from future employment. She, therefore, filed the suit praying that the order of the Charity Commissioner be declared ultra vires, null and void, and ineffective and for a declaration that she continuous in the service and she is entitled to all the benefits in the service and that she may be ordered to be re-instated and also prayed for a decree for Rs. 3,057/- for the arrears of ray from 21st September, 1966 to 30th April, 1968 and Rs. 50.85 p. as notice charges. 6. The defendants resisted the suit by their written statements Exs. 23 and 24 In substance the defence was that the plaintiff was appointed as a junior clerk purely on a temporary basis and that the plaintiff's services could be terminated at any time without notice. It was also the contention of the defendants that the order terminating the services of the plaintiff is not penal in nature nor it casts any stigma on (he plaintiff in any manner whatsoever. It was also submitted on behalf of the defendants that, under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is not entitled to the constitutional protection as provided in Article 311 of the Constitution. It was also submitted on behalf of the defendants that, under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is not entitled to the constitutional protection as provided in Article 311 of the Constitution. It is not necessary for me to mention in this judgment the rest of the contentions raised by the defendants for the disposal of the present appeal. 7. The learned trial Judge raised various issues as set out in para 14 of the judgment of the trial Court. The learned trial Judge in substance took the view that the plaintiff being a civil servant is entitled to the constitutional protection under Article 311 of the Constitution, and that the impugned order passed by the Charity Commissioner (vide Ex. 51) is illegal, ultra vires, in operative, unconstitutional and against the principles of natural justice. I need not set out the other findings of the learned trial Judge in this judgment for the disposal of the present appeal, as the only controversy in the course of the hearing of the appeal before me was whether the impugned order passed by the Charity Commissioner casts any stigma on the plaintiff and whether the same has visited her with any evil or any penal consequences. 8. The learned trial Judge, as stated above, decreed the plaintiff's suit with costs. 9. The defendants-the State of Gujarat and the Charity Commissioner were aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and preferred Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1970 in the Court of the District Judge, Rajkot. 10. The learned District Judge, in substance, took the view that the order of the Charity Commissioner dated August 18, 1966 terminating the plaintiff's services is not an order of dismissal or removal from the service Within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution, and hence, he tool the view that the impugned order is not ultra vires etc. as held by the learned trial Judge. Consequently, the learned District Judge took the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to any consequential relief and he allowed the appeal filed by the defendants. as held by the learned trial Judge. Consequently, the learned District Judge took the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to any consequential relief and he allowed the appeal filed by the defendants. The learned District Judge passed no orders as to costs throughout He also directed that the plaintiff should pay the court-fees as provided under Order 33 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, and hence, he ordered to send a copy of the decree to the Collector as per the provisions of Order 33 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code. 11. It is under these circumstances that the present second appeal is filed in this Court. The hotly debated controversy in the course of the bearing of the appeal before me was, whether the impugned order dated 18th August, 1966 passed by the Charity Commissioner terminating the services of the plaintiff casts any stigma on the plaintiff, and whether the same would visit the plaintiff with any evil or penal consequences on the future career of the plaintiff. It was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that, if the impugned order casts any stigma on the career of the plaintiff and if the same visits her with any evil or penal consequences in her career, then the impugned order is ultra vires, illegal and inoperative, as in the instant case, the defendants did not give to the plaintiff any opportunity of being heard, and thus the plaintiff was deprived of the constitutional protection conferred on her under Article 311 of the Constitution. 12. Having regard to the aforesaid nature of the controversy between the parties 1 may usefully mention at this stage the admitted facts between the parties. It is an admitted fact, that, at the relevant time, the plaintiff was a civil servant, but she was holding a temporary post in the office of the Deputy Charity Commissioner, Rajkot, it is also an admitted fact that she had no legal right to hold that post permanently It was also admitted in the course of the arguments before me that the services of any civil servant can be terminated by a mere intimation to any civil servant holding a temporary post. It was also admitted before me that, while terminating the services of any temporary clerk or an employee, in the order terminating the services, no words can be used in such an order which would cast any stigma on such employee's career, or no words should be employed in such an order which would visit the employee with any evil or penal consequences. In the context of what has been stated above, I may refer to the contents of the impugned order Ex 51, which, when translated into English language, are in the following terms :- "As the services of Smt. Ranjanben P. Joshi, a temporary Junior Clerk in Public Registration Office are not required, she is discharged from her services from September 20, 1966 after office hours." 13. The plain reading of the aforesaid impugned order (vide Ex. 51) does not show that any stigma is attached to the appellant-plaintiff as alleged or the impugned order on the face of it does not indicate that any evil or penal consequences would be visiting the plaintiff as alleged. 14. But Mr. Hathi, the learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff, invited my attention to the representation made by the plaintiff to the Collector on 3rd September, 1966 (vide Ex. 52). That representation was made by the plaintiff to the Collector after the passing of the impugned order on August 18, 1966. In the said representation, the plaintiff stated that the Deputy Charity Commissioner had treated her as a member of his surplus staff, and her services were terminated. She also requested the Collector in that very representation that she should be absorbed in the Agricultural Department of the State. 15. The Collector, Rajkot, thereafter, by his letter dated January 2, 1967 (vide Ex. 53; informed the plaintiff that the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad had informed him that as the plaintiff's work and behaviour were not proper, she was discharged from her services, and hence she could not be employed. In the course of hearing of the appeal, my attention was also invited to Ex. 63, a letter dated December 9, 1966 addressed by the Charity Commissioner to the Collector, Rajkot, wherein the Charity Commissioner had stated that, as the work and the behaviour of the plaintiff were not proper, the services of the plaintiff were terminated. My attention was also invited to Ex. 63, a letter dated December 9, 1966 addressed by the Charity Commissioner to the Collector, Rajkot, wherein the Charity Commissioner had stated that, as the work and the behaviour of the plaintiff were not proper, the services of the plaintiff were terminated. My attention was also invited to Ex. 85, which is the office noting from the office of the Charity Commissioner, and the perusal of the said noting also shows that no reason was to be assigned for terminating the services of the plaintiff. Placing reliance on Ex. 53, a letter dated January 2, 1967, addressed by the Collector to the plaintiff, Mr. Hathi very vehemently urged that 1 should take into consideration the true import of the impugned order Ex. 51, when read with the contents of Ex 53. Mr. Hathi submitted that, when one reads the impugned order, Ex. 51, along with Et. 53, it is clear that the impugned order casts a stigma on the plaintiff and the same blasts the future career of the plaintiff. Mr. Hathi laid considerable emphasis on the language used by the Collector in Ex. 53. a letter dated January 2, 1967, wherein the Collector had stated that the plaintiff could not be employed as the Chari y Commissioner, Ahmedabad intimated to him that the plaintiff's work and behaviour were not proper. Mr. Hathi urged that the letter of the Collector addressed to the plaintiff (vide Ex 53 dated January 22, 1963) would clearly indicate that the impugned order passed by the Charity Commissioner had visited the appellant-plaintiff with evil and penal consequences. He also urged, that, in the instant case, no opportunity was given to the plaintiff by the Charity Commissioner to explain any possible grievance with regard to her work and behaviour, and thereby she was deprived of the constitutional guarantee conferred upon her under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Under the circumstances, Mr. Hathi submitted that the reasoning of the lower appellate Court in its impugned judgment and the decree passed by the learned District Judge are illegal, and hence I should set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court and should restore the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 16. Before I refer to the various cases cited at the bar, I may briefly indicate the submissions made by Mr. 16. Before I refer to the various cases cited at the bar, I may briefly indicate the submissions made by Mr. M. B. Shah, the learned Assistant Government Header, who appeared on behalf of the Charity Commissioner. 17. Mr. Shah submitted that the lower appellate Court after having perused the entire oral as well as the documentary evidence on the record of the case did come to a conclusion in paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment that the Charity Commissioner's order does no; put any stigma as alleged. He also urged that as no stigma on the plaintiff by virtue of the impugned order is put, it is impossible to conceive that the impugned order had visited the plaintiff with any evil or penal consequences. Mr. Shan strongly emphasised the fact that, while hearing the second appeal, I have no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court. He stated that the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court may be an erroneous finding of fact, even then I have no jurisdiction to interfere with any erroneous finding of fact, unless I come to a conclusion that the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is grossly perverse or is based on no evidence or is arrived at on any inadmissible evidence going on the record of the case. Mr. Shah submitted that the lower appellate Court took into consideration the impugned order passed by the Charity Commissioner, the representation made by the plaintiff to the Collector, the Collector's letter to the plaintiff (vide Ex. 55), the Charity Commissioner's letter addressed to the Collector, Rajkot dated December 12, 1966 (vide Ex. 63), the noting of the Charity Commissioner's office on Ex. 63 and the entire oral as well documentary evidence on the record of the case, and came to the conclusion that the impugned order does not cast any stigma as alleged. He also urged that, once that ground is cleared up, it is difficult to conceive that the impugned order has resulted into any evil or penal consequences as urged by Mr. Hathi. 18. The second contention raised by Mr. He also urged that, once that ground is cleared up, it is difficult to conceive that the impugned order has resulted into any evil or penal consequences as urged by Mr. Hathi. 18. The second contention raised by Mr. Shah before me was that, when any temporary clerk or an employee works in any department of the State, it will be the duty of the higher officer to judge his suitability and, in order to judge the suitability of the temporary clerk or an employee, it would be natural for the higher officer to take into consideration his work and behaviour, and when the superior officer, in the discharge of his duties, judges the suitability of any temporary clerk or an employee, and if he comes to a conclusion that the behaviour and the work of any temporary clerk or an employee are not proper, and if he discharges the temporary clerk or an employee from his services, surely, the same cannot cast any stigma on the temporary clerk or the employee and it is impossible to conceive that the order terminating the services under such circumstances would visit the employee with any evil or penal consequences Mr. Shah even went to the length of submitting that, if the officer does not judge the work and the behaviour of any temporary clerk, he would be miserably failing in his duty, as otherwise, how can such a temporary clerk can be confirmed or how can he be assigned any other responsible work. Under the circumstances, shortly stated, Mr. Shah's submission was that if the Charity Commissioner, in the discharge of his duties, has judged the suitability of the appellant-plaintiff and if the same was not proper for the reasons disclosed by him to the Collector, the impugned order does not case any stigma on the plaintiff and the same is incapable of visiting any penal or evil consequences as apprehended. 19. The last submission of Mr. Shah before me was, that in the instant case, the impugned order merely terminates the services of a temporary servant, aid on the face of the impugned order, the same does not cast any stigma on the plaintiff nor any words are used in the impugned order which would indicate that the same are capable of visiting any penal or evil consequences as apprehended by the plaintiff. In the context of this background. Mr. In the context of this background. Mr. Shah emphasised the fact that the Charity Commissioner had merely given some information to the Collector, Rajkot and if there is some correspondence between the two officers of the State, the Court is not expected to have a deep dive in the official correspondence for coming to a conclusion that the cumulative effect of the correspondence between the two officers and the impugned order would be to cast a stigma on the plaintiff and that the same is capable of visiting the plaintiff with evil or penal consequences. 20. In substance, the submission of Mr Shah was that, if the plaintiff had no right to the post, and, if the impugned order does not show ex facie that her services were terminated as a measure of punishment and if the same does not cast any stigma or her, 1 should not normally go behind the impugned order to see if there are any motivating factors behind the impugned order. To justify the submission, Mr. Shah heavily placed reliance on the reported decision of the Supreme Court in S. P. Vasudeva v. State of Haryana, AIR. 1975, Supreme Court 2292. 21. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made at the bar, and I am in entire agreement with Mr. Shah's submission that this being a second appeal, I have no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court In the instant case, 1 am convinced that the finding of the lower appellate court namely that the Charity Commissioner's order does not put a stigma on the plaintiff is neither perverse nor is passed on no evidence, nor the same has been arrived at as a result of any inadmissible evidence going on the record of the case, in the instant case, the lower appellate court did take into consideration all the aforesaid material documentary evidence and the other evidence led by the parties and did come to a conclusion that the impugned order does not cast any stigma on the plaintiff as alleged. 22. 22. In State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra, A.I.R. 1976, Supreme Court 2547, the Supreme Court in para 25 of its judgment has observed as follows :- "We also find ourselves in agreement with the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the High Court failed to appreciate the true legal and constitutional position and upset the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below that the impugned order was not by way of punishment ignoring the well settled principle of law that a second appeal cannot be entertained on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error might seem to be." 23. in the instant case, it is difficult for me even on a re-appreciation of evidence led by the parties that the aforesaid finding of the lower appellate Court is pet verse or is based on no evidence or is based on any inadmissible evidence going on the record of the case. Under the circumstances, I am in entire agreement with the submission made by Mr. Shah that it is not open to me nor I have any jurisdiction to upset the said finding recorded by the lower appellate Court in regard to the impugned order that the said order does not put any stigma on the plaintiff. 24. As mentioned above, it is the official important duty of the higher officer to judge the suitability of any temporary clerk when he is discharging his duties in any state department. But while judging the suitability of any temporary clerk or an employee the higher officer has to see his work and behaviour, and to come to his own conclusion as to whether the temporary clerk or an employee is suitable to be retained in the concerted department or not. In doing so, surely, he is not out to stigmatise the temporary servant or the employee, nor be has even the remote intent to see that evil or penal consequences should visit the temporary clerk or an employee. It may be emphasised at this stage, that the temporary clerk or an employee does not hold the post permanently by way of any legal right either by virtue of contract of service or by virtue or any rules in the concerned department. It may be emphasised at this stage, that the temporary clerk or an employee does not hold the post permanently by way of any legal right either by virtue of contract of service or by virtue or any rules in the concerned department. Under the circumstances, and more particularly, when the impugned order does not ex-facie show any words indicating or casting stigma on the plaintiff or any words that the plaintiff's future career would be visiting with any penal consequences, I fail to understand as to how the aforesaid mere information (Ex. 53, can at all cast any stigma on the plaintiff as alleged, or how the same would consequently visit any evil or penal consequences on the plaintiff. To my mind, reading of such an inter-department correspondence would obviously result into patent and flagrant miscarriage of justice, particularly when there is no latent or patent intent on the part of the Charity Commissioner to cast any stigma on the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, there is lot of substance and force in the submission made by Mr. Shah that it was open to the Charity Commissioner to judge the suitability of the appellant plaintiff and a mere letter from.the Chanty Commissioner to the Collector (vide Ex. 53) should not create any apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff as alleged. 25. Mr. Shah's third submission before me was that it is not open to me or the Courts to have a deep dive in inter department files to find out as to whether any stigma is attached to the plaintiff. Under the circumstances "of of the case, particularly when the impugned order terminating the services of the plaintiff does not show ex facie any stigma attached to the plaintiff or when the impugned order is least apprehensive that the same would visit into any evil or penal consequences, I am in agreement with the said contention of Mr. Shah in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Binay Kumar v. State of Bihar 1971(2) S L.R. p. 314 and The Post Graduate Institute v. Sham Lal and another, 1974(2), S.L.R. 814. 26. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, I am in entire agreement with the submissions made by Mr. Shah. 27. But Mr. Shah in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Binay Kumar v. State of Bihar 1971(2) S L.R. p. 314 and The Post Graduate Institute v. Sham Lal and another, 1974(2), S.L.R. 814. 26. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, I am in entire agreement with the submissions made by Mr. Shah. 27. But Mr. Hathi, the learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff, very strenuously urged that in the instant case, the learned District Judge grievously erred in arriving at the conclusion that the impugned order passed by the Charity Commissioner does not put any stigma on the plaintiff He Stated that I should take into consideration the fact that after the passing of the impugned order, the plaintiff did make a representation to the Collector on September 3, 1966 (vide Ex. 5.) and that, only after her representation to the Collector, she knew for the first time on 2nd January, 1967 vide Ext. 63) that the Charity Commissioner had felt that her work and behaviour was not proper when she was discharging her duties in the office of the Charity Commissioner Mr. Hathi stated that I must necessarily read the impugned order Ex. 51 which has terminated the services of the plaintiff and the letter of the Collector, Ex. 53 dated 2nd January, 1967 and when one reads both those letters, together, the only inevitable inference is that a stigma is cast on the plaintiff's career, and that, because of the words or the language used by the Charity Commissioner, it is impossible for the Collector to assign any service to the plaintiff in any other department of the State, Mr. Hathi stated that the following words used in the Collector's letter, Ex. 53, are very pertinent ; "In Gujarati Language" Mr. Hathi submitted that the aforesaid words clearly indicate the stigma on the plaintiff and the Collector had decided not to give any employment to the plaintiff by shutting all the doors of the various department of the State for giving any employment to her as the Charity Commissioner bad felt that the plaintiff's work and behaviour were not proper. 28. It is difficult for me to agree with or accept the said submission of Mr. 28. It is difficult for me to agree with or accept the said submission of Mr. Hathi, for the simple reason that the lower appellate court did take into consideration the documentary as well as the oral evidence on the record of the case and did record as a finding of fact that the impugned order does not put a stigma on the plaintiff, and hence the said finding of fact is binding on me. Under the said circumstances, it is hot possible for me to agree with or accept the said submission of Mr. Hathi. 29. Bat in fairness to Mr. Hathi, I may refer to the following authorities cited by him in the course of the hearing of this appeal. In Jagdish Miller v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 449, the Supreme Court took the view that the order of discharge of temporary servant stating that he was incompetent in service, the Supreme Court took the view that the order was one which had dismissed the temporary servant and hence he has been denied the protection guaranteed to temporary servants under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 30. In Madan Mohan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court p. 1133, the Supreme Court took the view that simple termination of the services of a Government servant holding a permanent post though temporary, for the last seventeen years, without any enquiry against him is violative of Article 311(2) and as such is illegal. The Supreme Court in that case took into consideration the Chief Minister's statement in the Assembly about the services of the Government servant particularly when the Chief Minister had stated that the services of the Government servant were not satisfactory and hence the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the same cast stigma on account of inefficiency and misconduct on the part of the Government servant. 31. In the case of Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, 1976 (3) Supreme Court Cases, 334, the Supreme Court took the view that the re version of the Government servant from his officiating post to his substantive post for being "not fit yet" while juniors still retained and no administrative reasons shown for such action, the Supreme Court took the view that the order of reversion was by way of punishment. The Supreme Court took the view that the use of the words "not fit yet" is a casting stigma on the Government servant. 32. In the recent judgment delivered by my learned brother P. D. Desai, J. in Second Appeal No. 331 of 1971 (judgment delivered on 24th/25th November, 1976), my learned brother took the view that the order terminating the services of a temporary servant was an order by way of punishment and not discharge simpliciter. Suffice it to mention that in that case it was alleged that the Government servant had made some interpolations in the rates quoted by M/s. Mahmad Alibhai and Sons alleging that he was guilty or breach of trust. In that case, it was an admitted fact that the Government servant was holding temporary post. In this back-ground of that case, my learned brother took the view that the order terminating the services was a penal one, and hence, the Government employee was entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. 33. Mr. Hathi cited all the aforesaid cases and strongly urged that, in the instant case, no inquiry was held against the plaintiff and that she is deprived of the constitutional protection conferred on her under Article 311 of the Constitution. With respect. it is not possible for me to agree with or accept any of the submissions of Mr. Hathi for the simple reason that, in the instant case, no stigma is cast on the plaintiff as alleged. Nor the impugned order would result into penal consequences as apprehended by the plaintiff. Since I have agreed with the submissions of Mr. Shah, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, 1 do not think it necessary to burden my judgment with the authorities cited by Mr. Shah in the course of the appeal. 34. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, there is no substance or merit in the appeal, and hence the appeal failed and is dismissed with no orders as to costs all throughout. As regards the amount of court-fees to be paid by the plaintiff, I may state that in this litigation the State is also a party. I am told that the plaintiff is a poor lady who has been deserted by her husband and she has to maintain her two children. As regards the amount of court-fees to be paid by the plaintiff, I may state that in this litigation the State is also a party. I am told that the plaintiff is a poor lady who has been deserted by her husband and she has to maintain her two children. I am sure the ends of justice will he served, if I request the State not to recover the amount of court-fees from the plaintiff and will show sufficient magnanimity towards the appellant-plaintiff having regard to her poverty. Under the circumstance the order passed by the lower appellate court regarding court fees is set a said. Even for the purpose of the present appeal also, in view of what has been stated in regard to the recovery of court fees, no orders are necessary. Appeal dismissed.