Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. This application in revision by the first party to a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (here in after referred to as the "Code") is directed against the final order passed in the proceeding declaring both the parties to be in joint possession of the subject-matter of dispute. 2. The dispute relates to six plots situated in mauza Joshpur in the district of Santhal Parganas. Initially, a proceeding under section 107 of the Code was started, which was later converted into a proceeding under section 145 of the Code. The petitioner and the members of the opposite party are brothers. 3. According to the petitioner, his father was the Kotali of Mauza Joshpur and he was in possession of the disputed lands by virtue of his office as Kotali and since the Kotali lands are governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture, the eldest son of such Kotali succeeds to the office as well as to the properties of the Kotali. The petitioner, therefore, claims to have succeeded exclusively to the properties belonging to his father. 4. The members of the second party-opposite party, on the other hand, claim that, after the death of their father, all the three brothers came in possession of the disputed plots, along with the other properties of their father, and as such, they were in joint possession of the same. Therefore, the dispute between the parties was as to whether the petitioner was in exclusive possession of the plots in question, or the members of the opposite party were in joint possession with the petitioner. 5. The learned Magistrate, on a consideration of the documents and the affidavits on record, came to the conclusion that the petitioner as well as the members of the opposite party were in joint possession of the disputed lands. Therefore, he restrained them from interfering with the possession of either party, unless one of them is evicted in due course of law by a Court of competent jurisdiction. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised to points in support of this application. Firstly, he has urged that the learned Magistrate erred in declaring joint possession of the petitioner as well as of the members of the opposite party, which is foreign to the scheme of section 145 of the Code. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised to points in support of this application. Firstly, he has urged that the learned Magistrate erred in declaring joint possession of the petitioner as well as of the members of the opposite party, which is foreign to the scheme of section 145 of the Code. According to learned Counsel, once the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that both the parties were in joint possession of the disputed lands, he should have dropped the proceeding. Secondly, he has urged, the proceeding was initiated on the 23rd August, 1971 by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, but he directed the parties to file their written statements, documents and affidavits before another Magistrate, to whom the case was transferred for disposal, which is in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Code. 7. True it is that a Magistrate, while deciding a proceeding under section. 145 of the Code, is primarily concerned with the actual physical possession of one party' or the other. Sub-section (4) of section 145 provides that the Magistrate shall, without reference to the merits of the claim of any such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements, documents and affidavits and then decide "the question whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession of the said subject". There was some controversy in this respect as to what is the procedure to be followed in cases where the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that both the parties are in joint possession of the disputed land and the claim of exclusive possession put forward by one party is found to be untrue. A Bench of this Court in Me. Sudamawati Kuer V. Ram Chandra Singh A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 32 considered this aspect of the matter and all the earlier decisions of this Court were discussed. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that in such circumstances it was open to the Magistrate to declare both the parties to be in joint possession and later, if there is any apprehension of a breach of the peace, a proceeding under section 107 of the Code may be started against both or anyone of the parties. S.C. Misra, J.(as he then was). S.C. Misra, J.(as he then was). observed as follows: "As a matter of fact, when a dispute causing an apprehension of breach of the peace between two or more parties occurs, section 145 comes to be applicable to such a case and unless the Magistrate is satisfied that the apprehension has ceased to exist, he cannot drop the proceeding. He could, no doubt, attach the property in dispute pending the decision of a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction under section 146 as it stood prior to the amendment of 1955. But now even that position is not available as the Magistrate has to refer the matter to a Civil Court as mentioned above and an order has to be passed in accordance with its findings. I can see no justification now for the Magistrate to drop the proceeding when he has received a finding from the Civil Court that both parties are jointly in possession. I am in respectful agreement with the observation of their, Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court in the above case (A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan 156) that section 146 of the Code is not attracted in such a case. But I am not inclined to agree that the proper "order in such a case should be one of dropping the proceeding, but one of disposal of the proceeding holding the parties to be jointly in possession and in view of the existence of a dispute causing an apprehension of breach of the peace, the Magistrate may start a proceeding under section 107 of the Code against both or one of the parties as may appear to him to be expedient. In that case, the order under 'section 145 can be referred to bind down one or both the parties and prevent breach of the peace." In view of the aforesaid decision. it has to be held that the Magistrate has not committed any illegality in declaring the petitioner and the members of the opposite party to be in joint possession of the disputed lands and' restraining them from interfering with the possession of each other. As such, there is no substance in this contention of the learned Counsel. 8. it has to be held that the Magistrate has not committed any illegality in declaring the petitioner and the members of the opposite party to be in joint possession of the disputed lands and' restraining them from interfering with the possession of each other. As such, there is no substance in this contention of the learned Counsel. 8. So far as the other point raised on behalf of the petitioner is concerned, learned Counsel has referred to sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Code which provides that whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied that there is an apprehension of a breach of the peace concerning any land he shall make an order in writing" requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and "to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute…." It is submitted that section 145 (1) clearly provides that the Magistrate drawing up the proceeding will direct the parties to attend his Court in person or by pleader, and he cannot direct the parties to appear before some other Magistrate and file• written statements, documents and affidavits; and as in the present case the learned Magistrate directed the parties to appear and file their written statements, documents and affidavits before another Magistrate, there has been a contravention of the mandatory provision of section 145 (1), which has vitiated even the final order passed in the proceeding. 9. Learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the order, dated the 23rd August, 1971, by which the proceeding was drawn up and the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate directed the parties to file their written statements, documents etc. before another Magistrate. The relevant portion of the order runs as follows : "It is purely a land dispute where claim over possession of the disputed land is involved, and due to this dispute there is a reasonable apprehension of the breach of the peace. I, therefore, order that a proceeding u/s 145 Cr. before another Magistrate. The relevant portion of the order runs as follows : "It is purely a land dispute where claim over possession of the disputed land is involved, and due to this dispute there is a reasonable apprehension of the breach of the peace. I, therefore, order that a proceeding u/s 145 Cr. P. C. be drawn up calling upon the parties to file their written statements of claim along with affidavits of witnesses and documents in the court of Sri R. C. Mishra, Magistrate 1st class, Jamtara to whom this case is being transferred for favour of disposal. The land in dispute will remain attached u/s. 145 (4) Cr.P.C." In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on two decisions of this Court in Misri Choudhury Vs. Narsingh Prasad Tewari 2 PLT 186 and Basudeva Singh Vs. Ramsaroop Singh 24 PLT 329. In the case of Misri Choudhury, Jwala Prasad, J. set aside the order of the Sub-divisional-Magistrate because, while drawing up the proceeding, he had directed the parties to appear before another Magistrate on the date fixed in the said order. In the case of Basudeva Sinha also Chatterji, J. set aside the order because in that case also the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, while drawing up the proceeding, had directed the parties to appear before another Magistrate and file their written statements, documents etc. before that Magistrate. The impugned orders have been quoted in the aforesaid two decisions. It may be mentioned that in none of the aforesaid two cases the Sub-divisional Magistrate had transferred the proceedings to the other Magistrates while directing the, parties to appear before the other Magistrates and file their written statements, documents etc. before those Magistrates. A bare reference to the judgment in Misri Choudhury's case will show that the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party in• that case had drawn the attention of the Court to a Calcutta case in Guru Das Nag v. Gaganendra Nath Tagore 2 CLJ 614 where it, had been held that a proceeding under section 145 is a criminal case and a Magistrate, has power to transfer it under section 192 and section 528 of the Code. It was further urged in that case that the transfer, even if invalid, was cured by section 529 (f) of the Code. It was further urged in that case that the transfer, even if invalid, was cured by section 529 (f) of the Code. While repelling the said argument raised on behalf of the opposite party in that case, his Lordship observed "The ruling has no application inasmuch as the sub-divisional Magistrate did not transfer the case expressly or by implication to Mr. Yakub. "That means that in that case the learned sub-divisional Magistrate, while drawing up the proceeding, or before directing the parties to appear before another Magistrate had not transferred the proceeding to that Magistrate either expressly or by implication, and, as such the order was held to be bad. 10. In the case of Basudeva Singh the impugned order ran as follows: "I, therefore, under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, direct the parties noted on the margin to appear before Babu Suraj Narain Singh; Honorary Magistrate, 1st class, Sadar, Patna on 29-3-1943 at 10.30 a.m. personally or by pleader and file written statements of their respective claimed regarding the fact of actual possession of the disputed plot". His Lordship, following the decision in Mishri Choudhury's case (supra) set aside the impugned order. The facts of those cases are not applicable to the facts of the case in the hand inasmuch as in those cases the Sub-divisional Magistrate, while directing the parties to appear and file their written statements etc. before other Magistrates, had not transferred the proceedings to those Magistrate, whereas in the present case the learned Sub divisional Magistrate had transferred the case to Shree R.C. Mishra, Magistrate, before whom he had directed the parties to appear and file their written statements etc. This aspect has been further empasised in Abdul Hamid v. Hasan Raza A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 366 where Kulwant Sahay, J. distinguished the case of Misri Choudhury saying that in the case before his Lordship there was an order of transfer of the proceeding to another Magistrate before whom the parties had been directed to file their written statements etc. His Lordship observed: "Now, it has been held in a number of cases that proceedings under sections 145 and 147 are criminal cases and a Magistrate has power to transfer such cases under sections 192 and 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that is so, I see no ground for holding that the order for transfer made in the present case was without jurisdiction. If that is so, I see no ground for holding that the order for transfer made in the present case was without jurisdiction. Indeed it was conceded in the case just cited that the Magistrate had the power to transfer the case, but it was held In that case that the Sub-divisional Magistrate, who had drawn up the proceedings, did not transfer the case expressly or by implication to another Magistrate. In the case now before us, there is a clear order in the order sheet of the 7th November, 1922, transferring the case to the file of Second Lieutenant, Ram Prasad Narain Sahi. I am, therefore of opinion that the Deputy Magistrate, to whom the case had been transferred, had jurisdiction to deal with the case, and the Magistrate, who drew up the proceedings, had power to 'transfer the case." In this connection a reference can be made to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Qamaruddin Hussain v. Mustaq Ahmad A.I.R. 1049 All 616, where the aforesaid two decisions reported in 2 Patna Law Times and 24 Patna Law Times (supra) were referred to and distinguished on the same ground that there was an order by the Sub-divisional Magistrate transferring the proceeding to the Magistrate before, whom the parties had been directed to appear and file their written statements etc. In my opinion, there is no substance in this point also raised on behalf of the petitioner. 11. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed.