JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal by the Commissioners for the port of Calcutta and others against the judgment and order of A.K. Sinha, J. dated September 7, 1971 whereby the C.R. No. 1340 (W) of 1968 was made absolute. The facts, according to the petitioner are as follows: the petitioner was appointed a driver under the Port Administration since August, 1944 and worked in a lorry under the direct supervision of a mate. On November 29, 1964 the petitioner was booked in Conservancy Lorry no. WBL-2144 under the disposal of the Health Office. At about 7 a. m. he reported to the Health Office and was directed to drive as per instruction of the Mate Dasarathi Sarkar, first to howrah Bridge area and then at 'a' dock, Kidderpore at about 10 a. m. The mate and his men boarded the lorry. As the lorry was passing through Gate no. 9 towards dumping ground, it was stopped by a police constable on duty, and on search two polythene bags containing polythene granules were found in the garbage of the lorry. The petitioner, the Mate and four coolies were arrested and thereafter in due course placed on trial before the Presidency, magistrate, Fourth Court, Calcutta on a charge under section 411 of the Indian penal Code. By the judgment dated august 30, 1965 the petitioner and the coolies were acquitted, but the Mate was found guilty under the same charge and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The petitioner was charge-sheeted by the Deputy Chairman on January 20, 1966 on three charges (a) for taking lorry to 'a' shed at 10 a. m. though the place of duty was elsewhere, (b) not reporting to appropriate authorities for such taking of the lorry elsewhere otherwise than where it was booked and (c) for being negligent in the discharge of duties as a result of which two polythene bags were loaded or found in the lorry. Petitioner's written defence was that after the completion of the work as Howrah Bridge, he took the lorry to 'a' Shed, Kidderpore Dock under the Mate's instructions which he had to do as he had no choice in the matter. The Mate and his men got down there while the petitioner remained sitting at the wheel. Petitioner's written defence was that after the completion of the work as Howrah Bridge, he took the lorry to 'a' Shed, Kidderpore Dock under the Mate's instructions which he had to do as he had no choice in the matter. The Mate and his men got down there while the petitioner remained sitting at the wheel. They returned after twenty minutes and the mate directed him to drive towards the dumping ground As he was passing through the gate No. 9 he was stopped by the police constable and taken to thana. Except as stated above the petitioner did not admit any other allegations and the charges against him were denied. 2. AN enquiry was held by the respondent No. 4, Planning Officer, port Commissioners, Calcutta and he submitted his report together with his finding on October 25, 1966. It was found (a) that there was a conspiracy and both the petitioner and the Mate were parties to it and therefore both of them were guilty of misconduct, (b) though there was a reason for the petitioner's failure to submit any statement about the movement of the lorry as stated by him in view of the pending criminal proceeding, there was no reason for not disclosing it before the Sanitary Sub-Inspector, the Supervisory Staff on the spot. The only reason was that "there was a conspiracy and every one was involved in this". The charge accordingly was held as proved. (c) There was a conspiracy to which all delinquents were parties as mentioned in the charge-sheet The two bags of polythene were found in the lorry though the petitioner had no business to supervise the loading, he could not shirk his responsibility. All the charges were thus held at proved against the delinquents and it was recommended that they should be removed from service. It may be mentioned here that the charges against the delinquents were enquired in the same enquiry proceeding. 3. THE Deputy Chairman the opposite party No. 2 who accepted the findings, served on the petitioner a show cause notice on December 19, 1966, calling upon him to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner submitted his representation and the deputy Chairman by his order communicated by the Chief mechanical Engineer to the petitioner by letter dated April 29, 1967, ordered his removal from the Commissioner's service from April 12, 1967. The petitioner submitted his representation and the deputy Chairman by his order communicated by the Chief mechanical Engineer to the petitioner by letter dated April 29, 1967, ordered his removal from the Commissioner's service from April 12, 1967. The petitioner contended, inter alia, that he was found guilty of conspiracy for committing offence for which he was not charge and there were other illegalities in the enquiry. On these allegations and contentions the petitioner on service of demand of justice moved this Court under Article 226 (1) of the Constitution, whereon the instant rule was issued, calling upon the opposite parties to show cause why a Writ in the nature of Certiorari should not issue quashing the impugned order and also why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus should not issue restraining the opposite parties from giving effect to the order. 4. AN affidavit-in-opposition was filed on behalf of the opposite parties contending, inter alia, that the Writ petition was not maintainable against the Commissioners. It was stated that the petitioner went out of his allotted place of work and at 'a' Shed, Kidderpore dock, when challenged by the police he and his associates tried to escape, but were arrested by the police and thereafter put on trial. There was no illegality in the procedure nor violation of the principle of natural justice in the proceeding. The finding was based on appreciation of evidence and all steps culminating in the impugned order were according to the Rules. The petitioner accordingly was not entitled to any relief. The petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply reiterating the allegations made in the petition. The learned Judge was of opinion that the finding of the Enquiry officer was based on his conclusion that there was a conspiracy to which all the delinquents were parties. Under rule 11 (8) of the Calcutta Port Commissioners' Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 the Enquiry Officer is to prepare a report of the enquiry recording his findings on each of the charges with reasons therefore. The petitioner was found guilty on charge of conspiracy for which he was not charge-sheeted. There was thus no compliance with the Rules, which resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the impugned order of removal was quashed and the rule was made absolute. This appeal is against this order. 5. MR. The petitioner was found guilty on charge of conspiracy for which he was not charge-sheeted. There was thus no compliance with the Rules, which resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the impugned order of removal was quashed and the rule was made absolute. This appeal is against this order. 5. MR. Nalini Kanta Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants Commissioners and their officials, contended that the finding of conspiracy amongst the delinquents was a necessary conclusion when it was found that all the charges were established. Further the charge of conspiracy was included in Charge I which stated that the petitioner "took-or allowed to be taken the above lorry to 'a' Shed, Kidderpore Dock". There were further contentions that the petition under Article 226 (1) was not maintainable in law for allege violation of title Rules mentioned above These contentions have been disputed by Mr. Arun Kumar Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner respondent. 6. IT is difficult to appreciate the contentions on the charges raised by Mr. Nalini Kanta Mukherjee, appearing for the appellants. The contention that charge I in terms indicated a conspiracy is hard to accept, as, firstly, it relates to Charge I only which, while finding conspiracy covers all charges as the root cause of misconduct. Further conspiracy to do a wrongful act is itself a misconduct and without finding that there was a conspiracy to commit a misconduct the petitioner could not have been found guilty of the charges even according to the Enquiry Officer. Further, such a misconduct attaches stigma on the integrity of the delinquents. The conspiracy itself should have been made a separate charge against the delinquents before they could be found guilty of the same. Rule 11 (3) provides as follows "at the conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiring Authority shall prepare a report of the enquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. If in the opinion of such Authority the proceedings of the enquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the employee has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. If in the opinion of such Authority the proceedings of the enquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the employee has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. " If, therefore, the Enquiry Officer found that the proceedings also establish a charge of conspiracy in addition to those already framed, before recording his finding, he should have given an opportunity to the delinquent for defending themselves against the charge of conspiracy to commit the alleged misconduct. We are in agreement with the trial Court that the enquiry report was vitiated by the findings of conspiracy against the petitioner when he was not charge-sheeted for the same and this has resulted in violation not only of the Rules mentioned above, but also of the principles of natural justice. 7. THE formidable objection, however, relates to the maintainability of the application under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been contended by Mr. Mukherjee that the discipline and Appeal Rules governing the employees of the Commissioners are not statutory so that a breach thereof would not result in the violation of statutory or legal right of any employee and the Writ proceeding for enforcement of such rights which are neither legal nor statutory is not maintainable these contentions have been disputed on behalf of the respondents who have submitted that the Rules are statutory and Writ proceeding is maintainable against the Commissioners. This question involves a matter of public importance and as there are number of decisions seemingly conflicting, we requested mr. Noni Coomar Chakravarty a Senior Advocate of this Court to assist the Court about the legal position in the matter in controversy mr. Chakravarti has drawn cur attention to the several decisions, which along with the decisions cited by the learned advocates for the parties, we shall consider in due course. We, however, record our appreciation of the kind assistance rendered to Court by Mr. Chakravarti. 8. THE Calcutta Port Act (Bengal iii of 1890), hereinafter referred to as the Act, provides the law relating to the Port of Calcutta. We, however, record our appreciation of the kind assistance rendered to Court by Mr. Chakravarti. 8. THE Calcutta Port Act (Bengal iii of 1890), hereinafter referred to as the Act, provides the law relating to the Port of Calcutta. Duties for carrying out the provisions of the Act under section 40 are vested in a body of commissioners to be called the Commissioners of the Port of Calcutta, which is a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal, to sue and to be sued in such name. Section 31 invests the powers in the commissioners to frame rules, inter alia, regarding the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the commissioner. Section 31 in relevant extracts is as follows : "sec. 31 (1) The Commissioners in meeting shall fn m time to time, frame rules- (i) In regulating the recruitment, promotion, conduct, discipline, punishment and any other matter relating to the terms and conditions of service applicable to the employees of the Commissioners. . . . . . . . . . . . " Under Clause (iii) such rules are to have the prior approval of the central Government. Under the powers so vested the Commissioners framed the following rules : "whereas the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta in meeting have been empowered under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Calcutta Port Act, 1890 (Bengal Act III of 1890), to frame rules for regulating the discipline and punishment of their employees: the Commissioners in exercise of the said power and with the approval of the Central Government hereby frame the following rules:-" 9. Nature of penalties. . . . . . 10. Disciplinary Authorities. 11. Procedure for imposing penalties: (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. Nature of penalties. . . . . . 10. Disciplinary Authorities. 11. Procedure for imposing penalties: (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges, together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based shall be communicated in writing to the employee and he shall he required to submit within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary authority- (a) to such authority, or (b) where a Board of Enquiry or Enquiring Officer has been appointed under sub-rule (3) below, to that Board or Officer, a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person (8) At the conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiring Authority shall prepare a report of the enquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. If in the opinion of such authority the proceedings of the enquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the employee has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. (10) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Enquiring authority, consider the record of the enquiry and record its findings on each charge. (11) (ii) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, made by the employee in response to the notice under clause (i) and determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the employee and pass appropriate orders in the case. . . . . . . . " 9. THE point for determination is whether the said Rules framed by the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta under the powers conferred by statute creating the body are statutory and conferred a legal right on the employees governed by them. If the rules are statutory there can be little dispute that for enforcing compliance of the statutory rules by the statutory body a writ of Mandamus will lie. A Writ of certiorari will lie questioning the order passed in. If the rules are statutory there can be little dispute that for enforcing compliance of the statutory rules by the statutory body a writ of Mandamus will lie. A Writ of certiorari will lie questioning the order passed in. violation of such statutory rules framed by it under the powers conferred by the statute creating it, or of the principles of natural justice as such order purporting to terminate service of its employees per takes a character of a quasi judicial order. 10. A pattern of public undertakings in our country are the statutory bodies, also called Corporations created by different statutes. Such statutes provide for rules for the working, management and control of such corporations or bodies. In respect of some such corporations the Government, central or State, frame rules which, inter alia, relate to the terms and conditions of services of the employees. It has been uniformly and consistently held that orders terminating the services of employees of such statutory bodies in breach of the rules framed by the Government is amenable to Writ jurisdiction of the High Court, such Rules being made by the Government itself are undisputedly statutory rules. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Mukherjee A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 847 the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of this Court quashing the dismissal order passed by the Corporation in breach of the provisions of the rules framed by the Central Government under section 11 (2) of the Life insurance Corporation Act, 1956. Clause 10 (a) of the Rules provides for penalties and termination of service of a category of Life Insurance employees namely, Development Officers. It was laid down, inter alia, that the services of Development Officer might be terminated after giving him an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and after conducting such enquiry as the Corporation might deem fit. The impugned orders of termination were passed under the said Clause without following the above procedure and as already said these orders were quashed by this Court on an application under article 226 (1) and was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. 11. IN the decision in (2) Calcutta dock Labour Board and Qrs. The impugned orders of termination were passed under the said Clause without following the above procedure and as already said these orders were quashed by this Court on an application under article 226 (1) and was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. 11. IN the decision in (2) Calcutta dock Labour Board and Qrs. v. Jaffar imam, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 282 the employees of the Dock Labour Board were governed by a Scheme of 1956 framed by the Central Government under Dock workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948. The disciplinary proceeding provided under the Scheme for an opportunity to be given to the employee to show cause why the proposed action should not be taken against him. In that case a number of the Dock Workers was dismissed from without following the procedure laid down in the scheme and it was held that the order of dismissal could not be sustained as it was in breach of the provisions of the statutory rules under the Scheme and accordingly was liable to be quashed by a Writ on an application under article 226 of the Constitution. 12. IN (12) S.R. Tewari v. District board, Agra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680 the order of termination of the service of an engineer by the District Board was under challenge. Under the rules framed by the State Government under section 172 (2) of the relevant act the district Board could terminate the service of an employee on three months notice or three months' salary in lieu of notice. The State Government further framed regulations under the said act providing that no employee should be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without an opportunity to him of showing cause against the proposed action. It was held that the service was terminated not under the regulations but under the power provided by the rules and accordingly there was no breach of the regulations as contended. These cases are to be distinguished from the cases where the rules are framed not by the Government, but statutory corporations or bodies themselves under powers conferred on them by the statutes creating them. The statutes authorise such statutory corporations or bodies to frame rules also called regulations with the approval of Central or State Governments on due publication in the official gazette providing, inter alia, the terms arid conditions of service of all employees of the Corporation or Statutory Bodies. The statutes authorise such statutory corporations or bodies to frame rules also called regulations with the approval of Central or State Governments on due publication in the official gazette providing, inter alia, the terms arid conditions of service of all employees of the Corporation or Statutory Bodies. These rules or regulations so framed invariably relate to the provisions for disciplinary proceedings against employees for misconduct, providing for disciplinary authority framing of charges, opportunity to the delinquent employees to show cause against the charges, the departmental enquiry arid also the action proposed to be taken against them, major and minor penalties as may be imposed considering the gravity of misconduct established at the enquiry. Such elaborate rules of procedure are almost akin to, those contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the constitution. The point for determination is whether these rules or regulations are statutory, the breach whereof can be remedied in a Writ proceeding. We shall now consider the case cited at the bar by the learned Advocates. 13. IN (10) Prabhakar Ramakrishna jodh v. A.L. Pande and another, 1965 (2) S.C.R. 713, the Court was considering the dismissal of a teacher from service of the College in breach of the provisions of the College Code. Under the University of Saugar Act, 1946 the provisions therein were made for the framing of statutes and ordinances relating to the working and administration of the College. Under powers conferred by section 6 (6) and section 32 of the Act the University framed ordinances relating to the terms of office, duties and conditions of service of officers and teachers of the university. Clause 8 (vi) of the Ordinance called College Code provides that the governing body of the College shall not terminate the services of a teacher confirmed in the service of the college without holding a full enquiry in the matter and without giving an opportunity to him of defending himself on charges against him. It was held as follows : "in our opinion, the provisions of Ordinance 20, otherwise called the 'college Code' have the force of law. It confers legal rights on the teachers of the affiliated colleges and it is not a correct proposition to say that the 'college Code' merely regulates the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and the University alone. It confers legal rights on the teachers of the affiliated colleges and it is not a correct proposition to say that the 'college Code' merely regulates the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and the University alone. We do not agree with the High Court that the provisions of the 'college Code' constitute power of management. On the contrary we are of the view that the provisions of the 'college Code' relating to the pay scale of teachers and their security of tenure properly fall within the statutory power of affiliation granted to the University under the Act. It is true that clause 7 of the Ordinance provides that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed in Sch. A but that does not mean that teachers have merely a contractual remedy against the Government Body of the College. On the other hand, we are of opinion that the provisions of Clause 8 of the Ordinance relating to security of the tenure of teachers are part and parcel of the teachers' service condition and as we have already pointed out, the provisions of the 'college Code' in this regard are validly made by the University in exercise of the statutory power and have, therefore, the force and effect of law. It follows, therefore, that the 'college Code' creates legal rights in favour of teachers of affiliated colleges and the view taken by the High Court is erroneous. " 14. THE Supreme Court seat back the case to the High Court for determining whether there was any violation of the procedure prescribed in Clause 8 (vi) (a) of the College Code and if so, the order terminating the appellant's service was to be considered illegal and ultra vires and would be quashed by a writ in the nature of Certiorari. (7) Mafatlal Narandas Barot v. Divisional Controller, State Transport, Mehsana, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1364 the court was considering an order dismissing an employee of the Transport Corporation framed under the provisions of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Under section 45 of the Act power was given to the Corporation to frame regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government for the administration of the affairs of the corporation which included the conditions of appointment and service of employees of the Corporation. Under section 45 of the Act power was given to the Corporation to frame regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government for the administration of the affairs of the corporation which included the conditions of appointment and service of employees of the Corporation. The short question before the Court was whether an employee was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action of punishment as provided in rule 61 of the Regulations. It was held that the Corporation could visit the employee with discharge or removal from service, but before that was done, he was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause which included an opportunity to deny the guilt which and that he could only do only if he knows the charges levelled against him the order of termination contravened the provisions of Clause 4 (b) of the regulations as no opportunity was given to the employee to show cause against the alleged charges as provided in the regulations and the order also violated the principles of natural justice. A writ of Certiorari was issued accordingly quashing the order, but which however did not preclude the Corporation from making a fresh enquiry after affording opportunity to the employee to show cause as provided under Clause 4 (b) of the Regulations. 15. A contrary view was taken in the case of (3) Executive Committee of the U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244. The Uttar Pradesh Warehousing corporation was established under provisions of the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporation Act and under the provisions thereof by section 54 power was given to the Corporation to frame regulations governing the terms and conditions of the employees. The regulations under the Act applied to all the employees of the Corporation also to persons employed on contract in matters not regulated by contract Regulation 11 makes the provisions for termination of service and Regulation 16 (3) provides that no penalty should be imposed on any employee without giving him an opportunity of tendering an explanation in writing and cross-examining witnesses against him, if any and of producing evidence in support of defence. There was no dispute that in this case in passing the order of termination, the provision of service Regulation 16 (3) was breached. There was no dispute that in this case in passing the order of termination, the provision of service Regulation 16 (3) was breached. Even then it was held that an older made in breach of the regulations would be contrary to such term and conditions, but would not be in breach of any statutory obligation as was the position in Sunil Mukherjee's case. It was further held that the Act does not guarantee any statutory status to the respondent not does it impose any obligation on the appellant in such matters. It was held that violation of regulation 16 (3) made the dismissal wrongful, which would only result in a liability in damages. But it could not be said that thereby the service was not terminated or that the order was a nullity. 16. THIS decision was followed by a division Bench of this Court in the case of (6) Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. v. Nilratan Banerjee 75 C.W.N. 26, in which it was held that such regulations framed by the Corporation under the powers given to it by the statute were not statutory and accordingly the order dismissing an employee in breach of such regulations is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 (1) of the Constitution. In (4) Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukdeb Rai A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828, the Court was considering the regulations which were framed by the corporation under section 45 of the air Corporation Act, 1953. It was provided in the regulations that every person employed by each of the Corporations shall be subject to such conditions of service as may be determined by the regulation made by the Corporation by which he was employed. The regulation also provided for opportunity to the employees' of the corporation to show cause against any allegation of misconduct against him and the punishment that was to be inflicted on that basis. The Court held that the regulations did not take away the power of the Corporation to dismiss its employees and such regulations did not put any restriction in the exercise of such powers by the Corporation. The Court held that the regulations did not take away the power of the Corporation to dismiss its employees and such regulations did not put any restriction in the exercise of such powers by the Corporation. Accordingly the termination of service in breach of the regulations would be wrongful, which may sound in damages but for the compliance of the provisions of the regulation on the finding that such termination is a nullity, no remedy under Article 226 was available. 17. THE Supreme Court again in the decision of Dr. T.C.M. Pillai v. Indian Institute of Technology A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1811, in considering the order of termination of service of an Assistant Professor on probation, took a different view. The institute was incorporated as a Body Corporate by the institutes of Technology Act, 1961 as an institute of national importance. Under section 26 the statutes were to be formed for method of appointment and determination of terms of service of teachers and other staff. Under section 27 such statutes are to be framed by the Council of the Institute to be constituted under the provisions of section 31. Statute 13 contains the terms and conditions of permanent members, while Statute 14 governs the temporary employees. Under Clause 13 (9) penalties could to be imposed on a member of the staff includes removal and dismissal, but before the order was passed an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken was to be given to such employee. It was held : "if the services of a probationer were, therefore, terminated by way of punishment without following the procedure provided by Cl. 9 of Statute 13 it would be competent for the High Court to issue an appropriate Writ. " The impugned order terminating the services was held not as a measure of punishment so that the above provisions were not attracted. 18. IN (13) Vidyaram Misra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narayan college, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1450, the court was considering the removal of the petitioner from service by a resolution of managing committee. It was held that there could be no specific performance of personal contract of service and if the service was rightfully ended, there could be no complaint; if not rightfully, the remedy would be in damages for breach of contract. It was held that there could be no specific performance of personal contract of service and if the service was rightfully ended, there could be no complaint; if not rightfully, the remedy would be in damages for breach of contract. The court further referred to the decision of the House of Lords in (8) Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1578, in which Lord Wilberforce observed that where there is pure master and servant relationship, i.e., where there is no public employment or service, no support by statute, nothing in the nature of office or status, the observance of natural justice may be excluded. But if any of these elements exists, there may be essential procedural requirements to be observed and failure to observe them may result in a dismissal being declared void. It was further observed in this case by the Supreme Court that in Probhakar's case the College Code had the force of law apart from a contract and conferred rights on the employee there. In the case before the Court the terms and conditions of service mentioned in statute 151 of the lucknow University Act were to be incorporated into a contract between the college and the teacher concerned. The terms and conditions of service mentioned in statute 151 become the terms of service only by virtue of their incorporation in the contract and without the contract they have no vitality and confer no legal rights, while in the provakar's case the terms and conditions of service embodied in Clause 8 (vi) (a) of the 'college Code' had the force of law and conferred rights on the employees. In (11) Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 855, the suit was for declaration that resolution of the Municipality dismissing the plaintiff from service was void. Under Bombay District Municipality Act, 1901 by section 46, it was provide that this Municipality may make rules in respect of matters including conditions of service of its employees. Under Rule 143 no servants to be dismissed without opportunity being given of being heard in his defence. The order of dismissal is to be in writing, and also to specify the charges, the defence and the reasons for the order. Under Rule 143 no servants to be dismissed without opportunity being given of being heard in his defence. The order of dismissal is to be in writing, and also to specify the charges, the defence and the reasons for the order. The plaintiff's case was that no opportunity was given, while the Municipality's defence was that the rules were merely directions and no action lay for violation of the same. It was held that the dismissal by the municipality without reasonable opportunity for defence being given is void and the employee is entitled to the declaration. The Court observed : "in the present appeal, the preeminent question is whether the dismissal is in violation of Rule 143. Rule 143 imposes a mandatory obligation. The rules were made in exercise of power conferred on the municipality by statute. The rules are binding on the municipality. They cannot be amended without the assent of the State government. The dismissal of the respondent was rightly found by the High Court to be in violation of Rule 143 which imposed a mandatory obligation. The respondent was dismissed without a reasonable opportunity of being heard in her defence. The dismissal by the municipality was without recording any written statement which might have been tendered. The dismissal by the municipality was without written order. The dismissal was ultra vires. " 19. IN a very recent decision of this court in (1) Ajit Prasad Mukherjea v. Life Insurance Corporation and Ors., 78 C.W.N. 853 the Court noticed some of the cases noted above and the conflicting decisions. The Court, however, did not intend to enter into the controversy and followed the Division Bench decision of this Court in nilratan Banerjee's case, at the same time granting on the oral application of the appellant a certificate for appeal td the Supreme court under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution. It was further made clear that the said decision in this case was necessarily restricted to the provisions of section 49 of the Life Insurance corporation Act, 1956 and the Court was not expressing any opinion whatsoever on similar provisions in other statutes. In view of this observations we feel ourselves free to record our opinion on the rules we are concerned with in this appeal, namely, the calcutta Port Commissioners Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. 20. In view of this observations we feel ourselves free to record our opinion on the rules we are concerned with in this appeal, namely, the calcutta Port Commissioners Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. 20. THERE can be little doubt that the decisions in the cases of Prabhakar pandey's case followed in the decisions in Mafatlal Narandas Barot, T.C.M. Pillai and Sirsi Municipality, support the contentions that the rules and regulations framed by the statutory bodies or Corporations have the force of law and confer statutory or legal rights on the employees of such bodies. The decisions in the cases of U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Indian Airlines corporation are in conflict with the above view and it is to be seen that none of the earlier decisions, in particular, of Prabhakar's case which in clear and express terms stated that the rules framed by the statutory body under powers conferred by such statute creating it are statutory and has the force and effect of law was not cited before the Court in those cases and only in airlines Corporation's case Mafatlal narandas Barot's case was rioted. In the light of the uniform view taken in the above cases, it seems that the view taken in Warehousing Corporation's case as also in Airlines Corporation's case to the extent that such rules are not statutory and confer no legal right is to be deemed as not acceptable by the said decisions as also by the latest decision in Sirsi Municipality's case. In Kuttulal v. Radhelal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1596 when the Court found that it is not possible' to reconcile the observations of the two decisions of the Supreme Court and attention of the Court was not drawn to earlier decisions, the Court preferred to follow the decision of the larger Bench. As we have seen Pande's case was not cited before the Court in the said two cases and the decisions in Pande, Mafatlal, vidyaram and Sirsi Municipality were of the larger Bench. For all these reasons, we are of opinion that rules framed by the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta are statutory rules conferring legal rights on its employees and the petition for enforcement of the legal rights conferred by the said Rules under Article 226 (1)of the Constitution is maintainable in law and the employee is entitled to appropriate writs accordingly. The appeal in the premises fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.