JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - An undivided share in an agricultural plot of land , was declared evacuee property under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The Assistant Custodian sold the evacuee share on December 20, 1958 to Vishwa Nath, respondent No. 3. A sale certificate in respect of this sale was issued on December 16, 1963. 2. Proceedings for separation of the evacuee interest in this very plot were taken by the Competent Officer. On October 13, 1958, the Competent Officer issued notices under Sec. 6 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. The Competent Officer, in proceedings under Sec. 10 of the Separation Act, sold the evacuee interest to the appellants by a sale deed dated September 2, 1950. When the appellants came to know of the sale certificate in favour of Vishwa Nath, they filed a revision before the Assistant Custodian General challenging the transfer in favour of Vishwa Nath. The Assistant Custodian General rejected the revision holding that Vishwanath was in possession and that the sale in his favour was earlier in point of time. The appellants then filed a writ petition in this Court, praying for the quashing of the sale certificate in favour of Vishwa Nath and of the order of the Assistant Custodian General. The writ petition was dismissed by Lokur, J. Against his judgment, this appeal has been filed. 3. The main contention of Sri Bashir Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellants is that after the enactment of the Separation Act, the Assistant Custodian had no power or jurisdiction to affect a sale of the evacuee interest in composite property and that such a sale could only be affected by a competent officer under the Separation Act. 4. The notification that a property is evacuee property is made under Sec. 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. Under Sec. 8, any property declared to be evacuee property shall be deemed to vest in the Custodian. Sec. 10 lays down the powers and duties of the Custodian. Sub-sec. (2) (o) empowers the Custodian to transfer in any manner whatsoever any evacuee property. It will thus be seen that under this Act, evacuee property vested in the Custodian and he had the power to transfer it. Sec. 10 lays down the powers and duties of the Custodian. Sub-sec. (2) (o) empowers the Custodian to transfer in any manner whatsoever any evacuee property. It will thus be seen that under this Act, evacuee property vested in the Custodian and he had the power to transfer it. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the power of the Custodian remains as wide under this Act even after the enactment of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. The Separation Act deals exclusively with composite property. Composite property is defined under Sec. 2(d) of the Separation Act. Broadly, it means property in which an undivided or un-separated interest has been declared to be evacuee property. There is no dispute that the plot with which we are concerned was composite property. Sec. 3 of the Separation Act upon which Sri Bashir Ahmad places reliance reads thus :- "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act and of the Rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. For the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law." It is contended that on account of the provisions of this section, the Provisions of the Separation Act will prevail over the provisions of 1950 Act and that the sale under the Separation Act, would also prevail over the sale under the 1950 Act. We do not consider it necessary in this case to decide whether on the coming into force of the Separation Act, the power of the Custodian to deal with the evacuee share in composite property under Sec. 10(2) (o) of the 1950 Act, is completely lost or not. In our opinion, the powers of the Custodian to deal with such property must in any case come to an end once the competent officer is seized of the matter. 5. Both the Acts are enactments of Parliament. The 1950 Act was a general Act and the Separation Act deals exclusively with composite property. It lays down detailed procedure of how composite property is to be dealt with and how the evacuee interest is to be separated from the non-evacuee interest. 5. Both the Acts are enactments of Parliament. The 1950 Act was a general Act and the Separation Act deals exclusively with composite property. It lays down detailed procedure of how composite property is to be dealt with and how the evacuee interest is to be separated from the non-evacuee interest. It is legitimate to infer that Parliament intended that when separation proceedings have started under the Separation Act, the Custodian shall cease to deal with composite property. If even after the Competent Officer has started dealing with composite property, the Custodian also continues to deal with it. It will result in a conflict as in the present case. Parliament could never have intended such a conflict. Proceedings under the Separation Act start under Sec. 6 with the giving by the Competent Officer of a general notice and personal notices to all persons who may have claim in the property. This he does on receipt of information from the Custodian or on an application from a claimant. When the Custodian himself refers the matter to the Competent Officer for determining and separating the evacuee interest in composite property, it is obvious that he himself cannot thereafter deal with the matter until the separation has taken place. This conclusion is strengthened by the Provisions of Sec. 11. Sec. 11 provides that after the Competent Officer has, under Sec. 10 of the Separation Act, separated the evacuee interest, the evacuee interest thus separated shall vest in the Custodian from all encumbrances and liabilities. This section makes it clear that until the evacuee interest in composite property is separated by the competent officer, it will not vest in the Custodian and the Custodian will have no power to deal with it. For these reasons, we are of opinion that once the jurisdiction of the Competent Officer starts under Sec. 6, he alone can deal with the property and it is only after he has separated the evacuee interest that such interest vests in the Custodian and he can deal with it. If in proceedings under Sec. 10, the Competent Officer sells the evacuee share, as he is entitled to do, then there is nothing which can vest in the Custodian under Sec. 11. 6. In the present case, the notice under Sec. 6 of the Separation Act was issued to the appellants on October 13, 1958. If in proceedings under Sec. 10, the Competent Officer sells the evacuee share, as he is entitled to do, then there is nothing which can vest in the Custodian under Sec. 11. 6. In the present case, the notice under Sec. 6 of the Separation Act was issued to the appellants on October 13, 1958. It does not indicate that any application had been received from any claimant. It can be presumed that the custodian must have sent information to the Competent Officer sometime before October 13, 1958 regarding this composite property. Therefore, from the date of the receipt of such information or in any case from the date of the issue of notices under Sec. 6, the Competent Officer was seized of the matter and the separation proceedings must be deemed to have started. Thereafter the Custodian or the Assistant Custodian could not deal with the property and transfer it by sale to Vishwa Nath respondent No. 3. After October 13, 1958, the Competent Officer alone could deal with the property. In proceedings under Sec. 10, he sold the property to the appellants. The sale to the appellants was, therefore, a legal and valid sale and the sale in favour of Vishwa Nath, responded No. 3, by the Assistant Custodian was not a valid or effective sale. 7. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, the writ petition is allowed and the sale certificate dated December 16, 1963 and the order of the Assistant Custodian General, dated April 29, 1965 are quashed. Respondent No. 3, Vishwa Nath, will be entitled to a refund, of the sale price paid by him to the Assistant Custodian. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal as well of the writ petition.