JUDGMENT 1. THIS Rule is directed against the judgment dated june 19, 1973 made in Suit No. 479 of 1972 by the learned Judge, 4th Bench, small Causes Court, Calcutta, rejecting two applications under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 5 of the Limitation Act respectively. 2. THE petitioner is a partnership firm registered under the Indian partnership Act, 1932 and it carries on business in Road Transport. For such business, the petitioner at all material times employed and still employs various categories of employees including temporary workers, drivers, conductors and coolies and the Head Office of the firm at all material times was land still is at No. 16, Tarachand Street, calcutta-1 and furthermore it has also a godown at 5, Balai Dutta Street, calcutta. It has been alleged that due to "gherao", on or about February 4, 1972 the petitioner-firm was closed and for the purpose of necessary police help and assistance, it had to move this hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the constitution of India, whereupon on february 11, 1972, a Rule being Matter mo. 41 of 1972 was issued. It appears that after obtaining an interim order in that said Rule with the consequent help and necessary assistance of the police, the petitioners could open the firm but again due to further labour trouble the firm was again closed on February 21, 1972 and thereafter on March 21, 1972 the petitioner moved this Hon'ble court under Article 226 of the constitution of India for the second time and obtained a Rule being Matter No. 106 of 1972. It has been alleged that since February 1972, the employees of the petitioner-firm indulged in "gherao" of the partners not only in their business place but also in their respective residential quarters, for which the partners were forced to leave their residence and reside elsewhere. It further appears that after obtaining the aforementioned second Rule i.e. Matter No. 106 of 1972 on March 21, 1972, on or about June 6, 1972, the petitioners informed the Officer-in-Charge of the local Police Station for necessary help and assistance with the object of entering into their business premises at both the place as mentioned hereinbefore for taking out some office records and actually such police help was afforded to them on June 19, 1972. It has further been alleged that on the night of the said June 19, 1972, with the necessary help and assistance of the police some records were removed from their office premises and corresponding by a General Diary entry bearing No. 2158 dated June 19, 1972 was lodged to that effect. It appears that in the meantime and more particularly on February 11, 1972, the opposite party filed Money suit No. 479 of 1972 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1116.78 P. as compensation for non-delivery of goods which were booked for carriage with the carrier viz. the petitioner and the said suit, according to the opposite party, was decreed exparte on March 14 1972, after due service of summons. It appears from the service return that the summons for the suit in question was admittedly received by an officer of the petitioner-firm on February 15, 1972, who incidentally was neither a partner nor one of such officers as mentioned in Order 30 Rule 3 of the code of Civil Procedure and he accepted the said summons without disclosing the particulars of his identity. Thereafter, on or about July 4, 1972, the petitioners filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of civil Procedure along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation act and asked for recalling and reconsideration of the exparte order as mentioned hereinbefore after necessary condonation of the delay in filing the said application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the said applications the petitioners contended that when they got some records out of their business premises on June 19, 1972 with the help of the police, a notice of the Court below relating to the connected Money Suit no. 479 of 1972 was found and immediately on such detection, one of the partners of the petitioner firm approached their learned lawyer of the Court below, who on inspection of the records informed that the suit had already been disposed of exparte. Unfortunately, the date when such information was received by the petitioners, has not been mentioned in the connected proceedings. Unfortunately, the date when such information was received by the petitioners, has not been mentioned in the connected proceedings. It also appears that after passing of the said exparte decree, the opposite party has started Execution case No. 479 of 1972 and the learned trial Court by his judgment order of march 19, 1973 was pleased to dismiss the applications of the petitioner under order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil procedure and Section 5 of the limitation Act, holding inter alia amongst others that the delay in filing the applications in question has not been satisfactorily explained. Against the said judgment order, the petitioners on july 9, 1973 moved and obtained the present rule. 3. AT the time of hearing of this case Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned advocate for the petitioners contended that the learned trial Court was wrong in not holding that the applications in the instant case were in fact filled within 30 days from the date of knowledge in terms of the requirements of Section 123 of the Limitation Act and as such he should not nave rejected them. He further contended that the determination of the learned trial Court that the applications in question were not maintainable in law was irregular, illegal and without jurisdiction. He also contended that knowledge in the instant case from which 30 days under section 123 of the Limitation Act will have to be computed must be counted at least from June 19, 1972, when as contended by the petitioners, they had received for the first time some papers of the court below in relation to the said money Suit No. 479 of 1972. In any event, he submitted that the learned trial Court should have held that satisfactory explanation was given for the period from June 19, 1972 to July 4, 1972 and as such both the said applications under Order 9 Rule 13 of the code of Civil Procedure and Section 5 of the Limitation Act should have been allowed instead of rejecting them. He submitted that the fact that a party had knowledge of the suit on a particular date is of wholly immaterial consideration for the purpose of computing limitation under Article 164 of the Old Limitation Act which corresponds to Section 123 of the present limitation Act which and the second part of that Article comes into operation only where the application is made more than 30 days after the passing of the decree and the applicant feels that he had not been duly served and had knowledge of the decree within 30 days from the date of which he made the application. In support of the above contentions, Mr. Bhattacharyya relied on the case of Mir Ahmed v. Pir bakhsh Khuda Bakhsh reported in A.I.R. 1930 Lahore 397 and also in the case of Rajeshwari Prosad v. Brahmanand reported in A.I.R. 1933 Patna 279 mr. Bhattacharyya also contended that as in the instant case the defendant was admittedly a firm so, service on the said firm was required to be effected under the provisions of or in terms of order 30 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil procedure and in fact service under the said provisions has not been effected. As such, he also submitted that there was no due and proper service of the summons. 4. MR. Das Gupta, the learned advocate for the opposite party contended that the provisions of Order 30 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and more particularly the provisions regarding effecting of service as mentioned therein have no application to the cases before the Court of Small causes, Calcutta in view of the provisions contained in the Manual prepared and framed under the Presidency Small cause Courts Act, 1882. In support of his contentions he relied on Rule 8 of part III, Chapter V of the said Manual which lays down that when the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain or has a person on whom service of his summons can be effected within the jurisdiction of the Court, the summons shall be sent to the proper officer to be served by him or one of his subordinates, unless the Court otherwise directs. Mr. Das Gupta further relied on Rules 3 and 5 of Part III, Chapter XXX of the said Manual. Mr. Das Gupta further relied on Rules 3 and 5 of Part III, Chapter XXX of the said Manual. Rule 3 lays down that where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons should be served either- (a) upon any one or more persons or (b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within the provinces upon any person having at the service, the control or management of the partnership business there and such service shall be deemed good service upon firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners and within or without the provinces provided that, in the case of a partnership which has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the summons shall be served upon every person within the provinces whom it is sought to make liable. Rules 5 requires that where summons is issued to a firm and is served in the manner provided by rule 3, every person upon whom it is served shall be informed by notice in writing given at the time of such service, whether he is served as s partner or as a person having the control or management of the partnership business, or in both characters, and, in default of such notice, the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner. Relying also on the notification at the Appendix to the said manual viz. the notification issued by the high Court under section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure being Notification no. 7989g dated 3rd January, 1949, published in the issues of the "calcutta gazette" dated 6th January, 1949 which reads thus: - "in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 8 of the Code of Civil procedure, and all other powers enabling in this behalf the High Court of judicature at Fort William in Bengal is pleased to direct that the following provisions of the said Code as amended upto the 1st day of January, 1949, shall extend to all suits or proceedings, in the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta subject to the modifications and adaptations herein set forth. The provisions extended by this notification shall come into force on 2nd July, 1949 and supersede all rules heretofore in force relating to the materials dealt with therein. " Mr. The provisions extended by this notification shall come into force on 2nd July, 1949 and supersede all rules heretofore in force relating to the materials dealt with therein. " Mr. Das Gupta also contended that only certain sections of the Code of civil Procedure, by virtue of the said notification have been extended to the small Causes Court, Calcutta and not the Rules and as such he further submitted that all the provisions of the code including the provisions in Order 30 Rule 3 were not applicable in the connected proceedings before the Small causes Court, Calcutta and as such he submitted that even though the provisions of Order 30 Rule 3 of the Civil procedure Code were not complied with or followed, service as effected in the instant case should be deemed to be a good service. 5. THUS the whole question in the instant case rests on the determination as to what should be the starting point of limitation for maintaining the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of Section 123 of the Limitation act and whether there was due service of the summons on the firm. The admitted position in the instant case is that on February 4, 1972 the firm was closed for the first time and thereafter on February 21, 1972 for the second time. It is also an admitted fact that after obtaining the first Rule in Matter no. 41 of 1972, the petitioner-firm, with the necessary help and assistance of the police, was opened or at least the same remained open till February 21, 1972 at a day prior to that as the subsequent labour trouble as contended by the petitioner-firm commenced on february 21, 1972. Thus it is clear that on February 15, 1972 i. e. the date when the summons in question was served in the manner as stated hereinbefore, the petitioner firm was open and it may also be presumed that it had its business activities as no other statements contrary to the findings as above are forthcoming. Thus it is clear that on February 15, 1972 i. e. the date when the summons in question was served in the manner as stated hereinbefore, the petitioner firm was open and it may also be presumed that it had its business activities as no other statements contrary to the findings as above are forthcoming. So it can reasonably be presumed that at least on february 15, 1972 or immediately thereafter, the petitioner firm had knowledge of the connected proceedings and for that reason the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of civil Procedure can certainly be held to be filed long after 30 days after the receipt of the knowledge of the proceedings by the petitioner firm and the cases as referred to by Mr. Bhattacharyya have no application at all. It has been found in the case of Sodhi harnam Singh v. Sodai Mohinder Singh reported in A.I.R. 1954 Punjab 137 that the wording of Article 164 refers to summons issued in the first instance and not to notices issued to parties subsequently whether such notices are necessary under law or not. Where the defendant has received the summons of the first hearing or where he has been directed to appear before the transferee Court on a certain date by the transferring Court, the limitation under Article 164 to set aside exparte decree starts from the date of decree. Applying the tests as mentioned in the above decision, I find that the limitation in the instant case for maintaining the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be 30 days from March 14, 1972 i.e. the date of the decree and not from february 15, 1972 i.e. the date when the summons was received at the petitioner's office, though by an officer, who may not be duly authorised to receive such summons on behalf of the firm as contended by Mr. Dasgupta. In view of the fact that summons of the suit was received by the petitioner firm and duly received by them as would appear from the findings hereafter, the period of limitation for maintaining the application in question would be from the date of the decree and not from the date of subsequent knowledge on June 19, 1912 as contended by the petitioner. The special provisions in Rule 5 require that where a summons is issued to a firm and is served in the manner provided by Rule 3, every person upon whom, it is served shall be informed by notice in writing given at the time of such service, whether he is served as a partner or as a person having the control or management of the partnership business, or in both characters, and, in default of such notice, the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner. Although no particulars as are mentioned in Rule 8 are available before us or in the summons, in view of the deeming clause in the said Rule, the summons in the instant case should be deemed to have been served on a partners and consequently on the firm. I find that the argument advanced by Mr. Das Gupta stating that the provisions of Civil procedure Code in the instant case has no application so far the proceedings under the Presidency Small Cause court's Act are concerned and more particularly in view of the Manual under the said Act, has substance because the provisions as referred to by Mr. Das Gupta do envisage a special mode of effecting service on a firm other than or in addition to the mode as prescribed in Order 30 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil procedure. In support of his contentions that the provisions of the Civil procedure Code applies in a case of this nature Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned Advocate for the petitioner also relied on Section 48 of the Presidency small Cause Act, 1882. I find that the said Section, which is incorporated in chapter VII, deals with recovery of possession of immovable property only and thus has got no application to the facts and circumstances of the present suit. I further find that the notification in question which has been appended to the appendix to the Manual under the Presidency Small Cause Court act, 1882 framed and issued under section 8 of the Civil Procedure Code lays down that only certain provisions of the sections in the said Code will have application in, proceedings pending before the Small Causes Court and the same in fact supports the contentions of Mr. Das Gupta. Das Gupta. The notification framed under Section 8 of the civil Procedure Code read with Rules 3 and 5 of the Manual as mentioned hereinbefore provides for a special procedure for effecting service on a firm in suits or proceedings pending or initiated before the Court of Small causes and so in the instant case service on the petitioner-firm was duly effected and the learned trial Court was not wrong in holding that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the civil Procedure Code was time barred as the same was admittedly filed after 30 days from the date of knowledge "knowledge" in the instant case and in view of the nature of service for the purposes of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code should be counted on and from March 14, 1972 and as such the application for restoration was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation. In view of the above findings, I discharge this Rule. There will however be mo order as to costs. Let the records be sent down at an early date. Rule discharged.