JUDGMENT O.P. Trivedi, J. - This special appeal arises at the instance of Ghirrao Lal Srivastava against an order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 8-2-1972 dismissing a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India which was filed by Ghirrao Lal Srivastava. The appellant came to this Court with the case that he was appointed a Lekhpal by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Tahsil Nawabganj in the district of Barabanki in the year 1953. One Ramdeo filed complaints (Annexures 3 and 4 of the petition) against Hari Krishna Bajpai, Naib Tahsildar and Naumi Lal Collection Amin. These complaints were entrusted by the Sub-Divisional Officer to Mr. Chauhan, Tahsildar for enquiry but the Tahsildar forwarded the complaints to Hari Krishna Bajpai, Naib Tahsildar, for enquiry and report. The Naib Tahsildar submitted his report dated 16-11-1967 to the Tahsildar (Annexure 7) containing the finding that the complaints were unfounded so far as he personally was concerned and that in the course of enquiry he had found that Ghirrao Lal Srivastava and Sattan Lal Pradhan of the village were guilty of taking Begar from the villagers. He recommended that a police enquiry may be made against the conduct of the appellant Lekhpal. On the basis solely of this report of the Naib Tahsildar the Tahsildar submitted a report to the Deputy Commissioner on 18-11-1967 with the recommendation that the Lekhpal be placed under suspension immediately and a thorough enquiry may be made into the allegations made against him by the Naib Tahsildar. Thereafter the appellant was served with a charge sheet dated 25-1-1968 by the Tahsildar. 2. It was subsequently discovered that the Tahsildar was not the punishing authority of Lekhpals and, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner by a subsequent order passed in November 1968 directed an enquiry against the petitioner by the Sub-Divisional Officer himself. A fresh charge sheet was served upon the petitioner on 2-12-1968 by the Sub-Divisional Officer containing eight charges. The appellant furnished an explanation through a written statement and also made a request in the written statement that Shyama Charan Shukla, Shambhu, Sukkur, Jai Ram and Ram Deo may be called for cross examination. In the course of enquiry by the Sub-Divisional Officer only five witnesses were produced, namely, Shyama Charan Shukla, Kanungo, Jai Ram Shambhu, Ram Deo and Sukkur and they were also subjected to cross examination by the appellant. In the course of enquiry by the Sub-Divisional Officer only five witnesses were produced, namely, Shyama Charan Shukla, Kanungo, Jai Ram Shambhu, Ram Deo and Sukkur and they were also subjected to cross examination by the appellant. Hari Krishna Bajpai, Naib Tahsildar. Mr. Chauhan, Tahsildar, Naumi Lal Collection Amin and Devi Dayal Lekhpal were not called in the enquiry before the Sub-Divisional Officer was an opportunity of cross examining them afforded to the appellant. The Sub-Divisional Officer held all the charges proved except charge No. 7, and by his order dated 1-4-1969 ordered dismissal of the appellant with effect from the date of his suspension. This order was questioned by the appellant in appeal before the Deputy Commissioner but the appeal was dismissed and after this the appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 before this Court praying that the order of dismissal passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the order of the Deputy Commissioner passed in appeal may be quashed by certiorari. This petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge and, therefore, this appeal. 3. We have heard Sri K.K. Nayar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri K.S. Varma, Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents. Learned counsel for the appellant made two points before us. First, that the Sub-Divisional Officer did not follow the principles of natural justice in conducting the disciplinary enquiry against the appellant and, secondly, that the enquiry was vitiated by the fact that it was based on the report of the Naib Tahsildar who was maliciously disposed towards the appellant and levelled certain unfounded accusations against him. 4. We address ourselves to the first question first. We may state here that the disciplinary enquiry against the appellant was conducted under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. A portion of this rule so far as relevant for the present purpose reads as follows :- "At that enquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish etc. A portion of this rule so far as relevant for the present purpose reads as follows :- "At that enquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish etc. etc." On this point the argument of the learned counsel is that in support of charges 1, 2 and 3 reliance was placed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in the impugned order on the reports of Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal and the reports purporting to have been filed on 15-11-1967 and 14-11-1967 respectively and the reports of the Naib Tahsildar Hari Krishna Bajpai (Annexure 7) and the Tahsildar Mr. Chauhan (Annexure 8) and for his finding on charges 4 and 5 on the report of the Naib Tahsildar and two applications one purporting to have been filed by the public of Village Berehta dated 22.8.1967 (Annexure 6) and another by Shital Prasad, uncle of Ghirrao Lal Srivastava dated 23.8.1967 (Annexure 5), both against Naumi Lal, Amin. 5. On his finding on charge No.6 reliance was placed by the Sub- Divisional Officer again on the reports of the Naib Tahsildar and the statement of Ramdeo made before him. The submission is that the Naib Tahsildar Hari Krishna Bajpai and the Tahsildar Mr. Chauhan on whose reports reliance was placed by the Sub-Divisional Officer were not called and no opportunity to cross examine them was afforded to the appellant. It is further submitted that Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal, on whose statements also reliance was placed for the findings on some of the charges, were also not produced before the enquiring officer and no opportunity to cross examine those witnesses also was afforded. None from the public of Barehta nor Shital Prasad were examined and no opportunity was afforded to cross examine them to test the correctness of the allegations made in the applications (Annexures 5 and 6). None from the public of Barehta nor Shital Prasad were examined and no opportunity was afforded to cross examine them to test the correctness of the allegations made in the applications (Annexures 5 and 6). In addition it was also submitted that these applications did not contain any allegations against the appellant but against Naumi Lal and the complaint of Ram Deo also did not contain any allegations against the appellant but against the Naib Tahsildar Hari Krishna Bajpai and Naumi Lal and no reliance, therefore, could be placed on these applications (Annexures 3 to 6) to support any charges against the appellant and the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer in resting his findings on these applications disclosed an error of law. On hearing learned counsel we are of the opinion that all these submissions are well founded. The Chief Standing Counsel submitted that the enquiring officer was not bound to examine Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal afresh before him in support of the second charge sheet and could well rely upon their previous statements recorded by the Naib Tahsildar and no violation of principles of natural justice could be inferred as the appellant never made a request for calling Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal as he had in the case of other witnesses who were called and cross-examined by the appellant. Learned Chief Standing Counsel places reliance on observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 375 In that case the Supreme Court ruled that when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put to him and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party and he is given an opportunity to cross examine him, the requirements of the principles of natural justice are sufficiently complied with. No doubt in this case as well as in an earlier case, Union of India v. T. R. Varma, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 882, the Supreme Court held that the Evidence Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character and that the law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry. It was observed that broadly stated the rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, that he should be given the opportunity of cross examining the witnesses examined by that party and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. In the latter decision : State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 375 also they emphasised that the only obligation which the law casts on domestic tribunals was that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. It is in the background of this dominating principles which was emphasised in both these cases that the Supreme Court appears to have slightly modified the opinion expressed by it in the case of Union of India v. T. R. Varma, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 882, when it ruled that even if the evidence of the witnesses was not examined in presence of the charged officer observance of the rules of natural justice would be considered sufficient if the statement of the witness recorded at the lack of the charged officer is put to the witness in presence of the charged officer, admitted in evidence and a copy thereof is given to the party. They appear to have expressed this modification in the view earlier propounded for the reason that to require that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness word by word and sentence by sentence is to insist on bare technicalities and rules of natural justice are matters not of form but of substance. They are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked on their admission and copies thereof given to the person charged, and he is given an opportunity to cross examine them. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 375 therefore, cannot be pressed into service by the respondents. For the previous statements of Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal were not read over to those witnesses before the Sub-Divisional Officer during enquiry. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 375 therefore, cannot be pressed into service by the respondents. For the previous statements of Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal were not read over to those witnesses before the Sub-Divisional Officer during enquiry. Indeed no such occasion arose at all as those witnesses were never produced before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Secondly, copies of the previous statements of those witnesses were never handed over to the appellant and, thirdly, Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal were not called and produced before the Sub-Divisional Officer with the result that the appellant had no opportunity to test their previous statements by cross examination. The result is that the tribunal in this case filed to fulfil the obligation cast upon it by the principles of natural justice, namely, not to act on any information received without giving a fair opportunity of explaining it to the appellant. There was a clear violation of the principles of natural justice as by failure to produce Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal before the Sub-Divisional Officer and consequent deprivation of opportunity to the appellant to cross examine them the appellant was prevented from putting his case in cross examination to those witnesses and thereby offering his own explanation and also showing that their previous statements were not worthy of credit. The enquiring officer was not absolved from this obvious duty to call Naumi Lal and Devi Dayal as also the Naib Tahsildar and the Tahsildar in order that they may be cross examined by the appellant by the absence of an express request from the side of the appellant to call them for cross examination as it was his initial duty to call these witnesses for cross examination in order to satisfy the principles of natural justice. The substance of the observations made by the Supreme Court in these two cases clearly was this that the witnesses, on whose statements reliance is sought to be placed in support of the charges, must be called and an opportunity given to the charged officer to cross examine them. It is no doubt not obligatory that the witness. if he has made a previous statement, should be asked to repeat that statement before the enquiring officer in the presence of the charged officer. It is no doubt not obligatory that the witness. if he has made a previous statement, should be asked to repeat that statement before the enquiring officer in the presence of the charged officer. It will be sufficient if the previous statement is put to the witness and its copy delivered to the officer charged. But this is possible only when the witness, on whose previous statement reliance is placed, is actually called. For then only could the previous statement be put to him and the witness cross examined by the charged officer. It is clear that in this sense there was violation of the principle of natural justice because Naumi Lal, Devi Dayal, Naib Tahsildar and the Tahsildar were not called as witnesses and opportunity to cross examine them was not afforded. So far as the report of the Naib Tahsildar is concerned serious allegations were made against him by the appellant to the effect that his report was actuated by malice, that the statements of witnesses were never recorded by him during enquiry and that they were subsequently fabricated. These imputations were brushed aside on frivolous grounds. There is prima facie material on record lending support to the imputation that the statements of witnesses were not recorded by the Naib Tahsildar in the course of enquiry and that they were subsequently prepared. It will be noticed that the Naib Tahsildar himself in his report (Annexure 7) stated that although sor the allegations of Begar were made by a large number of villagers against the appellant none was prepared to make a statement in support of the allegations in spite of the Naib Tahsildar's assurance of protection to them. The plain inference is Tahsildar's assurance of protection to them. The plain inference is that the Naib Tahsildar could not record the statement of any witness in support of the allegations made against the appellant. Annexure 13 of the writ petition is a note of the Naib Tahsildar dated 20-5-1968 addressed to the Tahsildar. It disclosed that the original file of the enquiry conducted by the Naib Tahsildar was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner. We examined the original file of this enquiry and noticed that on this report the Tahsildar enquired from the Naib Tahsildar the whereabouts of the papers connected with the enquiry. It disclosed that the original file of the enquiry conducted by the Naib Tahsildar was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner. We examined the original file of this enquiry and noticed that on this report the Tahsildar enquired from the Naib Tahsildar the whereabouts of the papers connected with the enquiry. The original file contains the Naib Tahsildar's endorsement which reads : "I have no papers in this connection." The Naib Tahsildar did not mention in his report (Annexure 7) that he had examined any witness during enquiry and the report did not purport to enclose the statement of any witness who may have been examined. The Sub-Divisional Officer in his enquiry report (Annexure 30) mentions that subsequently the statements of Shyama Charan Shukla, Shambhu, Sukkur, Jai Ram, Naumi Lal and Devi Diyal were submitted by the Tahsildar with an endorsement dated 8-6-1968 that these papers were subsequently received by him from the Naib Tahsildar with the pretext that they were lying unnoticed in some other papers of the Naib Tabsildar. These facts and circumstances clearly lend support to the appellant's plea that the statements of witnesses were subsequently fabricated by the Naib Tahsildar and he was clearly deprived of opportunity to establish this case by cross examination on account of failure to produce the Naib Tahsildar and there was thus violation of the principles of natural justice on the part of the Sub-Divisional Officer in relying upon the report of the Naib Tahsildar in the circumstances. 6. We may add here that apart from non-observance of the general and accepted principles of natural justice, as propounded by the Supreme Court in the above authorities, Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules in the portion extracted above provides that the witnesses must be called before the enquiring officer. To repeat the language of the rule, it says : "At that enquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the enquiring officer considers necessary." The clear implication of this language is that the witnesses must be called and must depose in the presence of the charged officer and the enquiring authority. For the evidence of the witness can be heard by the enquiring officer and the charged officer only when he is actually produced and deposes in the presence of both. For the evidence of the witness can be heard by the enquiring officer and the charged officer only when he is actually produced and deposes in the presence of both. In disciplinary proceedings conducted under Rule 55 of the said Rules ordinarily witnesses relied upon in support of the charge must be produced during the enquiry and an opportunity afforded to the charged officer to cross examine them. In case the witness has made a previous statement behind the back of the charged officer and the department chooses to rely on that statement in support of the charge it would not be incumbent on the enquiring officer to ask the witness to repeat every word of his previous statement. It will be enough if the previous statement of the witness is put to him and the witness verifies and confirms his previous statement in the presence and hearing of the charged officer and thereafter an opportunity of cross examining the witness on the previous statement is afforded. In the instant case it will be seen that the formalities enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 375 were not followed and the procedure prescribed by Rule 55 was not observed with the result that the entire proceedings in the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Deputy Commissioner in appeal stand vitiated. 7. Apart from this, as rightly urged by learned counsel for the appellant, the proceedings are also vitiated by the fact that the source of complaint giving rise to the disciplinary proceedings was itself tainted. There were no complaints at all, as a matter of fact, against the appellant. The applications filed by Ram Deo contained allegations against the Naib Tahsildar and Naumi Lai only. Into these allegations the Tahsildar was ordered to hold an enquiry but he surprisingly handed over the enquiry to the Naib Tahsildar, a person who was the very subject of the enquiry. The applications filed by Ram Deo contained allegations against the Naib Tahsildar and Naumi Lai only. Into these allegations the Tahsildar was ordered to hold an enquiry but he surprisingly handed over the enquiry to the Naib Tahsildar, a person who was the very subject of the enquiry. The result was, as could well be anticipated, the Naib Tahsildar completely exonerating himself shifted the accusations to the appellant and there is reason to think that in doing so he made a escape goat of the appellant in order to save his own skin, It is on such a report that the proceedings were started and, it is this report which formed the corner stone of the findings on the various charges and the order of dismissal. It is clear that the entire proceedings were vitiated and are therefore not sustainable in law. The order of dismissal of the appellant dated 1-4-1969 and the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 16-2-1970 passed in appeal are, therefore, liable to be quashed. 8. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8-2-1972 and quash the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nawabganj, District Barabanki, respondent No. 3 dated 1-4-1969, of which Annexure 31 of the writ petition is a copy, and the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, respondent No. 2, dated 16-2-1970, of which Annexure 34 of the writ petition is a copy. There shall be no order as to costs.