ORDER The applicant seeks to obtain leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of this Court dated 4th February, 1974. 2. The first ground raised by Dr. Ataide Lobo is that this Court did not issue a notice to the respondent to show cause why the sentence awarded to him by the Magistrate should not be enhanced prior to the passing of the impugned order. Dr. Lobo argues that this omission militates against the principles of natural justice and vitiates the entire proceedings. The contention of Dr. Lobo is factually incorrect. When a revision application was made by the respondent No. 2 to the Sessions Court for enhancing the punishment awarded by the Magistrate to the applicant, the Sessions Court issued a notice of the application to the applicant. This notice must have been accompanied by the application itself and was sufficient to give the applicant notice that the enhancement of his punishment was being contemplated by a court of law. It is true that the Sessions Court had no power to enhance the punishment but it certainly had the power of examining the case and particularly the question as to whether the punishment should be enhanced and to submit to this Court a report recommending the enhancement of punishment. The hearings that are held by the Sessions Court under Section 435 Cr.P.C. are hearings held by that Court on behalf of this Court and in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court. The Sessions Court is not a Court of revision. But the law has given to it limited powers for the purpose of helping this Court in exercise of its revisional powers. The Sessions Court examined the question of enhancement of punishment in detail and came to the definite conclusion that the punishment should be enhanced. The only technical error which the Sessions Court appears to have committed by oversight is that instead of referring the matter to this Court for orders it passed the order itself. 3. When the matter came up to this Court, brought before me not only by the respondent No. 2 but also by the applicant, by means of two different proceedings, the applicant took part in the proceedings through his duly constituted attorney, Shri Joshi. 3. When the matter came up to this Court, brought before me not only by the respondent No. 2 but also by the applicant, by means of two different proceedings, the applicant took part in the proceedings through his duly constituted attorney, Shri Joshi. It is abundantly clear, that the applicant, in view of what was stated in the application of the respondent No. 2 of which a copy was supplied to the applicant, was fully aware that this Court was holding hearings in those two matters for the purpose of arriving at the conclusions as to whether the punishment awarded by the Magistrate to the applicant should be enhanced or not. The applicant argued the case at length on the point that the punishment should not be enhanced and one of his arguments was that the question of punishment is within the discretion of the Magistrate and that such discretion should not be lightly interfered with. 4. Even if we assume for argument's sake, that the applicant had not received any notice to show cause why the punishment awarded by the Magistrate should not be enhanced. I have to assume that the applicant whilst arguing the case through his advocate against the enhancement of the punishment has waived the notice which according to him had to be given to him. At this stage it is pertinent to note that Section 439 which gives this Court powers to enhance the punishment in revision, provides in its Sub-Section (2), merely that an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence should be given to the accused whose punishment is proposed to enhanced. It does not speak of any specific form of notice to be issued or states that such notice has to be issued by the High Court. If any authoritative decision is necessary on this point we may refer to 'Jayaram Vithoba v. State of Bombay' ( AIR 1956 SC 146 ) = (1956 Cri LJ 318). In that decision the Supreme Court has in clear and unmistakable terms laid down that the law does not prescribe that any particular formalities should be complied with, before action is taken under that Section 439(2). In that decision the Supreme Court has in clear and unmistakable terms laid down that the law does not prescribe that any particular formalities should be complied with, before action is taken under that Section 439(2). It only provides that the accused should have an opportunity of showing cause against the conviction and enhancement and as the first appellant was heard on both the questions, the requirements of the section were satisfied. This decision is clearly applicable to the case on hand, wherein the applicant has had ample opportunity of showing cause against not only his conviction, but also against the enhancement and which opportunity was fully availed of by him. 5. I am therefore unable to accept the contention of Dr. Lobo that there was any error committed by this Court or that the error was substantial or that the error has affected the outcome of the case on merits or that this Court has acted without jurisdiction. 6. The question of want of notice along with the other questions raised by the applicant are questions whereby this Court is alleged to have committed various errors. These, to my mind, are questions of fact and not of law. The most important fact is that an error committed by this Court in the Judgment does not entitle the applicant to obtain leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. What entitles the applicant to obtain leave under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, which is the Article under which this application is made is the fact that the point decided involves a substantial question of law of public or private importance. If I were to consider the errors, which according to the applicant. I committed in the Judgment which is sought to be appealed against and which are set out by him in his application. I would have to sit in Judgment over my own Judgment. This not being allowed by law I am not entitled to consider the points raised by the applicant in his application, for the purpose of finding out whether leave to appeal to the Supreme Court should be granted or not. In the circumstances no case has been made out by the applicant which empowers this Court to grant him leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against my Judgment dated 4-2-1974. ORDER Application is dismissed. Leave refused.