Surendra Nato Bhattacharjee v. Harendra Nath Bhattacharjee
1974-10-09
A.K.Sinha, Chanda
body1974
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an application purported to be made under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff-appellant, inter alia, for removal of Receiver and for appointment: of another disinterested person as Receiver briefly in the following circumstances : the appellant has instituted a suit in the City Civil Court at Calcutta inter alia, for declaration of his right title and interest in respect of a business of mainly publishing medical books entitled S. Bhattacharyya and company including its branches and ether connected business. The petitioner after institution of suit made an application for appointment of Receiver but the Court returned the plaint on account of absence of jurisdiction. Against that order the petitioner came up in appeal to this Court and in the connected Rule obtained by the petitioner, respondent No. 1, Harendra nath Bhattacharyya, who is the son of the appellant, was full powers under or. 40 R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure but without any remuneration and without security He was also directed to submit quarterly accounts to the Court below and to act in all other matters under the directions of that court. 2. THE trial Court by an order dated 7.1.1967 directed the Receiver to deposit a sum of Rs. 250/- per month to the credit of the appellant without prejudice to the contentions of the respective parties. This Court ultimately allowed the appeal on terms and remanded the matter for further hearing on the points of jurisdiction and valuation. As regards the Receiver this court made the following order : "we would further record that as we have already appointed defendant No. 1 as Receiver in this appeal on a consideration of the circumstances of this case that appointment will continue subject to further order in the matter which may be found necessary by the learned trial Judge in accordance with law." The learned trial Court again passed an order for return of plaint against which the appellant preferred an appeal (F.M.A. 303 of 1971) in this Court. 3. THE present appellant then made an application for a direction upon the respondent No. 1 to pay the above sum of Rs. 250/- per month as maintenance with effort from August, 1970 whereupon by an order dated 10th September, 1971, this Court directed the respondent No. 1 to pay a sum of Rs.
3. THE present appellant then made an application for a direction upon the respondent No. 1 to pay the above sum of Rs. 250/- per month as maintenance with effort from August, 1970 whereupon by an order dated 10th September, 1971, this Court directed the respondent No. 1 to pay a sum of Rs. 250/- per month and also continue such payment month by month till the disposal of the appeal on the appellant's giving an undertaking to refund such amount in case he would lose the suit the appellant, it is alleged, gave necessary undertaking but the respondent No. 1 neglected and failed to pay such amounts. This appeal also ended in favour of the appellant and ultimately the suit is continuing in the trial Court The respondent No. 1, the Receiver, continues to function under the order made in the previous appeal. 4. THE appellant made an application in suit for removal of the Receiver on various charges but that application it is undisputed, was rejected on the ground that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to remove the Receiver who was appointed by this Court. The appellant thus has now made an application in this Court on a number of allegations which substantially are as follow: (a) non-payment of allowance to the appellant. (b) non-submission of accounts (c) misappropriation of huge sums (d) publication of books and import and export works of the disputed business are being made in the name of "current Publishers" and "current Distributors" started by the respondent no. 1 as his own business (e) producing cinema pictures at the cost of the disputed business. (f) There was prosecution and punishment of the respondent No. 1 for violation of foreign exchange regulations. (g) removing of goods and materials of the disputed business to his own business. (h) suits and criminal proceedings started by the Receiver without leave of the Court. 5. THIS application is opposed by the respondent No. 1, the Receiver. Apart from the general denial of allegations, as regards payment of Rs. 250/-per month, it is started that the payment could not be made as again the plaint was returned and further no undertaking as directed by the Court was ever given by the appellant and therefore no question of making any payment did arise.
Apart from the general denial of allegations, as regards payment of Rs. 250/-per month, it is started that the payment could not be made as again the plaint was returned and further no undertaking as directed by the Court was ever given by the appellant and therefore no question of making any payment did arise. It is also stated that besides this the appellant has huge bank balance by sale of his lands which were acquired for the purpose of Lake Town and V.I.P. Road leading to Dum Dum Airport. All these amount, it is stated were completely under the control of Biswanath Bhattacharya second son of the appellant and question of payment such an insignificant sum of Rs. 250/- an account of maintenance did not and could not arise. 6. AS regards the filing of accounts same explanation is given to the effect that the suit was not maintainable regularly maintained True copies of abstract of accounts, as appears, were annexed to this affidavit from 16.8.67 to 15.9.73. It is also stated that it was impossible to cause the accounts of all the eleven branches of the disputed business to be produced before the trial court As regards publication of books in the name of "current Publishers" and "current Distributors" the fact does not appear to have been denied but it is stated that Biswanath Bhattacharyya, his other brother, respondent No. 2, also started a publishing business in medical books with the business of the firm in suit through Bijoya Publishing House at 27a, Khelat Babu Lane, as proprietor thereof. One of its publications is a book styled as "diseases of Ear, Nose and Throat" by Dr. Barun Kumar Roy chowdhury published in January, 1970. He has also constructed a three-storied building in Salt Lake Area. 7. THE allegations regarding production of motion pictures are not denied. But it is stated that this business has been started with partner-ship of some outsider and it has nothing to do with the business in question in the present suit. It is stated that he started this business initially by taking rs. 8,000/- as loan from one D. K. Neyogi and also several other sums from other Doctors in clause vii of paragraph 4 of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on 20th March, 1974. 8.
It is stated that he started this business initially by taking rs. 8,000/- as loan from one D. K. Neyogi and also several other sums from other Doctors in clause vii of paragraph 4 of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on 20th March, 1974. 8. THE respondent No. 1 has also denied the allegation of foreign exchange regulations and in any event, it is stated that he has preferred am appeal before the Central Board of revenue. As regards removal of goods of the disputed business they are covered by general denial of allegations and as regards the filling up suit and criminal proceeding it is stated that he was bound to institute this proceeding for the purpose of preservation and protection of the business. 9. UPON these allegations and counter-allegations it seems clear that there has been admitted failure on the part of the Receiver at least in two matters namely, (i) to pay Rs. 250/- per month and (ii) to file accounts at the direction of the Court. It is also admitted that he published certain books once published by S. Bhattacharyya and Co., in the name of two other firms as alleged. But the Receiver has certain explanation to each of these item question is whether those explanations are sufficient or proper enough to be accepted by this Court. 10. AS regards the payment of rs. 250/- p. m. we have already noticed that the Receiver wanted to cover his failure on two grounds. Firstly, there was no suit pending in the trial Court at the material time and in any event no undertaking as required by this Court was given by the appellant. Secondly, the appellant himself was rich enough and he did not require the paltry sum of rs. 250/- per month for his maintenance. We think none of these grounds are sufficient in justify the failure of the Receiver to carry out the mandatory directions of the Court. No paper has been produced by the Receiver to show that at the material item when the plaint was returned the money tendered in terms of the directions of this Court was refused.
We think none of these grounds are sufficient in justify the failure of the Receiver to carry out the mandatory directions of the Court. No paper has been produced by the Receiver to show that at the material item when the plaint was returned the money tendered in terms of the directions of this Court was refused. Next, as to the failure of the appellant, to file the undertaking, it is undisputed that the undertaking was filed by the appellant in this Court on 13th september, 1971 within time with a copy served on the Advocate on record of the respondent No. 1. Then on 16th November, 1971 it is also not disputed a letter was written by the Advocate of the appellant to the Advocate of the Respondent No. 1 remind of his failure to make payment but no reply was given. Then a notice was given for mentioning the matter and in fact it was mentioned before the Hon'ble mr. Justice A.K. De on February 9, 1974 in presence of the Advocate of the respondent No. 1. In face of these facts it is now contended on behalf of respondent No. 1, firstly, that the undertaking actually filed in this Court was not a proper undertaking as it was not verified by an affidavit. But Mr. Sinha could not show us any rule of this Court by which a written undertaking in absence of a specific direction of this Court must have to be affirmed by an affidavit. Mr. Sinha, however, has strongly asserted that this is the usual practice of this Court. It is difficult to see how in absence of any specific directions or appropriate statutory provision or statutory rules a person required to give a written undertaking would equally be required to verify it by an affidavit. Mr. Sinha has then contended that as the appellant is old and infirm, he could not have signed the undertaking in presence of his lawyer in Court and the signature appearing in the undertaking is not the signature of the appellant. This argument is based oh certain averments made by the respondent No. 1 in paragraph 14 of his further affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on 22nd August, 1974. This is strongly opposed on behalf of the appellant.
This argument is based oh certain averments made by the respondent No. 1 in paragraph 14 of his further affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on 22nd August, 1974. This is strongly opposed on behalf of the appellant. It appears that in the affidavit put in by the appellant's wife bijoya Debi affirmed on 30th August, 1974, it is stated in paragraph 4 that her husband visited the Court of the sub-Divisional. Magistrate Court at barrackpore on several dates between 10.1.74 and 20.1.74 in connection with a case filed against her husband for trespass by the State. It is further stated that he signed the Bail Bond in the said criminal case on several occasions and the last bail bond was given to him in the said Court on 20.7.1974. This criminal case, it is further stated, was filed at the instance of respondent no. 1 by the Manager of the Lucknow branch of the disputed business. It further appears that Mr. Shakti Pada chatterjee, advocate who represents the appellant has himself affirmed an affidavit on 19th August, 1974 stating in paragraph 2 thereof that Sri Surendra nath Bhattacharyya came in this hon'ble Court on 13.9.1971 and met him in the Library of Bar Association, high Court, Room No. 4 and that he signed the said undertaking in his presence. Thereafter he put down his own signature and made over to his clerk with an instruction to serve a copy thereof on the respondent No. 1 and to file the original in this Court. Ii the affidavit-in-opposition already referred to above, the respondent No. 1 did not deny the specific statements of mr. Chatterjee in paragraph 2 of his affidavit. Instead he has merely stated his opinion about the genuineness of the signature. In these circumstances, we must therefore accept the statements of Mr. Chatterjee, the Ld. Advocate, who asserts that the appellant has signed the undertaking in this Court. But this apart, it is a matter, we think, we should not allow the Receiver to agitate at this state. For it is undisputed that the copy of the undertaking was served on the Advocate of the Receiver as back as 1971 and thereafter the matter was mentioned in this Court in presence of his Advocate but no step was taken by the Receiver to prove that the signature appearing on the written undertaking was not the signature of the appellant.
The other point as to the appellant's economic sufficiency can be by no means be accepted as a proper plea in defence of Receiver's in action. The receiver being an Officer of the Court is bound to carry out the directions at all events except that he may be at liberty to make proper prayer before the Court for reconsideration of the order or directions. In our opinion, the belated plea is taken up by the receiver only to cover up his default in carrying out or complying with the directions of this Court. 11. AS regards the failure to file the accounts in terms of the order of this Court the explanation given is highly unsatisfactory. If there were any such difficulties as stated the Receiver should have obtained appropriate directions from Court. Instead, it appears, he did not take any step whatsoever. On the other hand, the attitude taken by him seems to be extremely unhelpful and practically amounts to flouting of the order of the Court. 12. AS regards the publication of books there appears to be no explanation as to why the books in question belonging to the disputed business were published at all in the name of other firms. It is no ground to state that the other respondent has started similar business. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to go into the other allegations made in the application we think these are sufficient to hold that the Receiver is guilty of conduct which warrants his removal. 13. IT is however, contended by mr. Sinha that since this Court is not in season of appeal, and for the matter of that suit is proceeding in the trial court and further in view of the directions already given by this Court in the appeal upon the trial Court to pass necessary orders and directions tin all other matters regarding the Receiver, this Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order of removal of the Receiver or to appoint any other Receiver again. In support of his contention he has cited before us a decision of the Patna high Court in (3) Kumar Jagadish bahadur v. Baldev Prasad, A.I.R. 1953 pat.
In support of his contention he has cited before us a decision of the Patna high Court in (3) Kumar Jagadish bahadur v. Baldev Prasad, A.I.R. 1953 pat. 253, to impress upon us that in the circumstances revealed in this case and in view of the order made by this Court any application for discharge of the receiver must be made to the Lower court. We, however, think that this case is distinguishable on facts. In this case, in the compromise petition that was put in it was stated amongst either things that "the Receiver will be deemed to have been appointed by the Court below and will be subject to the directions of that Court in the management of his property put into charge as receiver." In that context it was held that the lower Court was only competent to remove the Receiver. It is, however, well-settled that when a Receiver is appointed by the appellate court the power to remove or discharge such Receiver, unless there is specific direction given to the trial court in this behalf, will be with the court of appeal and not with the trial court. This principle extends to cases where even when the appeal is no longer pending, such Receiver must be regarded as Receiver of the property of which he has been put in possession until he is finely discharged and the appellate Court has jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to the Receiver. (See (1) C.E. Grey v. Woogramohun I.L.R. 28 Cal. . 790 (2) Dwijendra krishna v. Surendra Nath A.I.R. 1827 cal. 548, (5) Purshottam Das v. Prem Narain A.I.R. 1956 All. (665). It follows that the appellate Court even where no appeal is pending retains its jurisdiction over the matters relating to receiver and can review its own order by discharge of the Receiver or by appointment of another Receiver or joint Receivers in its discretion unless the original appointment of the Receiver by the Court of appeal was either for a limited purpose or for a fixed period. 14. MR. Sinha has next contended relying on Or. 19 R. 2 of the Code of civil Procedure that upon his application made on 28th June, 1974, the deponent in the Affidavit which relates to the genuineness of signature must be directed to attend the Court for cross-examination.
14. MR. Sinha has next contended relying on Or. 19 R. 2 of the Code of civil Procedure that upon his application made on 28th June, 1974, the deponent in the Affidavit which relates to the genuineness of signature must be directed to attend the Court for cross-examination. For the reasons already given we are not prepared to consider this application or give any such direction to the deponent concerned to offer himself for cross-examination by the respondent No. 1. It is clear that this application is highly motivated and made to avoid the liabilities the Receiver has incurred by not complying with the directions of this court. Mr. Sinha has then urged that as regards misconduct arising out of non-deposit of the amount or filling of accounts as directed the Court may at best compel specific performance by attachment of property under Or. 40 r. 4 of the Code but these failures on the part of the Receiver do not warrant his removal. We cannot accept this contention as correct for the provisions contained in Order 40 Rule 4 are only additional powers given to the Court for indemnification by the Receiver. But these provisions do not, in any event, fetter the powers of the Court to remove the Receiver In its discretion for its misconduct. Mr. Sinha has lastly contended on this aspect that since the trial Court rejected the application for removal of the Receiver the appellant could have only preferred an appeal but a further application to this Court is not maintainable. This argument is wholly misconceived. The application before the trial Court was rejected as it had no jurisdiction to remove the Receiver which was appointed by the appellate court. The appellant, therefore, made a substantive application before the court of appeal for appropriate reliefs regarding removal of the present receiver as also further appointment of another Receiver. 15. NOW, in the view we have taken in the matter as to the conduct of the receiver, we think the Receiver ought to be removed. But having regard to the fact that the Receiver has been managing the business for a long time and also that he has already deposited a large sum at the rate of Rs.
15. NOW, in the view we have taken in the matter as to the conduct of the receiver, we think the Receiver ought to be removed. But having regard to the fact that the Receiver has been managing the business for a long time and also that he has already deposited a large sum at the rate of Rs. 250/- per month under previous order of this court and also disclosed certain abstracts of accounts along with his affidavit-in-opposition for certain period from 1967 to 1973, we think, the Receiver ought to be given an opportunity to continue to function. But at the same time it would be just and convenient to appoint another Receiver along with him for a limited purpose namely for supervision of the accounts of the disputed business including all its branches. It is fairly settled that in the interest of justice the Court has always the power to appoint such Receiver even where a Receiver has already been appointed without removal of the existing Receiver. This view substantially finds support in a Bench decision of this Court in (4) Nandalal banerjee v. Jogesh Banerjee I.L.R. 1954 (1) Cal. 293, where Dasgupta J., as he then was, has observed, infer alia, as fellows : "in the interest of justice the court has right in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to make an order appointing such Receiver where a Receiver has already been appointed in terms of an Award which forms part of a decree though there is no provision for removal or partial removal of such Receiver under the ordinary provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure." It follows that without removal of the existing Receiver another Receiver for a limited purpose may be appointed by the Court in appropriate circumstances. 16. ACCORDINGLY, we appoint Mr. Alak Biswas one of the practising Advocates of this Court, a joint Receiver only for the purpose supervision of the accounts of the disputed business including all its branches. He shall visit the Head Office of the business and also its all other branches in or outside calcutta as and when required.
16. ACCORDINGLY, we appoint Mr. Alak Biswas one of the practising Advocates of this Court, a joint Receiver only for the purpose supervision of the accounts of the disputed business including all its branches. He shall visit the Head Office of the business and also its all other branches in or outside calcutta as and when required. He shall also have access to all the books of accounts and the connected documents and papers of the said business and all its branches and the existing receiver respondent No. 1, shall make all these account books, connected documents, papers available or cause them to be produced at the business premises or in its branch office as the case may be, as and when required by him. The existing Receiver shall also produce all the accounts or cause them to be produced before Mr. Biswas which are required to be filed in Court by him in terms of the previous order of this Court. The newly appointed Receiver Mr. Alak Biswas shall get a remuneration of Rs. 400/- (Rupees Four hundred) per month which shall be paid by the existing Receiver, respondent no. 1, out of the funds of the disputed business with effect from the date of this order within first week of each succeeding month. The newly appointed Receiver shall also be paid, out of the funds of the company over and above monthly remuneration, his usual travelling allowance and other allowances, if there be any, within the same period. Let a Writ be issued by the office immediately to Mr. Alak Biswas advocate. The application is disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs. The appellant petitioner will be at liberty to withdraw all moneys that are deposited in court by the Receiver as and by way of his maintenance in terms of the previous order of this court in F.M.A. 303 of 1971. Let a copy of this order be sent to the court below as quickly as possible.