( 1 ) THIS Rule is directed against an Order dated the 6th February, 1974 passed by Sri G. B. Ghosh, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, rejecting the accused-petitioners' application for discharge under section 253 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and for quashing the proceedings, being case no. C/749 of 1973, pending before the said learned Magistrate under sections 386, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) A petition of complaint was filed in the Court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta on 21. 11. 1973 by the complainant-opposite party no. 1, Govind Prosad Lath, against four accused persons under section 386, 467, 471, 403 and 477a of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 120b of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case inter alia is that the complainant was appointed as a distributor under the accused no. 2 Janak Raj Punni on a commission basis on the 14th June, 1966; that the accused no. 2 is the proprietor of M/s. J. R. Trading Company which was appointed as the Sole Selling Agent in West Bengal of Messrs Vardhaman Spinning and General Mills Ltd. ; having its office at 171a, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Calcutta and the accused no. 1 Prakash Chandra Sharma is the Accountant thereof; that in course of his business as the distributor under the accused no. 2 the complainant's commission on the said account amounted to about Rs. 26,000/- on 31. 3. 1973 but he same remained unpaid; that on the 29th March, 1973 when the complainant refused to dispose of a stock of cotton years approximately valued at Rs. 5,17,000/- lying in the godown of the accused at no. 2, Digambar Jain Temple Road, Calcutta in the black market, he was surrounded and under threats of violence and severe injuries, was forced to sign a blank voucher of M/s. Vardhaman Spinning and General Mills Ltd. purporting to be a receipt for Rs. 5,17,000/- and two blank letter-heads of the complainant; that the complainant, who came out after being assaulted, reported the matter to the police and also informed the Bureau of Investigation under the Ministry of Finance, Government of West Bengal about the misconduct and evasion of taxes etc. on the part of the accused persons; that as a result there of the department searched the office of the accused persons on 7. 4. on the part of the accused persons; that as a result there of the department searched the office of the accused persons on 7. 4. 1973 and seized several documents including some books of accounts and other papers from different places; that the accused persons in pursuance of their conspiracy falsified and/or caused to be falsified books of accounts of M/s. Vardhaman Spinning and General Mills Ltd. by issuing bogus receipts from different parties on March 29, 1973 and false entries were made to implicate the complainant falsely in order to cause wrongful loss to him; that in collusion with each other the accused persons had falsified and/or forged or caused to falsify or forge the said blank voucher and letter-heads and the books accounts and converted the voucher for Rs. 5,17,000/- on the basis whereof a case was instituted against the complainant in the Ludhiana Court; that the complainant had already moved the High Court at Chandigarh for quashing the said criminal proceeding and the matter is still pending; that the accused persons committed offences punishable under sections 386, 467, 471, 403 and 477a of the Indian Penal Code red with section 120b of the Indian Penal Code; and that the complaint could not be made earlier in the expectation that the police authority would move in the matter. ( 3 ) THE learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta examined the complainant and one Chandrabati Prasad on S. A. and by his order dated the 21st November, 1973 summoned the accused nos. 1 and 2 Prakash Chandra Sharma and Janak Raj Punni under sections 386, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and issued warrants of arrest against the other two accused persons under the same sections. A search warrant as prayed for was also issued. The accused persons thereafter appeared and were released on bail. On 11. 2. 1973, an application was filed on behalf of the accused no. 4, Shri Paul Oswal for staying the proceedings pending before the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta till the disposal of the criminal case pending before the Ludhiana Court or in the alternative for discharging the accused persons under section 253 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In course of the arguments, the prayer for staying the proceedings was given up and that for discharging only was pressed. In course of the arguments, the prayer for staying the proceedings was given up and that for discharging only was pressed. Sri G. B. Ghosh, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, ultimately by his Order dated the 6th February, 1974 rejected the prayer for discharge for reasons mentioned therein. The said order was impugned and the present Rule was issued along with an Order for interim stay of all further proceedings. ( 4 ) THE submissions of Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, Senior Advocate (with Messrs Jagadish Krishna Banerjee and Prabhjot Singh, Advocates), on behalf of the three accused-petitioners, have two dimensions. The first one is one of law, relating to procedure, arising out of the absence of an Order in writing under section 196a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, consenting to the initiation of the proceedings; and the second one is on merits viz. that on the materials of the case, the prosecution is unfounded and a continuance thereof will be an abuse of the process of the court, Mr. Asoke Sen, Senior Advocate (with Messrs D. K. Dutt, N. K. Choudhury, Tapan Kumar Mitra, P. B. Chakraborty, and S. P. Talukdar, Advocates) appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 joined issue and contended that the point of law raised by Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee is untenable inasmuch as no such sanction is necessary because no cognizance was taken of any offence of criminal conspiracy to commit a non-cognizable offence and no process also was issued thereunder. Mr. Asoke Sen further submitted that the contentions based on merits are pre-mature and the same can only be decided on proper materials at the proper stage. Mr. Sankar Das Banerjee, Senior Advocate (with Messrs Shyam Sundar Paul, and Sasanka Kumar Ghosh, Advocates) appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 2, Darshan Kumar Oswal, supported the Rule submitting inter alia that because of the procedural defect the proceedings should be quashed at the earliest stage. The learned Advocates for the respective parties referred to several cases which will be referred to and considered in their proper context. Mr. Sumit Kumar Moitra, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State contended that quashing is an extra-ordinary proceedings and should not be ordinarily allowed at the earliest stage before the requisite materials are on the record. The learned Advocates for the respective parties referred to several cases which will be referred to and considered in their proper context. Mr. Sumit Kumar Moitra, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State contended that quashing is an extra-ordinary proceedings and should not be ordinarily allowed at the earliest stage before the requisite materials are on the record. He however, submitted that there are conflicting decisions on the necessity of a consent in writing to initiate such proceedings and he referred in this context to the case of Bhanwar Singh and another appellants v State of Rajasthan respondent reported in (1) AIR 1968 SC 709 . ( 5 ) THE first dimension of Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee's submission is one of procedure, relating to a non-conformance to the mandatory provisions of section 196a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of the absence of the requisite order in writing consenting to the initiation of the proceedings. The steps of his reasoning in this context are that under section 190 (1), the Court at the outset takes cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such offence or upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer or upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed; that the petition of complaint clearly disclosed a distinct offence of criminal conspiracy under section 120b of the Indian Penal Code to commit various non-cognizable offences under sections 386, 467, 471, 403 and 477a, of the Indian Penal Code; that the Learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, when he took cognizance on 21. 11. 1973 after examining the complainant and his witness on S. A. , did so on a complaint disclosing an offence of criminal conspiracy as mentioned above; that under section 196a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no court shall take cognizance of the offence of a criminal conspiracy to commit non-cognizable offences unless the requisite authority, empowered in this behalf by the State Government, have by an order in writing consented to the initiation of the proceedings; and that such consent being non est, the entire proceedings, as initiated, are not maintainable in law. Mr. Sankar Das Banerjee, on behalf of the accused opposite party no. 2, supported the said submissions while Mr. Mr. Sankar Das Banerjee, on behalf of the accused opposite party no. 2, supported the said submissions while Mr. Sumit Kumar Moitra, appearing on behalf of the State, submitted that the decisions on the point are conflicting and relied in this context on the case of Bhanwar Singh and another appellants v. State of Rajasthan respondents reported in AIR 1968 SC 709 . Mr. Asoke Sen, appearing on behalf of the complainant opposite party no. 1, joined issue. While he did not dispute the proposition that for taking cognizance of an offence of criminal conspiracy to commit non-cognizable offences, there must be an order in writing by a competent authority, consenting to the initiation of the proceedings, he contended emphatically that no such consent in writing is necessary with regard to distinct non-cognizable offences committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. Mr. Sen further contended that the cloud raised on the point can be lifted by a reference to the provisions of the statute as well as to stare decisis. The steps of Mr. Sen's reasoning are that the petition of complaint disclosed not only the offence of criminal conspiracy but also distinct non-cognizable offences, requiring no such sanction; that the averments made in paragraph 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 bring to light distinct non-cognizable offences; that both in the cause title as well as in the ultimate prayer, several non-cognizable offences have been stated as being read with section 120b of the Indian Penal Code; that in order to attract the bar contained in section 196a (2) Criminal Procedure Code, the offence of criminal conspiracy alleged must relate to the commission of a non-cognizable offence and that as a distinct offence; that the words used in section 190 (1) relating to cognizance of offences by Magistrates are that ?may take cognizance of any offence? and not of all offences; that in this case the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, took no cognizance of any offence of criminal conspiracy to commit non-cognizable offences but of several distinct non-cognizable offences only; and as such there is no question of any non-conformance to the mandatory provisions of section 196a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his contentions, Mr. Sen referred to the relevant provisions of the statue and to several decisions which will be permanently considered. In support of his contentions, Mr. Sen referred to the relevant provisions of the statue and to several decisions which will be permanently considered. ( 6 ) FOR a proper decision of the point, a reference has to be made to the provisions of the statute in the first instance. Section 196a of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly provides at the outset that ?no Court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120b of the Indian Penal Code?, and then lays down the two different categories in sub-sections (1) and (2) as well as a proviso given thereunder relating to section 195 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this case, we are neither concerned with sub-section (1) nor with the proviso. The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 196a of the Code of Criminal Procedure are relevant and are as follows: - ?in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence, or a cognizable offence not punishable with death, (imprisonment for life) or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, unless the State Government or a Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the State Government has, by order in writing, consented to the initiation of the proceedings. ? In this, case, however, we are concerned only with non-cognizable offences and therefore, with the first part of sub-section (2) of section 196a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The aforesaid provisions clearly indicate that when there is an allegation of an offence of Criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120b of the Indian Penal Code, the object whereof is to commit any non-cognizable offence, the Court shall not take cognizance thereof without an order in writing by the requisite authority, consenting to the initiation of the proceedings. It is significant that the words used in the statute categorically refer to ?the offence of criminal conspiracy? and not to other non-cognizable offences committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. The principles of intent and of meaning by which statutes should be interpreted, lend assurance to the abovementioned interpretation. Some meaning and effect must be given to the clear and categorical words used in the statues as reflecting the intention of the legislature. The words of a statue must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. The principles of intent and of meaning by which statutes should be interpreted, lend assurance to the abovementioned interpretation. Some meaning and effect must be given to the clear and categorical words used in the statues as reflecting the intention of the legislature. The words of a statue must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. As was observed by Lord Summer in the case of Quebec Railway Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry reported in (2) AIR 1920 P. C. pp. 181 at p. 186 that ?effect must be given if possible to all the words used, for the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. ?we respectfully agree with the same and hold accordingly that in view of the clear provisions of the statutes, the bar under section 196a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure relates only to the offence of criminal conspiracy of the categories provided for in sub-clause (a) or (b) thereof as a distinct offence committed in pursuance of the said conspiracy. The court is prevented only from taking cognizance of an offence of criminal conspiracy, which is clearly distinct from a separate and substantive offence of non-cognizable nature committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. As to the other facet of Mr. Banerjee's submissions based on the provisions of Section 190 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there appears to be a conflict of decisions. Mr. Asoke Sen referred to the case of Gopal Das Sindhi and others appellant v. State of Assam and another Respondent reported in (3) AIR 1961 Supreme Court 986 wherein Mr. Justice S. J. Imam, delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 989 that ?we cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word 'may' in Section 190 to mean ?must?. Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee referred to the case of A. C. Agarwal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi and another (In all the Appeals) Appellants v. Mst. Ram Kali etc Respondents reported in (4) AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1 wherein Mr. Justice K. S. Hegde delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 5 that ?under Section. Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee referred to the case of A. C. Agarwal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi and another (In all the Appeals) Appellants v. Mst. Ram Kali etc Respondents reported in (4) AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1 wherein Mr. Justice K. S. Hegde delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 5 that ?under Section. 190 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of any cognizable offence brought to his notice. The words ?may take cognizance? in this context means ?must take cognizance?. He has no discretion in this matter, otherwise that section will be violative of Art. 14. ? Their context of the observations, however, is different and without entering into the conflicting interpretations of the word 'may' in Section 190 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the various decisions of the Supreme Court thereupon, it may be observed that the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta in this case took cognizance of distinct non-cognizable offences committed in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy, and not of an offence or criminal conspiracy to commit non-cognizable offences punishable under section 120b of the Indian Penal Code, ruling out thereby the necessity of a consent in writing under section 196a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 7 ) WE may now turn to the decisions cited by the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the different parties. Mr. Sen referred to the case of Madan Lal Appellant v. The State of Punjab, (5) reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court page 1590. Mr. Justice Shelat delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 1594 that ?the conspiracy to commit an offence is by itself distinct from the offence to do which the conspiracy is entered into. Such an offence, if actually committed, would be the subject-matter of a separate charge. If that offence does not require sanction though the offence of conspiracy does not sanction is not obtained, it would appear that the Court can proceed with the trial to the substantive offence as if there was no change of conspiracy?. Such an offence, if actually committed, would be the subject-matter of a separate charge. If that offence does not require sanction though the offence of conspiracy does not sanction is not obtained, it would appear that the Court can proceed with the trial to the substantive offence as if there was no change of conspiracy?. In the case under consideration before the Supreme Court there was not only a charge for conspiracy under section 120b of the Indian Penal Code but also two other separate charges for offences under sections 409 and 477a alleged to have been committed in pursuance of the conspiracy and it was observed by Mr. Justice Shelat at page 1595 that ?though the charge under section 120-B required sanction no such sanction was necessary in respect of the charge under S. 409. At the most, therefore, it can be argued that the Magistrate took illegal cognizance of the charge under S. 120-B as S. 196-A (2) prohibits entertainment of certain kinds of complaints for conspiracy punishable under S. 120-B without the required sanction. The absence of sanction does not prevent the Court from proceeding with the trial if the complaint also charges a co-conspirator of the principal offence committed in pursuance of the conspiracy or for abetment by him of any such offence committed by one of the co-conspirators under S. 109 of the Penal Code. ? The Supreme Court ultimately held that ?in our view, the fact that sanction was not obtained in respect of the complaint under S. 120-B did not vitiate the trial on the substantive charge under S. 409. ? Mr. Sen also relied upon the several decisions referred to and approved of by the Supreme Court in the abovementioned case viz. , those of Sukumar Chatterjee v. Mofizuddin Ahmed, (6) 25 Cal. WN 357; Syed Yawar Bakht v. Emperor (7) reported in 44 Cal. WN 474 : Ram Pat v. State (8) reported in (1962) 64 Punjab LR 519; and Nibaran Chandra v. Emperor (9) reported in AIR 1929 Cal 754. We respectfully agree with the principles laid down in the abovementioned cases and applying the same to the present case, we hold that absence of any consent in writing in this case, has not resulted in any non-conformance to the provisions of section 196a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. We respectfully agree with the principles laid down in the abovementioned cases and applying the same to the present case, we hold that absence of any consent in writing in this case, has not resulted in any non-conformance to the provisions of section 196a (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Sumit Kumar Moitra, Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the State submitted that conflicting views have been taken by the Supreme Court on the point and he referred to in this context to the case of Bhanwar Singh and another appellants v. State of Rajasthan respondent reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court page 709. He inter alia contended that the decision in Bhanwar Singh's case was a contrary one, though arrived at on a consideration of Madan Lal's case, referred to above. On an anxious consideration of the facts involved in Bhanwar Singh's case and also the principles laid down therein, we hold that the submissions of Mr. Moitra are not tenable. The Supreme Court had referred to the earlier decision in Madan Lal's case and it did not take ultimately a different view. Mr. Justice Vaidialingam delivering the judgment of the Court observed that ?the view of the various High Courts, to which we will refer presently, and with which view we agree, is that no sanction is necessary, under S. 196-A (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the object of the conspiracy is to commit the offence of cheating (420 IPC), but, forgery of documents (467 IPC) and similar non-cognizable offences are also committed as merely steps taken, by one or other of the accused, for the purpose of effecting the main object of the conspiracy A trial, under such circumstances, for offences under S. 120-B, read with S. 467/471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, without obtaining sanction is neither illegal, nor invalid. ? It proceeded to observe that ?even if the object of conspiracy, viz. , of cheating is sought to be attained by resort to non-cognizable offences, as in the case before us, sanction under S. 196-A of the Code is not necessary. ? The ultimate findings arrived at by the Supreme Court are at page 713 viz. ? It proceeded to observe that ?even if the object of conspiracy, viz. , of cheating is sought to be attained by resort to non-cognizable offences, as in the case before us, sanction under S. 196-A of the Code is not necessary. ? The ultimate findings arrived at by the Supreme Court are at page 713 viz. , that ?therefore the trial of these accused, for offences under Section 120b read with sections 467/471 and 429 I. P. C. , and other allied offences, cannot be held to be illegal, on the ground that sanction under section 196a (2) of the Code, has not been obtained. ? We respectfully agree with the said observations and we find that not only the facts of the said case are different but the principles again, laid down do not lend assurance to the submissions made by Mr. Moitra that the principles of the latter case are in conflict with the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Lal's case. Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee who contended that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code and as such there has been a non-conformance to section 196a (2) of the Code, relied on the case of Govind Mehta appellant v. The State of Bihar respondent (10) reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1708. On a consideration of the principles laid down in the said case, we do not however agree with Mr. Banerjee's submissions inasmuch as the observations made in the abovementioned decision are not, in any way, in conflict with the principles laid down in the earlier decisions. Mr. Justice Vaidialingam delivering the judgment of the Court observed at page 1711 that ?section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of Magistrate to take cognizance under S. 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under S. 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under S. 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of S. 195 (1 ). Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under S. 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under S. 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of S. 195 (1 ). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of S. 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences enumerated therein. ? We respectfully agree but the point involved in the present case, however, is wholly different. True it is that the learned Magistrate must, before taking cognizance, examine, the facts of the complaint and determine whether his power is barred in the absence of any consent in writing as provided for under the respective provisions of the Code and that if it be so, the resultant non-compliance vitiates the cognizance and the trial. This proposition, however, is not disputed by Mr. Sen and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the earlier decisions referred to above do not also run off at a tangent from the observations made in Govind Mehta's case. The point, ultimately, involved in the present case is whether the conspiracy to commit an offence is by itself distinct from the offence to do which the conspiracy is entered into, forming the subject-matter of a separate charge. The Supreme Court laid down in Madan Lal's case and the same was approved of in Bhanwar Singh's case that if the distinct offence to commit which the conspiracy is entered into does not require sanction though the offence of conspiracy does not sanction is not obtained, the Court nonetheless ?can proceed with the trial as to the substantive offence as if there was no charge of conspiracy. ? The imprimatur of judicial decisions therefore lend assurance to the contentions of Mr. Ashoke Sen. The first dimension of Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee's submission relating to the maintainability of the proceedings accordingly fails. ( 8 ) THE other dimension of Mr. Banerjee's submissions relates to merits and requires a consideration of facts. Such a consideration, however, would be pre-mature at this stage in the absence of the requisite materials which are yet to forthcame. Quashing is an extraordinary matter and should not be resorted to excepting in exceptional cases. ( 8 ) THE other dimension of Mr. Banerjee's submissions relates to merits and requires a consideration of facts. Such a consideration, however, would be pre-mature at this stage in the absence of the requisite materials which are yet to forthcame. Quashing is an extraordinary matter and should not be resorted to excepting in exceptional cases. A reference in this context may be made to the case of R. P. Kapur Appellant v. State of Punjab Respondent (11) reported in AIR 1960 Supreme Court 866. Mr. Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar (As His Lordship then was) observed therein at page 869 that ?ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. ? The Supreme Court further held in the abovementioned case that ?the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. ? On an anxious consideration of the facts and circumstances and also the stage reached, it is difficult for us to hold either way and we keep accordingly the same open for being decided by the learned Trying Magistrate in accordance with law and on the materials that may be adduced by the respective parties. We make it quite clear, however, that we make no observations as to the merits of the case. The second dimension of the submissions laid down by Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee accordingly fails as being pre-mature. ( 9 ) IN the result, the Rule is discharge; the Order dated the 6th February, 1974 passed by Sri G. B. Ghosh, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, in case no. C/749 of 1973 under sections 386, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby upheld; and we direct that the case shall go back to the court below for being tried in accordance with law and expeditiously by the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, from the stage reached before the present Rule was issued. The records shall go down as early as possible. Rule discharged.