Judgment.- An intricate and important question of interest is raised for resolution in this criminal revision case. The question is: What is the true scope and extent of the enquiry envisaged under section 6-B of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ? The answer to the question must necessarily depend on the legislative language employed in the section. Section 6-B reads: “Issue of show cause notice before confiscation of foodgrains etc.- No order confiscating any essential commodity shall be made under section 6-A unless the owner of such essential commodity or the person from whom it is seized. (a) is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the essential commodity; (b) is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation; and (c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter”. The section itself was inserted by section 3 of Act XXV of 1966. The section prescribes the procedure to be followed before any essential commodity seized in pursuance of an order made under section 3 of the Act is confiscated by the Collector under section 6-A of the Act. The section lays down: (a) that a notice in writing must be given to the owner or person from whom the essential commodity is seized; (b) such notice must contain the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the essential commodity seized; (c) an opportunity of miking a representation in writing within a reasonable time against the grounds of confiscation should be given to the owner or person from whom the essential commodity is seized; and (d) such owner or person should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The procedural safeguard provided in the section contemplates two stages in the proceeding. In the first stage an opportunity is afforded to the owner or person from whom the essential commodity is seized to make a representation in writing within a reasonable time against the grounds of confiscation communicated to him. The second stage is after making such a representation in writing, he is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The scope of the first part of the enquiry is plain enough. The second stage is after making such a representation in writing, he is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The scope of the first part of the enquiry is plain enough. But what does the second part of the enquiry relating to “reasonable opportunity of being heard” imply? 2. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that a “reasonable opportunity of being heard” implies the examination of the concerned person and his witnesses, if any, produced by him. On the other hand, the Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. Ramaswamy, submits that the expression contemplates only an opportunity of being heard in person or through Counsel and the enquiring authority is not obliged to examine either the person, concerned or his witnesses. 3. The Essential Commodities Act was enacted in 1955 with the dominant object and intendment of ensuring equitable distribution and adequate availability at fair prices of essential commodities defined or notified under the Act. But the administrative and penal measures devised for dealing with the defaulting persons under the Act were rendered ineffective by getting round the provisions of the Act by some sections of trade and middlemen. In order to make the administration of the Act more effective, sections 6-A to 6-D were inserted by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Amending Act (XXV of 1966). Section 6-A provides for the confiscation of the essential commodities seized for the contravention of an order made under section 3 of the Act. Section 6-B prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Collector before an order of confiscation is made by him under section 6-A. Under section 6-C an appeal is provided for a person aggrieved against an order passed under section 6-A. 4. The procedure prescribed under section 6-B of the Act is based upon expediency and policy necessitating speedy and prompt action. If the authorities under the Act were to go in for the traditional, elaborate and time-consuming process of trial in a law Court, the very purpose of the object to take ready and immediate action either to quell some prejudicial activity or to palliate some measure economic or otherwise would be frustrated. It is true that the enquiry under section 6-B results in confiscation if the essential commodity seised for contravention of an order made under section 3 of the Act. It is true that the enquiry under section 6-B results in confiscation if the essential commodity seised for contravention of an order made under section 3 of the Act. Therefore it is a measure taken against a person who has been found guilty of some commission or omission described as violation. The very act of confiscation implies without anything more a judicial process and imposes on the authority conducting the enquiry an obligation to hear. Scrupulous administration of justice implies the punctilio of fair hearing and impartiality. Therefore the observance of the principles of natural justice and impartiality is ensured and strengthened by the provisions of section 6-B and 6-C of the Act. Rules of natural justice are but principles of procedure. They are pious principles of fairness without which it is difficult to conceive justice. They are not provisions of a legal code but are provisions of a moral code which is within the heart of man ever since he breathed life. 5. As early as 1803, Byles, J., observed in Cooper v. Wardsworth Board of Works1, that: "Although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature. The judgment of Mr. Justice Fortescue in Dr. Bentlay’s case2, is somewhat quaint but it is very applicable, and has been the law from that time to the present. He says ‘the objection for want of notice can never be got over. The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have it observed by a very learned man, upon such an occasion that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. ‘Adam’ (Says God) ‘where art thou. Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldest not eat?‘ And the same question was put to Eve also". 6. In Arthur John Spackman v. The Plumstead District Board of Works3, Lord Selborne observed: "No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. 6. In Arthur John Spackman v. The Plumstead District Board of Works3, Lord Selborne observed: "No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word, but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law". 7. In Board of Education v. Rice4, Lord Loreburn expressed the same principle slightly differently: "In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view". 8. In Local Government Board v. Arlidge1, Viscount Haldane observed at page 132 as follows: "......When the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a Tribunal whose duty it is to met out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such Tribunal must be the same. In the case of a Court of law tradition in this country has prescribed certain principles to which in the main the procedure must conform. But what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature of the Tribunal". But it does not follow that the procedure of every such Tribunal must be the same. In the case of a Court of law tradition in this country has prescribed certain principles to which in the main the procedure must conform. But what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature of the Tribunal". In that case Lord Shaw expressed the same matter in the following words at page 138: "The words "natural justice" occur in arguments and sometimes in judicial pronouncements in such cases. My Lords, when a central administrative board deals with an appeal from a local authority it must do its best to act justly, and to reach just ends by just means". Lord Parmoor reiterated the principle governing the decisions of the quasijudicial Tribunals in these words: "Where, however, the question of the propriety of procedure is raised in a hearing before some Tribunal other than a Court of law, there is no objection to adopt the regular forms of legal procedure. It is sufficient that the case has been heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance with the principles of substantial justice". 9. In Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd2. Harman, J., analysed the principles into three categories and stating as follows: "First I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course that the Tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more". 10. The Supreme Court in The. New Prakas Transport Co. Ltd. v. The. New Suwarna Transport Co., Ltd.3, observed: "Section 64 provides for right of appeal against specified kinds of orders passed by the provincial or Regional Transport Authority to the ‘prescribed authority’. I do not think that there really is anything more". 10. The Supreme Court in The. New Prakas Transport Co. Ltd. v. The. New Suwarna Transport Co., Ltd.3, observed: "Section 64 provides for right of appeal against specified kinds of orders passed by the provincial or Regional Transport Authority to the ‘prescribed authority’. It also in terms provides that on an appeal being filed to the prescribed authority it shall give the appellant end the original authority, that is to say, the authority against whose orders the appeal had been brought ‘an opportunity of being heard.‘ * * * * * * * it will thus be seen that though the substantive section creating the right of appeal does not in term, create any right in a respondent to be heard, the rules framed providing for the procedure before the Appellate Authority contemplate that sufficient notice shall be given to "any other person interested in the appeal" which expression must include person other than the appellant who may be interested in being heard against the points raised in support of the appeal. Neither the sections nor the rules framed under the Act contemplate anything like recording oral or documentary evidence in the usual way as in Courts of law". 11. In Union of India v. T.R. Varma1, Venkatrama Aiyar, J., speaking for the Court observed at page 885: "Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be given the opportunity of Crossexamining the witnesses examined by that party and that no material should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them". "If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed". 12. "If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed". 12. The observations in Union of India v. T.R. Varma1, ware quoted with approval in Phulbari Tsa Estate v. Its Workmen2, Again the same learned Judge explained his decision in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur3, as follows: "It is on the observation that "the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence" that the decision of the learned Judges that the evidence of witnesses should be recorded in the presence of the person against whom it is to be used is based. Read literally the passage quoted above is susceptible of the construction which the learned Judges have put on it, but when read in the context of the facts stated above, it will be clear that that is not its true import. No question arose there as to the propriety of admitting in evidence the statement of a witness recorded behind the back of a party. The entire oral evidence in that case was recorded before the enquiring officer and in the presence of the petitioner. So there was no question of a contrast between evidence recorded behind a party and admitted in evidence against him, and evidence recorded in his presence. What was actually under consideration was the procedure to be followed by quasi-judicial bodies in holding enquiries and the decision was that they were not bound to adopt the procedure followed in Courts, and that it was only necessary that rules of natural justice should be observed. Discussing next what tho5e rules required, it was observed that the person against whom a charge is made should know the evidence which is given against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation". 13. The next decision that requires to be referred to is Khim Chand v. Union of India4. Discussing next what tho5e rules required, it was observed that the person against whom a charge is made should know the evidence which is given against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation". 13. The next decision that requires to be referred to is Khim Chand v. Union of India4. Dealing with the words "reasonable opportunity" occurring in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court summarised the conclusions at page 307 as follows: "To summarise: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes: (a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally; (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant". 14. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to observe: "........the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened, should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions, but in the light: of the statutory rules and provisions“. These observations were reiterated in Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T. Corporation1. 15. In Abott v. Sullivan2, it was observed that the principles of natural justice are easy to proclaim but their precise extent is far less easy to define. 16. In Ridge v. Baldwin3, Lord Reid tried to remove the perennial fallacy involved in this expression. His Lordship observed: ”In modern times, opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. 16. In Ridge v. Baldwin3, Lord Reid tried to remove the perennial fallacy involved in this expression. His Lordship observed: ”In modern times, opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried, nicely weighed and measured, therefore it does not exist. The idea of negligence is equally insusceptible of exact definition but what reasonable man would regard as negligence in particular circumstances are equally capable of serving as tests in law and natural justice as it has been interpreted in the Courts is much more definite than that. It appears to me that one reason why the authorities on natural justice have been found difficult to reconcile is that insufficient attention has been paid to the great difference between various kinds of cases in which it has been sought to apply the principle. What a minister ought to do in considering objections to a scheme may be very different from what a watch committee ought to do in considering whether to dismiss a chief constable“. 17. Lord Reid deduced that there was a minimum requirement of justice to be essentially observed in every case, whether conducted by strictly legal tribunal or by other body of persons invested with authority to determine questions affecting the rights of individuals, viz., that no man is to be condemned for misconduct without being heard. 18. The Supreme Court had to decide what a ‘reasonable opportunity’ is in Fedco (P.) Ltd. v. S.N. Bilgram4. It was emphasised therein by the Supreme Court that the Court was the final authority to determine whether the opportunity afforded in a given case was or was not reasonable. Dasgupta, J., observed that: ”the concept of reasonable opportunity has two elements. “The first is that an opportunity to be heard must be given; the second is that this opportunity must be reasonable. Both these matters are justiciable and it is for the Court to decide whether an opportunity has been given and whether that opportunity has been reasonable”. Dasgupta, J., observed that: ”the concept of reasonable opportunity has two elements. “The first is that an opportunity to be heard must be given; the second is that this opportunity must be reasonable. Both these matters are justiciable and it is for the Court to decide whether an opportunity has been given and whether that opportunity has been reasonable”. The Court then observed in paragraph 9 of the judgment that: “There can be no invariable standard for ‘reasonableness’ in such matters except that the Court’s conscience must be satisfied, that the person against whom an action is proposed has had a fair chance of convincing the authority who proposes to take action against him, that the grounds on which the action is proposed are either non-existent or even if they exist they do not justify the proposed action. The decision of this question will necessarily depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature of the action proposed, the grounds on which the action is proposed, the material on which the allegations are based, the attitude of the party against whom the action is proposed in showing cause against such proposed action, the nature of the plea raised by him in reply, the request for further opportunity that may be made, his admission by conduct or otherwise of some or all the allegations in all other matters which help the mind in coming to a fair conclusion on the question”. 19. In Miwral Development v. The Stile1 Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) observed in paragraph 10 of the judgment that: “........The concept of ‘reasonable opportunity’ is an elastic one and is not susceptible of each and precise definition. The decisions on cases under Article 311 of the Constitution afford illustrations of the applications of the said doctrine to varying situations. What is reasonable opportunity under one set of circumstances need not be reasonable under different circumstances. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain in each case having regard to the overall picture before it to come a conclusion whether reasonable opportunity is given to a person ‘to show cause’......” 20. The propositions that emerge from the sequence of the aforesaid authorities are: 1. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain in each case having regard to the overall picture before it to come a conclusion whether reasonable opportunity is given to a person ‘to show cause’......” 20. The propositions that emerge from the sequence of the aforesaid authorities are: 1. The scope and extent of reasonable opportunity must be judged in the light of the constitution of the statutory body which has to function in accordance with the rules laid down by the legislature; 2. Whether an opportunity has been afforded and whether that opportunity was or was not reasonable in a given case should be ascertained by the Court on an encyclopaedic view of all the material in the case; 3. In every case the minimum requirement of hearing must be satisfied and there must be a fair and honest determination of the question; 4. The test for the minimum requirement is satisfied if the person concerned was given proper opportunity of making a representation or statement that would dissipate the suspicion of the authority competent to take action; and 5. Whether the representation dispelled or confirmed the suspicion was of no consequence. 21. Now let me turn to the facts of this case: The Inspector of Police, Vigilance Cell inspected the petitioner’s shop on 26th July, 1973. He found 70 bags of sugar 15 bags in excess of the stock he should have held according to the stock register. He also found that the dealer had not exhibited the price list at the shop. He, therefore, seized the 70 bags of sugar and 26 bags of Khandasari Sugar which he found in the shop for the violation of the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1963, and the Andhra Pradesh Exhibition of Price Lists of Goods Order, 1966, and reported the matter to the District Revenue Officer for taking action under section 6-A of the Act. The District Revenue Officer issued notice under section 6-B of the Act to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause why the essential commodities seized should not be confiscated. He was further informed that he could present his case either in person or through advocate before he District Revenue Officer. The Petitioner submitted his explanation. He stated that he had purchased 15 bags of sugar from Messrs. He was further informed that he could present his case either in person or through advocate before he District Revenue Officer. The Petitioner submitted his explanation. He stated that he had purchased 15 bags of sugar from Messrs. Diamond Trading Company on 26th July, 1973, that his employee Sri Abdul Ali present at the time of the check did not know the details of the purchase of sugar and that if the said purchase of 15 bags of sugar is taken into account the stock held by the petitioner will tally with that of the entries noted in the stock register. 22. As regards the alleged, contravention of the Andhra Pradesh Exhibition of Price Lists of Goods Order, the explanation was that the price list was exhibited. He explained that he had written the price in the morning with chalk on the broad but due to the movement of stocks and the customers in the narrow place the figures became faint and could not be seen and that, therefore, there was no contravention of the order. He disputed the correctness of the panchnama recorded at 7.10 p.m. by the Inspector of Vigilance Cell. After receipt of the explanation a notice was again issued to the petitioner informing him that the case was posted for hearing on 12th September, 1973. The learned Advocate for the petitioner who was present was heard in he matter by the District Revenue Officer. On the date of hearing the petitioner however filed an application stating that the proprietor of the firm desires to examine himself and also examine other witnesses and requesting that the witnesses may be examined. But the District Revenue Officer apparently did not examine the proprietor or his witnesses. The District Revenue Officer, on the material on record, accepted the explanation of the petitioner in so far as it related to the violation of the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers’ Licensing Order. But he rejected his explanation in so far as the non-exhibition of price list of goods was concerned. He held that the petitioner contravened clauses 3 (1) and (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Exhibition of Price List of Goods Order and ordered the confiscation of the entire stock of 70 bags of sugar and 26 bags of Khandasari sugar found and seized from the shop of the petitioner. He held that the petitioner contravened clauses 3 (1) and (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Exhibition of Price List of Goods Order and ordered the confiscation of the entire stock of 70 bags of sugar and 26 bags of Khandasari sugar found and seized from the shop of the petitioner. On appeal by the petitioner, the learned Principal Sessions Judge upheld the order of confiscation and dismissed the appeal. 22. The order found to have been contravened by the petitioner is an order made under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. Section 3 enacts that the Central Government whenever it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. Section 6-B was inserted by section 3 of Act XXV of 1965. It provides the procedure to be adopted by the authority empowered under section 6-A of the Act, to confiscate the essential commodity seized for violation of any order made under section 3 of the Act. The action for contravention of an order made under section 3 emanates wholly from considerations of policy and expediency, calling for swift and effective action. What then was the nature and extent of enquiry held in this case? The petitioner has been served a notice in writing informing him the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the essential commodity seized; on receipt of the notice the petitioner made a representation in writing against the grounds of confiscation; the petitioner was again given notice of the date of hearing of his case; the Counsel for the petitioners was heard on the date of hearing and the impugned order of confiscation was passed after a consideration of all the circumstances in the case. Taking an encyclopaedic view of the facts and circumstances in this case and applying the principles enunciated above, I have no reluctance in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner in this case was afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 23. Taking an encyclopaedic view of the facts and circumstances in this case and applying the principles enunciated above, I have no reluctance in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner in this case was afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 23. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions in M/s. Sova Chand Mulchand v. The Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs1, Nagarmohan Rao v. The Collector of Central Excise2and M/s. Valimohomed Gulamhussain Sonavala & Co. v. C.T.A. Pillai3, and contended that a decision of a quasi judicial body without giving a fair opportunity to the accused to offer his explanation as to the facts on record was opposed to principles of natural justice and is void. They are all cases arising under the Sea Customs Act; the subject-matter that is being dealt with is different; the statute under which the Tribunal is acting is different; the nature of enquiry naturally will be different. Therefore those decisions are inapplicable to the facts of this case. As already held supra, the enquiry conducted in this case by the statutory authority is in accordance with the procedure prescribed by section 6-B of the Act and is not vitiated. 24. But that does not however conclude the decision of this case. The traditions of our jurisprudence commit us to the objective standard. A jurisprudence that is not constantly brought into relation to objective or external standards, incurs the risk of degenerating into a jurisprudence of a mere sentiment or feeling. As observed by Prof. Gray in “Nature and Sources of Law” (section 610): “......that many cases should be decided by the Courts on notions of right and wrong, and of course, every one will agree that a Judge is likely to share the notions of right and wrong prevalent in the community in which he lives”. The petitioner is found to have contravened clause 3 (1) and (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Exhibition of Price List of Goods Order. The entire stock of 70 bags of sugar and 26 bags of Khandasari sugar is ordered to be confiscated for the said violation. What was the allegation against the petitioner? The petitioner is found to have contravened clause 3 (1) and (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Exhibition of Price List of Goods Order. The entire stock of 70 bags of sugar and 26 bags of Khandasari sugar is ordered to be confiscated for the said violation. What was the allegation against the petitioner? The allegation against the petitioner was that he failed to exhibit the price list of the essential commodities in a conspicuous place as required under clause 3 (1) and 3 (2) (a) to (c) of the Andhra Pradesh Exhibition of Price Lists of Goods Order, 1966. The explanation of the petitioner was that he had written the prices on a Board with the chalk in the morning but due to the movement of stocks and the customers in the narrow place, the figures became faint and could not be seen. The inspection of the shop was at 5-30 p.m. It is clear from the panchnama drawn by the Vigilance Inspector at 7-10 p.m. a board with the particulars of the commodities available for sale was found but the prices of the commodities were not found noted. It is not disputed in this case that the sugar that the petitioner was selling in his shop was not levy or controlled sugar but free market sugar. Therefore, if the price of the sugar was; not noted in the notice board at 5-30 p.m. it would not in any way prejudicially affect the customers that visit the shop for the purchase of the commodity since there is no controlled price. It is nobody’s case that the non-exhibition of the price list by the petitioner was motivated with the illegal intention of profiteering by selling sugar at a price higher than the controlled price. The board found in the shop contained the list of goods held for sale. It is clear from sub-clauses 3 and 4 of clause 3 of the order that the exhibition of the price list is essentially to enforce the sale by dealer at the controlled rate, if any, fixed by the Government. But there is no such controlled price for the sugar seized in this case. The public are, therefore, not prejudicially affected by the non-exhibition of the price list in the shop. But there is no such controlled price for the sugar seized in this case. The public are, therefore, not prejudicially affected by the non-exhibition of the price list in the shop. Both, the administrative authority as well as the judicial authority totally ignored the aforesaid mitigating circumstances in the case and ordered the confiscation of the entire commodity seized from the shop oblivious of the wide discretion conferred by section 6-A of the Act. Section 6-A reads: “Where essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under section 3 in relation thereto it may be produced, without any unreasonable delay, before the Collector of the district or the Presidency-town in which such essential commodity is seized and whether or not a prosecution is instituted for contravention of such order, the Collector, if satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order, may order confiscation of the essential commodity so seized”. It is as plain as paint from the provisions of the section that it is not obligatory on the part of the Collector to pass an order of confiscation for any and every violation of an order made under section 3 of the Act. Permissive words are used by the Legislature conferring capacity or power on the Collector to order confiscation. The discretionary power should no doubt be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Then the question arises. in what cases, does it become the duty of the authority to exercise that power? Broadly stated one has to look into the nature of the violation, the object with which it is done and the circumstances under which it is done. If the nature of the violation is of technical or trivial nature and if there is no object of black marketing and hoarding behind such violation it would be proper exercise of discretion either not to order or order confiscation of only a part. However, in the absence of any such mitigating circumstances, the order of confiscation should follow the finding of contravention of an order made under section 3 of the Act. It is a well recognised rule that the atrocity of the penalty should match the atrocity of the crime. Public indignation directly varies with the degree of importance of the rights violated. In punishment the State “looks not to virtue and vice but to rights and wrongs”. It is a well recognised rule that the atrocity of the penalty should match the atrocity of the crime. Public indignation directly varies with the degree of importance of the rights violated. In punishment the State “looks not to virtue and vice but to rights and wrongs”. In this case, having regard to the nature of the violation and the absence of any object for black-marketing or hoarding in the omission to exhibit the price list, it would be proper to interfere with the improper exercise of discretion in ordering the confiscation of the entire stocks seized. The blame and the agony undergone by the petitioner - so far as an upshot of the order of confiscation are a sufficient punishment in a case of this kind. Therefore, I do not propose any order of confiscation of even a part of the stocks seized in the case. The revision petition is allowed accordingly.