JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge, who allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of dismissal dated 24th April, 1972 passed against the respondent as also all proceedings subsequent to the show cause notice dated 29th July, 1970. 2. In outline, the allegations made in the writ petition by the present respondent, Brij Nandan Kansal, were these. Brij Nandan Kansal, respondent, was a member of the U.P. Civil Service. During the period June 1962 and October 1964 he served as a Regional Transport Magistrate, Bareilly. The Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow, served a charge-sheet on him on 24th September, 1968 requiring him to submit his reply. The first charge related to misappropriation of Government money and the charges Nos. 2 to 5 related to four journeys during the period June 1962 to October 1964 alleging that he had travelled without purchasing first class tickets but had charged first class travelling allowance for those journeys. The sixth charge related to charging travelling allowance twice for the same journey. Sri Kansal filed his reply repudiating the charges. Thereafter, the Tribunal recorded the evidence of the parties and finally submitted a report on 7th May, 1970 recording a finding that the first charge had not been proved but the other charges had been established. The report of the Tribunal along with its recommendations regarding the penalty to be imposed upon Sri Kansal was sent to the Governor by the Tribunal. Thereupon a show cause notice was given to Sri Kansal on 29th July, 1970 asking him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. A copy of the findings of the Tribunal on the charges was also attached with the show cause notice. Its recommendation with regard to the punishment to be imposed was, however, not sent to Sri Kansal. On 15th December, 1970 Sri Kansal asked for a copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal with regard to the punishment to be imposed and also asked for time up to 31st December, 1970 for filing his written statement. Its recommendation with regard to the punishment to be imposed was, however, not sent to Sri Kansal. On 15th December, 1970 Sri Kansal asked for a copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal with regard to the punishment to be imposed and also asked for time up to 31st December, 1970 for filing his written statement. He sent his reply against the show cause notice on 28th December, 1970 in which he pointed out that as he had not been furnished with a copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal regarding the punishment he was being deprived of a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. He, however, made his submissions with regard to the punishment of dismissal which was proposed to be awarded to him in the show cause notice and submitted that the proposed punishment was too severe. The State Government meanwhile sent a letter to Sri Kansal extending the time till 31st December, 1970 for submission of his reply to the show cause notice and also enclosing a copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal regarding the punishment. This letter was delivered to Sri Kansal on 31st December 1970. He made a request for oral hearing which was, however, not acceded to and ultimately an order dated 24th April 1972 was passed dismissing him from service. He then filed a writ petition which has given rise to this appeal challenging the said order of dismissal. 3. This letter was delivered to Sri Kansal on 31st December 1970. He made a request for oral hearing which was, however, not acceded to and ultimately an order dated 24th April 1972 was passed dismissing him from service. He then filed a writ petition which has given rise to this appeal challenging the said order of dismissal. 3. Before the learned single Judge the order of dismissal was impugned on four grounds, namely, (1) the finding that Sri Kansal had travelled on various dates specified in charges 2 to 5 without purchasing first class tickets was based on no evidence or in any event was arbitrary, (2) reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the punishment was denied to him inasmuch as he was not supplied with the copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal with regard to it before he submitted his reply to the show cause notice, (3) inasmuch as the Governor before passing the impugned order consult- ed the Administrative Tribunal and also the law department and took into account their opinions before passing the impugned order it was incumbent on the Governor to have made the opinions available to Kansal and should have called a further reply in respect thereof before making the impugned order, and (4) the impugned order was bad inasmuch as it did not give any reasons. 4. The learned single Judge observing that it could not be said that there was no evidence on the record for the finding recorded by the Tribunal rejected the first contention. The second contention however, prevailed with the learned single Judge. With regard to the third contention the learned single Judge observed that it would be a travesty of the principles of natural justice and infringement of Article 311 of the Constitution in case the punishing authority takes into account the subsequent facts for punishing the officer without giving him any opportunity of rebutting the fresh material. The fourth contention also found favour with the learned single Judge, who held that as there were two conflicting reports of the Tribunal the punishing authority should have disclosed the reasons why it disagreed with the opinion given under Rule 10 (2) in favour of the officer. The fourth contention also found favour with the learned single Judge, who held that as there were two conflicting reports of the Tribunal the punishing authority should have disclosed the reasons why it disagreed with the opinion given under Rule 10 (2) in favour of the officer. A question was also raised before the learned single Judge as to whether the Chief Minister could pass the impugned order but the learned single Judge did not find it necessary to decide the point in view of his conclusion with regard to points Nos. 2, 3 and 4 mentioned above. The writ petition was, therefore, allowed and the order of dismissal passed against Sri Kansal was quashed. The State of Uttar Pradesh which has come up in appeal from the said decision has assailed the findings of the learned single Judge with regard to points Nos. 2, 3 and 4 mentioned above. We shall deal with those points in seriatim. 5. The Administrative Tribunal submitted its findings on the charges together with its recommendations in respect of the punishment to be imposed on May 7, 1970. On receipt of these, a notice dated July 29, 1970, was served on Sri Kansal to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The show cause notice was accompanied by a copy of the findings of the Administrative Tribunal on the charges, but a copy of the recommendations of the Tribunal with regard to the punishment was not sent to Sri Kansal. He was required to submit his reply within three weeks. The time for submission of the reply appears to have been extended. On December 15, 1970, Sri Kansal wrote to Government to supply him with a copy of the recommendations of the Tribunal regarding punishment and also requested that the time for submitting the reply be extended up to December 21, 1970. Apparently, the time was expiring on or about December 15, 1970. No intimation about the extension of the time was received by Sri Kansal. He handed over his reply on December 28. 1970, to the District Magistrate at Allahabad. This was done when the time .allowed by the Government to submit the reply had expired and Sri Kansal had not received any information of the extension of time. No intimation about the extension of the time was received by Sri Kansal. He handed over his reply on December 28. 1970, to the District Magistrate at Allahabad. This was done when the time .allowed by the Government to submit the reply had expired and Sri Kansal had not received any information of the extension of time. By a letter of the same date, that is to say, December 28, 1970, Government informed Sri Kansal that the time had been extended up to December 31, 1970, and also enclosed a copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal regarding the punishment. This letter was received by Sri Kansal on December 31, 1970, that is to say. on the last day to which time for filing the reply had been extended. 6. Sri Kansal's complaint is that a copy of the recommendations of the Tribunal having been supplied to him so late, he had no opportunity to say anything about those recommendations. In our opinion, Sri Kansal could well have, if he so desired, submitted his reply or explanation in respect of the recommendations of the Tribunal regarding punishment and his complaint is without substance. In the first place, Sri Kansal could have handed over his reply in respect of the recommendations to the District Magistrate at Allahabad on 31st December, itself. The reply to the recommendations could not be a very lengthy one and, if Sri Kansal was so inclined, he could give the reply the same day. In the second place, Sri Kansal could, if he wanted, submit his reply even after the expiry of December 31, 1970. The original reply, which Sri Kansal submitted on December 28, 1970, was also submitted by him after the expiry of the period for submitting the reply. On December 28, 1970, the time for submitting the reply had expired and Sri Kansal did not know of the extension. If he could submit the original reply after the expiry of the time, we can see no reason why he could not do so in respect of his reply to the recommendations of the Tribunal. Lastly, we find that no prejudice has been caused to Sri Kansal by the late supply of the recommendations of the Tribunal. He was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. In his reply he has said what he wanted to say against this punishment. Lastly, we find that no prejudice has been caused to Sri Kansal by the late supply of the recommendations of the Tribunal. He was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. In his reply he has said what he wanted to say against this punishment. There is little which he could have added by way of reply to the recommendations of the Tribunal. In its recommendations the Tribunal had observed that Sri Kan- sal, by realising fictitious travelling allowance, was guilty of conduct unbecoming of a responsible public servant, that such 1 conduct amounted to corruption within the meaning of clause (c) of Rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules and that there was no room for corrupt officials, in Government service. In his reply Sri Kansal had denied the realising of fictitious travelling allowance and had also denied that he was guilty of corruption, as defined in Rule 2 (c) of the Tribunal Rules. It may be mentioned that the charge-sheet stated that Sri Kansal was guilty of corruption as defined in Rule 2 (c) of the Tribunal Rules on account of the various allegations made in the charges against him. The observation of the Tribunal that there was no room for corrupt officials in the Government has been more than amply met by Sri Kansal in his reply. We are, therefore, of opinion that Sri, Kansal had ample opportunity of submitting a reply to the recommendations off the Tribunal regarding the punishment and that the late supply of these recommendations to him has not prejudiced him in any manner. 7. With regard to the second ground, the facts are simple. The Administrative Tribunal was consulted after t.he respondent submitted his reply to the show cause notice and that the Administrative Tribunal submitted its exhaustive opinion dated 27th July, 1971 wherein it found merits in the contention of the respondent against the finding on charges Nos. 2 to 6 and opined that the said charges did not appear to have been fully and convincingly established. After the receipt of this, opinion of the law department of the Government of U.P. was also obtained. Thereafter, the impugned order of dismissal was passed. No copy of the opinion of the administrative Tribunal dated 7th July 1971 or the opinion of the law department was, however, given to the respondent. After the receipt of this, opinion of the law department of the Government of U.P. was also obtained. Thereafter, the impugned order of dismissal was passed. No copy of the opinion of the administrative Tribunal dated 7th July 1971 or the opinion of the law department was, however, given to the respondent. On these facts the respondent raised a contention that as the punishing authority had taken into consideration the aforesaid two opinions, the contents whereof were not made known to him, he was denied a reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. This contention prevailed with the learned single Judge. The learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State submitted that it was not necessary to supply a copy of the opinion of the Administrative Tribunal or that of the law department to the respondent. He urged that the proceedings were taken under Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 (hereinafter called the Rules) and these rules did not provide for furnishing copies of these opinions to the delinquent officer. Under Article 311 of the Constitution, the delinquent officer was not entitled to be served with a copy of these opinions and to make further submissions in the light thereof. 8. For appreciating this contention, the scheme of the said rules may be examined. These rules have been made for regulating in certain cases the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the award of punishment to the members of the public services under the control of the Governor in the rule-making power. Under Rule 3, the Governor may from time to time constitute one or more Administrative Tribunals for inquiry into such cases or class of cases .as Government may by general or special order direct. Under Rule 4 the Governor may refer to the Tribunal cases relating to an individual Government servant or class of Government servants or Government servants in a particular area in respect of certain matters including corruption, mentioned therein. Rule 8 provides that the Tribunal shall in each case make inquiry as may be appropriate and in conducting such inquiry it shall be guided by rules of equity and natural justice and shall not be bound by formal rules relating to procedure and evidence. Rule 8 provides that the Tribunal shall in each case make inquiry as may be appropriate and in conducting such inquiry it shall be guided by rules of equity and natural justice and shall not be bound by formal rules relating to procedure and evidence. Under Rule 8 (3) the Tribunal has to give a concise summary of the charges against the official and give him an opportunity, orally or in writing, within the time to be prescribed by it, to offer his explanation in respect of the charges. The oral explanation of the delinquent official is required to be recorded as far as possible in his own words. Rule 9 (1) provides that after completing its proceedings the Tribunal shall make a record of the case in which it shall state the charges, the explanation, its own findings and the views of the assessor. It shall also, where satisfied that the punishment be imposed, formulate its recommendations about Punishment. Rule 10 (1) provides that the Governor shall not be bound to consult the Public Service Commission on the Tribunal's recommendations and may pass an order awarding the punishment recommended by the Tribunal or a higher or lesser punishment or pass such other order as he may deem fit. It further provides that in cases to which clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution applies the Governor shall give the delinquent official a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed but only on the basis of evidence adduced during the inquiry by the Tribunal. Under Rule 10 (2) the Governor may before passing final orders consult the Tribunal, if necessary, in such manner as may be deemed fit. Rule 10 i(3) provides that no appeal shall lie against the order passed by the Governor. Thus, in all those cases to which the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution are attracted it is incumbent on the Governor to give the delinquent official reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed. 9. Rule 10 i(3) provides that no appeal shall lie against the order passed by the Governor. Thus, in all those cases to which the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution are attracted it is incumbent on the Governor to give the delinquent official reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed. 9. Article 311 (2) of the Constitution provides that no person who is a member of the Civil Service of the State shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation .against the penalty proposed but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry. Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, therefore, comes into play when the penalty of dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank is to be imposed upon a member of the Civil Service. It is thus quite plain from R. 10 (1) of the said Rules and Article 311 (2) of the Constitution that if the penalty of dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank is proposed to be imposed upon the delinquent officer the Governor shall give .him a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed. If no such opportunity is given the order of dismissal would be invalid. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that a notice dated 29th July, 1970 was served on the respondent informing him that the Governor had come to the tentative conclusion that the respondent be dismissed from service, and asking him to show cause against the proposed punishment. This notice was given to the respondent in accordance with the requirements of Rule 10 (1) of the said Rules and Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The respondent did submit his reply dated 28th December, 1970. Subclauses (2) of Rule 10 enables the Governor to consult the Tribunal, if necessary, in such manner as he may deem fit before passing the final order in the matter. It is not mandatory on the part of the Governor to always consult the Tribunal before passing the final order. The respondent did submit his reply dated 28th December, 1970. Subclauses (2) of Rule 10 enables the Governor to consult the Tribunal, if necessary, in such manner as he may deem fit before passing the final order in the matter. It is not mandatory on the part of the Governor to always consult the Tribunal before passing the final order. The Governor may or may not consult the Tribunal before passing final orders. In the instant case, however, the Governor did consult the Tribunal before passing the final order. There is no provision in the rules which makes it necessary for the Governor to supply a copy of the opinion of the Tribunal obtained under Rule 10 (2) of the Rules. For the respondent it was urged that if the Governor consults the Tribunal under Rule 10 (2) and the Tribunal accordingly submits its opinion (the learned counsel chose to call it 'finding'), the Governor would necessarily take into consideration that opinion also before passing a final order hence the delinquent officer would be greatly prejudiced if he were not given a reasonable opportunity to make his submissions with regard to that opinion. The same argument was raised with regard to the opinion of the law department with a further contention that the said rules did not authorise the Governor to consult the law department of the Government before passing the final order. 10. There is no provision in the Tribunal Rules to supply a copy of the opinion of the Tribunal given on consultation under Rule 10 (2). Rules of natural justice and the affording of reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) require that the punishing authority should not rely upon any material which has not been disclosed to the charged officer and which he has not had an opportunity to meet. 'Material' means facts, evidence - direct or circumstantial, documents, statements of witnesses and such like. It does not include opinion, whether it is of departmental officers or of legal advisers. No new material was taken into consideration in passing the order of dismissal. The opinion expressed by the Administrative Tribunal on consultation under Rule 10 (2) and the nothings and opinions of the various officers of Government including the Judicial Secretary, who dealt with the matter, were not fresh evidence or material and Government was not required to disclose them to the charged officer. The opinion expressed by the Administrative Tribunal on consultation under Rule 10 (2) and the nothings and opinions of the various officers of Government including the Judicial Secretary, who dealt with the matter, were not fresh evidence or material and Government was not required to disclose them to the charged officer. There was no violation of the rules or of the provisions of Article 311 (2) or the principles of natural justice by the Government in not supplying to the respondent copies of the opinions of the Tribunal given on consultation under Rule 10 (2) and of the Judicial Secretary. The contention of the respondent that the proceedings are vitiated by the non supply of these copies cannot be accepted. 11. The third ground on which the order of dismissal was assailed was that it was not a speaking order and it gave no reasons for the same. The submission on behalf of the respondent was that the Tribunal in its report submitted before the Governor had found that the charges 2 to 6 had been proved against him. However, the Tribunal on being consulted under Rule 10 (2) came to a different conclusion and opined that charges 2 to 6 against him did not appear to have been fully and convincingly established. In these circumstances, it was urged that it was essential for the punishing authority to give reasons for dis- agreeing with the subsequent report of the Tribunal. We find no substance in this contention. 12. The impugned order sets out that the Tribunal after due inquiry had in its report dated 27-5-1970 found that the charges 2 to 6 had been proved against the respondent, that the Governor concurring with the said findings had come to the tentative conclusion that the respondent be dismissed from service, that a show cause notice dated 28-7-1970 was then given to the respondent and the respondent had in reply submitted his explanation dated 28-12-1970; that the Governor after consulting the Tribunal and considering the charges, the evidence adduced, the report of the Tribunal and the representation of the respondent was satisfied that the respondent was guilty of the charges 2 to 5 and had failed to discharge his duties properly as Government servant and, therefore, the punishment of dismissal would be proper and the same was, therefore, being awarded. Reading the said order as a whole it is quite plain that the Governor took the view that the charges 2 to 5 levelled against the respondent had been proved and it is on proof of those charges that the punishment of dismissal from service was imposed on the respondent. The Tribunal had recorded definite findings that the charges 2 to 6 had been proved against the respondent. The respondent made his representation against those findings. The Governor accepted his representation with regard to charge No. 6 but held that the respondent was guilty of charges 2 to 5 and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. It was urged that the order was bad in law inasmuch as it gave no reason as to why the respondent was guilty of charges 2 to 5. In our view, this argument is not tenable. The disciplinary proceedings were commenced with an inquiry which was conducted by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. The Tribunal submitted its report to the Governor who sent a copy thereof to the respondent. The recommendations of the Tribunal were also subsequently sent to the respondent. On receipt of the respondent's reply to the show cause notice the Tribunal was consulted. The Governor, after considering the entire material, came to be satisfied that the respondent was guilty of the charges 2 to 5. In these circumstances the fact that the order did not contain detailed reasons would not render the order invalid or void. The Tribunal in its report dated 27-5-1970 had clearly found that the charges 2 to 6 had been proved against the respondent. When the respondent submitted his reply to the show cause notice the Tribunal was consulted under Rule 10 (2) of the Rules. The Tribunal in its opinion rendered under that rule advised that the charges were not established. As the opinion of the Tribunal raised a legal point on a question of evidence the opinion of legal Remembrancer was also obtained. The Governor thereafter passed the impugned order. The Tribunal in its opinion rendered under that rule advised that the charges were not established. As the opinion of the Tribunal raised a legal point on a question of evidence the opinion of legal Remembrancer was also obtained. The Governor thereafter passed the impugned order. It was open to the Governor to accept in part or the whole of the findings of the Tribunal dated 27-5-1970 and impose a punishment on the respondent or to accept the representation of the respondent and agree with the opinion of the Tribunal rendered under the Rule 10 (2) of the Rules and exonerate the respondent of the charges levelled against him. In the instant case, the Governor obviously did not agree with the opinion of the Tribunal given under Rule 10 (2) and held the respondent guilty of charges 2 to 5. It also did not accept the finding of the Tribunal dated 7-5-1970 with regard to charge No. 6 and accepted the representation of the respondent in that behalf. As was held by the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Srinivasan, ( AIR 1966 SC 1827 ) it is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal, though even in such a case it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. But where the State Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer we do not think as a matter of law it could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it. The proceedings are no doubt quasi-judicial but having regard to the manner in which the inquiries are conducted we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case. 13. The proceedings are no doubt quasi-judicial but having regard to the manner in which the inquiries are conducted we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent raised an argument that in the instant case the findings of the Tribunal dated 27-5-1970 stood superseded by its subsequent findings dated 7-7-1971 and as the Tribunal in its latter findings dated 7-7-1971 found that the charges had not been 'fully and convincingly established' against the respondent, the Government should have given reasons why it differed from that conclusion of the Tribunal. We find no merits in this contention. The findings of the Tribunal. The Governor thereafter consulted the Tribunal under Rule 10 (2) of the Rules. The opinion given by the Tribunal on such consultation under Rule 10 (2) cannot be equated with the findings recorded under Rule 9 of the said Rules. It is merely an advice. It is not given after hearing the delinquent. It will not, in our view, supersede the findings which are recorded by the Tribunal after giving an opportunity to all concerned to adduce evidence and of being heard. 14. The relevant Government files were placed before us; they had been placed before the learned single Judge also. The nothings therein clearly show that there was, from the beginning, agreement with the approach and the findings of the original Tribunal. The nothings by the Judicial Secretary also indicate that the approach and findings of the original tribunal on charges Nos. 2 to 5 were correct and worthy of acceptance. Though the opinion of the subsequent Tribunal on consultation under Rule 10 (2) was different, it was open to the Government to accept some or all of the findings of the original Tribunal. The nothings on the file show that the findings of the original Tribunal relating to charges Nos, 2 to 5, in the light of the material on the record, were accepted to be correct and proper. For agreeing with and accepting the findings of the original Tribunal on these charges Government was not required or bound to record reasons, though, in our opinion, in the circumstances of the present case, it would have been much better if it had recorded its reasons. For agreeing with and accepting the findings of the original Tribunal on these charges Government was not required or bound to record reasons, though, in our opinion, in the circumstances of the present case, it would have been much better if it had recorded its reasons. Such a course would have saved much of the time of the Court spent in looking into the records of the Government. However, for reasons stated above, the impugned order of dismissal cannot be held to be bad for failure to give reasons. 15. It was then contended on behalf of the respondent that the findings of the Tribunal on charges 2 to 5 were based on no evidence. Before this contention is examined it may be recalled that in disciplinary proceedings taken against public servants the technicalities of criminal law cannot be invoked and the strict mode of proof prescribed by the Indian Evidence Act may not be applied with equal rigour. However, even in disciplinary proceedings, the charge framed against the public servant will have to be proved before any punishment can be imposed on him. (See AIR 1966 SC 1827 ). Under Rule 8 of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal is to be guided by the rules of equity and natural justice and is not bound by formal rules of procedure and evidence. It cannot, however, rely on evicting which is purely hearsay because to do so would be contrary to rules of equity and natural justice. The prosecution must adduce legal evidence before the Tribunal to prove the charge or charges levelled against the delinquent officer. But, as was held in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ) "Where there is some evidence, which the authorities entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusions on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole Judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ I under Article 226 of the Constitution." 16. In the instant case, it is common ground that the Tribunal conducted the inquiry fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal has, after examining the evidence, recorded clear finding against respondent on the charges 2 to 6. It held that the first charge had not been proved but charges 2 to 6 had been proved against the respondent. The charges 2 to 6 related to the submission of wrong T.A. Bills. The basis of the charges was that the respondent did not travel in first class but charged fare for the same in the T.A. Bills in question. With regard to the three journeys in question from (Bareilly to Najibabad the prosecution produced Ticket Sale Register maintained i at Bareilly junction and the City Booking (Office to prove that no 1st class ticket for Najibabad was sold on the material date. The Ticket Collection Register maintained at Najibabad was also produced to show that no 1st class ticket was collected there from any passenger the relevant dates. The prosecution also produced the Advance Booking/Reservation Register for establishing that no advance booking or reservation was got made for 11th April, 1963. The Advance Booking/Reservation Register for the period from 1st April, 1963 to 31st August, 1963 could not, however, be produced as the same had been in the meantime weeded out. The prosecution also produced the Advance Booking/Reservation Register for establishing that no advance booking or reservation was got made for 11th April, 1963. The Advance Booking/Reservation Register for the period from 1st April, 1963 to 31st August, 1963 could not, however, be produced as the same had been in the meantime weeded out. The Excess Fare Ticket Books for the journeys of 14th April, 1963 and 27th May, 1963 were brought on record to show that no second or third class ticket was converted into first class on any of these dates between Bareilly and Najibabad. However, the E.F.T. Book for 11th April, 1963 was not produced as it had also been in the meantime weeded out. Sher Prakash, the Head Ticket Collector, Bareilly, who after seeing the E.F.T. Books had stated before the Vigilance Establishment in the year 1967 that he had examined all the books available for the relevant dates and found that no ticket had been converted into first class ticket. Similarly with regard to the journey of 30th April, 1963 Ticket Sale Register and Advance Booking/Reservation Register showed that no 1st class ticket was sold on that day or prior to it for 30th April, 1963. The E.F.T. books maintained by the two Ticket Collectors out of three were produced. The E.F.T. book of the third Ticket Collector could not be produced having been weeded out. On the appraisal of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances and after considering the defence pleas set up by the respondent the Tribunal found that the charges 2 to 5 were established against the respondent. This conclusion of the Tribunal cannot be said to be wholly arbitrary and capricious nor can it be said that no reasonable person could ever arrive at the conclusion on the basis of the evidence brought on the record. 17. The contention on behalf of the respondent is that these pieces of evidence, neither individually nor collectively, excluded the possibility of his having purchased 1st class tickets and, therefore, they could not be considered to be evidence of the fact that he did not purchase such tickets. This argument, is another form of the argument that the rule of circumstantial evidence applicable in criminal law applied to proceedings before Administrative Tribunals. This argument, is another form of the argument that the rule of circumstantial evidence applicable in criminal law applied to proceedings before Administrative Tribunals. It is to be kept in mind that the department was asserting a negative fact, i.e., Sri Kansal had not purchased 1st class tickets on the relevant dates. Existence or non-existence of the positive fact was within the exclusive knowledge of the respondent and he alone could prove it. Every fact and every circumstance which established, for the journeys in question in one of the normal modes would be evidence relevant to prove the allegations made by the department. Likewise, evidence of the fact that at the destination station no 1st class ticket were surrendered or collected on the relevant dates is also a circumstance tending to support and prove the department's case. The question whether the evidence relating to all these facts and circumstances is or is not sufficient to establish the case against Sri Kansal is not a question which affects the relevancy of the evidence. We have no doubt that the evidence referred to above was relevant to the issue which arose in the case and that the Administrative Tribunal was entitled to arrive at its findings on the basis of this evidence. The contention of 'the respondent that the findings of the Administrative Tribunal were based on no evidence is without any merit and 'deserves to be rejected. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent raised a further argument that it was the Governor alone who could punish the petitioner whereas in the instant case the order was passed by the Chief Minister. This argument appears to have been advanced before the learned single Judge as well but he did not express any view on the point as he allowed the writ petition on other points. 19. A perusal of the impugned order discloses that it is expressed in the name of the Governor as required by Article 166 of the Constitution. That being so, the validity of the order duly authenticated cannot be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. 19. A perusal of the impugned order discloses that it is expressed in the name of the Governor as required by Article 166 of the Constitution. That being so, the validity of the order duly authenticated cannot be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. Further, in exercise of the power conferred by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution' the Governor of Uttar Pradesh had made "Uttar Pradesh Rules of Business, 1965." Under these rules the allocation of business of the Government is made amongst the Ministers. Under Rule 28 (1) (viii) proposal for the dismissal, removal, or forced retirement of any gazetted officer is required to be submitted to the Chief Minister before issue of orders. These rules have been made by the Governor for the convenience of the transaction of business of the Government. In the instant case the Tribunal submitted its report dated 27th May, 1970 containing its findings to the Government. The Secretary (Appointment Department), Government of U.P., then submitted the findings of the Tribunal along with his report to the Chief Secretary expressing a general agreement with the findings of the Tribunal and requesting that the opinion of the Legal Remembrancer with regard to evidence and its adequacy might be had. The Chief Secretary then asked for the opinion of the Legal Remembrancer. The Legal Remembrancer expressed his views with regard to legal points raised and opinion that the charges 2 to 5 could be said to have been proved against the officer concerned. In respect of charge No. 6 he was of the view that the officer concerned could be exonerated of it. The opinion of the Legal Remembrancer was then routed through the Secretary (Appointment Department) who having found that the charges had been proved against the respondent, submitted the papers to the Chief Secretary stating that the punishment of dismissal might be imposed, and the Chief Secretary might therefore like to place the papers before the Chief Minister. Thereafter, the Chief Secretary submitted the papers before the Chief Minister with his report stating in brief the charges levelled against the respondent, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in its report of 27th May, 1970. Thereafter, the Chief Secretary submitted the papers before the Chief Minister with his report stating in brief the charges levelled against the respondent, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in its report of 27th May, 1970. the view of the Legal Remembrancer and the conclusion that the charges 2 to 5 having been established punishment of dismissal from service might be imposed against the respondent. The Chief Minister endorsed his agreement by putting his signature on that report of the Chief Secretary. The matter was obviously placed before the Chief Minister under Rule 28 (1) (viii) of the U.P. Rules of Business. The power to dismiss a Government servant is executive power of the State. Under Article 166 of the Constitution all executive actions of the Government of the State are required to be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor and to be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in the rule and the validity of an order which is so authenticated cannot be called in question on the ground that it is not the order made by the Governor. Under Rule 10 (1) of the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rule 1947 the Governor may pass an order awarding punishment recommended by the Tribunal or a higher or lesser punishment or pass such other order as he may deem fit. An order passed in exercise of this executive power under Rule 10 (1) could be expressed to be made in the name of the Governor and this is what was done in the instant case. Inasmuch as the impugned order was duly authenticated and made in the name of the Governor the validity thereof could not, in our view, be called in question on the ground that it was not made by the Governor. 20. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ petition. However, in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.