A. D. DESAI, B. J. DIVAN, D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) RELEVANT facts to state briefly are that the petitioner is the landlord of the first opponent in respect of a residential premises. The petitioner gave a notice dated March 1 1965 through his lawyer to the said opponent of eviction and demanding arrears of rent by registered post with an acknowledgment due. The envelope in which the notice demanding possession and arrears of rent was sent is produced in the suit subsequently filed by the petitioner against the opponents to recover possession and arrears of rent. The possession of the suit premises was sought on various grounds including that of arrears of rent. The envelope produced in the case shows that there is an endorsement of not found which is dated March 3 1965 There is another endorsement of refused dated March 5 1965 On the other side of the envelop there are two cross lines across the name of the addressee tenant and between these two cross lines endorsement refused is noted which bears the date of March 4 1965 The envelope with the endorsements thereon is exhibited in the case and bears Ex. 43. The tenant had also filed an application for fixation of standard rent in respect of the suit premises on April 6 1965 under sec. 1 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Civil Revision Application No. 790 of 1968 relates to the fixation of rent under sec. 11 of the Act. Explanation to sec. 12 of the Act provides that a tenant if he makes an application under secs 11 to the Court for fixation of standard rent before expiry of the period of one month after the notice of eviction is deemed to be ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted increases provided the tenant thereafter pays or tenders in Court the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court. The question of service of notice dated March 1 1965 of eviction of the tenant assumes importance because if the opponent-tenant is held not to have received the said notice of eviction on either March 3 or 4 or 5 1965 then the tenant would get protection under the explanation to sec. The question of service of notice dated March 1 1965 of eviction of the tenant assumes importance because if the opponent-tenant is held not to have received the said notice of eviction on either March 3 or 4 or 5 1965 then the tenant would get protection under the explanation to sec. 12 of the Act and a decree of eviction cannot be passed. To complete the facts it may be mentioned that subsequently on March 6 1965 the landlord had sent the very notice of eviction by a certificate of posting which would have reached the opponent tenant in ordinary course of business on March 7 1965 The landlord again gave another notice of eviction on various grounds including that of arrears of rent and this notice was sent by a registered post and a copy thereof was sent by a certificate of posting. So far as the notice of eviction and demand of rent dated March 1 1965 is concerned the case of the tenant in his written statement is that he had not received the same. However the tenant has not said a word on this point in his deposition. No issue was sought on the point of service of delivery of registered notice dated March 1 1965 and the point was not argued in the trial Court or the lower appellate Court that there was no service or delivery of the notice in fact and the effect thereof. The trial Court passed a decree of eviction against the tenant and in the appeal filed by the tenant against the said decree the same was confirmed. The tenant filed Revision Application No. 544 of 1968 in this Court wherein the arguments in respect of notice dated March 1 1965 were advanced to the effect that mere endorsement of refusal purporting to have been made by a postal official on a returned envelope without being substantiated by any evidence of the postal officer who went to deliver the letter to the addressee would not be sufficient for raising a presumption statutory or factual that the addressee in fact refused to accept the delivery of the letter and that in view of the special provision of sec. 12 of the Act the addressee tenant who refused to take delivery of the registered letter addressed to him could not be posted with knowledge of the contents of the notice. 12 of the Act the addressee tenant who refused to take delivery of the registered letter addressed to him could not be posted with knowledge of the contents of the notice. The learned Single Judge found that on the points raised before him the decisions of the Bombay High Court as well as of the other Courts are not uniform and therefore referred two points for determination to a larger Bench. The points referred by him are:" (I) Whether the mere endorsement of refused found on the returned registered envelope without being substantiated by any evidence of the postal peon who went to deliver the letter to the addressee would be sufficient for raising a presumption statutory or factual that the addressee had in fact refused to accept the delivery of that letter ? (ii) Whether in view of the special provisions contained in sec. 12 of the Rent Act the addressee-tenant who has refused to take delivery of a registered letter addressed to him can be posted with a knowledge that his landlord has given him a notice to pay up the arrears of rent ?"under the orders of the learned Chief Justice this Full Bench has been constituted for determining the aforesaid two questions. ( 2 ) THE first question that is raised is whether when notice dated March 1 1965 demanding the rent and possession of the premises under the provisions of the Rent Act was sent by the lawyer of the landlord by registered post with an acknowledgment due to the opponent and returned with two endorsements dated March 4 1965 and March 5 1965 of refusal a presumption of due service of the notice can arise in Law. The arguments advanced on behalf of the landlord in this Court were that such a presumption does arise in view of the provisions of sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act 1897 or sec- 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 and under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Before we refer to the aforesaid provisions of law we shall first take into account the provisions of sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act 1897 or sec- 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 and under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Before we refer to the aforesaid provisions of law we shall first take into account the provisions of sec. 12 (2) of the Act which provide that no suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 What the aforesaid provisions require is that before suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent is filed a notice demanding the arrears of rent possession of the premises and terminating the tenancy has to be served upon the tenant in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant part of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and may be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it. Having noticed these relevant provisions we shall refer to sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act which is as under:"27 Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post whether the expression serve or either of the expression give or send or any other expression used then unless a different intention appears the service be deemed to be effected by properly addressing pre-paying and posting by registered post a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. "sec. "sec. 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act provides:"28 Where any Bombay Act or Gujarat Act made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post whether the expression serve or either of the expressions give or send or any other expression is used then under a different intention appears the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing prepaying and posting by registered post a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. "it is obvious that see. 27 of the General Clauses Act and sec. 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act are identical. The question whether in the present case the provisions of sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act or sec. 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act apply loses all its importance because the sections are similarly worded and are identical. The purpose of the General Clauses Acts is to place in one single statute different provisions as regards interpretations of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified separately in many different Acts and Regulations. Whatever the General Clauses Act says whether as regards the meanings of the words or as regards legal principles has to be read in every statute to which it applies vide Chief Inspector of Mines and another etc. v. Karam Chand Thapar etc. A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 838. Now sec. 57 of the General Clauses Act 1897 is divisible in two parts. The first part deals with the mode of service and the second Dart deals with the time of service. On the proof of facts that a letter on which stamps has been paid properly which is properly addressed which contains the document and which was sent by registered post a two fold presumption arises under the section namely (i) that the service shall be deemed to have been effected; and (ii) deemed to have effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The said presumption is rebutable because the words unless the contrary is proved govern both the parts of the section. The said presumption is rebutable because the words unless the contrary is proved govern both the parts of the section. It was vehemently argued before us that the aforesaid words relate and apply only to the second part of the section and in respect of the service of the letter the presumption which arises under the first part of the section is conclusive. Reliance was sought to be placed on the decision in The King v. The Westminster Unions Assessment Committee Ex parte Woodward and Sons 1917 (1) Kings Bench Division 832 wherein sec. 65 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 came for interpretation before the Court. It is not possible to accept this argument. It is true that words unless the contrary is proved come just before the words to have been effected at the time etc. but the whole import of the section seems to be that the two fold presumption arising under that section holds good unless the contrary is proved. There is no reason to assume that the first part of the section containing the words service shall be deemed to be effected is to be treated as a complete sentence before we read the words into have been effected at the time etc. . The words of the section are such that the appropriate place where the words unless the contrary is proved can be conveniently inserted is at the place where they are as the intention of the legislature is that these words must govern both the parts. If the presumption of the service is to be treated as conclusive evidence to prove that in fact service had not been made would be inadmissible and that cannot be the intention of the legislature especially when the legislature was enacting such a provision in the General Clauses Act. Whenever the legislature intends to make a statutory presumption as conclusive it ordinarily does specifically say so. It is therefore legitimate to hold that the two fold presumption arising under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act is a rebuttable one. The consequence is that the words unless the contrary is proved govern both the parts of the section. In this view of ours we are fortified by the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in I. C. De Souza Cawnpore In re. A. I. R. 1932 All. 27 of the General Clauses Act is a rebuttable one. The consequence is that the words unless the contrary is proved govern both the parts of the section. In this view of ours we are fortified by the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in I. C. De Souza Cawnpore In re. A. I. R. 1932 All. 374 and Badri Prasad v. Lakshmi Narain A. I. R. 1964 All. 426. Now in the case of Ex parte Woodward and Sons (supra) the relevant part of sec. 65 which came for interpretation before the Court was as follows:"they may also be served and sent by post by a prepaid letter addressed to such person or to the office of such body or to their clerk and if sent by post shall be deemed to have been served and received respectively at the time when the letter containing the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post and in proving such service or sending it shall be sufficient to prove that the letter containing the notice was properly addressed and prepaid and put into the post. "the question involved was in respect of assessment of a property and the law required that a notice by post be served in case where valuation was sought to be revised to the detriment of the owner. The following passage in the judgment of Viscount Reading C. J. has been relied upon:"a notice prepaid and addressed as directed by sec. 65 if sent through the post shall be deemed to have been served and received respectively at the time when the letter containing the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. That provision applies to a case where in fact the notice has not been received otherwise it has no meaning. The intention is to treat as a fact something which has not been established as a fact even something which can be shown not to be a fact. The section continues and in proving such service or sending it shall be sufficient to prove that the letter containing the notice was properly addressed and prepaid and put into the post. In my view when those conditions have been performed it must be taken as concluded that the notice has been served and received. In this opinion I am fortified by the whole scheme of the Act. In my view when those conditions have been performed it must be taken as concluded that the notice has been served and received. In this opinion I am fortified by the whole scheme of the Act. It is most important for the local government of the country that assessment should be made by a properly constituted committee whose duties and obligations should be defined by statute. We are not dealing with reciprocal rights and duties of individuals. "now the Court in that case was dealing with a section in which the words unless the contrary is proved are not to be found. The section was read as a whole and along with the other provisions of the Act and having so read it was held by the (Court that the presumption arising thereunder was conclusive one. Lush J. who also gave the judgment in that case observed that it was necessary to consider the language of secs. 41 and 42 of the earlier Act the Union Assessment Committee Act 1862 which for the purposes of the metropolis only had been superseded by sec. 65. The learned Judge further observed that these two enactments standing side by side one of them applicable to the metropolis only and the other to places other than the metropolis and therefore how could it be said that the additional words in sec. 65 had no operation and were intended to effect no alteration in law ? The learned Judge further proceeded to consider the entire scheme of the Act and held that the presumption that arose under the provisions of sec. 65 was conclusive Thus the said decision cannot be of any assistance in construing sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act which is differently worded. In Regina v. Country of London Quarter Sessions appeals Committee Ex parte Rossi 1956 (1) Q B. D 682 a notice by post pursuant to sec. 3 (1) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals) Act 1933 of the date time and place fixed for hearing of an appeal was given by the mother of an illegitimate child from the dismissal of her summons against a man whom she alleged to be the father of the child. The notice was returned to the sender with postal mark Undelivered no response. The Court in the case was concerned with interpretation of sec. The notice was returned to the sender with postal mark Undelivered no response. The Court in the case was concerned with interpretation of sec. 26 of the Interpretation Act 1889 which is in identical terms with sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act. Denning J. observed as under:"in the present case therefore when the case was called on for hearing on September 28. 1954 and Mr. Rossi did not appear it was essential for counsel for Mrs. Minors to prove service of the notice in accordance with sec. 3 (1) of the Act. He had to prove that the clerk of the peace had in due course given Mr. Rossi notice of the date time and place of the hearing. This could be done by proof that a notice had been sent to him in good time by post in a registered letter which had not been returned for it could then be assumed that it had been delivered in the ordinary course of post; see sec. 26 of the Interpretation Act 1889 But once it appeared that the letter had been returned undelivered then it was quite plain that he had not been given notice at all of the date time and place of the hearing. In short service had not been effected: and the court should not have entered upon the hearing at all. "morris L. J. made the following observations:"then by the concluding words of sec. 26. the sending of the notice was deemed unless the contrary was proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post. But here the contrary was proved. It was proved not merely that the letter was not delivered in the ordinary course of post but that the letter was not delivered at all. Service cannot in this case be deemed to have been effected at some particular time i. e. in the ordinary course of post: service was proved not to have been effected at all. The said decision came up for consideration before Lord Denning M. R. in Hewitt v. Leicester City Council 1969 All England Law Reports 802 where a notice sent by postal mark gone away. The said decision came up for consideration before Lord Denning M. R. in Hewitt v. Leicester City Council 1969 All England Law Reports 802 where a notice sent by postal mark gone away. Lord Denning M. R. observed as follows: "i prefer to go by the earlier decision of this court in R. v. Appeal Committee of County of London Quarter Sessions Ex p. Rossi. There a bastardy summons was returned to the sender marked underlivered. . . . . . . no response. It was held that it had not been served. . . . . . . . . This is case like Rossis case where the time of service was important. The valuation depend on it. Once it appeared that the letter of 1965 was returned through the post marked gone away then it was quite plain that it was not served at all. We are not bound to deem a notice to be served at a particular time when we know that in fact it was not served at all. "in Beer v. Davies 1958 Q. B. D 187 Lord Goddard C. J. considered the decision in Ex parte Rossi and observed as under:"in Reg. v. County of London Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee Ex parte Rossi; the Court of Appeal seem to me to have decided that where a notice is served by registered post or is purported to be served by registered post it is not enough to prove that it was correctly directed stamped and posted. That is prima facie enough but it can be shown that the letter was never delivered and it was never delivered then the Court of Appeal has said that there has not been service and that sec. 26 of the Interpretation Act does not assist. "the aforesaid decisions clearly lay down that the presumption of service which arises under the first part of sec. 26 of the Interpretation Act of 1889 which is identical in terms with sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act is rebuttable and supports the view which we have taken. 26 of the Interpretation Act does not assist. "the aforesaid decisions clearly lay down that the presumption of service which arises under the first part of sec. 26 of the Interpretation Act of 1889 which is identical in terms with sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act is rebuttable and supports the view which we have taken. ( 3 ) IT was sought to be argued in the alternative that the words until the contrary is proved must only refer to the conditions contained in the first part of the section and have no reference to actual service and if any of these conditions are not proved the presumption that arises under the section is taken away. For this argument reliance was sought to be placed in Mrs. Achamma Thomas v. R. Fairman A. I. R. 1970 0 Mysore 77 and on the following passage:"it is contended by the respondents counsel that in this case the very fact that the registered letter has come back with the endorsement as mentioned above shows that the contrary has been proved namely that there has been no due service effected on the tenant; on the other hand it is submitted that the service would be deemed to be effected if the four conditions are fulfilled namely sending the letter by registered post it being properly addressed prepaid and the letter contains the document the contrary that is required to be proved to take away the presumption is with reference to the four requirements referred to above. it appears to me that this contention is not without force. It is only to meet the contingency of a person who is to be served with the notice trying to evade it that the service shall be deemed to have been effected if the four conditions are fulfilled. If the contrary to be proved has reference to the actual service then provision of sec. 27 could be rendered useless by the addressee avoiding to receive the letter or even refusing the registered letter. With respect to the learned Judge of the Mysore High Court it is not possible to accept this argument. The words unless to the contrary cannot be construed in such a narrow manner and full meaning to the words used must be given. Presumption under sec. With respect to the learned Judge of the Mysore High Court it is not possible to accept this argument. The words unless to the contrary cannot be construed in such a narrow manner and full meaning to the words used must be given. Presumption under sec. 27 can arise only on the proof of the conditions set out in first part of the section. The existence of each of the conditions has to be established by positive evidence and it is only then that the presumption under the section can arise. If the evidence on the record is insufficient to establish any one of the conditions the presumption cannot arise. The conclusion is that when it is proved that the registered letter with prepaid stamps containing the document has been posted at the proper address of the addressees a prima facie presumption arises viz. that the notice was served meaning thereby that letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office and it was received by the person to whom it was addressed. Dealing with this question Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Harihar Benerji v. Ramsashi Roy 45 India Appeals 222 B. L R. 522 observed:". . . IF a letter properly directed containing a notice to quit is proved to have been put into the post office it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. That presumption would appear to their Lordships to apply with still greater force to letters which the sender has taken the precaution to register. . . . . . . . "the same conclusion was arrived at in Beluram Ramkissen and others v. Bai Pannabai and another I. L. R. 35 Bom. 213. As the presumption is rebuttable it can be shown that by leading reliable evidence by the addressee that the letter was never delivered to him in fact in which case it will be held that there was no service. Thus the presumption which arises under the section stands rebutted. No general rule can be laid down as to what evidence can be regarded as sufficient to rebut the presumption arising under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act. Thus the presumption which arises under the section stands rebutted. No general rule can be laid down as to what evidence can be regarded as sufficient to rebut the presumption arising under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act. In Roopchand Rangildas v. Haji Hussein Haji Mahomed Soudagar 16 B. L. R. 204 Mr. Justice Beaman after referring to the provisions of sec. 27 came to the conclusion that a prima facie presumption of service arises under sec. 27 and observed as under:" Thus it lies on the defendant in this case to prove that it was not delivered. X think for all practical purposes that the point is actual delivery and that the defendant may not take advantage of his own refusal to accept delivery when tendered. That is to say if the summons in a registered cover be tendered to and refused by him he refuses at his own risk. Where he disputes the actual delivery or tender of delivery it is a mere question of fact and the onus is on him. "this decision completely supports our aforesaid conclusion ( 4 ) IT was then argued that the very fact that an unopened registered letter have been received back by itself shows that sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act cannot come to any assistance or the said circumstance is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that arises under the said section. It was contended that when an unopened envelope is before the Court can it be said the service thereof can be deemed to have been effected ? The very fact of an unopened cover being before the Court negatives the deemed fiction. The arguments are no doubt at first sight attractive but have to stand the test of scrutiny. The legal fiction incorporated in sec. 27 is that when a letter prepaid properly addressed and is sent through registered post then it shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth was not done the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what person the statutory fiction is to be resorted and full effect should be given to the statutory and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. The statute directs the Court to imagine certain state of affairs; it does not say having done so the Court should permit imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs vide State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and others A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 244. The purpose why the fiction has been raised under sec. 27 is to do away with the proof of service and thus avoid inconvenience and expenses when certain conditions are fulfilled by a sender of a registered letter. In order to achieve this object the legislature has a recourse to the public department namely the post office and enacted that when prepaid registered letter properly addressed has been handed over to the postal authority it must be taken that it is duly delivered as letters in the ordinary course are duly delivered. A letter so posted is to be taken to have been received by the addressee unless the contrary is proved. It may happen that when a notice is not received there would be hardships to an individual but looking at the provisions of sec. 27 the legislature did intend that the burden must fall on the addressee. The object of the provisions of sec. 27 is to ease the burden on a person who sends a registered letter and fulfills the conditions laid down in sec. 27. The legislature transfers in such cases the burden to prove non-delivery on the addressee. This is so because in great majority of cases actual delivery of notice by registered letter is achieved and only in exceptional cases it will be otherwise. On the proof that the letter was properly addressed prepaid registered and put into post office the rest follows without further proof viz. that the document has been served upon and received by the addressee. The Court has to give effect to the presumption that arises under sec. 27 even in a case where the registered letter has been returned unopened. A registered letter may be returned back to the sender for various reasons. To illustrate when the addressees house is found to be closed or he is out of place or has left the house or refuses to accept. 27 even in a case where the registered letter has been returned unopened. A registered letter may be returned back to the sender for various reasons. To illustrate when the addressees house is found to be closed or he is out of place or has left the house or refuses to accept. Thus mere fact of the return of a registered letter which may be produced in the Court cannot lead to the lone conclusion that the service had not been effected. The normal rule of construction is that the evidence must be read as a whole. The provisions of the Post Office Act and Rules show that a registered letter with an acknowledgment due can only be returned with an endorsement either of not found or not claimed or Refused etc. The registered envelope must be read as a whole and not in part. The Court cannot therefore rely upon the circumstance of the return of the envelope only as that will tantamount to reading the evidence in part The Court is bound to raise a presumption of delivery under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act even in a case where the registered letter is received back without endorsement as the statutory fiction has to be taken to its logical end. So far as the endorsement of either not found or not claimed or refused is concerned the court has to take notice of sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened regard being had to the common course of natural events human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations (e) and (f) to the section explain the said provisions. It is provided in illustration (e) that Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. Illustration (f) provides that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. We may also refer to the Rules of the Indian Post Office framed under the Post Office Act relating to the registered articles. Rule 62 63 and 64 (1) and (2) read as follows:"62 A receipt shall be given to the person who presents an article for registration at the post office windows during the hours prescribed for posting registered articles. Rule 62 63 and 64 (1) and (2) read as follows:"62 A receipt shall be given to the person who presents an article for registration at the post office windows during the hours prescribed for posting registered articles. 63 No registered article shall be delivered to the addressee unless and until he or his agent has signed a receipt for it in such form as the Director General shall prescribe. 64 (1) If the sender of a registered article pays at the time of posting the article a foe of ten naye Paise in addition to the postage and registration fee there shall be sent to him on the delivery of the article a form of acknowledgment which shall be signed in ink by the addressee or his duly authorised agent or if the addressee refuses to so sign shall be accompanied by a statement to the effect that the addressee or his duly authorised agent has refused to so sign. Provided that no fee shall be payable in respect of a registered Blind Literature packet for which an acknowledgment is required. (2) No article for which an acknowledgment is required under sub-rule (1) shall be accepted for registration unless it bears the name and address of the sender and is accompanied by a Prescribed form of acknowledgment duly filled in and securely fastened to such article and unless the article bears the superscription Acknowledgment Due on the address side. "paragraph 191 of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual Vol. Vl provides the manner in which the refused registered article shall be dealt with and the relevant portion thereof provides that inland registered articles or the letter mail which are refused by the addressee and which have the name and address of the sender clearly written on them should not be kept in deposit but should be marked Refused and sent by the first post with the acknowledgment if any to the office of posting for delivery to the sender. These provisions indicate the regular course of business in the post office. When a registered letter is handed over to the receiving post office it is the official duty of the postal authority to make delivery thereof to the addressee. Consequently it is legitimate to expect that a registered letter would be delivered in normal course to the addressee as that is the official and normal function of the post office. When a registered letter is handed over to the receiving post office it is the official duty of the postal authority to make delivery thereof to the addressee. Consequently it is legitimate to expect that a registered letter would be delivered in normal course to the addressee as that is the official and normal function of the post office. Once the article is delivered to the post office it remains with it unless it is delivered to the addressee or returned to the sender and there is no scope for any person to intermeddle with the letter. When the latter is refused by the addressee an endorsement thereon is made by the post-man and he does so in discharge of his duties Taking into consideration the manner in which the post office deals with registered letter the endorsement on a returned unopened envelope of refusal raises a presumption that an attempt was made to deliver the notice to the addressee and he refused to sign the receipt. The presumption of delivery which arises under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act is in such cases strengthened by the presumption which arises under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. The presumption that arises under sec. 114 of Indian Evidence Act is one of fact. It is not obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption under that section. The Court may refuse to do so if the evidence on record or the circumstances of the case raise any doubt. It must be mentioned that it will facilitate the Court to raise a presumption under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act if evidence is led by the sender to the effect that the registered letter had no endorsement at the time when it was posted and that endorsement was in existence at the time when unopened registered letter was returned to him. If such evidence is on record it will greatly assist the Court in exercising its discretion of raising a presumption under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is not possible to lay down a general rule when the Court should raise a presumption under the section or refuse to do so. Each case must be decided on its own facts. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is not possible to lay down a general rule when the Court should raise a presumption under the section or refuse to do so. Each case must be decided on its own facts. If a registered letter is accepted by the addressee he would be deemed to have knowledge of its contents even if he never cared to read the same. On a parity of reasoning the addressee would be deemed to have knowledge of the contents of a registered letter where he refuses the receipt of it. The Court must be guided in each case by the special circumstances as to how far it will give effect to the endorsement on the returned cover. In our conclusion on the aforesaid points we are supported by the decisions in Gopal Raghunath Kulkarni v. Krishan and others 3 B. L. R. 420; Baluram Ramkissen and ors. v. Bai Pannabai I. L. R. 35 Bom 213; Appabhai Motibhai v. Laxmichand Zaverchand and Co. A. I. R 1954 Bom. 159; Bai Shanta w/o Khalas Ramjibhai Chhotalal v. Khalas Ramjibhai Chotalal A. I. R. 1956 Bom. 144; Lala Jugalkishore Jodhalal v. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal 60 B. L. R. 1075; Shamsadhi Naga Pinjari v. Gunvantibai Ramsnehi 74 B. L. R. 723; Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati A. I. R 1970 All. 446 (FB); Raunq Ram and others v. Prabha Dayal and others A. I. R 1930 Lahore 439; Sm. Munni Devi v. Sm. Puspalata Mondal and Anr. 71 C. W. N 282; Ramayya and another v. Venkatanchellamma and another A. I. R. 1953 Madras 834 Balbhadar Mal Kuthiala v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab Himachal Pradesh and Billaspur Simla A. I. R. 1957 Punjab 284 and Mrs. Achmma Thomas v. K. R. Fairman 1970 0 Mysore 77. The same view has beentaken by J. B. Mehta J. in Special Civil Application No. 617 of 1967 decided on September 9 1970 (Arhabhai Dadabhai and Ors. v. Nathabhai Ranchhodbhai and Anr.) and by myself in Second Appeal No. 629 of 1968 decided on December 5 1968 The presumption arising under sec. The same view has beentaken by J. B. Mehta J. in Special Civil Application No. 617 of 1967 decided on September 9 1970 (Arhabhai Dadabhai and Ors. v. Nathabhai Ranchhodbhai and Anr.) and by myself in Second Appeal No. 629 of 1968 decided on December 5 1968 The presumption arising under sec. 114 relates to an official act being done in a regular manner and is the Court is not in a position to raise such a presumption in respect of the endorsement the Court should not exhibit the endorsement but exhibit only the returned envelope and in that case the evidence of returned envelope is itself sufficient to rebut the presumption of the letter being received by the addressee which arises under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act and sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Once presumptions arise under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act and sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act the burden to rebut the said presumptions would be on the addressee in case where the letter is returned back with an endorsement of Refused. One who challenges an endorsement made by the postal authority in discharge of the duties has to lead evidence to rebut the presumption arising because of the endorsement. The question then is one of rebuttal by leading evidence and such question can be raised only at the stage of trial of the suit. Such a question which depends upon of leading evidence cannot be raised for the first time in appeal or revision. If the registered envelope containing the endorsement is received in evidence and marked as an exhibit in the case the endorsement made thereon cannot be questioned in appeal or revision arising out of the suit in which the envelope is exhibited. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the tenants reliance was sought to be placed on the decision in Vaman Vithal Kulkarani and others v. Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar A. I. R. 1935 Bom. 247=37 B. L. R. 376 and particularly on the following passage occurring in the judgment of Beaumont C. J. :"in the case of defendants 4 and S a registered letter containing the notice was sent to them duly addressed and service is alleged to have been refused. In fact the refusal was not proved as the postman who took the letter and brought it back was not called. In fact the refusal was not proved as the postman who took the letter and brought it back was not called. But in any case even if the refusal had been proved I should not be prepared to hold that a registered letter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought back unopened was well served. There are I know some authorities in this Court to the contrary but it seems to me impossible to say that a letter has been served so as to bring the contents to the notice of the person to whom the letter is addressed if the agent for service states that in fact the notice was not served although the reason may have been that the addressee declined to accept it. One cannot assume that because an addressee declines to accept a particular sealed envelope he has guessed correctly as to its contents. Many people in this country make a practice of always refusing to accept registered letters a practice based I presume on their experience that such documents usually contain something unpleasant. So that it is clear that this notice was not served on three of the defendants. It was also sought to be argued that unless the endorsement on the envelope is proved in the manner in which it is capable of proof no presumption under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can be raised and for this purpose reliance was placed on the decisions in Jankiram Narhari Shahane v. Damodhar Ramchandra Joshi A. I. R. 1956 Nagpur 266 Firm Ganeshdas Kishnaji v. Murlidhar A. I. R. 1956 Madhya Bharat 151 and Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmish A. I. R. 1964 A. P. 314. Now it appears that decision of Vama Vithal Kulikarni (supra) the provisions of sec. 114 of the Evidence Act were not brought to the notice of the Court. The observations made by Beaumont C J. have been treated as obiter and doubted in two subsequent decisions Or the Bombay High Court vide Babasaheb Appasaheb Sirnadgouda v. Laxmanappa Kallimani 40 B. L. R. 1075 and Venkatrao Shrinivasrao v. Basavprabhu Lakhamgouda Sirdesai 45 B. L. R. 754. As pointed out earlier form the manner in which the post office deals with the registered letter it can be presumed by the Court under sec. As pointed out earlier form the manner in which the post office deals with the registered letter it can be presumed by the Court under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that the endorsement thereon was made by the postman in discharge of his official duties and the said endorsement can be relied upon to raise the presumption under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that the delivery of the registered letter was offered to the addressee and he refused to sign the receipt in case where the endorsement is one of refusal. The Court can raise such a presumption on the basis of the endorsement of refusal inspite of the fact that evidence of the authority who made the endorsement is not led in the case. For the reasons already given we do not agree with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions of the Bombay Nagpur and Andhra Pradesh High Courts. ( 6 ) NOW we shall consider the second question which is referred to us. The provisions of sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act have been noted herein before and they refer to the notice of demand of rent. The object of sec. 12 (2) is to restrict the right of the landlord to recover possession on the ground of non-payment of rent and require that a notice be given demanding the rent due in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The said section provides a safe-guard to the tenant against forfeiture of his tenancy on the ground of non-payment of rent because a landlord can file a suit on the ground of non-payment of rent only after giving a notice demanding the rent due and terminating the tenancy. There can be one combined notice demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy. The notice has to be given as per the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore if the notice that is contemplated in sec. 12 (2) is duly served on the tenant as per the manner and provisions of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and if the provisions of sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act are complied with a presumption arises that the notice was duly served on and received within proper time by the addressee. This presumption will be under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and if the provisions of sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act are complied with a presumption arises that the notice was duly served on and received within proper time by the addressee. This presumption will be under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act. If there is an endorsement of refusal on the envelope a presumption under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act also arises viz. that the notice was duly tendered to the tenant but he refused to receive the same and consequently the tenant had the knowledge of the contents of the notice. The special provisions of the Rent Act in our opinion makes no difference in this aspect of the law. ( 7 ) WE shall summarise our conclusions and they are: (1)THAT on the proof of the facts that a prepaid properly addressed letter containing the document was sent by a registered post a presumption under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act or sec. 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act arises that the registered letter reached its destination at the proper time and was received by the addressee. (2) The words unless the contrary is proved govern both the parts of sec. 27 or 28 of the said Act and the presumptions arising thereunder are rebuttable. (3) That the mere production in Court of an unopened envelope of a registered letter bearing an endorsement of refusal does not by itself rebut the presumption arising under sec. 27 or 28 of the General Clauses Acts. (4)That the Court may raise a presumption under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act on the basis of the postal endorsement of refusal on the envelope that the registered letter was tendered to the addressee that he refused to accept the same and that he knew the contents of the letter. The said presumption can be rebutted by the addressee leading evidence to the satisfaction of the Court. The provisions of sec. 12 of the Rent Act make no difference. If the envelope bearing the postal endorsement is marked as an exhibit in the case then question relating to the proof thereof cannot be raised for the first time in an appeal or a revision that is filed against the decree in the suit in which the envelope is exhibited. (5) That the Court may raise a presumption under sec. If the envelope bearing the postal endorsement is marked as an exhibit in the case then question relating to the proof thereof cannot be raised for the first time in an appeal or a revision that is filed against the decree in the suit in which the envelope is exhibited. (5) That the Court may raise a presumption under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act on the basis of the postal endorsement marked on the envelope of a registered letter even though the author thereof is not examined as a witness. (6)The presumption arising under sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act relates to official acts being done in a regular manner and if the Court is not in a position to raise such a presumption in respect of the endorsement the Court should not exhibit the endorsement but exhibit only the returned envelope and in that case the evidence of returned envelope is itself sufficient to rebut the presumption of the letter being received by the addressee which arises under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act or sec. 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. ( 8 ) OUR answers to the two questions referred to us are as follows:answer to the first question is: That on the basis of a mere endorsement of refusal found on the returned registered envelope without being substantiated by any evidence of the postal peon who went to deliver the letter a statutory rebutal presumption of fact that the addressee had in fact refused to accept the delivery of the letter can be raised under the provisions of sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Answer to the second question is: that in a case under sec. 12 of the Rent Act the addressee tenant who refused to take delivery of the registered letter addressed to him can be posted with knowledge that the landlord has given a notice to pay up the arrears of rent. ( 9 ) THE case papers are ordered to be returned for final disposal of the revision application in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs of this reference. Answers accordingly. .