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1974 DIGILAW 322 (CAL)

USHA RANJAN BHATTACHARYA v. MAHALAKSMI THACKER

1974-12-10

M.N.RAY

body1974
M. N. RAY, J. ( 1 ) THIS Rule is directed against an order dated 26th February, 1974 made in the Distraint Proceeding No. 396 of 1973 by the learned Judge, 6th Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta in an application under Section 60 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act which was filed against a proceeding initiated on an application under section 53 of the said Act. ( 2 ) AT all material times the petitioner was and still is a tenant in respect of a room, being Room No. 26/2, at the first floor of premises No. 35, Chittaranjan Avenue, under the respondents. The petitioner contended at the time of the hearing of the proceeding and still he contends in this Court that the monthly rent payable by him for the premises in question was Rs. 99/- plus Rs. 11/- on account of lift, scavenging charges, water and other services. Thus he has contended that he was required to pay a total sum of Rs. 110/ -. Such payment, it is an admitted fact, was also required to be made according to English Calendar month. The petitioner has alleged that by letters of 7th March, 1970 and 16th March, 1970 he was asked by the respondents not to pay rent and consequent to that he had suspended payment of rent. After more than a year, the respondents by their letter of 15th March, 1971 asked the petitioner to pay all the arrears and/or current rent. It has further been alleged by the petitioner that even in spite of his repeated request for setting the terms of payment of arrear and current rent nothing was done by the respondents, who in their turn insisted on payment of the arrear rents at a time. It has also been alleged that the respondents with the malafide intention and for the purpose of humiliating and harassing the petitioner got the Distraint proceeding for realisation of 12 months' rent for the period from 1st October, 1972 to 30th September, 1973 in Distraint Proceeding No. 396 of 1973 and the total amount which was asked to be recovered by the said distraint proceeding was Rs. 1,419. 90 P. which was inclusive of costs. In the said Distraint proceeding the petitioner filed an objection under section 60 of the Act and deposited the sum claimed by the respondents with costs. 1,419. 90 P. which was inclusive of costs. In the said Distraint proceeding the petitioner filed an objection under section 60 of the Act and deposited the sum claimed by the respondents with costs. He, interalia, objected that the distraint claimed at Rs. 110/- as rent per month was bad, illegal and invalid and as such the same was liable to be set aside as the rate of actual rent in the instant case was Rs. 99/- per month, payable according to English Calendar month and the rent which was claimed in the instant case at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month was never payable by him. The petitioner averred that apart from Rs. 99/- payable by him on account of rent he was required to pay a sum of Rs. 11/- per month for the charges as mentioned hereinbefore and as such the amount, if any, on such charges cannot legally from part of rent and thus recoverable through the impugned proceedings. ( 3 ) THE respondents in a reply contended that the petitioner was actually obliged to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month and not Rs. 99/- as claimed. The further case of the petitioner was that by the letter dated 25th June, 1969 he agreed and rented from the respondents on terms of 20 years registered lease the premises in question on the basis of a draft effected on and from 1st July, 1969. He alleged that payment was made as per terms of the draft lease and a sum of Rs. 440/- was paid as security deposit and a further sum of Rs. 100/- was also paid towards preparation charges of the lease deed. He further alleged that he had purchased non-judicial stamp paper worth Rs. 99. 50 for the lease deed in question and handed over the same to the respondents. He further contended that he had executed the lease deed at the Registration Office at Calcutta and paid the registration costs. But the registration could not be completed on that day as the respondents did not turn up at the Registration Office to execute the deed. He contended further that the respondents undertook that they would execute the lease deed duly and conveniently and subsequently represented that the execution and registration were completed by him. But the registration could not be completed on that day as the respondents did not turn up at the Registration Office to execute the deed. He contended further that the respondents undertook that they would execute the lease deed duly and conveniently and subsequently represented that the execution and registration were completed by him. The petitioner further alleged that he had accepted the said representations by the respondents as true and started making payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 99/- per month and service charges at Rs. 11/- per month. ( 4 ) AT the time of the trial before the learned Judge parties did not lead any evidence excepting producing two documents, viz. a letter from the petitioner to the respondents dated 25th June, 1969, (Ext. 1), and a rent bill dated 1st July, 1969, (Ext. A), issued for and on behalf of Mahalaksmi Thaker and Lakhmibai. ( 5 ) THE learned trial Court on consideration of evidence came to the conclusion and found that the rent for the suit premises was Rs. 110/- inclusive of lift, water and other charges of Rs. 11/- per month and it further found that from the rent bill in question it could not be construed that the rate of rent was Rs. 99/- per month as contended by the petitioner. The learned Judge further relied on the document (Ext. 1) which was produced in the proceedings without any objection and concluded that in view of the terms of the said Exhibit the tenant had agreed to pay Rs. 110/- as monthly rent to the respondents herein. In that view of the matter it was found that the tenant's application was not maintainable. ( 6 ) IT is against that order, the tenant petitioner, on 22nd April, 1974 moved and obtained this Rule and at the time of the final hearing of the same Mr. Chowdhury appearing for the petitioner contended that the learned Judge was wrong in accepting Rs. 110/- as rent for the premises in question and in coming to his conclusion he failed to consider that the rent in the instant case would mean, on construction of Exhibit A, Rs. 99/- per month and the balance of Rs. 11/- could not, in any event be considered as a part of the rent in view of the recitals of the said Ext. 99/- per month and the balance of Rs. 11/- could not, in any event be considered as a part of the rent in view of the recitals of the said Ext. A, which read thus: - "to rent of room Nos. 26/2 on the 6th floor in the premises No. 35, Chittaranjan Avenue for the month of July, 1969 at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month (inclusive of charges for lift, water and scavenging services at the rate of Rs. 11/- per month ). " ( 7 ) HE further submitted that in support of the statements as contained in Ext. 1 his client had causes service of a notice to produce the registered lease dated 1st July, 1969 executed by and between the respondents as lessors and the petitioner as lessee for a period of 20 years from 1st July, 1969 to 30th June, 1989 and the learned trial Court was wrong and he acted illegally and with material irregularity in not considering the effect of the said document, viz. the notice to produce, as he did neither pass any order for production of the document in question nor considered the effect of the non-production of the said document, which was very material for an effective determination of the case. He further contended that in view of the specific averments in Exhibit A, the learned Judge should have held that Ext. 1 was given a go-by and in any event, a new tenancy was created by the subsequent document, Exhibit A, the monthly rent whereof was Rs. 99/- and Rs. 11/- was required to be paid as service charges. He also contended that the learned Judge should have held that service charges in any event and in the instant case, cannot form part of rent. Lastly, Mr. Chowdhury submitted that the instant case, in view of the facts and circumstances, is a fit one for sending back to the learned trial Court for the purpose of deciding the issues arising in the proceeding after taking fresh and further evidence. While arguing on Ext. 1 Mr. Chowdhury submitted that Ext. 1 was not a complete document by itself and without the registered lease, the execution whereof has been mentioned in Ext. 1, no definite opinion can be formed on the basis of the same that the rent in the instant case was Rs. 110/- per month. While arguing on Ext. 1 Mr. Chowdhury submitted that Ext. 1 was not a complete document by itself and without the registered lease, the execution whereof has been mentioned in Ext. 1, no definite opinion can be formed on the basis of the same that the rent in the instant case was Rs. 110/- per month. In support of his contention that service charges in the instant case should not be considered as rent, Mr. Chowdhury relied on the case of (1) S. E. Adbul Ghafoor Sahib v. A. M. Abdul Salam Sahib, reported in AIR 1966 Madras 93, wherein it has been held under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 that the rent does not include charges for electricity by the landlord. Consequently, for the calculation of the standard rent, these charges, if paid by the tenant as part of his rent, as is usually done, must be excluded since rent is the recompense paid by the tenant to the landlord for the transfer of a right to enjoy the premises. In the facts of the said case it has been held further that what the tenant had undertaken was a lump-sum payment of nine annas per diem as part payment towards the capital expenditure incurred by the landlord constituting an improvement plus monthly payment of the electricity consumption charges. In support of his contentions Mr. Chowdhury further relied on the case of (2) Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, reported in (1971) 82 ITR 547. In the said case the assessee Company owned the Karnani Mansion constituting of numerous residential flats and over a dozen shops. All these were let out to tenants who made monthly payments which included charges for electric current, for the use of lifts, for the supply of cold water, for the arrangement for scavenging, for providing watch and ward facilities as well as other amenities. It purchased high voltage current in bulk, converted the same into low voltage current in its own power house within the premises and supplied the power to the tenants. It also maintained a separate water pump-house and the boiler for the supply of hot and cold water to the tenants. The Company provided electric lifts for the benefit of the tenants. For all these purposes the assessee maintained a large number of permanent staff. It also maintained a separate water pump-house and the boiler for the supply of hot and cold water to the tenants. The Company provided electric lifts for the benefit of the tenants. For all these purposes the assessee maintained a large number of permanent staff. The Company claimed that the entire receipts from the tenants should be treated as income from the business as it has been formed for carrying on the business of letting out flats and shops. The Income Tax Officer rejected its claim but splitted the receipts into two parts, one part being treated as rent and the other as income from other sources taxable under section 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Appellate Tribunal held that the second part was assessable as income from business under Section 10. Neither the department nor the assessee, the High Court held that the later part of the receipts was also assessable as income from property under section 9 and on appeal to the Supreme Court it was held, reversing the decision of the High Court, that (i) the department having all along proceeded on the basis that the income of the assessee was from two different sources, it should not have been allowed by the High Court to change its case; (ii) on the facts, the services rendered by the assessee to its tenants were the result of its activities carried on continuously in an organized manner, with a set purpose and with a view to earn profits; those activities were business activities and the income arising therefrom was assessable under section 10. ( 8 ) IN reply Mr. Amiya Narayan Mukherjee appearing for the respondents contended that the rent in the instant case was and is inclusive of service charges and after the recitals in Ext. 1, wherein the tenant himself has admitted Rs. 110/- as rent payable per month and there having no other contrary evidence, he cannot be heard to say that the rent was Rs. 99/- per month. Apart from relying on Ext. 1, Mr. Mukherjee also relied on Ext. A and contended that if a total view is taken of the said exhibit and if the same is read along with Ext. 1, there would be no room for doubt that the agreed rent per month for the premises in question which was in occupation of the tenant, was Rs. 110/ -. 1, Mr. Mukherjee also relied on Ext. A and contended that if a total view is taken of the said exhibit and if the same is read along with Ext. 1, there would be no room for doubt that the agreed rent per month for the premises in question which was in occupation of the tenant, was Rs. 110/ -. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on (3) S. K. Chatterjee v. Residence Limited, reported in 58 CWN 607 wherein it has been held that the word "rent" has not been defined in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950 and in the absence of any definition, it must be taken to mean any amount which is agreed to be paid by the tenants as consideration for the occupation of the premises. Thus where a subtenant agreed to pay the contractual rents including the charges for furniture and services, the charges for services are to be treated as part of the rent under the contract of tenancy. Apart from this, Mr. Mukherjee also relied on (4) Wilkes v. Goodwin, reported in (1923) 2 K. B. 86 in support of his contention that in view of the Exhibits in the case, particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore, the rent of the premises could nt be apportioned. ( 9 ) AFTER going through the records myself, I find that the point which was sought to be urged by Mr. Chowdhury on the learned trial Court's illegal or irregular use of power in not allowing further evidence to be taken and in not considering the effect of non-production of the document as mentioned in the notice to produce has no substance at all and the statements as made by the petitioner in paragraph 8 of the petition of motion, which has been affirmed as true to his knowledge, cannot be correct. It appears that the application in question, although is dated 23rd February, 1974 and was served on the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent herein on the same date, yet the said application was filed, as appear from the order sheet in Distraint Case No. 396 of 1973 on 26th of February, 1974, and after the judgment was pronounced. The said order reads thus: - "an application in form of "notice to produce document" signed by the defendant's lawyer on 23. 2. The said order reads thus: - "an application in form of "notice to produce document" signed by the defendant's lawyer on 23. 2. 74 is filed just after the delivery of order. This cannot be considered at this stage as because the learned lawyer for the other side ahs left the Court long before and the defendant's application has already been decided. However, keep the document in the file". ( 10 ) IN view of the above position of the records, I find that the learned trial court has not acted in any manner which can be considered as illegal or irregular, as contended by Mr. Chowdhury, in not taking into consideration the notice to produce or the document as mentioned therein. In fact, the documents or records as mentioned either in the said notice to produce or in Ext. 1, have not at all been proved or even attempted to be proved by the petitioner. ( 11 ) COMING to the next question as was sought to be urged by Mr. Chowdhury, viz. whether the payments in the instant case could be computed under the term "rent" and what should be the rent of the premises in question; whether it is Rs. 110/- or Rs. 99/- on account of rent and Rs. 11/- on account of other charges. It appears that the word "rent" has neither been defined in the Act nor the same has been defined in the General Clauses Act. The English Acts do not define rent and the definition given in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act is also of not much assistance. In its wider sense, "rent" means any payment made for the use of land or buildings and thus includes the payment by a licensee in respect of the use and occupation of any land or building. In its narrower sense as has been found in (5) State of Punjab v. British India Corporation, AIR 1963 SC 1459 "rent" means payment made by tenant to landlord for property demised to him. "rent" according to the decisions in English Courts is the monetary compensation payable by the tenant, howsoever it may be described or allocated. As the word "rent" is not defined in the Act, therefore, in terms of the determination in (6) Residence Limited v. Surendra, 87 CLJ 322, it must be given its ordinary grammatical meaning. "rent" according to the decisions in English Courts is the monetary compensation payable by the tenant, howsoever it may be described or allocated. As the word "rent" is not defined in the Act, therefore, in terms of the determination in (6) Residence Limited v. Surendra, 87 CLJ 322, it must be given its ordinary grammatical meaning. Therefore, in terms of the determination in (7) Gajjar v. Guru Surdul, 78 I. C. 383, the word "rent" must be intended to be understood in the ordinary sense of a return in money or kind for the enjoyment of specific property held by one person from or under another. Rent is the whole amount agreed to be paid by a tenant to his landlord in respect of his enjoyment of what is let out to him whether described as rent or not. Even additional payments made for such things as fitments and payments in respect of rates where the landlord has rated or agreed to be paid by the tenant as condition for his tenancy, will be rent. But as has been found in (8) R. G. Ramchandran v. M/s. Ravalo and Company 1969 0 RCJ 736 it must be the result of an agreement and it must be in consideration of the letting. "rent" as has been found in (9) Samrose v. Gebbard, (1958) 1 WLR 235 an (10) Sidney Trading Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough, (1952) 1 All. E. R. 460, is also a monetary compensation payable by the tenant in consideration for the grant. Under the English Acts, as has been found in (11) Property Holding Company v. Clark (1948) 1 K. B. 630, "rent" also includes additional payments for amenities such as gas cooker, certain fixtures and furnishing and lighting for common parts of the building. Rent in terms of the determination in (12) Alliance Private Company v. Shaffer, (1949) 1 KB 367 also includes payments for alteration and management costs. Rent as has been found in (4) Wilkis v. Goodwin, does not mean rent in its strict sense but the total payment under the instruction of letting and the additional payment for the use of the Linoleum. Rent as has been found in (4) Wilkis v. Goodwin, does not mean rent in its strict sense but the total payment under the instruction of letting and the additional payment for the use of the Linoleum. In view of the aforesaid facts and also in view of the determination made in (3) S. K. Chatterjee v. Residence Limited, 58 CWN 607, rent should mean and include any amount which is agreed to be paid by the tenant as consideration for the occupation of the premises. Here, in the instant case it appears from Ext. 1 that the petitioner has agreed unequivocally to pay an amount of Rs. 110/- as monthly rent without any reservation. Since the remaining statements as contained in Ext. 1 were not proved before the learned trial Court, I am of the view that the learned trial court in consideration of the statements as contained in Ext. 1 read with Ext. A was not wrong in holding that Rs. 110/- was the rate of rent of the tenancy, which according to the opposite parties herein included payments at the rate of Rs. 11/- for charges of lift, water and scavenging services. I further find that on the basis of the reading and construction of the said Exhibits 1 and A, the learned trial court was not wrong in coming to his conclusion, as it did, that taking a total view of the said two Exhibits, the rent payable by the tenant was Rs. 110/- and not Rs. 99/- as claimed. It further appears to me that the cases as cited by Mr. Chowdhury in support of his contentions are of no avail or of very little assistance and in fact the determination as made in those cases have very little relevance to the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 12 ) MR. Chowdhury's prayer for sending back the matter to the learned Court below for re-adjudication of the dispute after taking further or fresh evidence cannot be allowed at this stage and furthermore such liberty is not required to be given in view of the admitted facts and circumstances of the present case and more so when the petitioner himself, having had due opportunities to prove all the contents of Ext. 1 by other evidence had not taken any steps to do so and when in fact he has failed to do so. 1 by other evidence had not taken any steps to do so and when in fact he has failed to do so. In view of the above, all the contentions as raised by Mr. Chowdhury fail and as such the Rule is discharged. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down at an early date. Rule discharged.