JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - This writ petition was originally heard by a Division Bench. The Hon'ble Judges, however, differed in their opinions. One of the learned Judges held that the writ petition should be allowed and the notification dated 1-9-1969 as also the notification under Sec. 4 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Annexure O to the writ petition) be quashed. The other learned Judge was of the view that the writ petition be dismissed. It is in these circumstances that the whole case has been referred to me for opinion. The petitioners have prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to interfere with their property rights in 6786.6 Bights of land in West Dehra Dun popularly known as Anghaila Housing Colony under the notifications dated 1-9-1969 (Annexure O and P to the writ petition) and the proclamation or the Ghoshna Patra of the Collector, Dehra Dun dated 26-3-1970 (Annexure R to the Writ petition). The petitioners have also asked for a mandamus commanding the respondents not to interfere with the petitioner's utilisation and development of the Anghaila Housing Colony, Dehra Dun. The petition contains the usual residuary clause that any other and further relief that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper may be granted. 2. The writ petition has been filed by Anghaila Housing Private Limited and three others, and the dispute is mainly confined to an area of 951 acres of land situate in villages Guljawari and Prohitwala of district Dehra Dun. One Lala Joti Prasad was the original owner of the land. On March 30, 1949 he entered into an agreement with the Delhi Land and Finance Limited for developing the area under a housing scheme. This agreement provided for selling the land to the Company. Under the agreement, possession was handed over to the Company. Pursuant to this agreement, the Company took some steps and a lay-out plan was prepared. Some plots shown in the layout plan are alleged to have been booked by some intending purchasers. Since most of the land was covered by forest and there were in existence certain orders prohibiting the cutting down of the forest, no substantial progress could be made in the execution of the housing scheme. On March 7. Some plots shown in the layout plan are alleged to have been booked by some intending purchasers. Since most of the land was covered by forest and there were in existence certain orders prohibiting the cutting down of the forest, no substantial progress could be made in the execution of the housing scheme. On March 7. 1969, the Company transferred its rights to another Company, namely, D. L. P. Housing and Construction (Private) Limited which undertook to execute the colonising scheme known as the Anghaila Housing Scheme. 3. On July 1, 1952, a notification under clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published, declaring that areas held on July 7, 1949, for purposes of a housing scheme by a limited liability Company were areas held and occupied for a public purpose or work of public utility. The petitioners applied to the State Government to make a declaration under Sec. 2(1) (c) of the Act that the area of the Anghaila Residential Colony was held and occupied for a public purpose, but the Government replied that it had already issued a notification on July 1, 1952, and that it was now for the local officers of the Government on the spot to decide whether any area was covered by that notification. The petitioners then applied to the Collector, Dehra Dun and he by his order dated April 27, 1954 (Annexure B to the writ petition) declared that the land of the petitioners to the extent mentioned in the order came within the orbit of the notification of July 1, 1952 and was exempt from the operation (J) of the Act. By a subsequent order of the State Government dated July 9, 1956, a timetable for six years was set out, within which the Company was required to complete the Housing Scheme. According to the petitioners for no fault of their own the Company was unable to make much progress as it was prevented from clearing the forest on account of the notifications issued under the Indian Forest Act prohibiting the felling of the trees. On September 28, 1964, however, an agreement was entered into between the Governor and the Company. According to the petitioners for no fault of their own the Company was unable to make much progress as it was prevented from clearing the forest on account of the notifications issued under the Indian Forest Act prohibiting the felling of the trees. On September 28, 1964, however, an agreement was entered into between the Governor and the Company. Under this agreement, the Government agreed to withdraw the restrictions under the Indian Forest Act and to permit the Company to fell the trees and carry out the Housing Scheme. It laid down certain conditions regarding survey and soil conservation measures to be taken by the Company. In January, 1966, the Government actually withdrew the notifications under the Indian Forest Act so far as they related to the land in dispute, and also granted permission to the Company to clear the area of the trees within four years. According to the Company, it cleared the area within three years. However, on September 1, 1969, a notification under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 1 read with Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 of the Act (Annexure P to the writ petition) was issued. 4. Admittedly, the area involved in this writ petition was covered by clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 of the Act and, therefore, initially the Act did not apply to this area. (3) of Sec. 1 read with Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 of the Act (Annexure P to the writ petition) was issued. 4. Admittedly, the area involved in this writ petition was covered by clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 of the Act and, therefore, initially the Act did not apply to this area. The impugned notification dated September 1, 1969, which was published in the Gazette, reads thus:- "Whereas the areas held and occupied on the seventh day of July 1948 for the purposes of housing scheme by cooperative societies, registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 and limited liability companies, were by clause (6) of Revenue (A) Department notification No. 4093/1A-450-51 dated July 1, 1952, declared by the Governor under Sec. 2(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) to be areas held or occupied for public purposes or worked of public utility and were as such exempted from the operation of the said Act; AND WHEREAS subsequently an area of 700.30 acres of land in the Chandan Bani Estate (also sometimes described as Chander Rani Estate) in district Dehra Dun (hereinafter referred to as the said area of Dehra Dun district held for the purposes of housing scheme by a company named the Doon Housing Limited, was declared in Government Order No. 8141/ l-A-513/1952 dated July 9, 1956, to be an area mentioned in Sec. 2(1) (c) of the said Act, and as such exempted from the operation of the said Act, and it was made clear in the said order that unless the housing scheme was fully implemented before the end of the sixth year from the date of the aforesaid declaration, the exemption was liable to be withdrawn; AND WHEREAS the holder of the said area of Dehra Dun district have so far failed to utilise it for the purpose for which the exemption was granted and the Governor is satisfied that it will not be in public interest to allow continuance of such exemption in respect of that area from the operation of the said Act; AND WHEREAS the Governor is further satisfied that it will not be in public interest to allow continuance of the said exemption in respect of such of the other areas of the State covered by the said notification of July 1, 1952, as have not till now been utilised for purposes of housing scheme; NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 1, read with Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 of the said Act, and Sec. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, the Governor is pleased to appoint September 1, 1969 as the date with effect from which the whole of the said Act shall apply - (i) to the said area of Dehradun district; and also (ii) to all such other areas of the State as were declared under clause (c) of Sub-sec. 2 of the said Act as areas held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility by clause (6) of Revenue (A) Department Notification No. 4093/l-A-450/1951 dated July 1, 1952 other than areas or parts thereof which have actually been utilised in execution of a housing scheme before the date of this notification." The gist of the notification is that since the petitioners had defaulted in executing the housing scheme within time, the exemption of the area in question from the Act was withdrawn. As I have already pointed, the Collector, Dehra Dun by his proclamation dated 26-3-1970 (Annexure R to the writ petition) held that the notification dated 1-9-1969 was applicable to the Anghaila area. It is by the notification (Annexure O to the writ petition) and the proclamation (Annexure P to the writ petition) that the petitioners feel aggrieved. 5. Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, urged the following three points before me:- (1) That the State Government was estopped from issuing the notification applying the Act to the lands of the Anghaila Housing Scheme; (2) That the impugned notification and proclamation were in law not applicable to the land of the Anghaila Housing Scheme; and (3) That the Government should have given an opportunity to the petitioners before coming to the conclusion that they had failed to implement the aforesaid scheme. It may be noticed at the very outset that the impugned notification does not refer to the land of Anghaila Housing Scheme by name, though it has referred to the Chandan Bani Housing Scheme by name. The notification, however, recites that there were "other areas", which had also not been utilised for the purpose of the Housing Scheme and that it was not in public interest to allow continuance of the exemption in respect of such areas. 6. The notification, however, recites that there were "other areas", which had also not been utilised for the purpose of the Housing Scheme and that it was not in public interest to allow continuance of the exemption in respect of such areas. 6. The operative portion of the notification recites that it applies the provisions of the Act to the Chandan Bani estate as well as other areas which had been given exemption under Sec. 2(1) (c) except "areas or parts thereof which have actually been utilised in execution of a housing scheme before the date of this notification." The contention of the petitioners is that they are covered by the exemption quoted above, and, therefore, the provisions of the Act could not be brought into force in that area, and, further, that the State Government was estopped from issuing such notifications with respect to the land of the Anghaila Housing Scheme. 7. The foundation of a plea of estoppel is a representation made by one party on the basis of which another party alters its position to its detriment, which, in law, precludes the first party from going back on its assurance. The primary question, therefore, which has to be determined in this case, is as to whether an assurance or representation was made by the State Government. The respondents have strongly urged that there is no evidence of any such assurance or representation. I am unable to accept this submission. Annexure A to the writ petition is a letter dated October 29, 1953, addressed by the Deputy Secretary, the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Managing Director, D. L. F. Housing and Construction Limited stating that by its notification dated 1-7-1952 the Government had in unambiguous terms laid down its policy and declared that the areas mentioned in clause (6) of the said notification were areas held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility. The Deputy Secretary advised that it was now for the local officers of the Government on the spot to decide whether any area of land came within the ambit of the main notification, and in case the petitioner company was aggrieved by the decision of the local officers, it was open to it to seek redress in a proper court of law. Thereafter, the petitioners moved the Collector, Dehra Dun for a declaration to the effect that the land belonging to the Company was a Housing Colony under Sec. 2(1) of the Act. The Collector made an enquiry into the matter and expressed the opinion in his order dated 27-4-1954 that the petitioners estate to the extent of the area now in dispute came within the purview of the notification and should therefore be exempted under Sec. 2 of the Act. The recommendation was forwarded to the Government which passed an order on 9-1-1956 (Annexure D to the writ petition) on the subject:- "Exemption from the operation of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 of the lands comprised in the Chandan Bani Estate and Anghaila Colony in district Dehra Dun." By the said order, the Government was pleased to declare the area in question as an area mentioned in Sec. 2(1) (c) of the Act, that is, it exempted the land from the operation of the Act. A copy of the order was endorsed to the Director, D. L. F. Housing and Construction Limited. Thus, there remains no manner of doubt that on the basis of an enquiry made by local officers at the instance of the Government, a decision was eventually reached by the Government that exemption should be granted with regard to this land. This led up to the agreement .dated September 28, 1964, admittedly between the Governor and the D. L. F. Housing Construction Private Limited, the Company. It is true that in the order dated July 9, 1956, a time-table of six years had been laid down requiring the Company to perform those tasks according to the schedule on pain of nullifying the exemption if the schedule was not adhered to. It was, however, submitted, and think rightly, that the agreement dated 28-9-1964 did not incorporate any such condition that the Housing Scheme was to be completed within a period of six years reckoned from the date mentioned in the order dated July 9, 1956. It was, however, submitted, and think rightly, that the agreement dated 28-9-1964 did not incorporate any such condition that the Housing Scheme was to be completed within a period of six years reckoned from the date mentioned in the order dated July 9, 1956. This agreement was in continuation of the earlier orders and notifications which cumulatively showed that there was a representation made by the Government not to apply the Act and to exempt the land from the operation of the same in as much the land in question was occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility declared by the State Government. I am, therefore, unable to accept the respondents contention that in the instant case there was no assurance held out by the State Government which could form the basis of an estoppel. 8. It has however, been strongly contended by Sri Shanti Bhushan for the respondents that there could be so estoppel against law or with respect to the legislative power of the State, and the decision whether or not to apply the Act to a particular area was the exercise of a purely legislative power. In other words, it was submitted that the State Government had the unfettered Legislative power to issue a notification under Sec. 1 (3) read with Sec. 2(1) (c) of the Act and thereby grant exemption to a land from the operation of the Act or withdraw such exemption. Irrespective of any rule of estoppel based on representation, the State Government itself was incompetent to impose a curb on its own legislative power which had to be exercised according to the statutory provisions. The learned counsel advanced the extreme plea that even if an assurance had actually been held out by the State Government, it would be void in as much the legislative power enshrined in a statute admitted of no such concessions. The principal question, therefore, which arises for decision, is whether the power to grant exemption from the operation of the Act, like the one which was granted in the instant case, is an essentially legislative or executive power. In order to appreciate this point, it is necessary to refer to some salient provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Sec. 1 of the Act reads thus :- "S. I. Short title, extent and commencement. In order to appreciate this point, it is necessary to refer to some salient provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Sec. 1 of the Act reads thus :- "S. I. Short title, extent and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 1950. (2) It extends to the whole of the Uttar Pradesh except the areas which on the 7th day of July, 1949, were included in a Municipality or a Notified Area under the provisions of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, or a Cantonment under the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924 or a town area under the provisions of the United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914: Provided that in relation to areas included in the Rampur Municipality, this sub-section shall have effect as if for the words and figures 7th day of July, 1949 the words and figures 31st day of July, 1949 were substituted therein: Provided further that where any area which on July 7, 1949, was included in a municipality, notified area, cantonment or town area ceases to be so included therein at any time after the date and no notification has been made in respect thereof under Sec. 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956- (i) in case it has ceased to be so included at any time before June 29, 1971, this Act shall extend to such area from June 29, 1971, and (ii) in any other case, this Act shall extend to such area from the date, on which the area ceases to be so included; (8) It shall come into force at once except in the areas mentioned A in clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 where it shall, subject to any exception or modification under Subsec. (1) of Sec. 2, come into force on such date as the State Government may by notification published in the Gazette appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different areas and different provisions of this Act " Section 2 deals with modification of the Act in its application to certain areas, the areas being mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-sec. (1). We are only concerned in this case with the areas mentioned in clause (c). (1). We are only concerned in this case with the areas mentioned in clause (c). The relevant provisions of Sec. 2 are as follows :- "(1) The State Government may by notification in the Gazette apply the whole or any provision of this Act to any of the following areas or estates subject to such exceptions of modifications, not affecting the substance, as the circumstances of the case may require - ... ... ... ... (c) areas held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility and declared as such by the State Government ..........; or (2) The declaration of the State Government under clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land is held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility. Explanation :- Any area held on the seventh day of July, 1949, for the purposes of a housing scheme by a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or a limited liability company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, shall be deemed to be held for a work of public utility." A perusal of the above sections shows that even though the Act extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh excepting the areas mentioned in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1, it does not ipso facto come into force in the areas covered by clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2. The Act shall come into force with respect to such areas only by a notification of the State Government appointing a date of such application. Should no such notification be issued, the Act would not come into force with respect to such areas. The Act also seems to contemplate a declaration in terms of Sec. 2(1) (c) to the effect that certain areas are "held and occupied for public purposes or a work of public utility". Thus, although the legislative policy is clearly formulated in the Act, namely, the non-applicability of the Act to areas coming within clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2, in the absence of a notification by the State Government under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 1, whether any particular portion of land answers this description or not is a matter which has to be decided by the State Government. (1) of Sec. 2, in the absence of a notification by the State Government under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 1, whether any particular portion of land answers this description or not is a matter which has to be decided by the State Government. In other words, the particularisation of such areas of land is left to the discretion of the State Government, which naturally acts through its officers. That is way in the instant case, at the instance of the Governor, the Collector made an enquiry and made the recommendation that exemption should be granted with respect to the land in dispute and the same was accepted by the State Government. 9. The Legislature may enact a Statute which may operate by its own force, or it may merely lay down the policy and leave it to some other instrument or agency on fulfilment of certain conditions to apply the Statute to a certain area or exempt the same from its operation. The former is an instance of the exercise of a purely legislative power, and the latter case, where as instrument or agency, whether it be the State Government or some other person or body or officers, declares whether certain conditions or facts exist so as to attract the provisions of the Act, is an instance of the exercise of an administrative or executive power. Where a power is purely legislative, the rule that there can be no estoppel against a Statute or law will be fully applicable to it, despite a representation or assurance made by the authorities. On the other hand, if the matter is within the ambit of administrative or executive powers, any assurance or representation held out with respect to the exercise of such powers would be amenable to the rule of estoppel. It is difficult to accept the respondents contention that the power to issue notifications is invariably a legislative power. It will depend upon the nature of the notification which is made. Thus, for instance, it would be fatuous to contend that a notification made under Sec. 4 of the Act is in exercise of a legislative power. A notification issued by the State Government may share predominantly the characteristics of an administrative power. It will depend upon the nature of the notification which is made. Thus, for instance, it would be fatuous to contend that a notification made under Sec. 4 of the Act is in exercise of a legislative power. A notification issued by the State Government may share predominantly the characteristics of an administrative power. Where it is left to the officers of the Government to find out on facts as to whether certain land or area comes within a particular category such as the one referred to in clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2, the determination of those facts and the decision as to whether these facts still subsist or not so as to attract the applicability of the provisions of an Act is an essentially executive action. I am conscious of the fact that the Act does not in so many words appoint any machinery for investigation of these actual conditions. Nevertheless, there is no bar to the employment of an appropriate agency for particularising the land or area which may be deemed to be held or occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility. Where the law requires a particular act to be done, power to perform other acts incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the substantive power can always be inferred by necessary implication See the Income-tax Officer, Cannamore v. M.N. Mohammad Kunbi, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 430. That is why the State Government directed the Collector, in the present case to investigate into the facts which he did and recorded a finding by his order (Annexure B to the writ petition) that the land was covered by clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2 of the Act. Such power is a necessary corollary of the main power of issuing a notification under Sec. 2 applying the Act to an area held and occupied for public purposes, etc. It has to be exercised for the purpose of specifying that particular land, and, therefore, it is an incidental power of investigation by local officers, as was actually done in the instant case. 10. In Wade and Philips, "Constitutional Law", it has been laid down :- "It is customary to divide functions of Government into three classes, legislative, executive (or administrative) and judicial. 10. In Wade and Philips, "Constitutional Law", it has been laid down :- "It is customary to divide functions of Government into three classes, legislative, executive (or administrative) and judicial. It is not always easy, or indeed possible, to determine under which head an act properly falls, but the organs which mainly perform these functions are distinguishable." As the learned authors point out, sometimes the three categories become blurred and it is difficult to exclude the one entirely from the other, and, therefore, the only working principle can be evolved is to ascertain the predominant nature of certain functions in order to apply to them one or the other of these labels. To me it appears that where the Legislature leaves it to the State or any other agency to embark upon findings of facts and on the basis thereof in its discretion to apply or not to apply certain provisions and issue notifications or refrain from issuing such notifications, what the Statute actually requires to be done is the performance of certain administrative functions. They cannot be regarded as an exercise of legislative power. In "American Jurisprudence" 2nd Edition, Volume at page 933 paragraph 125 it is stated :- "The legislature may delegate its authority to make findings of fact, and the fact-finding power may be conferred for putting into effect, suspending, or applying the law. When the legislature indicates its will by declaring the policy or purpose of a Statute, and provides a standard for the exercise of such power, it may confer upon administrative agencies power to ascertain the facts and condition to which the policy and principles of the law apply and under which they are to be enforced, such function being administrative rather than legislative. Power to ascertain and determine whether the qualifications facts or conditions comprehended in and required by general terms stating the policy and standards of a law have been met, and whether the provision of the law so fixed and declared have been complied with, may be vested in administrative agencies without violating the principle for bidding the delegation of legislative powers. An administrative agency may be empowered to determine the localities and businesses or occupations to which the law applies, and whether a particular person or entity is with in a regulatory statute or its exceptions, and generally to determine the fact of its jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). 11. An administrative agency may be empowered to determine the localities and businesses or occupations to which the law applies, and whether a particular person or entity is with in a regulatory statute or its exceptions, and generally to determine the fact of its jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). 11. Applying the formula oi the three broad divisions of functions already adverted to, a is well settled that those powers, which strictly do not fall within either legislative or judicial categories are relegated to a kind of residuary zone, which is equated with executive powers. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 7, Art. 409, page 192, it is observed :- "Executive functions are incapable of comprehensive definition for they are merely the residue of the functions 0f Government after legislative and judicial functions have been taken away. They include, in addition to the execution of the laws, the maintenance of public order, the management of Crown property and nationalised industries and services, the direction of foreign policy, the conduct of military operations, and the provision or supervision of such services as education, public health transport, and state assistance and insurance." The same principle was adopted by the Supreme Court in Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. P.N. Rana, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 648, wherein it is observed (at page 655) :- "But is now well settled that functions which do not fall strictly within the field legislative or judicial, fall in the residuary class and must be regarded as executive." This sphere which is assigned to the State or some other body by the Legislature for investigation of facts land then arriving at its own decision whether to apply or not to apply the provisions of a law, in my opinion appertains to a power which must be placed in the residuary class and regarded as executive or administrative in character. In fact, the Supreme Court assigns a new nomenclature to the exercise of such power by calling it "conditional legislation and not bracketing it with delegated legislation. In Basant Kumar Sarkar v. The Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1260, the provisions of Sec. 1 (3) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (No. 34 of 1948) were examined, which empowered the Central Government to issue notification and appoint different dates for applying different provisions of the Act and for different States or different parts thereof. In Basant Kumar Sarkar v. The Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1260, the provisions of Sec. 1 (3) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (No. 34 of 1948) were examined, which empowered the Central Government to issue notification and appoint different dates for applying different provisions of the Act and for different States or different parts thereof. Gajendragadkar, C. J., speaking for the Court, remarked in paragraph 4 of the reports :- "Sec. 1 (3) is really not an illustration of delegated legislation at all; it is what can be properly described as conditional legislation. The Act has prescribed a self-contained Code in regard to the insurance of the employees covered by it; several remedial measures which the Legislature thought it necessary to enforce in regard to such workmen have been specifically dealt with and appropriate provisions have been made to carry out the policy of the Act as laid down in its relevant Sections. Sec. 3(1) of the Act purports to authorise the Central Government to establish a Corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees State Insurance by a notification. In other words, when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories it should be issued, has been left to the discretion of the Central Government and that is precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation." In my opinion, the term "conditional legislation" used by the Supreme Court in the above dictum is very significant. It implies that in order to effectuate the legislation, the exercise of the executive powers by the State or some agency other than the Legislature is essential. In other words, the legislation itself is not effective unless an administrative authority has passed an order embodying its own decision in the exercise of its administrative powers. If within the penumbra of such executive powers a representation is made, directly or indirectly, by the administrative authority and acted upon by another person to his detriment, the rule of estoppel operates with full force. There is no reason why such authority should be permitted to elude the bar of estoppel. Thus, even though on superficial view the nature of such power might appear legislative, on deeper dissection it becomes apparent that it is really an administrative or executive power. There is no reason why such authority should be permitted to elude the bar of estoppel. Thus, even though on superficial view the nature of such power might appear legislative, on deeper dissection it becomes apparent that it is really an administrative or executive power. What particular areas should, on investigation of facts, be regarded as "areas held and occupied for public purposes or a work of public utility" at a particular time and how long do those areas retain such character so as to be excluded from the operation of the Act is a matter which has been left under, the Act entirely to the executive power of the State. The Legislature itself has conferred a discretion on the State after ascertaining facts to administratively decide whether or not a notification should be made under the Act in a particular case. Thus, I find no substance in the respondents argument that since the alleged assurance or representation related to the exercise of a legislative power, no estoppel could arise. 12. Sri Shanti Bhushan vehemently urged that the doctrine of estoppel qua the State was a nearly attenuated doctrine and had now been confined to a very narrow region. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in N. Ramnath Pillai v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2641, in which the following passage from the "American Jurisprudence", 2nd Edition, Volume 28, at page 783, paragraph 123 was quoted with approval:- "Generally, a State is not subject to an estoppel to the same extent as is an individual or a private corporation. Otherwise, it might be rendered helpless to assert its powers in government. Therefore, as a general rule, the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the State in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. An exemption, however, arises in the application of estoppel to the State where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice." It was submitted that the rule of estoppel should not be invoked against the State in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. We cannot, however, lose sight of two notable exceptions which have been engrafted in the above enunciation of law, namely, that the rule would be applicable where it is necessary "to prevent fraud or manifest injustice". We cannot, however, lose sight of two notable exceptions which have been engrafted in the above enunciation of law, namely, that the rule would be applicable where it is necessary "to prevent fraud or manifest injustice". If the facts of a particular case move the conscience of the Court and an inference becomes irresistible that a party had actually determined its course of action on an assurance or representation held by the State directly or indirectly, then the State if like any other litigant, cannot be allowed to play fast and loose with such assurance. In the same volume of the "American Jurisprudence" at page 785, paragraph 123, the following passage occurs :- "Under some circumstances, however, a state may be held estopped if an individual would have been held estopped. A state may be estopped by an act of the legislature in a matter not involving a constitutional question, and moreover, may be estopped only by an act of the legislature where the legislature possesses the sole power to bind it in the transaction in which an estoppel is alleged to arise. A State may be held estopped when acting in a proprietary or contractual capacity. Also, there is authority that a state may be deemed estopped when the acts of its officials, alleged to constitute the ground of estoppel, are done in the exercise of powers expressly conferred by law, and when acting within the scope of their authority. So a department of a State Government in a matter of procedure and within the scope of departmental powers, may be estopped. A contract or deed lawfully made by a state may create an estoppel against it if the effect of the estoppel will not be to impair the exercise of the powers of Government, although, there is also authority to the effect that a state, by virtue of its sovereign status, can never be estopped by its deed." Moreover, Ramnath Pillai as case is completely distinguishable on facts. That was a case of a Government servant. An agreement had been entered into between him and the Government of Kerala that his term of appointment was for a period of 5 years or till he attained the age of 60 years, whichever was earlier. That was a case of a Government servant. An agreement had been entered into between him and the Government of Kerala that his term of appointment was for a period of 5 years or till he attained the age of 60 years, whichever was earlier. It appears that prior to the expiry of that time-limit, the post itself was abolished, and the petitioner took exception to it on the ground that the agreement had further stated that he was not to be removed or suspended from office except in the manner provided for removal or suspension of the Chairman or Members of the State Public Service Commission. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the abolition of a post might entail the consequence of termination of the services of a Government servant, but such termination was not dismissal or removal, and there was no agreement or undertaking not to abolish the post. The agreement merely provided that the petitioner shall not be removed or suspended from office. No bar could obviously be pleaded to the Governments power to abolish a post which was an executive or policy decision. Thus, on the facts of the case, no plea of estoppel could be successfully raised, and the Court, in those circumstances, excluded the operation of the doctrine of estoppel. In my opinion, this decision can be of no assistance to the respondents." 13. The rule of estoppel is a rule of equity and operates equally against an individual citizen and the State and its officials. In Union of India v. M/s Anglo Afgan Agencies, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 718, it was held that the Government was not exempt from equity arising out of acts done by citizens to their detriment relying upon the representations as to its future conduct made by the Government. The Government had framed an Export Promotion Scheme in which a representation was made that import licences upto the value of the goods exported would be issued and the respondents had altered their position to their prejudice by relying upon the representation contained in the scheme in as much as they had actually exported goods. It was held that their claim for import licence for the maximum value permissible by the scheme could not be arbitrarily rejected. It was held that their claim for import licence for the maximum value permissible by the scheme could not be arbitrarily rejected. When the exporters had acted in the manner they were invited to act, the Government was, bound to honour' its solemn promises, even though no formal contract in the manner required by Art, 299 of the Constitution had been executed. The claim of the respondent was recognised as being founded upon the equity which arose in their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the Union of India in the Export Promotion Scheme and the action taken by the respondents acting upon that representation under the belief that the Government would carry out the representation made by it. 14. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. : A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1021. the same dictum was re affirmed, and Shah, J. referred to the observations made by Donning, J. in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, (1949) 1 K.B. 227, which in his opinion, applied in India as well. "The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to better its future executive action." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court declared the law in these terms: "Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice." It was remarked by Shah, J. :- "If our nascent democracy is to thrive, different standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice." In Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 469, even though on account of the non-compliance with the statutory formalities the Government Resolution authorising the Corporation to take possession of the site was held to be not an effective grant passing title in the land to the Corporation the Court was of the view that the representation of the Government that it would not levy any rent had been acted upon by the Municipal Corporation and it was bound by its representation. Chandsekhara Aiyar, J., expressed himself thus :- "Can the Government be now allowed to go back on the representation, and, if we do so, would it not amount to our countenancing the preparation of what can be compendiously. described as legal fraud which a Court of equity must prevent being committed? If the resolution can be read as meaning that the grant was of rent-free land, the case would come strictly within the doctrine of estoppel enunciated in Sec. 115, Evidence Act. But even otherwise, that is, if there was merely the holding out of a promise that no rent will be charged in future, the Government must be deemed in the circumstances of this case to have bound themselves to fulfil it. Whether it is the equity recognised in Ramaden's case or it is some other form of equity, is not of much importance. Courts must do injustice by the promotion of honesty and good faith, as far as it lies in their power." 15. Anglo-Afgan Agencies case was followed by a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Gappu Lal Munni Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1971 A.L.J. 796, to which was a party. The petitioner had argued that in view of the State Governments notification under Sec. 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act to exempt sale of country liquor from levy of sale-tax and to recoup the consequential loss of revenue by enhancing the rate of excise duty thereon it was estopped from imposing on or realising from the petitioners any sales tax on the retail sale of country liquor. The plea of the State was that no estoppel could be pleaded against law. This contention was rejected and Kirty, J. speaking for the Court observed in paragraph 20 of the Reports :- "In reply to the petitioners above noted submissions, the learned counsel for the State submitted that no estoppel can be pleaded against law and its enforcement, much less in the matter of taxation. As a broad general proposition this contention is correct and has not also been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In the circumstances of the case, however, such proposition cannot bar or repel the petitioners plea. They have not pleaded any estoppel against the exercise of the legislative power by the legislature nor against any statutory provision which operates spontaneously by its own force nor against the exercise by the State of its exclusive executive function. The plea is against the exercise of the subordinate powers by the delegate of the Legislature in the instant case the State Government - on whom large discretionary powers have been conferred to grant exemption from taxation as also to impose tax at enhanced rates within the prescribed ceiling. The powders delegated are not plenary nor in law could be plenary. The legislature may provide the State Government with several sources of revenue from different taxes under different taxing statutes and may further delegate to it certain discretionary powers in regard to the extent and manner of exploiting the legislative measures for purposes of revenue. The State Government in exercise of such powers delegated to it under different taxing statutes may, for administrative reasons or in the interest of revenue, consider it expedient and decide to exempt a tax payer or a class of taxpayers, liable to be taxed simultaneously under more than one statute, from tax liability under one Act and to subject such tax-payer or class of tax-payers to taxation at a higher rate under another Act in lieu thereof. If the State Government makes such announcement and gives effect to the same, thereby realising tax at enhanced rates under the Act selected by it and inducing the persons concerned also to pay larger sums on some other but collateral head of revenue, it cannot be held that even though the State Government subsequently seeks to levy tax also under that Act under which exemption was granted, no plea of estoppel can be raised against it, by the person or persons adversely affected. The plea of estoppel raised by the petitioners is well founded and also supported by highest authority." 16. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on certain authorities in support of his contention that no estoppel would arise against the State, but they are distinguishable on facts and, in my opinion do not assist the respondents contention. I was referred to the case of C. Sankarnarayanan v. The State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1997. In that case the age of superannuation fixed by alteration was assailed, and the petitioner relied on an understanding, which was pleaded as a binding agreement or contract between the Government and the teachers and from which it was alleged, it was not open to the Government to reside unilaterally. Alternatively, a rule similar to that of estoppel was invoked. Both arguments were repelled for two reasons. Firstly, the basis of estoppel is a clear and unequivocal assurance or representation. Secondly, there can be no estoppel against the exercise of constitutional powers. The finding recorded in the case was that no agreement or contract, as alleged could be spelt out from the documents relied upon. It was held that the Government could not possibly contract out of the Constitution and the power conferred by Art.309 for framing rules with regard to the conditions of service of Government employees or teachers in aided schools could not in any manner be curtailed or fettered by an agreement or contract. 17. The other case, on which reliance was placed was M/s Narinder Chand Hem Rai v. Lt. Governor Administrator, Union Territory, H.P., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2399. In that case the Supreme Court laid down the dictum, "No court can issue a mandate to a legislature to enact a particular law. 17. The other case, on which reliance was placed was M/s Narinder Chand Hem Rai v. Lt. Governor Administrator, Union Territory, H.P., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2399. In that case the Supreme Court laid down the dictum, "No court can issue a mandate to a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly no court can direct a subordinate legislative body to enact or not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact." It is on the authority of this passage that the argument was raised that no court could direct either the Legislature or any subordinate legislative body not to exercise its legislative powers. Those observations were made in an entirely different context. In that case the dispute related to the imposition of Sales Tax. The case of the petitioned firm, who were merchants in Simla, was that at the time of the auction of Indian made foreign liquor and beer, the Deputy Commissioner, Simla who was the Collector of Excise and Taxation, had announced that no sales tax shall be liable to be paid on the Indian made foreign liquor and beer, but despite that assurance the Government had levied Sales Tax and was taking steps for realising the same. The Supreme Court, however, recorded a finding of fact that no such representation as alleged had been made by the Deputy Commissioner. That clinched the matter. Secondly, Simla was a part of Punjab till reorganisation of Punjab in 1966 when Simla was added on to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. Under Sec. 6 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act no sales tax was payable on the sale of goods specified in schedule B and the liquor in question formed part of that schedule. Later the liquor was deleted from schedule B and included in Schedule A and thus the sale of the said liquor became exigible to sales tax. It was found as a fact that this delegation had taken place prior to the reorganisation of Punjab. Simla continued to be governed by the law in force in Punjab where reorganisation took place. For that reason liquor was subject to sales tax and the Government had no option in the matter. Thirdly, it is patent that the power to amend a schedule enacted by the Legislature is a purely legislative power. Simla continued to be governed by the law in force in Punjab where reorganisation took place. For that reason liquor was subject to sales tax and the Government had no option in the matter. Thirdly, it is patent that the power to amend a schedule enacted by the Legislature is a purely legislative power. Fourthly, the most notable feature of that case was that there was no provision in that Act empowering the Government to exempt any assessee from payment of tax. It was in that background that the above quoted observations were made. In paragraph 7 of the reports it was significantly observed:- "Unless the executive is specifically empowered by law to give any exemption, it cannot say that it will not enforce the law against a particular person. No court can give a direction to a Government to refrain from enforcing a provision of law." In other words, it was recognised by implication that if an executive discretion had been conferred by the legislature on the Government the latter would have been competent to issue an appropriate, direction to exempt the assessee from tax. On the other hand, in the case in hand, the Legislature has given an executive discretion to the State Government under Sec. 2 of the Act to apply or not to apply its provisions to a particular region." 18. Thus, the respondent No. 1 was estopped from withholding the exemption granted to the petitioner for the purpose and on account of carrying on work of public utility on the land in question. 19. The next point which arises is whether the notification dated 1-9-1969 (Annexure P to the writ petition) applies to the land in dispute. In case it is held not applicable, the proclamation dated 26-3-1970 (Annexure B to the writ petition) issued by the Collector, Dehra Dun holding that the land in question is covered by the Said notification would be invalid. The notification (Annexure P to the Writ petition) relates to those "areas of the State covered by the said Notification dated 1-7-1952 as have not till now been utilised for purposes of housing schemes". The question, therefore, is as to whether the area in dispute had not been utilised for the purpose for which exemption had been granted or the petitioners had failed to utilise the same. The question, therefore, is as to whether the area in dispute had not been utilised for the purpose for which exemption had been granted or the petitioners had failed to utilise the same. The respondents took a rather rigid position and laid emphasis on the earlier order of the State Government dated 9-7-1956 whereby six years time schedule was fixed, and contended that the Housing Scheme had not been completely executed within six years from that date and as such the t petitioners had failed to utilise the land for the purpose- for which exemption had been granted. I am unable to accede to this proposition. Firstly, as I have already pointed out, the order stood superseded by the agreement dated 28-9-1964 (Annexure J to the writ petition) which does not incorporate any such condition. Moreover, it does not stand to reason that when the agreement itself had been entered into nearly eight years after the order dated 9-7-1956, there could still remain in operation the time-limit of six years. It is also material that the various notifications under Secs. 4 and 38-B of the Indian Forest Act, which stood in the way of the petitioner executing the scheme, since no housing colony could be established unless the land was denuded of the trees, were withdrawn only in January, 1966, leaving actually only four years time to the petitioner within which to clear off the forest. In these circumstances it will be plainly unreasonable to hold that the petitioner was expected to complete the Housing Scheme within six years reckoned from 9-7-1956. It is not disputed that the felling licence was issued to the petitioner on 21-5-1966 and the four years time granted for felling the trees was due to expire in April 1967 but the petitioner succeeded in completing the felling in the entire area one year earlier than the period allowed. On the material furnished before me, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that before the impugned notifications were made the petitioner had taken the following steps :- (i) It had prepared the lay-out plan long ago. On 31-12-1965, it had submitted a working plan which was approved by the U. P. Government on 25-12-1968. (ii) It had entered into agreements with several persons for the sale of plots in the colony. On 31-12-1965, it had submitted a working plan which was approved by the U. P. Government on 25-12-1968. (ii) It had entered into agreements with several persons for the sale of plots in the colony. (iii) It had written to the appropriate authorities and actually obtained sanction for water and electricity connections. (iv) It had got the land surveyed in accordance with the agreement entered into with the Government in 1954. (v) It had taken the soil conservation measures, as contemplated by the 1964 agreement. (vi) It had constructed roads in the colony. In paragraph 72 of the writ petition, the averment was that the company had constructed 8 to 9 miles of roads connecting all the blocks of the colony at a cost of over a lakh of rupees. In the counter-affidavit of Sri R.P. Tyagi filed on behalf of the respondents, this allegation was denied, and it was stated that "some Kachcha muddy export tracks have been laid down simply to export the felled material from the colony blocks." In paragraph 15 of the rejoinder-affidavit, however, this allegation was controverted, and it was stated that the roads had been inspected by Sri K. D. Srivastava, appointed by the Collector, Dehra Dun, at the instance of the U. P. Government and he found that they were not Kachcha muddy export tracks hut were regular roads connecting the colony blocks It appears from annexure B-38 which is a plan showing the construction of such roads, that the allegation made by the petitioner was correct. (vii) The company had admittedly cleared the forest in accordance with the agreement in less than the time allowed for the purpose. 20. On these facts, it cannot be inferred that the land had not been utilised in the execution of the Housing Scheme. Surely, it cannot be said that the petitioners remained inert or immobile. I am not included to put a strict and literal construction on the understanding as to the time within which the Housing Scheme was to be "executed" particularly when the time schedule was, not incorporated in the agreement arrived at in the year 1964. In my opinion the terms execution of the scheme should be liberally construed so as to cover not only those cases where the Housing Scheme has been fully implemented, but also cases where the process of implementation has made considerable headway. In my opinion the terms execution of the scheme should be liberally construed so as to cover not only those cases where the Housing Scheme has been fully implemented, but also cases where the process of implementation has made considerable headway. In the instant case, the petitioners had taken not only the first step of clearing the trees, but various other major steps which I have adverted to. In that view of the matter, the modification dated 1-9-1969 which speaks of areas not utilised for purposes of Housing Schemes, will not be applicable to the present case. It follows that the proclamation made by the Collector on 26-3-1970 (Annexure R to the writ petition) stating that the notification of 1-9-1969 was applicable to the land in dispute, namely, the Anghaila Housing Colony belonging to the petitioners, was invalid and must be quashed. The petitioners are entitled to continue and proceed with the execution of the Housing Scheme. 21. In view of my conclusions recorded above it is not necessary to deal with the third contention urged on behalf of the petitioners. 22. For my part, I would, therefore, allow this writ petition with costs and quash the order of the Collector, Dehra Dun dated 26-3-1970 (Annexure R to the writ petition) and issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to interfere with the petitioners utilisation and development of the Anghaila Housing Colony, Dehra Dun within a reasonable time. 23. With this opinion I order that the papers of the case be returned to the Bench concerned. 24. By the Court.- In accordance with the opinion of the learned third Judge, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the order of the Collector, Dehra Dun, dated March 26, 1970 (Annexure R to the writ petition) is quashed and a writ of mandamus is issued commanding the respondents not to interfere with the petitioners utilisation and development of the Anghaila Housing Colony, Dehradun, within a reasonable time.