JUDGEMENT Bimal Chandra Basak, J. :- This is an application for a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus challenging the order of detention passed by the Commissioner of Police. Calcutta on the 13th July, 1974 in exercise of powers conferred by Sub-Section (1)(a)(ii) read with Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The said order was made with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds of detention which were served on the detenu relies on the incident set out hereinbelow :- "That at about 22.00 hours on 28-1-1974, you along with your associates, all belonging to Sibnarayan Das Lane (Calcutta) group being armed with iron rods and bombs formed an unlawful assembly on Guru Prasad Chowdhury Lane. Calcutta and committed riot with your rivals, belonging to Guru Prasad Chowdhury Lane (Calcutta) Group over old enmity on Guru Prasad Chowdhury Lane in front of premises No. 52 (Guru Prasad Chowdhury Lane) and when a police party rushed to the spot on receipt of the information of the aforesaid disturbances and arrested you on Guru Prasad Chowdhury Lane at the aforesaid date and time after a hot chase with a bomb in your hand, you instantly exploded the said bomb which was in your illegal possession on Guru Prasad Chowdhury Lane session at the aforesaid date and time in order to facilitate your retreat. In consequence Const. Ram Adesh Singh (sic) on his person resulting in his admission in the hospital. As a result of your action as aforesaid, fear, frightfulness and insecurity prevailed in the above areas and thereby affected the maintenance of public order." 2. Mr. Dilip Kumar Dutt, learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule, firstly contended that the order of detention was made in mala fide exercise of power. As a result of your action as aforesaid, fear, frightfulness and insecurity prevailed in the above areas and thereby affected the maintenance of public order." 2. Mr. Dilip Kumar Dutt, learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule, firstly contended that the order of detention was made in mala fide exercise of power. In this connection he referred to the averments made in paragraphs 8 and 14 of the petition wherein it has been alleged as follows : "(8) That the petitioner states that the ground for detention is false, frivolous, non-existent and has been engineered by the officer-in-charge and the other officers namely the respondent No. 5 who investigated the case No. 35 of 1974 attached to the Amherst Street Police Station, who are inimical towards the petitioner." (14) That the petitioner states that the aforesaid facts clearly show that the order of detention was passed mala fide and for collateral purposes by the detaining authority at the behest of the officer-in-charge of the Amherst Street Police Station and the respondent No. 5 who are inimical towards the petitioner and are determined to implicate him in various false cases." He admitted that the Commissioner of Police has affirmed an affidavit dealing with the said allegation but he wanted the Court to take notice of the fact that other persons, against whom allegations of mala fide have been made have not filed any affidavit controverting the same. In this context he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in G. Sadanandan v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1966 SC 1925 : (1966 Cri LJ 1533). Mr. D. Choudhury, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents strongly disputed these contentions of Mr. Dutt. He submitted that the allegation of mala fide in paragraph 8 of the petition is very vague in nature. He further pointed out that such allegation is directed not against the detaining authority but against some other persons. So far as paragraph 14 of the petition is concerned, Mr. Chowdhury submitted that there is nothing new in this paragraph in addition to what has been stated in paragraph 8 of the petition. He further pointed out that such allegation is directed not against the detaining authority but against some other persons. So far as paragraph 14 of the petition is concerned, Mr. Chowdhury submitted that there is nothing new in this paragraph in addition to what has been stated in paragraph 8 of the petition. In this context he relied on the averments made in paragraphs 11, 12 and 17 of the affidavit affirmed by the detaining authority dealing with the allegations of mala fide alleged in the petition and submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case there is sufficient and specific denial of the allegation of mala fide. Paragraphs 11, 12 and 17 of the affidavit of the detaining authority relied on by Mr. Chowdhury are set out hereinbelow. "(11) With reference to the statements contained in paragraph 8 of the said petition. I deny each and every allegation contained therein. I deny that the ground is false, frivolous and non-existent. I deny that the ground has been engineered by anyone. I deny that anyone is inimical towards the detenu as alleged. As already stated hereinbefore the detenu was caught red-handed in connection with the incident which forms the subject-matter of the ground of detention. (12) With further reference to the statements contained in paragraph 8 of the said petition, I say that before making the order of detention. I personally scrutinised the genuineness of the materials which formed the ground of detention and after being satisfied about their dependability I made the order of detention. (17) I deny each and every allegation contained in paragraph 14 of the said petition. As already stated hereinbefore. I made the detention order bona fide. I deny that I passed the detention order at the behest of the Officer-in-Charge of the Amherst Police Station or Shri Salil Jha, Sub-Inspector attached to Amherst Police Station at the material time." 3. The law is now well settled to the effect that an order of detention can be set aside if it has been passed mala fide or in colourable exercise of powers. It is also well settled that if there is an allegation as to mala fides an affidavit has got to be affirmed by the detaining authority. The law is now well settled to the effect that an order of detention can be set aside if it has been passed mala fide or in colourable exercise of powers. It is also well settled that if there is an allegation as to mala fides an affidavit has got to be affirmed by the detaining authority. On the other hand this is also well settled that allegation of mala fide must be made specifically and that it should be directed against the person making the order. In the case of C.S. Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh. AIR 1964 SC 962 their Lordships observed as follows. "It is, no doubt, true, that allegations of mala fide and improper motives on the part of those in power are frequently made and their frequency has increased in recent times. It a also somewhat unfortunate that allegations of this nature which have no foundation in fact, are made in several cases which have come up before this and other Courts and, it is found that they have been made merely with a view to cause prejudice or in the hope that whether they have basis in fact or not some of it at least might stick. Consequently, it has become the duty of the Court to scrutinise these allegations with a care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them, in cases where they have no foundation in fact." 4. In the present case, it is to be membered, there is no specific allegation of mala fide against the Commissioner of Police himself. In suite of the same the Commissioner of police has affirmed an affidavit wherein, as pointed out, he has specifically denied that the around has been engineered by any one or that the order has been passed at the behest of any such person. He has further categorically stated that before making the order of detention, he had personally scrutinised the genuineness of the materials which formed the ground of detention and after being satisfied about their dependability, he had made the order of detention. In our opinion, having regard to the scope and nature of the allegation made in the petition, this is sufficient denial of the charge of mala fide. 5. In our opinion, having regard to the scope and nature of the allegation made in the petition, this is sufficient denial of the charge of mala fide. 5. In this context it may be pointed out that if allegation of mala fide is challenged in the affidavit affirmed by the respondent, the Court is not entitled to so into the merits of the same. In the case of Mohd. Sabir v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1971 SC 1713 : (1971 Cri LJ 1271) it was observed that if the statement in the affidavit on behalf of the respondents was true, there cannot be any question of mala fides. In this context it was pointed out that the Court cannot go into the merits whether the facts stated in the affidavits are correct or not, but the Court can see that on these facts, no charge of mala fide can be made out. The other thing to be noticed is that in the present case the detaining authority is the Commissioner of Police against whom there is no specific allegation of mala fide but charges are made against the respondent No. 5 and the Officer-in-Charge of the Amherst Street Police Station. In the case of Kedar Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 873 the petitioner challenged, on the ground of inter alia, mala fide, the decision of the Government to discontinue a post. Dealing with the same it was observed as follows :- "Moreover, all that the appellant has been able to say is that his superiors in the department were hostile to him. But we are concerned not with the action of his immediate superiors but the action of the Government. The decision to discontinue the post was the decision of the Government and it is not alleged in the writ petition that in taking this decision the Government acted mala fide. We therefore agree with the High Court that there is no substance in the allegation that the post was discontinued or abolished in order to punish the appellant." 6. In the case of R.P. Driver v. General Manager. Eastern Railway reported in (1966) 70 Cal WN 390 similar observations were also made by a Division Bench of this Court to the following effect. In the case of R.P. Driver v. General Manager. Eastern Railway reported in (1966) 70 Cal WN 390 similar observations were also made by a Division Bench of this Court to the following effect. "Out of the two short submissions of learned Advocate for the appellant the first one is that the order of removal is mala fide. The story of the appellant that the whole proceeding is mala fide was not believed by Sinha, J. and we affirm the said finding. There is neither any definite charge of mala fide nor any evidence of mala fide. The statement in paragraph 7 of the petition falls short of such allegation. Even if allegation of mala fide, may with difficulty be spelt out against Mr. Barbaro, not a whisper of such allegation is made against the Divisional Superintendent who is the dismissing authority and who has passed the final order." 7. In the present case it may be pointed out that even allegations against the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 are limited in nature. It is alleged that they were inimical towards the petitioner. This in our opinion, is not even an averment of mala fides, so far as the impugned order of detention is concerned. In the case of State of Haryana v. Rajendra reported in AIR 1972 SC 1004 it was observed as follows :- "Certain incidents have been placed on record which will show that the respondent may have incurred the displeasure of, the second appellant. But that circumstance, by itself, cannot lead to the conclusion that the impugned order has been passed mala fide." 8. The case cited by Mr. Dutt has no application in the facts of thepresent case. In that case the petitioner challenged the validity of the order of detention mainly on the ground that it had been passed as result of the malice and false reports prepared at the instance of the respondent No. 2. In that case it was held that where specific allegations are made against an authority, the denial of such allegation by an authority other than the one against whom allegations are made and that too in a vague manner is a ground sufficient to arrive at the conclusion of mala fide. In that case it was held that where specific allegations are made against an authority, the denial of such allegation by an authority other than the one against whom allegations are made and that too in a vague manner is a ground sufficient to arrive at the conclusion of mala fide. It was further held that the affidavit of the Deputy Secretary did not only suffer from formal defects but that the affidavit was also very vague and unsatisfactory and that the statements made therein did not appear to have been made by the deponent after due deliberation. Very specific and detailed allegations of mala fide were made in that case unlike the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court the order of detention was made by the Home Department of the respondent No. 1 i.e. the State of Kerala. In that case it was found that the respondent No. 2 had not chosen to file a counter-affidavit denying the specific allegations made against him by the petitioner and it was held that the failure of the respondent No. 2 to deny this serious allegations affected the order of the respondent No. 1. As already pointed out the allegations in the present case are quite different in nature. Here there is no specific or detailed allegation. There is no allegation of any false report. Further the affidavit of commissioner of Police, who has himself passed the order has sufficiently controverted whatever allegations have been made. Before leaving this aspect of the matter we may refer to an observation of their Lordships made in the very case cited by Mr. Dutt :- "We are conscious that even if a subordinate officer makes a malicious report against a citizen suggesting that he should be detained, the malice inspiring the report may not necessarily or always make the ultimate order of detention passed by the appropriate authority invalid. Even a malicious report may be true, but the person making the report was determined to report those facts out of malice against the party concerned. But a malicious report may also be false. Even a malicious report may be true, but the person making the report was determined to report those facts out of malice against the party concerned. But a malicious report may also be false. In either case, the malice attributable to the reporting authority, cannot in law, be attributed to the detaining authority; but in such cases, it must appear that the detaining authority carefully examined the report and considered all the relevant material available in the case before passing the order of detention. Unfortunately, in the present case, the affidavit made by the Home Secretary is so defective and in many places so vague and ambiguous that we do not know which authority acting for respondent No. 1 in fact examined the case against the petitioner and what was the nature of the material placed before such authority : and the affidavit does not contain any averment that after the material was examined by the appropriate authority the appropriate authority reached the conclusion, that it was satisfied that the petitioner should be detained with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community." As already stated there is such an averment in the affidavit of detaining authority in the present case. For all these reasons we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dutt that the order was passed mala fide. 9. It was next contended by Mr. Dutt that the order was passed collaterally because the criminal case had failed. He drew our attention to the fact that the only ground for detention was the subject-matter of Section F case No. 3 dated 28th January, 1974 though there were other police cases also against the detenu. It is alleged that the prosecutor made a prayer before the relevant Court for discharge of the petitioner from the aforesaid case and that the same was allowed on 13th July, 1974. Mr. Dutt submitted that the grounds in the present case show that the police witnesses are the only witnesses in the criminal case and there is no reason why they could not come forward to depose in the criminal case. Mr. Dutt submitted that the grounds in the present case show that the police witnesses are the only witnesses in the criminal case and there is no reason why they could not come forward to depose in the criminal case. Accordingly he submitted that the statement of the Commissioner of police to the effect that the detenu was discharged from the case because the witnesses were reluctant to depose against the detenu should be rejected. In this context Mr. Dutt relied on the averment made in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the petition which are set out hereinbelow. "(10) That the petitioner states that the order of detention been passed by the detaining authority mechanically without proper application of mind, inasmuch as, if the allegations contained in the ground for detention are true then the prosecution would have continued with the case and would not have prayed for discharge of the petitioner from the said case. (11) That the petitioner further states that having known that the said ground is false and frivolous, the detaining authority mala fide passed the order of detention for collateral purpose, inasmuch as, if the allegations were true then the prosecution could have surely proved the same in the Court of law and the only material witness who could have proved the allegations are police witnesses. (12) That the petitioner further states that in spite of the fact that the proof of the said allegations depends upon the evidence of the police witnesses only the prosecution with ulterior motive withdrew the case against the petitioner and resorted to this extraordinary procedure for collateral purpose." 10. In this connection Mr. Dutt also strongly relied on a judgement of Anil Sen and N.C. Mukherjee JJ. delivered on 22-3-1972 in Criminal Misc. Case No. 72 of 1972 (Cal) (Bhibhupada Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal). Mr. Dutt also relied on a recent decision of Supreme Court in Noorchand v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1974 SC 2120 : (1974 Cri LJ 1394). 11. Mr. D. Choudhury appearing on behalf of the State, challenged the correctness of the contentions of Mr. Dutt both in fact and in law. He also submitted that the facts of this case are quite different from the facts in Cri. Misc. Case No. 72 of 1972 (Cal) the judgement in which is relied upon by Mr. Dutt. 12. 11. Mr. D. Choudhury appearing on behalf of the State, challenged the correctness of the contentions of Mr. Dutt both in fact and in law. He also submitted that the facts of this case are quite different from the facts in Cri. Misc. Case No. 72 of 1972 (Cal) the judgement in which is relied upon by Mr. Dutt. 12. The power of detaining authority to make an order of detention which is based on an incident which also amounts to an offence punishable by the ordinary law of the land and in respect of which a criminal case may be pending or in respect of which the detenu may have been discharged is now well settled by the Supreme Court. In the case of Golam Hossain v. Police Commr., Calcutta, AIR 1974 SC 1336 : (1974 Cri LJ 938) it was observed as follows :- "The branch of jurisprudence bearing on prohibitory detention has been crystallised by now and it is no longer a valid contention that because the accused has been discharged in a criminal case the ground of charge cannot be relied upon by the appropriate authority for passing an order of detention. The former relates to the punitive branch of the criminal law and relates to the past commission, be later to the preventive branch of social defence and protects the community from further injury. Whether we like it or not, this branch of jurisprudence, as interpreted by this court, has made it futile for a detenu to urge that because the grounds of detention have been the subject-matter of criminal cases which have ended in discharge, therefore the order of detention is mala fide. The basic imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to the 'subjective satisfaction' component of imprisonment for reasons of internal security. To quarrel with such a proposition is to challenge the wisdom of Parliament. Of course, we can visualise extreme cases where a Court has held a criminal case to be false and detaining authority with that judicial pronouncement before him may not reasonably claim to be satisfied about prospective prejudicial activities based on what a Court has found to be baseless. Of course, we can visualise extreme cases where a Court has held a criminal case to be false and detaining authority with that judicial pronouncement before him may not reasonably claim to be satisfied about prospective prejudicial activities based on what a Court has found to be baseless. But the present case where the order of discharge is made purely for want of evidence of the score that witnesses were too afraid to depose against a desperate character cannot come under this exceptional category." This position is also now well settled by the decision of Supreme Court in Writ Petition No. 1999 of 1973 and No. 1913 of 1973 : (1974 Cri LJ 1479) (SC). (Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal and Mandalal Agarwal v. State of West Bengal) which is a Division Bench decision of five learned Judges. Their Lordships observed as follows :- "The essential concept preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is the satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in any manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. A criminal conviction on the other hand is for an act already done which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel between prosecution in a Court of law and detention under the Act. One is a punitive action and other is a prevention act. In one case a person is punished to prove his guilt and the standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt whereas in preventive detention a man is prevented from doing something which it is necessary or the reasons mentioned in Section 3 of the Act to prevent." It was further observed by their Lordships that it is not a case of parallel proceeding. It does not over-lap with prosecution even it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. After consideration of all the relevant decisions on the point, Supreme Court summarised the law on this point. In this connection it was observed by their Lordships that the decision in the case of Biramchand v. State of Uttar Pradesh. After consideration of all the relevant decisions on the point, Supreme Court summarised the law on this point. In this connection it was observed by their Lordships that the decision in the case of Biramchand v. State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1974 SC 1161 : (1974 Cri LJ 817) which was a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges, was contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha's case is as follows :- "The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a Criminal Court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that detention order is passed during the pending of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the light of the surrounding circumstances." 13. Regarding the judgement in Criminal Misc. Case No. 72 of 1972 (Cal) relied upon by Mr. Dutt the same is of no assistance to the petitioner in the present case. In that case it was not disputed that in the First Information Report there was nothing to indicate that any person other than the Police personnel were the subject of attack or suffered any injury. Case No. 72 of 1972 (Cal) relied upon by Mr. Dutt the same is of no assistance to the petitioner in the present case. In that case it was not disputed that in the First Information Report there was nothing to indicate that any person other than the Police personnel were the subject of attack or suffered any injury. It was also not in dispute in that case that according to the said First Information Report each one of the detenu was arrested at the place of occurrence. The only explanation furnished by the District Magistrate in that case for having these persons discharged from the criminal case and putting them to preventive detention was the alleged refusal of witnesses giving any evidence against the detenu. This explanation was not accepted by the Court to be reasonable or bona fide inasmuch as the allegations made against the detenu in the First Information Report was that attack was on a group of police personnel who would be the only competent witnesses for prosecuting these people. It was further pointed out that it cannot be disputed that most effective witnesses were all members of the police force who were subjected to the assault and that there was no suggestion that these police personnel were not available to give evidence against the detenu. In that view of the matter it was held that the withdrawal of the prosecution was not bona fide but was made only with a view to use the power of preventive detention collaterally as convenient substitute for prosecution. Further it was pointed out that the grounds of detention did not indicate that there was any other allegation against the detenu except those on which the prosecution was started and withdrawn. After a careful consideration we are in agreement with Mr. Choudhury that the facts in the present case are completely different. As would be apparent from the first portion of the grounds in the present case, it cannot be said that no person other than the police personnel were the subject of attack. It cannot also be said that in the present case the police personnel are the only competent or effective witnesses. The grounds in the other case as narrated in the said judgement make it clear that the decision in that case cannot be applied in the facts of the present case. 14. It cannot also be said that in the present case the police personnel are the only competent or effective witnesses. The grounds in the other case as narrated in the said judgement make it clear that the decision in that case cannot be applied in the facts of the present case. 14. Regarding the Noorchand's case, (1974 Cri LJ 1394) (SC) relied upon by Mr. Dutt, we are of the opinion that the said decision has no application in the facts of the present case. In that case the detenu alleged that as the local police has failed to produce any material or witness against him he was discharged from the Criminal case and that the detention order was based on the same allegation. He further submitted that the detaining authority had acted "mechanically" and had not considered the "merits of the case." In that case the affidavit-in-opposition was not affirmed by the District Magistrate concerned, who was the detaining authority but by Deputy Secretary, Home (Special) Department. With reference to the allegations made in the petition, as we have indicated earlier, it was stated by the said Deputy Secretary that the Investigating Officer, who was in charge of the matter had informed the deponent that "as no person was willing to give evidence against the petitioner in open Court, the petitioner was discharged from the said case." It was pointed out by their Lordships that the reasons for the discharge of the detenus from the Criminal cases was not given by the detaining authority but by the Deputy Secretary. It was pointed out that the fact that the detenu was discharged from the Criminal case cannot be said to be entirely irrelevant and of no significance it was a circumstance which the detaining authority cannot altogether disregard. In that context it was observed as follows :- "If, as the petitioner has asserted, he was discharged because there was no material against him and not because witnesses were afraid to give evidence against him, there would be apparently no rational basis for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It is for the detaining authority to say that in spite of the discharge he was satisfied, on some valid material, about the petitioner's complicity in the criminal acts which constitute the basis of the detention order. It is for the detaining authority to say that in spite of the discharge he was satisfied, on some valid material, about the petitioner's complicity in the criminal acts which constitute the basis of the detention order. But, as stated already, the District Magistrate, Malda, who passed order in this case, has not affirmed the affidavit what has been filed on behalf of the State." 15. It is to be pointed out that in that case also it was pointed out that an unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would not operate as a bar to a detention order or make it mala fide. In the case before us the facts are different : the allegations in the petition are also different. Further, as already pointed out in the present case there is an affidavit by the detaining authority himself wherein he has specifically stated that he has arrived at the subjective satisfaction after taking into consideration all the relevant facts including discharge of the detenu from the criminal case and he has also given specific reasons as to why he passed such an order. Accordingly we reject this contention of Mr. Dutt. 16. The last point argued by Mr. Dutt is the alleged lack of proximity between the alleged incident referred to in the ground and the order of detention. It is to be noticed that the incident alleged in the ground took place on the 28th January, 1974 and the order was passed on 13th July, 1974 i.e. 5½ months later. On the other hand, Mr. Choudhury contended that the delay is not of such a length that the detention can be held as illegal. 17. The position in law on this point is now well settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Malwa Shaw v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1974 SC 957 : (1974 Cri LJ 773) and Olia Mallick v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1816 : (1974 Cri LJ 883) 5 months' unexplained delay was held not be fatal. In the case of Malwa Shaw v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1974 SC 957 : (1974 Cri LJ 773) and Olia Mallick v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1816 : (1974 Cri LJ 883) 5 months' unexplained delay was held not be fatal. In this context it was observed in Malwa Shaw's case as follows :- "The time lag between the dates of the alleged incidents and the making of the order of detention is not so large that it can be said that no reasonable person could possibly arrive at the satisfaction which the District Magistrate did on the basis of the alleged incidents. It must be remembered that some time is bound to elapse before the investigation into the alleged incidents is completed and the matter is brought to the notice of the District Magistrate and the District Magistrate applies his mind and arrives at the requisite satisfaction culminating in the order of detention. The period of about five months which elapsed between the dates of alleged incidents and the making of the order of detention cannot be regarded as so unreasonably long as to warrant the inference that no satisfaction was really arrived at by the District Magistrate or that the satisfaction was colourable or no satisfaction at all as required by the statute. The satisfaction which the District Magistrate is required to reach in order support the order of detention is that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a particular manner and that satisfaction can obviously be founded only on a reasonably anticipated prognosis of future behaviour of the petitioner made on the basis of past incidents. It is not possible to say that the incidents referred to in the grounds of detention were such that they could not reasonably lead to the satisfaction which the District Magistrate reached when he made the order of detention." 18. In the case of Olia Mallick it was observed as follows :- "It appears that the police filed criminal cases but without any result. In the case of Olia Mallick it was observed as follows :- "It appears that the police filed criminal cases but without any result. Since the activity of the petitioner marked him out as a member of a gang indulging systematically in the cutting of aluminium electricity wire the District Magistrate would have been very well satisfied, even after the lapse of 5 months, that it was necessary to pass the detention order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supply of electricity." 19. In the case of AIR 1974 SC 1336 : (1974 Cri LJ 938) the Supreme Court observed as follows. "……….there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial activity of the species specified in the statute. This credible chain is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik. No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statuary requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation." 20. In the case of Anil De v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 832 : (1974 Cri LJ 702) it was similarly held that even if the incident attributed to the detenu has some connection with the obnoxious activities, it should not be too trivial in substance nor too stale in point of time as to snap the rational link that must exist between the vicious episode and the prejudicial activity sought to be interdicted. 21. 21. In the case of Lakshman Khatik v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1264 : (1974 Cri LJ 936), it was stated that mere delay in passing the detention order was not conclusive but it has to be seen whether the grounds would really weigh with an officer some seven months later in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the detenu to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies of food grains. It was not explained in that case why there was delay of 7 months in passing the order. It was further observed that the authorities concerned must have due regard to the object with which the order is passed and if the object was to prevent disruption of supplies of foodgrains, one should think prompt action in such matters should be taken as soon as incidents like these have taken place. In the case of Abdul Munnaf v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2066 : (1974 Cri LJ 1233) it was observed that there was no cogent explanation for the delay of 9 months between the incident and the order of detention and accordingly it was held that the detention was not in accordance with law. In that context it was observed as follows :- "The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. It is indeed largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a person that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. But in order to justify such an inference it is necessary to bear in mind that such past conduct or antecedent history should ordinary be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary (see Nagen Murmu v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 SCC 63 : ( AIR 1973 SC 844 : 1973 Cri LJ 667). No doubt, it is both inexpedient undesirable to lay down any inflexible test as to how far distant the past conduct or the antecedent history should be for reasonably and rationally justifying the conclusion that the person concerned if not detained may indulge in prejudicial activities. If in a given case the time lag between the prejudicial activity of a detenu and the detention order made because of that activity is ex facie long, the detaining authority should explain the delay in the making of the detention order with a view to show that there was proximity between the prejudicial activity and the detention order. If the detaining authority fails to do so in spite of an opportunity having been afforded to it, a serious infirmity would creep into the detention order." 22. In Lakhan Khatik's case it was the unexplained delay was of 7 months and in Abdul Munnaf's case the delay was of 9 months. As pointed out earlier in the present case the delay is if 5½ months only and accordingly it is governed by Malwa Shaw and Olia Mallik's case where delay of 5 months was held not be fatal. Further, in the present case it cannot be said that even such delay remaining totally unexplained. Some explanation can be ascertained from the petition itself apart from the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police. For all these reasons we are satisfied that in the present case no valid ground has been made out on the basis of lack of proximity between the incident relied on and the order made. Accordingly we reject this contention of Mr. Dutt. 23. All the contentions raised by Mr. Dutt fail. Accordingly, we dismiss this application and discharge the Rule. 24. SUDHAMAY BASU, J. :- I agree. 25. Mr. Dutt's two fold contentions about mala fide and the order being passed for a collateral purpose have been dealt with at length by my learned brother. I would only like to point out very shortly the implications of a discharge in criminal law and why the three cases relied on by Mr. Dutt are not applicable in this case. In the case of AIR 1966 SC 1925 : 1966 (2) SCA 1 : (1966 Cri LJ 1533) the detaining authority field no affidavit. Primarily that fact distinguishes the said case from the present one. The decision in Criminal Misc. Dutt are not applicable in this case. In the case of AIR 1966 SC 1925 : 1966 (2) SCA 1 : (1966 Cri LJ 1533) the detaining authority field no affidavit. Primarily that fact distinguishes the said case from the present one. The decision in Criminal Misc. Case No. 72 of 1972 (Cal), (B. Chakraborty v. the State of West Bengal) also has no application because in that case only police personnel were attacked and injured and the police were the only witnesses who were alleged to have refused to be witnesses. In the present case it cannot be said that the only witnesses involved are the police personnel. A reference to the case reported in AIR 1974 SC 2120 : (1974 Cri LJ 1394) is also of no avail. The position in law of a discharge in criminal case in relation to a detention order under the M. I. S.A. seems to be that while fact of discharge from a criminal case is no bar to preventive detention it may under certain circumstances be of significance. It was stated in the case of Noor Chand itself that when it is ascertained that the discharge was on account of absence of materials against the person concerned and not because witnesses were afraid to give evidence against him there would be apparently no rational basis for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It is then for the detaining authority to say that in spite of the discharge he was satisfied on some valid material about the person's complicity which provided a basis for the detention order. In other words under certain circumstances the fact of discharge has to be adverted to and taken note by the detaining authority before he comes to his satisfaction to detain a person. In the instant case the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police amply shows that he took into consideration the fact of discharge and that in spite of that he was satisfied on materials before him as to the necessity for detention two other relevant cases of Golam Hossain v. The Commissioner of Police and Haradhan Shaw v. The State of West Bengal have been referred to hereinbefore by my learned brother. Rule discharged.