( 1 ) THIS is a petition under S. 115 CPC. to revise the reversing judgment of the Civil Judge, Bidar, holding that the plaintiffs suif for permanent injunction has abated. ( 2 ) THE events leading to the petition are these: One Ambaji and neelamma instituted O. S. No. 68 of 1970 in the Court of Munsiff, Basava-kalyan, stating that they are the joint owners of the suit property and 'that the defendant was interfering with their possession. During the pendency of the suit, the second plaintiff transferred her undivided interest under a registered sale deed dt. 10-1-1969 in favour of one Kashappa. On 25-7-1970, the second plaintiff died. The application to bring her legal representatives on record was not filed within the time allowed by law. On 26-3-1971, the 1st plaintiff filed an application under Or. XXII, Rule 2, cpc, requesting the Court to make necessary entries on record that the right to sue survived to him alone and that he may be permitted to proceed with the suit. On that very day, the transferee Kashappa filed an application under Order XXII, Rule 10 CPC. praying for leave to continue the suit. These two applications were allowed by the trial Court on 19-6-1971 without hearing the defendant, but later at the instance of the defendant, the Court reconsidered its order and dismissed the application of the first plaintiff and allowed the application of the transferee. Against the said order, the defendant preferred an appeal before the Court of the civil Judge, Bidar. It was contended before the learned Judge that the application filed by the transferee under Order XXII, Rule 10 CPC. , could not have been allowed since the suit has abated as the legal representatives of the second plaintiff were not brought on recqrd within time. The learned judge accepted that contention. He said that by the time the transferee made an application under Or. XXII, Rules 10 CPC. the plaintiffs' suit was not pending as it had already abated. He further held that the right to sue did not survive to the first plaintiff on the death of his co-owner the second plaintiff. This decision of the learned Civil Judge is challenged in this revision petition. XXII, Rules 10 CPC. the plaintiffs' suit was not pending as it had already abated. He further held that the right to sue did not survive to the first plaintiff on the death of his co-owner the second plaintiff. This decision of the learned Civil Judge is challenged in this revision petition. ( 3 ) THE first question arising for my consideration is whether the, right to sue did not survive to the first plaintiff on the death of the second plaintiff. If the right to sue did not survive to the first plaintiff, the application of the transferee could not have been entertained because under Or. 22, rule 10, the transferees can obtain leave only to continue the suit. If the suit has already abated there was no suit which could be continued because the abatement terminates" the suit and disposes of the planitiffs' plaint as if the suit has been dismissed without hearing. Leave to continue a suit cannot be given after the suit has terminated. ( 4 ) THE controversy in question could be easily resolved if one recalls the respective rights of the co-owners and the transferee. The test of co-ownership is coordinate interest. If the interest is one subordinate or higher in degree to the other there is no co-ownership between the two. Ail co-owners have equal rights and coordinate interest in the property. Each co-owner is in theory interested in every infinitismal portion of the subject matter and each has the right, irrespective of the quantity of his mtesrst, to be in possession of every part and parcel of the property, jointly with the others. A co-owner's right is always subject to the rights of his other co-owners but without interference from any tres- passer. Therefore if a co-owner is in possession, he is ordinarily entitled to an injunction restraining a third person from entering into the premises and disturbing his possession. It is a firm settled principle that one of the co-owners can bring a suit for ejecting a trespasser from the property owned either jointly or as co- owners and the other co-owners are not necessary parties to the suit though they may be proper parties. The judicial opinion on this point is so far uniform. See the decisions in Shivangouda v. Gangawwa 1966 (2) Mys. L. J. 148. Ahmad sahib Shutan v. Magnesie Syndicate AIR. 1915 Mad. 1214. The judicial opinion on this point is so far uniform. See the decisions in Shivangouda v. Gangawwa 1966 (2) Mys. L. J. 148. Ahmad sahib Shutan v. Magnesie Syndicate AIR. 1915 Mad. 1214. Tuljaram Harkisandas v. Harkisan Jagjivan AIR 1929 Bom. 244. Carrimbhoy and Co. Ltd. v. L. A. Creet air. 1930 Cal. 113. Sambhu Gosain v. Piyari Mian AIR. 1941 Patna 351. Ambika v. Rameshwar AIR. 1946 Oudh 221. Ram Kali v. Pahilwan singh AIR. 1953 All. 331 Biharilal v. Wasundarabai air. 1956 MB. 35. and Rama Motibhai v. Dalwedi Rupoo Ram AIR. 1956 Bom. 204. ( 5 ) LET me recall the effect of an assignment of interest pending suit or appeal. Where during the pendency of a suit or appeal, the property in suit is transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit, the transferee is bound by the result of the litigation whether he is joined as a party or not. The transferee is not under any legal obligation to apply for being added on as a party. He may leave the proceedings to be carried on by the transferor but Order 22, Rule 10 CPC enables htm to apply for being added on as a party to continue the suit. In a proper case the Court may allow such a transferee to be made a party. As i have already held, such an application could be allowed only in a pending suit or proceedings and not in a suit which was disposed of or has abated or in a proceeding which has terminated. My view finds support from the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kedarnoth Kanoria v. Khaitan Sons and Co. AIR. 1959 Cal. 308. wherein it is held : but the assignee can obtain leave Only to continue a suit. If the suit has already abated, there is no suit which may be continued. The abatement terminates the suit and disposes of the platiniff's claim as if the suit has been dismissed without a hearing. Leave to continue a suit cannot be given after the suit has terminated. It cannot be given if the suit has already been decreed or dismissed for default of appearance of the plaintiff. Similarly, leave cannot be given if the suit has already abated. The suit abates automatically in the absence of any application under Or. Leave to continue a suit cannot be given after the suit has terminated. It cannot be given if the suit has already been decreed or dismissed for default of appearance of the plaintiff. Similarly, leave cannot be given if the suit has already abated. The suit abates automatically in the absence of any application under Or. XXII, Rule 3 within ninety days and a further order declaring that the suit has abated is not necessary. The assignee is bound by the abatement and by proceedings had in the suit before his intervention. (page 372 ). ( 6 ) I will now notice and deal with the cases relied upon by Mr. Manohar Rao Jahgirdar, Counsel for the respondent. His contention was that the plaintiffs' suit was based on the joint cause of action and on the death of the second plaintiff, the right to sue did not survive to the first plaintiff, in the absence of the legal representatives of the second plaintiff. In Biro Sethi v. Purshottam Misra AIR 1963 Ori. 118 . there was a suit for permanent injunction to restrain defendants 1 and 14 from interfering with their possession and also for recovery of damages. The trial Court decreed the suit for injunction. Against the decree all the defendants preferred an appeal. One of the appellants died. His legal reprentatives were not brought on record. The High Court held that the decree appealed against was based upon a common ground to all the plaintiffs and defendants, and the suit was based upon a joint and indivisible cause of action and hence the entire appeal abated. In Damodar Patra v. Kanchan Sahuani AIR. 1963 Ori. 140 there was a suit for ejectment of joint trespassers. One of the defendants died during the pendency of the suit. His legal representatives were not brought on record. The Court held that all trespassers known to be in possession by the date of the suit are necessary parties to such a suit, and, in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant, the controversy as regard the rights and interests of the plaintiffs and the surviving defendants can not be effectively determined, and even if it is determined, the decree passed will not be effective. In Govind Lal v. Bandhu Ram AIR. 1961 Pat. 240. the plaintiff brought a suit for " damages against joint tortfeasors. The suit was dismissed. In Govind Lal v. Bandhu Ram AIR. 1961 Pat. 240. the plaintiff brought a suit for " damages against joint tortfeasors. The suit was dismissed. He preferred an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal one of the respondents died and his legal representatives were not substituted. The Court held that the entire appeal abated. In Babu Sukhram Singh v. Ram Dular Singh AIR. 1973 SC. 204. the plaintiff's suit for permanent injunction against thirty-nine defendants was dismissed by the trial Court in its entirety. The first appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in part against all the defendants. On a further appeal being taken to the High Court, the High Court allowed the appeal of the defendants and dismissed the suit. As against the judgment of the High Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of that appeal, some of the defendants died. Their legal representatives were not brought on record within the time prescribed. The Supreme Court observed that as the plaintiff made a joint claim against all the defendants, the appeal had abated as a whole for want of legal representatives of the deceased respondents. ( 7 ) IN my view, none of the above decisions can be of any assistance to the case on hand. Those are all cases where the suit was based upon a joint and indivisible act of trespass and joint and indivisible cause of action. In the present case, the suit was instituted by co-owners, against an alleged trespasser. The death of the co-plaintiff cannot affect the, individual right of the other plaintiff to maintain or continue the suit. One co-owner is always competent to maintain a suit for ejectment. The other co-owners are not necessary parties to the suit. ( 8 ) SINCE the suit has not abated, it is always open to the transferee to make an application under Or. 22, R. 10 CPC. , for being impleaded as a party in the suit. His application has been allowed by the trial Court, and, in my opinion very rightly. ( 9 ) IN the result, this revision petition is allowed, the order of the appellate Court is set aside and that of the Munsiff restored. The trial court is directed to proceed with the, suit. No costs. --- *** --- .