JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J. 1. This is an appeal, filed by the plaintiffs, directed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge Mandsaur, reversing the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge, Class II, Mandsaur, and dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for eviction of the defendant under section 12 (1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". 2. The material facts, shortly stated, are these : The plaintiffs own a house at Mandsaur. They executed a usufructuary mortgage of the house on 23-7-1951 in favour of one Ismail Bhai. The mortgagee inducted the defendant as a tenant on 9-11-1951. That was in exercise of his rights of management as a mortgagee in possession. There was redemption of the aforesaid mortgage by the plaintiffs on 5-4-1969 On 6-5-1965 the defendant attorned to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, thereafter, served a notice of ejectment upon the defendant on 20-5-1969 under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and brought the present suit for eviction under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act on 8-8-1969. 3. The short question that arises is, whether the plaintiffs' suit for eviction under section 12(1) (e) of the Act was not maintainable, in view of section 12 (4) thereof, which reads- 12(4) Where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in Cl. (e) or Cl. (f) thereof, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. 4. Similar provisions are to be found in other States. The object of the legislature is to confer some protections on the tenants who form a major section of the public, by imposing a restriction on the right of the transferee-landlords to recover possession of their property for a limited period of one year from their purchase. In Sailendra Nath Ghosal and others v. S. Ena Dutt and others AIR 1970 Cal. In Sailendra Nath Ghosal and others v. S. Ena Dutt and others AIR 1970 Cal. 33, the Calcutta High Court construed the analogous provision contained in section 13(3-A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, by taking into consideration matters of common knowledge, i.e., the conditions prevailing at or about the time of enactment, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied, and held that the section does not offend against Article 19(1) (f) or Article 14 of the Constitution. In dealing with the subject. Mookerjee, J., speaking for the Court, stated:- The sole object of the amended provision of the Act, is to give some protection to the tenants against eviction. A copy of the statement of the Minister-in-charge at the time of piloting the bill in the Legislature, was placed before us. It is submitted, that, it is the intention of the legislature, as it appears from the statement of the Minister to protect the tenants from a particular class of persons who have sufficient means to purchase properties and immediately thereafter institute ejectment suits to drive out the tenants from their living places. Old landlords cannot enhance rents with respect to old tenants beyond the limits of fair rent, fixed under the statute At the present time, when the price of every commodity has gone up, naturally 'owner-landlords' are dissatisfied with the low return they get out of the tenanted premises. As between these two classes of landlords, namely, "owner" and "transferee", it is difficult for the owner-landlords to make out a case for eviction either on the grounds of their own use and occupation or building or rebuilding. The "owner-landlords" are naturally reluctant to spend money for building and rebuilding on properties which do not yield a covetable income So, 'owner-landlords" tend to sell the tenanted properties to get rid of the old tenants and the transferee landlords, just after the transfer, try to find out means to drive out the tenants, taking resort to those two grounds, viz., (f) and (ff) - landlords' reasonable requirement for own use and occupation and building and rebuilding. Having regard to the background and surrounding circumstances the legislature has reasonably classified landlords into two classes, namely, owner and transferee, and put reasonable restriction upon the latter... Having regard to the background and surrounding circumstances the legislature has reasonably classified landlords into two classes, namely, owner and transferee, and put reasonable restriction upon the latter... The problems of the tenants are many; there are landlords of different kinds; there is one class - original owners, who are (he old inhabitants of the city, these owner-landlords are not affluent, they solely depend upon the rents received from the tenants It has been ascertained from experience that two of the grounds of eviction, namely, requirement of the premises for own use of the landlords and for the purpose of building and rebuilding, have been misused by the landlords. In the city of Calcutta and other towns, there are millions of tenants, who are left at the mercy of the landlords In this background and after taking into account similar provisions in other States, it has been decided that some restrictions ought to have been imposed upon transferee-landlords prohibiting them from bringing ejectment suits against the tenants within three years from their purchase. These observations have my respectful concurrence. 5. The question is, what is the meaning of the word "transfer" used in section 12 (4) of the Act. In V. N. Sarin v. Ajitkumar Poplai and another AIR 1966 SC 432 , their Lordships, while dealing with the analogous provision contained in section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, stated, with reference to the object intended to be achieved by the provisions and the policy underlying it,- It seems plain that the object which this provision is intended to achieve is to prevent transfers by landlord as a device to enable the purchasers to evict the tenants from the premises let out to them. If a landlord was unable to make out a case for evicting his tenant under section 14(1) (e), it was not unlikely that he may think of transferring the premises to a purchaser who would be able to make out such a case on his own behalf; and the legislature thought that if such a course was allowed to be adopted, it would defeat the purpose of section 14(1).... It is possible that this provision may, in some cases, work hardship, because if a transfer is made by a landlord who could have proved his case under section 14 (1)(e), the transferee would be precluded from making a claim for the eviction of the tenant within five years even though he, in his turn, would also have proved his case under section 14 (1) (e). Apparently, the legislature thought that the possible mischief which may be caused to the tenants by transfers made by landlords to circumvent the provisions of section 14(1) (e) required that an unqualified and absolute provision should be made as prescribed by section 4 (6). Then again,- What section 14 (6) provides is that the purchaser should acquire the premises by transfer and that necessarily assumes that the title of the property which the purchaser acquires by transfer did not vest in him prior to such transfer. 6. In dealing with section 12(4) of the Act, Dixit, C. J., in Tribhuwandas v. Premchand 1964 JLJ 544 : 1964 MPLJ 904, has observed:- The question turns on the meaning of the word "acquire" and ' by transfer". The plain meaning of the word "acquire" in the law of Contracts and Descents is to become owner of property. The term "transfer" means to convey or pass the right of one person over to another. Acquisition by transfer of a property is, therefore, an act or transaction by which the property of one person becomes vested in another. 7. The decision in V. N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai (supra) and Tribhuwandas v. Premchand (supra) are, however, sought to be distinguished on the ground that they deal with partition amongst coparceners in a joint Hindu family. In these cases, there was a partition in a joint Hindu family, where an item of property belonging to the joint Hindu family was allotted 10 the share of one of the coparceners. Partition is not a "transfer" and, therefore, the provisions of section 14 (6) of the Delhi Act or section 12(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Act were not attracted at all. In a coparcenery. there is community of interest and unity of possession, and the partition merely effects a change in the mode of enjoyment. Partition is not a "transfer" and, therefore, the provisions of section 14 (6) of the Delhi Act or section 12(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Act were not attracted at all. In a coparcenery. there is community of interest and unity of possession, and the partition merely effects a change in the mode of enjoyment. The question, therefore, was, whether such allotment in substance amounts to a transfer of the said property to The coparcener, and, therefore, "acquisition" of property by transfer", within the meaning of section 14(6) of the Delhi Act of section 12(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Act. In repelling the contention, the Court stated that there is, no doubt, a change of the landlords; but the said change is not of the same character as the change which is effected by transfer of premises to which these provisions refer. It was held that allotment of one parcel of property, belonging to an undivided Hindu family, to an individual coparcener as a result of partition, was not "acquisition" of such property by transfer by the said coparcener within the meaning of these sections. 8. Next, the submission on behalf of the defendant is that the word "acquire" used in section 12(4) of the Act should be understood in its ordinary sense. The element of title or ownership was never thought of by the legislature while enacting section 12 (4). It is a well settled principle of statutory interpretation to give to the words used their plain and natural meaning so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature, unless it gives rise to anomalous results. Ordinarily, the intention of the legislature must be gathered from the words used. The plain and natural meaning of the word "acquire" as given in Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Third Edn. is "to receive; to come into possession of". That literal meaning it is said, advances the intention of the legislature and is in keeping with the spirit of the law enacted. 9. The word "transfer" has different shades of meaning. The word "transfer" is defined in section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act with reference to the word "convey". In view of the object and purpose of the legislation it is urged on behalf of the defendant, the word "transfer" appearing in section 12(4) of the Act should not be interpreted in that narrow sense. The word "transfer" is defined in section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act with reference to the word "convey". In view of the object and purpose of the legislation it is urged on behalf of the defendant, the word "transfer" appearing in section 12(4) of the Act should not be interpreted in that narrow sense. The submission is that the word "transfer", in the context in which it appears, must be construed in a much wider sense, to include any form of assurance inter vivos, such as mortgage, charge, lease, disclaimer, release and every other assurance of property or of interest therein. So interpreted, a usufructuary mortgage, or a mortgage by conditional sale, or an English mortgage, it is suggested, would come within the mischief of section 12(4). Otherwise, the mortgagee, who gets into possession in a usufructuary mortgage, would straightway file a suit for eviction. The bar of section 12(4) would equally apply to a suit under section 12(1) (e) or (f) by a mortgagee-in-possession. There is a fallacy in that argument. No suit under section 12(1) (e) or (f) can possibly be brought by a mortgages in possession, i.e., on the ground of personal need. 10. In dealing with a mortgage, as defined in section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is stated in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edn., page 363 :- A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property as security for the repayment of a debt The nature of the right transferred depends upon the form of the mortgage. In a simple mortgage, what is transferred is a power of sale which is one of the component rights that make up the aggregate of ownership. In a usufructuary mortgage the transfer is of the right of possession and enjoyment of the usufruct. In a mortgage by conditional sale and in an English mortgage, the right transferred is, in form, a transfer of a right of ownership subject to a condition. In each case, whatever be the form of mortgage, there is a transfer of some interest and not a transfer of the whole interest of the mortgagor. On redemption of a mortgage, it is suggested, there is a re-transfer of an interest in the property. There is no need for me to decide the question. In each case, whatever be the form of mortgage, there is a transfer of some interest and not a transfer of the whole interest of the mortgagor. On redemption of a mortgage, it is suggested, there is a re-transfer of an interest in the property. There is no need for me to decide the question. True, it is the payment of the debt which extinguishes the mortgage, as observed in Kashinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishweshwar AIR 1952 SC 153 , but certain other consequences follow. In a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee-in-possession has to place the mortgagor in possession. In a mortgage by conditional sale, or in an English mortgage, there has to be a reconveyance. In these circumstances, the contention is that the tenant should not, in that case, be deprived of the protection, that he has, under section 12(4) of the Act as in the case of a conveyance Likewise, it is said, in the converse case, i.e., on redemption of such mortgages, the bar of section 12(4) of the Act would follow. 11. In my view, the crux of the problem really is whether the plaintiffs acquired the status of landlord by virtye of a transfer within the meaning of section 12(4) of the Act. The word "landlord" is not merely descriptive of the person suing for eviction. The section no doubt speaks of "landlord" and not the "owner"; further, of "acquisition of accommodation by transfer", not of "acquisition of title by transfer". But that is not decisive of the matter. In a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee-in-possession could have leased out the property to the mortgagor himself. In that event, the mortgagee-in-possession would be the "landlord" vis-a-vis a mortgagor, while the mortgage was subsisting. 12. On redemption of a mortgage, the mortgagee interest stands extinguished. If, therefore, the mortgagee in-possession has let out the mortgaged property, or any part of it, the lease created by him would not survive the termination of the mortgagee interest so as to be binding on the mortgagor, unless of course, such lease was an act done bona fide and prudently in the ordinary course of management under section 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act. In All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyannath. In All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyannath. 1962 (3) SCC 79, their Lordships stated,- The relationship of lesser and lessee cannot subsist beyond the mortgagee's interest unless the relationship is agreed to by the mortgagor or a fresh relationship is recreated. While dealing with section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, their Lordships have laid down that the principle embodied therein does not extend to the management of urban property. Their Lordships have reiterated the same view in M/s Sachalmal Parasram v. Mst. Ratanbai and others AIR 1972 SC 637 . 13. On redemption of the mortgage, in the present case, the pre-existing lease created by the mortgagee-in-possession lapsed. The plaintiffs, however, pleaded an attornment. They, therefore, acquired the status of "landlord", not by any transfer of the suit accommodation, but by a contract between the parties. If there was no such attornment, they could have got a decree for ejectment straightway. However, the defendant having attorned, there came into existence the relationship of lessor and lessee. The plaintiffs cannot, therefore, get a decree for eviction unless they are able to establish any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. The plaintiffs have admittedly established their need under section 12(1) (e). The question is, whether section 12(4)of the Act would still operate as a bar. The answer must clearly be in the negative. Even assuming that redemption of the mortgage was a "transfer" within the meaning of section 12(4) of the Act, the plaintiffs did not acquire the status of landlord as a result of redemption. 14. In that view, it must accordingly, be held that the plaintiff's suit for eviction under section 12(i) (e) of the Act, though brought within one year of the data of redemption of the mortgage, was not barred under section 12(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 15. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge are set aside, and those of the learned trial Judge, decreeing the plaintiffs' suit are restored with costs throughout. Counsel fee as per schedule or certificate, whichever is less. 16. Leave is, however, granted to the respondent to appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Appeal allowed