Sriramulu, J.-The sole accused in Sessions Case No. 16 of 1972 was tried for the offences punishable under sections 302 and 404 of the Indian Penal Code, and was acquitted of both the charges by the Sessions Judge, Ongole. 2. The prosecution case was that in the evening hours of 13th November, 1971, the accused visited his father-in-law’s house at Chilukurivaripalem, to see his wife, Sumathi, stayed for the night there and, on the next day, after killing his wife between 12-00 and 3.00 p.m. left the place. 3. The accused denied having visited his father-in-law’s house on 13th or stayed there on the night of 13th or during the day time on 14th November, 1971, or killed his wife. It was his case that some jewels were presented by his father to the deceased at the time of her marriage and, in the absence of her parents from the house, some one had committed theft of the jewels and killed his wife; that, his father-in-law, at the time of the marriage, had promised to give 2 acres of land to the accused and when he failed to keep up his promise and to execute a document there was an altercation between his father and father-in-law and, apprehending that after the death of the deceased, the accused would ask for the return of the jewellery, his parents-in-law foisted a false case upon him. 4. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 22 witnesses, and the accused examined none. 5. Stated in brief, the prosecution evidence is as follows: P.Ws. 1 and 2 speak to the visit of the accused to their house on 13th November, 1971 and his stay there on the night of 13th and 14th November, 1971, and also to the motive of the accused to kill his wife. P.Ws. 1, 2, 6 and 9 say that the accused was found wearing a cut-banian and a lungi on 14th November 1971. P.Ws. 3 and 7 saw the accused in the house of his father-in law on 14th November, 1971 wearing a cut-banian and lungi, and leaving his father-in-law’s house in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971 in a hurried manner. They also saw the accused having a bandage on his left wrist. P.Ws. 3 and 7 saw the accused in the house of his father-in law on 14th November, 1971 wearing a cut-banian and lungi, and leaving his father-in-law’s house in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971 in a hurried manner. They also saw the accused having a bandage on his left wrist. P.W.4 and P.W.5 saw the accused running in the pasture lands in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971, and they also speak to the fact that the accused, at that time, had a bandage on his left wrist. P.W.8. was examined by the prosecution to prove that the accused had forced his three months’ pregnant wife (the: deceased) to swallow pills for bringing about abortion, but this witness did not support the prosecution and was treated hostile. P.W.9, is an inquest panch and he also saw the accused wearing a Cut-banian and lungi in the morning of 14th November, 1971. At the instance of P.W.1, P.W.10 went and brought the village Munsif of Yeddanpudi to record the report of P.W.1. P.W.11 is the corps Constable. P.W.12 is the doctor who conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. P.W.13 and P.W.14 of the Government General Hospital, Guntur, were examined to show that the accused was treated at the Hospital on 14th November, 1971 between 2-00 and 8-00 p.m. for an injury of his left hand. P.W.15, the village Munsif of Vinjanampadu Village, was the inquest panch. He spoke to the inquest and also to the examination of P,Ws. by the Sub-Inspector of Police at the inquest. He also speaks to the seizure of M.Os. 12, 13 and 14 through the Mediatornama (Ex.P-9). P.W.16 is the Village Munsif of Martur, and speaks to the recovery of M.Os. 2, 9 and 11. He wrote the Mediatornamas, Exs. P-10, P-11 and P-12, and is also a panch witness. P.W.17 is the Court Clerk. P.W.18 is the Head Constable who received the first information report and the printed reports through the Vetti, P.W.19. P.W.20 is the Circle Inspector of Police who verified the investigation. P.W.21 is the Sub-Inspector of Police who investigated into the case and P.W.22 is the Sub-Inspector who filed the final charge-sheet in Court on 21st April, 1972. 6. After considering the said evidence and examining the accused under section 342, Cr. P.W.20 is the Circle Inspector of Police who verified the investigation. P.W.21 is the Sub-Inspector of Police who investigated into the case and P.W.22 is the Sub-Inspector who filed the final charge-sheet in Court on 21st April, 1972. 6. After considering the said evidence and examining the accused under section 342, Cr. P.Code, with reference to the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge of Ongole acquitted the accused of both the charges. Hence this appeal by the State. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that the learned Sessions Judge did not properly appreciate the evidence. The learned Counsel, Dr. B. Bheemaraju appearing for the respondent-accused, on the other hand, contended that there was considerable delay in the F.I.R inquest report, and the seized M.Os. reaching the Court, which has not been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. Whether the circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution have been satis factorily established or not, must be considered in the context of delay occurring at every stage of the investigation, and the unfair methods adopted by the investigating agency in collecting the evidence against the accused. None of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In an appeal against acquittal this Court must come to grips with the reasons given by the Sessions Judge, and will not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of the Sessions Judge who had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in Court. 8. That the death of the deceased was homicidal and not natural is not in dispute. The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the accused killed his wife, the deceased. There is no doubt that the murder, whoever may have committed it, is a gruesome murder of a young girl in teens, who was eight months pregnant. There is no evidence of direct eye-witnesses in this case. The entire case for its proof rests upon circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution in proof of the guilt of the accused, are stated in Paragraph 10 of the judgment of the Court below. Those circumstances are given below and the P.Ws. There is no evidence of direct eye-witnesses in this case. The entire case for its proof rests upon circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution in proof of the guilt of the accused, are stated in Paragraph 10 of the judgment of the Court below. Those circumstances are given below and the P.Ws. who sought to establish them by their evidence, are shown in brackets, against each circumstance: (1) Due to his illicit intimacy with one Nelluri Nagendramma, the accused was ill-treating his wife, the deceased (P.Ws. 1 and 2); (2) When the deceased was 3 months’ pregnant, much against her will, the accused forced his wife, the deceased to swallow pills for bringing about abortion (P.W.8); (3) The accused came to his father-in-law"s house on 13th November, 1971, stayed for the night and also on the next day, i.e., on 14th November, 1971, till about 3-00 p.m. (P.Ws. 1, 2 and 6); (4) At the house of his father-in law the accused was seen wearing a cutbanian and a lungi (P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and (5) The accused persuaded his father-in-law, (P.W.2 to go to Jonnathala for getting the tobacco seedlings, and his mother-in-law (P.W.1) to go to pasture lands for grazing the she-buffaloes (P.Ws. 1 and 2); (6) The accused and the deceased were alone in the house of his father-in law, during the day time, on 14th November, 1971 (P.Ws. 1,2 and 7); (7) The accused was seen leaving the house of his father-in-law hurriedly in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971, with a bandage on his left wrist (P.Ws. 3 and 7); (8) The accused was seen running in the pasture lands, in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971, with a bandage on his left wrist (P.Ws. 4 and 5) ; (9) Confessions made by the accused led to the discovery of M.Os. 2, 9 and 11 from places which were shown by the accused (P.Ws. 16) and (10) The accused was found absconding immediately after the offence (P.W.21). 9. 4 and 5) ; (9) Confessions made by the accused led to the discovery of M.Os. 2, 9 and 11 from places which were shown by the accused (P.Ws. 16) and (10) The accused was found absconding immediately after the offence (P.W.21). 9. Where there are no eye-witnesses to the murder and the case against the accused rests for its proof entirely on circumstantial evidence the standard of proof that is required to convict the accused on such evidence is, that| the circumstances relied upon must be fully established and the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances should be so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. Various links in the chain of evidence must be clearly established and the chain when completed, must be such as to rule, out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. If the various links in the chain of evidence are satisfactorily established and they point out with reasonable definiteness that the accused is the probable assailant, the absence of explanation, or a false explanation, would be an additional link which completes the chain. If the explanation, on the other hand, that is offered by the accused, is reasonable and consistent with his innocence, it would be accepted, though the accused has not proved it; See Deonandan v. State of Bihar1. Conduct of the accused which has no reasonable explanation except on the hypothesis that he is guilty, and which will destroy the presumption of innocence, will be considered as incriminatory and can be considered as material in judging the guilt of the accused (See: Anant Lagu v. State of Bombay2) 10. The credibility of circumstantial evidence depends largely upon the methods adopted by the investigating agency for collecting the evidence. If those methods are fair they inspire confidence into the evidence which is given by the witnesses in Court. But, if they are unfair and are found to be in utter disregard and flagrant violation of the rule of law, the evidence of the witnesses given in Court, which has been gathered by those methods, will be of very little value and such evidence is likely to fabricate links and build up its chain of evidence. But, if they are unfair and are found to be in utter disregard and flagrant violation of the rule of law, the evidence of the witnesses given in Court, which has been gathered by those methods, will be of very little value and such evidence is likely to fabricate links and build up its chain of evidence. It is therefore, imperative that clean and fair methods must be adopted by the investigating agency so as to create an impression on the mind of the Court that the evidence that it has collected and put forward in Court, is true and beyond suspicion; (See: Amin v. The State3). 11. The evidence in this case has to be carefully scrutinised in the light of the above well settled principles. 12. When the prosecution has, in proof of the guilt of the accused, relied upon the motive of the accused to kill the deceased as one of the incriminating circumstances against him, the prosecution must establish it by evidence as it establishes any other incriminating circumstances (See: Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra4). The absence of a motive is always a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence. (See: Rajendrakumar v. State of Punjab5). 13. The motive alleged by the prosecution against the accused in this case, was that the accused, even before his marriage with the deceased, was having illicit intimacy with one Nelluri Nagendramma, and that intimacy continued even after the marriage and the accused was, therefore ill-treating his wife, the deceased, and was not liking her, and that is the reason why he was determined to do away with the deceased. 14. The contents of Ex. P-24, i.e., the first information report which was given by P.W.1 and was recorded by the Village Munsif of Yeddanapudi regarding the commission of the offence of murder, show that P.W.1 was suspecting her son-in-law, the accused to have committed the murder of the deceased. That is why, she mentioned about the visit of the accused to her house on 13th November, 1971 and his stay on the night of 13th and in the day time on 14th. November, 1971 till about 3-00 p.m. If she had a suspicion against the accused of having killed his wife, we would naturally expect her to mention in Ex.P-24 that the accused was ill-treating his wife, the deceased, because of his illicit intimacy with Nelluri Nagendramma. November, 1971 till about 3-00 p.m. If she had a suspicion against the accused of having killed his wife, we would naturally expect her to mention in Ex.P-24 that the accused was ill-treating his wife, the deceased, because of his illicit intimacy with Nelluri Nagendramma. The absence of such a statement in the earliest report, throws a good deal of doubt on her later evidence given in Court that the accused was in illicit intimacy with Nelluri Nagendramma. In Paragraph 11 (a) of the inquest report (Ex.P-5) it was mentioned that the accused, Haribabu, had kept a girl and had been ill-treating his wife, but the name of Nelluri Nagendramma was not stated in it. Though the Sub-Inspector of Police, on 16th November, 971 examined Nelluri Negendramma and recorded her statement under section 161 of the Cr. P. Code, she has not been examined in Court. An adverse inference is, therefore, drawn against the prosecution that if she was examined in Court, her evidence would not support the prosecution. 15. Apart from the non-mention of the illicit intimacy of the accused with Nelluri Nagendramma in the first information report (Ex.P-24) and of her name in the inquest report (Ex.P-5), there is also no admissible evidence on record to prove the motive of the accused to kill the deceased. P.Ws. 1 and 2 speak to the motive. P.W.1 says that she learnt about it from her daughter, the deceased after she was brought to her house; whereas P.W.2, the father of the deceased, stated in his evidence that he came to know about it from the deceased, five or six months prior to bringing his daughter to his house. P.W.2 further stated that on coming to know of it, he enquired from one Lingamma and verified its correctness. Lingamma has not been examined in Court and, therefore, the evidence of P.W.2 that he had made enquiries and verified it from Lingamma, is a hearsay evidence, which is not admissible. 16. Both the parents of the deceased say that they learnt about the illicit intimacy of the accused, only from the deceased. Under section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, the statements of a deceased person relating to the cause of his death, or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in the death of the deceased, alone are admissible. 16. Both the parents of the deceased say that they learnt about the illicit intimacy of the accused, only from the deceased. Under section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, the statements of a deceased person relating to the cause of his death, or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in the death of the deceased, alone are admissible. The statement of the deceased alleged to have been made to her parents, P.Ws. 1 and 2, that her husband was having illicit intimacy with Nelluri Nagendramma and was therefore ill-treating her, is neither the cause of death nor the transaction resulting in her death. That statement supposed to have been made by the deceased to her parents is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. There is no other evidence on record on which the prosecution could rely in proof of the alleged intimacy of the accused with Nelluri Nagendramma. The prosecution has thus failed to prove the motive of the accused to kill his wife, the deceased. 17. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution in proof of the guilt of the accused was that, the accused had forcibly made his wife, the deceased, to swallow pills for bringing about abortion To prove that fact, the prosecution examined the doctor, P.W.8. P.W.8 however, did not support the prosecution and was, therefore, treated hostile. The witness was confronted with that portion of his section 16.2 Statement (Ex.P-1) in which he is supposed to have said about the illicit intimacy etc., but the witness denied to have made such a statement. We, therefore, agree with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had forced his wife, the deceased, to swallow pills for bringing about abortion. 18. Even assuming that he did force his wife to swallow pills, it does not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the accused was ill-treating his wife. In these days, youngsters may not desire to have a child in the early years of their marriage. That circumstance cannot, therefore, be taken as an act of ill-treatment. The absence of motive is, however, relevant for assessing the evidence. 19. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution, was that the accused came to the house of P. Ws. In these days, youngsters may not desire to have a child in the early years of their marriage. That circumstance cannot, therefore, be taken as an act of ill-treatment. The absence of motive is, however, relevant for assessing the evidence. 19. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution, was that the accused came to the house of P. Ws. 1 and 2 on the evening of 13th November, 1971, stayed for the night and also in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971 till 3-00 p.m. 20. P. Ws. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 9 speak to the fact that the accused had come to the house of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and that, they saw him in the house of P. Ws. 1 and 2 on 14th November, 1971. P. Ws. 4 and 5 saw the accused in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971 running in their pasture fields. 21. The accused denied having gone to the house of his father-in-law on 13th November, 1971 or that those witnesses saw him in the house of P.W.2 on 14th November, 1971 or in the pasture lands. 22. The plea of the accused was that, at the time of his marriage, his father-in-law announced a gift of 2 acres of land to him and that, his father gave the deceased 2 pairs of bangles, one necklace and a gold chain with block hands, and a “Thali Bottu”, in all weighing about 12 sovereigns. His father was asking P.W.2 to execute a document for the 2 acres of land but P.W.2 was postponing and, therefore, there was an altercation between his father and father-in-law. When his wife, the deceased, went to her father’s house, she went away with all her jewels. 23. It was suggested in the cross examination to P. Ws. 1 and 2 that, on the fateful day, the deceased happened to be alone in the house and some one entered the house and committed theft after killing the deceased. The suggestion was, however, denied by them. 23. It was suggested in the cross examination to P. Ws. 1 and 2 that, on the fateful day, the deceased happened to be alone in the house and some one entered the house and committed theft after killing the deceased. The suggestion was, however, denied by them. In his section 342 statement the accused stated that on coming to know of the death of the deceased, he, his father and relatives went in a tractor to the house of P.W.2 on 14th November, 1971 at about 6 00 p.m. or so and after seeing the dead body of the deceased, asked P.Ws.1 and 2 about the jewellery, but none gave any reply and, after an hour, they returned back to their village. P.Ws.1 and 2 denied that the accused, his father and his relations had come to their house to see the deceased on 14th November, 1971. 14. It is in evidence that P.W.2 owned 8 acres of land and it was not denied that the accused’s father possessed 30 acres of land. Considering the status of both the families, and the fact that the deceased was the only daughter of P.Ws.1 and 2, the Sessions Judge did not believe the case of P.Ws.1 and 2 that the accused’s father did not present any jewellery to the deceased at the time of her marriage, except a “Thali-Bottu”. The inference drawn by the Sessions Judge that the accused must have presented jewellery to the deceased, is a presumption and not based on any evidence. Merely because the parents of the girl and the accused’s father possessed some landed property, it does not necessarily follow that the accused’s father must have presented jewellery to the deceased. Nor is there any evidence on record to show that the deceased went to her parent’s house with her jewels. No doubt, in his cross-examination the village dhobi (P.W.7) stated that he saw the deceased wearing jewels like gold necklace, neck chain etc, but even if that statement is believed, it does not necessarily give rise to an inference that the said jewels, worn by the deceased, were those presented to her by the accused’s father. She being the only daughter of her parents, it is quite possible that the jewellery worn by her may belong to her mother. The case of the accused as disclosed by the suggestion to the P.Ws. She being the only daughter of her parents, it is quite possible that the jewellery worn by her may belong to her mother. The case of the accused as disclosed by the suggestion to the P.Ws. that some one had committed theft of the jewellery of the deceased and killed her, is devoid of any truth. If it was a case of murder for committing theft of jewellery, it is ununderstandable why the thieves should have left the gold ear-rings on the body of the deceased. The deceased was 8 months pregnant. The thieves could have, without any resistance from the deceased, taken away the jewellery and there would have been no necessity for them to kill the deceased. It is also denied by P.W.1 that, after the death of the deceased, the accused, his father and his relatives had come to their house and returned when she did not tell them about the jewellery. This conduct of the accused, if true, appears to be strange. This conduct reveals that the accused, his father and his relatives were more keen to get the jewellery and they did not feel sorry for the death of the deceased. It could be a very strange conduct of the accused, if it is believed, that he and his relations, after having gone to the house of the parents of the deceased, had left the place even before the funeral. This is, certainly, not the conduct of a loving husband. The plea set up by the accused is, therefore, unbelievable and unacceptable. Merely because one part of the evidence given by P.W.1 and P.W.2 regarding the motive has not been established, we cannot reject the other part of their evidence which reveals that the accused had come to their house on 13th November, 1971, stayed for the night there and left on the next day at about 3-00 p. m. 25. The Sessions Judge held that P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 7 are not disinterested witnesses. They belong to a small compact village with a few houses. Those villagers have affinity towards each other, because they belong to the same community, except P.W.7. P.W.7 is a dhobi who washes the clothes of P.W.2. That may be so. The Sessions Judge held that P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 7 are not disinterested witnesses. They belong to a small compact village with a few houses. Those villagers have affinity towards each other, because they belong to the same community, except P.W.7. P.W.7 is a dhobi who washes the clothes of P.W.2. That may be so. The acceptance of this theory that, because the witnesses belong to a small compact village and belong: to the community to which the deceased belonged, their evidence cannot be accepted as true, makes it impossible to prove any murder taking place in a small village. In such a case, except the villagers of that place who are related to the deceased, we cannot expect of others to come and give evidence of the murder. Nor would itbe reasonable to exclude the evidence of villagers merely on the ground that they belonged to the caste of P.W.2 or that they are residents of a compact and a small village. To exclude or disbelieve their evidence on that ground would, in our opinion, be improper. The truth or otherwise of the evidence of a witness must be judged from the inherent contradictions or discrepancies which have been brought out in their cross examination and by what is spoken to by other witnesses. They may, at times, exaggerate or give a coloured version, or embellish or improve their original version; but, if such evidence can be separated from the other evidence which is true and acceptable, then there would be no valid reason to exclude and reject their entire evidence as untrue. We are, therefore, inclined to, and accept the evidence of the said witnesses wherein they say that the accused came to the house of P. Ws. 1 and 2 on the evening of 13th November, 1971, stayed for the night there and also on the next day, till about 3-00 P.M. 26. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution was that, on 14th November, 1971 the accused persuaded his father-in-law (P.W.2) to go to Jonnathala village for getting tobacco seedlings, and P.W.1 to the pasture lands for grazing the she-buffaloes. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 adduced in this behalf cannot be believed. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution was that, on 14th November, 1971 the accused persuaded his father-in-law (P.W.2) to go to Jonnathala village for getting tobacco seedlings, and P.W.1 to the pasture lands for grazing the she-buffaloes. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 adduced in this behalf cannot be believed. In her first information report (Ex.P-24) P.W.1 did not say that the accused persuaded her to go to pasture lands for grazing the she-buffaloes, or that her husband (P.W.2) was persuaded by the accused to go to Jonnathala village for getting tobacco seedlings. In the absence of the mention of such an important circumstance in the first information report, there arises a good deal of doubt as to the veracity of their evidence in Court. We, therefore, hold that the prosecution has not proved this circumstance beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persuaded P.Ws. 1 and 2 to go away from their house on 14th November, 1971. 27. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution was that the accused was found wearing a lungi (M.O.1) in the morning and during the day time on 14th November, 1971 and that lungi was found stained with blood. The prosecution case was not that the lungi (M.O. 1) belonged to the accused, but that it was purchased by P.W.2 at the Sankranti festival time in 1971 for being used by the accused when he came to his fatherin-laws house. There is nothing improbable or strange in a father-in-law providing his son-in-law who goes there in a pant, with a dhoti or lungi for a change of dress. The plea of the accused that whenever he went to his father-in-law’s-house, he used to take all the necessary clothes for a change of dress, although his visit or stay was brief, i.e., just a halt for the night, sounds strange. Undoubtedly, the lungi (M.O. 1), containing blood-stains, has been seized by the police. The question is whether that lungi was worn by the accused on 14th November, 1971. There are no dhobi marks on the lungi. In their section 162 statements, P.Ws. 1 and 2 did not state to the Sub-Inspector of Police that they had purchased that lungi for the use of the accused when he came to their house. The question is whether that lungi was worn by the accused on 14th November, 1971. There are no dhobi marks on the lungi. In their section 162 statements, P.Ws. 1 and 2 did not state to the Sub-Inspector of Police that they had purchased that lungi for the use of the accused when he came to their house. P.W.6, who also stated in Court that he saw the accused in lungi, did not, in his section 162 statement, say that he saw the accused wearing a lungi. 28. P.W.7 stated in his evidence that he has been washing that lungi for the last two years. P.W.7 could not have washed that lungi (M.O. 1) for two years, till 14th November, 1971, when according to the prosecution, the lungi was purchased by P.W.2 in January, 1971. P.W.3 and P.W.9 have, in addition to P.Ws. 1 and 2, spoken to this fact. We are not very much impressed with the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 9. P.W.9 is a close relation of P.W.2 and P.W.3’s evidence is very artificial. She has perjured on other matters. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bloodstained lungi (M.O. 1) was worn by the accused on 14th November, 1971. 29. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution was that P.W.1 and P.W.2 were not in their house between 12-00 and 3-OO p.m. on 14th November, 1971 and that, the accused and the deceased were alone present in the house. We have believed the statement of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that on 14th November, 1971 they left the house after taking hot food. It, therefore, necessarily follows that the accused and the deceased were alone in the house on 14th November, 1971 after P.Ws. 1 and 2 had left the house. We only disbelieve the prosecution version that they were persuaded by the accused to leave the house. Even in Ex. P-24, i.e., the first information report, P.W.1 stated that at 11 o clock she left to the fields taking the she-buffaloes and that, she returned to the house at 3-00 p.m. We, therefore, agree with the prosecution that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were not in their house on 14th November, 1971 between 12-00 and 3-00 p.m. Even P.W.7 says that on 14th November, 1971 he delivered the washed clothes, during day time, to the deceased. 1 and 2 were not in their house on 14th November, 1971 between 12-00 and 3-00 p.m. Even P.W.7 says that on 14th November, 1971 he delivered the washed clothes, during day time, to the deceased. We, therefore, hold that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were not in their house on I4th November, 1971 between 12-00 noon and 3-00 p.m. and the accused and the deceased were alone in the house. 30. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution was that the accused was seen leaving P. Ws. 2’s house in a hurried manner in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971 and was seen with a bandage on his left wrist. P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 7 also say that they saw the accused with a cloth on his left wrist. To probabilise that the accused received an injury in the scuffle with the deceased while killing her, the prosecution examined P.W.13 and P.W.14. P. W. 13, Dr. P.C. Syda Rao, stated in his evidence that on 14th November, 1971, between 2-00 and 8 00 p.m. when he was in the O.P. Casualty Ward of the Government General Hospital at Guntur, he treated one person by name Haribabu who reported that he received a nail scratch on his left wrist and that, he entered his name in the Casualty Register at Serial No. 25575. The doctor, however, could not say whether the injury was bleeding or not, or whether the accused was the person who had come to him for treatment on that day. Ex. P-7, which is the copy of the medical opinion, does not contain the surname of the patient. Ex.P. 7. does not contain the signature of the Superintendent of the General Hospital. The doctor could not also say as to who prepared Ex.P-7. When the original register did not come before the Court and the doctor says that he could not say whether the accused was the person who got treatment on that day, his evidence is of no use to the prosecution. 31. P.W.14, a male Nursing Assistant in the Guntur General Hospital, stated in his evidence that he did not remember to have dressed up the accused on 14th November, 1971. He was treated hostile. The evidence of this witness also does not help the prosecution in proving that the accused was the person who got treatment for a nail scratch or. P.W.14, a male Nursing Assistant in the Guntur General Hospital, stated in his evidence that he did not remember to have dressed up the accused on 14th November, 1971. He was treated hostile. The evidence of this witness also does not help the prosecution in proving that the accused was the person who got treatment for a nail scratch or. his left wrist. We are also unable to accept that the accused would have gone all the way from Chilukurivaripalem to Guntur on that very day and got himself treated for a nail scratch on his left wrist in a Government Hospital. P.W.8 was a doctor who was closely related to the accused, and one would reasonably expect him to go to a doctor who is related to him rather than go to the General Hospital to get treatment for such a minor and simple injury. 32. At the time of the inquest held on 15th November, 1971, the Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.21) examined P.Ws. 1 to 7 and 9. P.Ws. 3, 4, 5, and 7 who deposed in Court that they saw the accused with a bandage on his left wrist when he was going. If the above witnesses had stated that they saw the accused going with a bandage on his left wrist, that fact would have been mentioned in the inquest report as one of the reasons to suspect the accused of having committed the murder of his wife. The Sub-Inspector of Police, in his evidence, stated that some of the witnesses stated to him that they saw the accused going away from his father-in-law’s house with a bandage on his left wrist, but, that fact was not mentioned in column 11 (a) of the inquest report, Ex.P-5. This statement of the Sub-Inspector of Police, we are unable to believe. This was one of the most important circumstances in proof of the guilt of the accused and such a statement, if made by the witnesses at the inquest, the Sub-Inspector of Police would not have omitted to include in the inquest report. The absence of the mention of such an important statement in the inquest report gives rise to a serious doubt as to whether P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 7 saw the accused going with a bandage on his left wrist. Their evidence in Court cannot be believed. The absence of the mention of such an important statement in the inquest report gives rise to a serious doubt as to whether P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 7 saw the accused going with a bandage on his left wrist. Their evidence in Court cannot be believed. The prosecution, therefore, failed to prove that the accused was seen going with a bandage on his left wrist. We are of the opinion that the said witnesses did not see the accused leaving the house of P.W.2 in a hurried manner, or that he was seen running in the pasture lands on 14th November, 1971. 33. P.W.7 stated in his evidence that he saw the accused lying on a cot in the pancha portion of the house of P.W.2 when he had gone there at mid-day with washed clothes. He also says in his evidence that he saw the accused and his wife, the deceased, while alive, and later he saw the accused only and not the deceased. The Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.21), in his cross-examination, deposed that P.W.7 had not stated before him that after returning the washed clothes to the deceased he went to the house of P.W.2 two times in the afternoon for obtaining the rope to bring a bundle of tobacco stems for fuel. The evidence of P.W 7 in Court that he saw the accused thrice that day and the deceased twice is, therefore, an improvement and embellishment. After coming to know of the report (Ex. P-7) from the Guntur General Hospital, regarding the treatment of one Haribabu, the P.Ws. began to say in Court that they saw the accused with a bandage on his left wrist. The evidence of P.Ws. 3, 7, 4, and 5, who say that they saw the accused going with a bandage on his left wrist is, therefore, unbelievable. It is an improvement and an afterthought. 34. P.W.4 is the son of P.W.3. P.W.5 is closely related to P.Ws. 3 and 4. P.W.4 is 13 years, and P.W.5 is 16 years old. They say that they saw the accused running in the pasture lands on the afternoon of 14th November, 1971. Their evidence is highly artificial. It is in their evidence that the accused, without meeting their pasture lands, could have gone to his village from Chilukurivaripalem. 3 and 4. P.W.4 is 13 years, and P.W.5 is 16 years old. They say that they saw the accused running in the pasture lands on the afternoon of 14th November, 1971. Their evidence is highly artificial. It is in their evidence that the accused, without meeting their pasture lands, could have gone to his village from Chilukurivaripalem. For this and other reasons stated in his judgment by the learned Sessions Judge, we are unable to agree with the prosecution that P.Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 7 are disinterested witnesses and that, they saw the accused going hurriedly from the house of P.W.2. or running in the pasture lands, or that they saw the accused with a bandage on his left wrist. This evidence is either false or highly doubtful. We, therefore, hold that the prosecution failed to establish the circumstance that P.W.3 and P.W.7 saw the accused leaving the house of P.W.2, in the afternoon of 14th November, 1971, in a hurried manner and that, P.Ws. 4 and 5 saw the accused running in the pasture lands in the evening of 14th November, 1971 with a bandage on his left wrist. 35. The next circumstance that was relied upon by the prosecution, was that the confession made by the accused (Exs. P-10, P-11 and P-12) led to the discovery of blood-stained knife (M.O.II), gold “Thali-Bottu” with string (M.O.2) and the blood-stained towel (M.O.9). The panch witnesses to these recoveries are P.W.16 and V. Ramachandra Rao. The Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.21) in his cross-examination admitted that P.W.16 had figured as a witness in some of the cases filed by the Police Station at Martur and that, V. Ramachandra Rao also might have figured as a witness in some of the cases filed by the said Police Station. They are, therefore, stock witnesses of the Police and, for that reason itself, their evidence cannot be believed. The accused denied having made those confessional statements, and farther denied that he had taken the mediators or the police and showed the places where from the said M. Os. were alleged to have been recovered. 36. They are, therefore, stock witnesses of the Police and, for that reason itself, their evidence cannot be believed. The accused denied having made those confessional statements, and farther denied that he had taken the mediators or the police and showed the places where from the said M. Os. were alleged to have been recovered. 36. It appears from the evidence of the Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.21) and of the panch-witness (P.W.16) that the accused was taken into custody on 20th December, 1971 and interrogated on 21st December, 1971 but the accused said that he did not know anything and, after repeated questioning, he narrated. Every time the Sub-Inspector of Police was asking the accused as to why he killed. The S.I. asked the accused twice. P.W.21, the Sub-Inspector of Police, also confirms this statement of P.W.16. In his evidence, the Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.21) deposed that when he questioned the accused as soon as the mediators came, the accused remained silent for some time. Again he asked the accused now and then in the presence of the mediators and on 22nd December, 1971 he would have questioned the accused about once or twice. 37. The learned Counsel, Dr. Bheemarajulu, appearing for the respondent accused, contended that the so called confessions (Exs. P-10, P-11 and P-12) are not voluntary and are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. It was further contended that the mere recovery of the M.Os. is not sufficient. There must be evidence to show that they were either owned by the accused, or were used in the commission of the offence. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contended that when once the confessional statements lead to the discovery of a fact, those confessions are admissible in evidence, under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, irrespective of the fact whether they are voluntary, or not. 38. In re Mudugula Jermaiah1 Subba Rao, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Bench, observed that: “.....Under section 27 of the Evidence Act, the information given to the police relating distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, is allowed to be given in evidence by the police. The information given under section 27 may be either voluntary or extracted from him by compulsion. In either case, before the Constitution, it was admissible in evidence if the conditions laid down in the section are complied with. The information given under section 27 may be either voluntary or extracted from him by compulsion. In either case, before the Constitution, it was admissible in evidence if the conditions laid down in the section are complied with. But, after the enactment of the Constitution, information obtained by compulsion must be excluded from evidence for, otherwise in effect the accused would be compelled, contrary to the provisions of Art. 20 (2) of the Constitution, to be a witness against himself, Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution”embodies the principle of protection against conclusion of selfincrimination and the protection afforded under that Article is not confined to giving oral evidence or producing evidence in the Court room but extends to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. The information given to the police by the accused is certainly testimony previously obtained from him, for that is intended to be used in a Court of law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act and Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution however may be reconciled. Information voluntarily obtained from an accused relating distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is not hit by Art. 20 (3) and, therefore is relevant evidence under section 27 of the Evidence Act............” 39. In Amrut v. State of Bombay2 Raju, J., observed that: “........Statements leading to discovery are admissible under section 27, Evidence Act, although they are statements made to the police in the course of investigation. But, the principle of section 24 applies to the statements under section 27 and if the statement is involuntary, it would be excluded. Where the statements leading to discovery were made to the police as a result of harassment and continuous interrogatories for several hours after the person is treated as an offender and accused, such statements must be regarded as involuntary and must therefore be excluded from the evidence.........” “.... Moreover statements made by the accused person after long interrogation by the police and admitted under section 27, Evidence Act would be hit by Art. 20(3) of the Constitution of India.........” 40. In Amin v. The State3 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra4 and observed that: “.....The phrase used in Art. 20 (3) is ‘to be a witness’ and not to appear as a witness. In Amin v. The State3 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra4 and observed that: “.....The phrase used in Art. 20 (3) is ‘to be a witness’ and not to appear as a witness. It follows that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase ‘to be a witness’ is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the Court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him “... Art. 20 (3) therefore applies to discoveries under section 27, Evidence Act, if these discoveries are the results of compulsion. The scope of section 27, Evidence Act, is thus restricted by Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution and the discoveries which follow a confession brought about by compelling an accused person cannot be used against him......”. 41. In Public Prosecutor v. Munigan5 (Division Bench) it was observed that: “.......Naturally persistent questioning of the accused in custody by the police may negative the impression that the statements are voluntary. It would be extremely dangerous to attach any importance to statements made in those circumstances.......”. 48. It is thus seen from the above decided cases that, after the enactment of the Constitution, only voluntary confessional statements, leading to discoveries of facts, are admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Persistent questioning of the accused in custody of . the police, negatives the impression that they are voluntary. In view of the evidence of the panch witness (P.W.16) and of P.W.21, the Sub-Inspector of Police, we have no hesitation in holding that Exs. P-10, P-11 and P-12 are not voluntary statements and are the result of persistent questioning of the accused while in custody of the Police and they are, therefore, involuntary and inadmissible in evidence, under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 43. In Prabhu v. State of Uttar Pradesh1 S.K. Da: , J., observed that the incriminating statements made to a Police Officer are hit by section 27 of the Evidence Act. The statement that the axe seized is one with which the murder has been committed is not a statement which leads to any discovery within the meaning of section 27 of the Evidence Act. The statement that the axe seized is one with which the murder has been committed is not a statement which leads to any discovery within the meaning of section 27 of the Evidence Act. Nor is the alleged statement of the accused that the blood-stained shirt and dhoti belong to him, a statement which leads to any discovery within the meaning of section 27. It is fallacious to treat ‘discovered’ within section 27 as equivalent to object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object produced, and the knowledge of the accused as to the information given must relate distinctly to the fact. It is, therefore, wrong to admit in evidence the alleged statement of the accused that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the blood-stained shirt and dhoti were his. 44. The recoveries alleged to have been made in this case on the confessional statements made by the accused are inadmissible in evidence unless those M.Os. have been proved by independent evidence to have been used in the commission of the offence, or as belonging to the accused. M. O. 2 has not been proved to have been used in the commission of the offence. Similarly, in regard to the “Thundugudda” also there is no evidence to show that it either belonged to the accused, or was used in the commission of the offence. If the blood-stained “Thundugudda” was secreted by the accused in the eves of the house, we would expect the accused to have equally concealed the blood stained lungi also. A person who has committed a crime and has secreted the blood-stained towel in the eves of the house, would not so indiscreetly leave the blood-stained lungi somewhere near the room to be seen by others. Moreover, the scrappings of the knife sent to the Serologist were examined by him and in his report (Ex. P-19) the Serologist expressed that the blood-stains on the knife-scrappings were disintegrated and their origin could not be determined. In view of this evidence it is impossible to say that the knife (M.O. 2) was used in the commission of the offence. We have already said above that the prosecution did not prove that the knife (M. O. 2) belonged to the accused. In such circumstances, the recovery of the knife loses its importance. In view of this evidence it is impossible to say that the knife (M.O. 2) was used in the commission of the offence. We have already said above that the prosecution did not prove that the knife (M. O. 2) belonged to the accused. In such circumstances, the recovery of the knife loses its importance. The manner of recovery and the removal of the knife by the Sub-Inspector of Police, by separating the grass in the Japan Babul bushes, shows that he knew the place where the knife was found, even before it was shown by the accused. 45. There is any amount of doubt regarding the discovery of “Thali Bottu” (Mangalasutaram) tied over the knife. P.W.16, the inquest panch, stated that the ‘Mangalasutaram’‘was found on the person of the deceased at the time of the inquest. If the Mangalasutaram was found on the person of the deceased after her death, it could not have been recovered or discovered in pursuance of the confessional statement of the accused. Mangalasutaram could not have been found twisted over the knife. The recovery of those M. Os. is, therefore, highly suspicious and, on the basis of the alleged recoveries, in the aforesaid manner, the guilt of the accused cannot be presumed or inferred. 46. It is also unthinkable that the accused, who had taken the "Thali Bottu’ i.e., a gold and a valuable article from the person of the deceased, would have simply thrown it away in the Japan Babul bushes. Any sensible man would keep such a valuable article with himself. Nobody would expect the accused to be so foolish enough as to throw away a valuable article like "Thali-Bottu" in the Japan Babul bushes. We, therefore, agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the alleged recoveries of M. Os. 2, 9 and 11 have not been proved to have been the result of a voluntary statement and that, Exs. P-10, P-11 and P-12 are inadmissible in evidence. It is not, therefore, an incriminating circumstance that could be taken against the accused. 47. The butt-end of the cigarette (M. O. 14) was found at a distance of about 7 yards from the dead-body of the deceased. None at the time of the inquest stated that it was the butt-end of a Charminar cigarette. It was seized under the mediatornama (Ex. P-9), and P.W.15 spoke about it in Court. 47. The butt-end of the cigarette (M. O. 14) was found at a distance of about 7 yards from the dead-body of the deceased. None at the time of the inquest stated that it was the butt-end of a Charminar cigarette. It was seized under the mediatornama (Ex. P-9), and P.W.15 spoke about it in Court. P.W.21, the Sub-Inspector of Police, in his cross-examination admitted that the statements under section 162, Cr.P. Code recorded by him, did not disclose that any of the witnesses stated that the accused was accustomed to smoke "Charminar" brand cigarette, or that the butt-end of the cigarette (M. O. 14) that was found near the dead-body of the deceased was the butt-end of a Charminar cigarette. The evidence of P.W.2 in Court to the effect that the accused was in the habit of smoking "Charminar" brand cigarette and that, he used to purchase that brand of cigarette for the accused whenever he came to his house, must be held to be an improvement over the original version he gave to the Sub-Inspector of Police in his section 162 statement. 48. In Ex. P-19, the Serologist to whom the butt-end of the cigarette was sent for the ascertainment of saliva on the butt-end, reported that the presence of saliva on it could not be confirmed and as such its origin and group could not be determined. M. O. 14 cannot, therefore, be taken as an incriminating circum- stance. Even assuming that the cigarette butt-end was found at that place, near the dead-body, it only proves the presence of the accused in the house of P.W.2. The fact of the presence of the accused in the house of P.W.2, on the day of occurrence, we have already found. However, we have no reliable evidence to believe that the accused smokes Charminar brand cigarette and that, the butt-end of the cigarette (M.O. 14) that was found there was the one smoked by the accused. 49. The next circumstance that has been relied upon by the prosecution is that the accused had been absconding from the date of the offence, i.e., 14th November, 1971 till the date of his surrender in the Magistrate’s Court on 8th December, 1971. 50. A suggestion was made to the Sub-Inspector of Police in cross-examination that the accused did not abscond but was moving about in the village. 50. A suggestion was made to the Sub-Inspector of Police in cross-examination that the accused did not abscond but was moving about in the village. The Sub-Inspector of Police denied the suggestion. The Sub-Inspector also gave positive evidence that, on his confidential enquiries, he found that the accused was absconding. The Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.21) also went to the village of the accused and searched the house of the accused, but the accused was not found there and no information regarding him was available. We are, therefore, satisfied that the accused was absconding after the date of the offence. 51. In Raghav Prapanna v. State of Uttar Pradesh1 Raghubar Dayal, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, in paragraph 27 at page 79 of the report, observed that: ".. The mere absconding, however, may lend weight to the other evidence establishing the guilt of the accused but by itself is hardly any evidence of the guilt of the accused....." 52. In Datar Singh v. State of Punjab2 the Supreme Court observed that the prosecution cannot benefit from merely suspicious circumstances that the accused did not surrender or was not traceable for nearly one year. 53. In view of the above rulings although we find that the accused was found absconding after the date of the offence, it cannot be taken as an incriminating circumstance against the accused when the chain of evidence does not prove the various links to establish the guilt of the accused. If various links in the chain of evidence are proved by satisfactory evidence, then the fact of absconding can help the prosecution as an additional link. But, in the present case, those links have not been established and the fact of absconding cannot lend support to the prosecution theory that the accused was guilty of the offence, charged with. 54. Lastly, we would like to deal with the manner and method adopted by the investigating agency in collecting the evidence against the accused. The first information report (Exs. P-24) was given to the Vetti (P.W.19) at about 12-00 mid-night. It reached the Police Station which was hardly 7 miles away from the house of P.W.2, at 8-00 a.m. on the next day. The first information report (Exs. P-24) was given to the Vetti (P.W.19) at about 12-00 mid-night. It reached the Police Station which was hardly 7 miles away from the house of P.W.2, at 8-00 a.m. on the next day. It reached the Magistrate’s Court on the next day at 12-15 p.m. P.W.19’s explanation for delay has not, and rightly in our opinion, been accepted by the learned Sessions Judge as a satisfactory explanation for the delay. We agree with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the prosecution has not satisfactorily explained the delay in the F.I.R. reaching the Court or the Police Station. 55. The inquest report should reach the Court within 24 hours. It was prepared on 16th November, 1971, but it reached the Court on 19th November, 1971. The mediatornamas (Exs. P-10, P-11 and P-12) strongly relied upon by the prosecution as one of the circumstances to prove the guilt of the accused, were drawn up on 22nd December, 1971 but they reached the Court only on 28th December 1971. M. Os. 2, 9 and 11 said to have been recovered on 22nd December, 1971, reached the Court on 30th December, 1971. Thus, there was delay at every stage of investigation, which has not been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The effect of delay in lodging the F.I.R has been stated by the Supreme Court in Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu1 thus: " .. .First information report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the standpoint of the accused. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of eye-witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of after-thought. On account of delay the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or connected story as a result of deliberation and consultation. Delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of after-thought. On account of delay the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or connected story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the first information report should be satisfactorily explained.‘ 56. In the instant case, as we have already pointed out above, there has been delay in the F.I.R reaching the Court. The truth or otherwise of the evidence given by the witnesses in Court has to be judged with reference to what is contained in the first information report. We have already stated in the foregoing paragraphs of our judgment, that the F.I.R. which was given by the mother of the deceased P.W.1, is silent about very many matters which should have found place in the first information report. Some of the matters on which the F.I.R. is silent, are: (1) that the accused was in illicit intimacy with Nelluri Nagendramma and was, therefore ill-treating his wife, the deceased; or that he had forced the deceased to swallow pills so as to bring about abortion; and (ii) the accused persuaded his father in law (P.W.2) to go to Jonnathala village for getting tobacco seedlings and P.W.1 to go to pasture lands for grazing the she-buffaloes. We must, therefore, say that the evidence of the P.Ws. regarding matters which are not found in the F.I.R. is an embellishment and an improvement. That evidence cannot be accepted at its face value. 57. We have, therefore, to say that the prosecution has established the following three circumstances, viz., (i) that, the accused came to his father-in-law’s house on 13th November, 1971, stayed for the night and also on the next day, i.e., 14th November, 1971, till about 3-00 p.m.; (ii) P.Ws. 1 and 2 were not present in their house during the day time on 14th November, 1971 and that, the accused and the deceased alone were there; and (iii) the accused was found absconding. These three circumstances, however, do not complete the chain of evidence so as to establish the guilt of the accused. 1 and 2 were not present in their house during the day time on 14th November, 1971 and that, the accused and the deceased alone were there; and (iii) the accused was found absconding. These three circumstances, however, do not complete the chain of evidence so as to establish the guilt of the accused. The first two circumstances that have been found by us, are not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, and the third circumstance cannot be taken as a circumstance enuring to the benefit of the prosecution when material links, connecting the accused with the crime, have not been established by the prosecution. It would be unsafe to convict the accused for the murder of his wife on the above circumstances found by us. We, therefore, entirely agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt. 58. In the result, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.