JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - In the basic year plot No. 3370 of Khata No 28 of village Mahru Murtiha, Tahsil Nanpara, district Bahraich, was recorded in the name of Sattar Khan Respondents Nos. 4 to 10 filed objection claiming grove-holders right in the said plots. They claimed that the grove in question had been planted by Bahadur Khan, their predecessor in interest, and after his death they succeeded to him and acquired grove-holders rights and after the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act Bhumidhari rights. Sattar Khan petitioner contested their claim. The Consolidation Officer held that the respondents had no right or title in the grove and the basic year entry was correct. On appeal, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and upheld the claim of the respondents and declared them co-grove holders. The petitioner preferred a revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which was dismissed and the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was upheld. Aggrieved, the petitioner, has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the orders of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 2. It appears, that plot No. 1660 (new No. 3370) had been letout to Bahadur Khan, father of Bashir Ahmad, respondent No. 6, by the erstwhile Zamindars of Nanpara Estate. After the death of Bahadur Khan, Bashir Ahmad, respondent No. 6 was not able to pay rent of tenancy land held by him, and as such he executed a registered deed on June 29, 1942, relinquishing his title in various plots of tenancy land which included plot No. 1660, situate in village Mahru Murtiha. A certified copy of the deed of relinquishment is on the record That document was signed by Bashir Khan and Dost Mohammad Khan, sons of Dalmir Khan, father of opposite parties Nos. 7 to 9. In that deed it was recited that since the tenure-holders were not able to pay rent to the Zamindar they were surrendering the tenancy land to the Zamindar thereafter the Zamindar let out the land to Sattar Khan petitioner under a registered lease dated October 15, 1942 thereafter his name was entered into the village papers as hereditary tenant. In that deed it was recited that since the tenure-holders were not able to pay rent to the Zamindar they were surrendering the tenancy land to the Zamindar thereafter the Zamindar let out the land to Sattar Khan petitioner under a registered lease dated October 15, 1942 thereafter his name was entered into the village papers as hereditary tenant. Subsequently in 1366 Fasli Fourth Settlement took place in the village, during that Settlement the petitioner was recorded Bhumidhar on the basis of being grove-holder of the plot in dispute. The respondents never raised any objection or dispute either at the time of the settlement or even thereafter. It was during the consolidation operations that they claimed grove-holders rights by means of objections filed under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Consolidation Officer placing reliance on the deed of relinquishment and on the registered lease deed and the fourth settlement entries held that the petitioner was the sole Bhumidhar of the grove and the objector-respondents bad no rights, title or interest in the grove. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer, he held that Bahadur Khan was a grove-holder, and as a grove-bolder could not legally relinquish his right of Bahadur Khan or his successors-in-interest. He further held that the deed of relinquishment was inadmissible in evidence as the original had not been produced before the Court. In revision the Deputy Director of Consolidation upheld both the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the two reasons given by the aforesaid two authorities are misconceived in law and there is no error apparent on the face of the record in that of judgment. The question which arises for consideration is to whether Bahadur Khan was a tenant or a grove-holder. If Bahadur Khan was a tenant, he could relinquish his tenancy rights under Section 82 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which was in force at the time of the execution of the deed of relinquishment. In case, however, it is found that Bahadur Khan had planted trees with the permission of the Zamindar then he would be a grovel holder. Admittedly a grove-holder could not relinquish his rights under Section 82 of the 1939 Act. In case, however, it is found that Bahadur Khan had planted trees with the permission of the Zamindar then he would be a grovel holder. Admittedly a grove-holder could not relinquish his rights under Section 82 of the 1939 Act. The petitioner has clearly asserted in paragraph 2 of the petition that the Zamindar had not granted any permission to Bahadur Khan for planting trees and the nature of tenancy had not changed by planting of trees. Even though trees were standing on the plots, the nature of tenancy continued to remain the same i.e. of hereditary tenancy. The respondents have not asserted that Bahadur Khan had planted trees with the permission of the Zamindar. Under the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act, it was open to a tenant to plant trees on the tenancy land let out to him under Section 80 of the U.P. Tenancy Act as no permission was required for that, but in case the tenant wanted to change the nature of the tenancy by planting trees, in that event permission of the landlord was necessary under Section 205 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. If no such permission as contemplated by Section 205 was obtained and trees were planted on the agricultural land the nature of tenancy could not be changed. In the instant case the respondents have not stated that Bahadur Khan had planted trees after obtaining permission from the Zamindar, whereas the petitioner has categorically stated that no such permission had been obtained, it is thus evident that trees were planted without obtaining permission from the Zamindar. This finding is further supported by the recital in the deed of relinquishment dated June 29, 1942. In that document Bashir Khan and Dost Mohammad, father of respondents Nos. 7 to 9 had expressly stated that they were not able to pay rent to the Zamindar in respect of the plots mentioned therein and for that reasons they were surrendering the land to the Zamindar. Plot No 1660 which is equivalent to plot No. 3370 was mentioned in that document. This recital shows that the nature of tenancy had not changed and after the death of Bahadur Khan his son Bashir Khan continued to have the rights of a hereditary tenant in the land in dispute. Plot No 1660 which is equivalent to plot No. 3370 was mentioned in that document. This recital shows that the nature of tenancy had not changed and after the death of Bahadur Khan his son Bashir Khan continued to have the rights of a hereditary tenant in the land in dispute. If permission had been granted and the nature of tenancy had been changed and Bahadur Khan bad acquired grove-holders right, then there was no occasion or sense in stating in that document that they were not able to pay rent. If the nature of tenancy had been changed by planting grove with the permission of the Zamindar then there was no liability for payment of rent. Bashir Khan and Dost Mohammad both accepted the liability to pay rent to the Zamindar in respect of the plot in dispute and when they found that they were unable to pay rent they surrendered the land to the Zamindar. 4. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation have both held that no relinquishment could legally be made by a grove-holder. Even if that so, I find that Bahadur Khan and Bashir Khan were not grove-holders, instead they were hereditary tenants of the land in dispute. I have already discussed that Bashir Khan and Dost Mohammad Khan both surrendered the land to the Zamindar on the ground that they were not able to pay rent. They never claimed grove-holders rights. Once it is held that the nature of the tenancy was not changed and they continued to be hereditary tenants the provisions of Section 82 of the U.P. Tenancy Act would be applicable. It was always open to a hereditary tenant to surrender tenancy rights to the Zamindar, there was no prohibition against such a surrender. In my opinion, therefore, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation both committed error apparent on the face of the record in discarding the deed of relinquishment. 5. Both the authorities again held that the deed of, relinquishment was not admissible in evidence. They again committed patent error of law in recording that finding. The deed of relinquishment was executed on June 29, 1942 and registered on June 30, 1942. 5. Both the authorities again held that the deed of, relinquishment was not admissible in evidence. They again committed patent error of law in recording that finding. The deed of relinquishment was executed on June 29, 1942 and registered on June 30, 1942. Admittedly a certified copy of the deed had been filed before the consolidation authorities and that copy was on the record before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation. They discarded the certified copy on the ground that the original had been produced before them. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act as amended by the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1954 lays down that where a certified copy of any document purporting to be 20 years old is produced, the court may presume that the signatures and every other part of that document which purports to be in the handwriting and in the case of a document executed or attested it may further be presumed that it was executed and attested by the person by whom it is purported to have been attested or executed. Amendments in Section 90 were made as the legislature intended that certified copies of such documents which are 20 years old should be admissible without requiring the original to be produced before the Court. The provisions contained therein clearly contemplate that the original need not be produced and the certified copy should be admitted in evidence. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as well as the Deputy Director of Consolidation failed to consider the provisions contained in Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Deputy Director placed reliance on certain cases. In none of those cases the provisions of Section 90 as amended by the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1964, were considered or discussed. Those cases are therefore not applicable to the facts of the present case. 6. In the result, the petition succeeds. The order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated March 22, 1968, and of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated August 23, 1969, are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.