JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. - The question involved in these two revisions being similar, propose to decide them together by a common judgment. The facts necessary are as follows : A Society known by the name of Paliwal Brahman School Committee was a registered society under the Societies Registration Act. The society was running an Intermediate College in the name of Gopi Ram Paliwal Intermediate College at Aligarh. The College has its own Scheme of Administration, which amongst other matters provided for the constitution of a Committee of Management. The Committee of Management of the College was constituted in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 16-A of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, briefly stated hereinafter as an Act and Regulations made thereunder. 2. In September 1972 election for the various posts of the office bearers of the Committee of Management took place. Chunni Lal Sharma, who is a party in both these revisions, was elected as a Manager of the said Committee. Niranjan Prasad Parashar, applicant No. 3 of revision No. 937 of 1973 was elected as the Joint Secretary-cum-Manager whereas Brij Kishore Paliwal, the opposite party No. 1 of Revision No. 249 of 1974 was elected as Assistant Secretary-cum-Manager. The administration of the college was being run by the aforesaid office bearers under the Managership of Chunni Lal Sharma. 3. It transpires that after sometime some of the members of the Committee of Management started entertaining doubt about the validity of the election of Chunni Lal Sharma as Manager. In as much as they thought that since the brother-in-law of Chunni Lal Sharma was a teacher in the College, Chunni Lal Sharma was disqualified from being elected as Manager. A letter was accordingly sent to Chunni Lal Sharma informing him about the invalidity of his election. In the meantime the District Inspector of Schools was also approached. He also wrote a letter calling upon Chunni Lal Sharma to explain the aforesaid facts. Chunni Lal Sharma did not send any reply. The further development of the case reveals that some members of the Committee of Management called an ordinary meeting on 5-8-1973 and approved the action of Niranjan Prasad Parashar of assuming charge of the office of Managership on himself. The executive Committee further directed Chunni Lal Sharma to handover all records, proceeding books etc. to Parashar by 16-9-1973. The further development of the case reveals that some members of the Committee of Management called an ordinary meeting on 5-8-1973 and approved the action of Niranjan Prasad Parashar of assuming charge of the office of Managership on himself. The executive Committee further directed Chunni Lal Sharma to handover all records, proceeding books etc. to Parashar by 16-9-1973. It was also decided that another meeting of the Committee of Management would take place on 16-9-1973. 4. In the meantime Jagdish Prasad Sharma, who was the relation of Chunni Lal Sharma, retired from service and one Bhupal Singh was appointed acting Principal. Niranjan Prasad Parashar, however, felt that some obstruction was being caused by Chunni Lal Sharma in the discharge of his duties as Manager, therefore, he instituted original Suit No. 348 of 1973 against Chunni Lal Sharma and others. Niranjan Prasad Parashar also filed an application for interim injunction restraining Chunni Lal Sharma and others from interfering in the management of the institution in his capacity as Manager. The learned Munsif granted ad-interim injunction on 24-9-1973 restraining the defendants of that suit from causing any obstruction and interference in the Management of the Institution. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Munsif, an appeal was filed by Chunni Lal Sharma to the District Judge. The second Additional Civil Judge, to whom the appeal was transferred held that Chunni Lal Sharma was disqualified from being elected as Manager and, therefore, was not entitled to function as such. Since, however, the finding given by the said court further was that Niranjan Prasad Parashar was also disqualified from being elected as Joint Manager-cum-Secretary, being a teacher in an institution, it therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction granted by the trial court. It is against this judgment that Revision No. 937 of 1973 was filed in this court. 5. Before the Revision No. 937 of 1973 could be decided by the High Court, Brij Kishore Paliwal mentioned above filed another suit No. 12 of 1974 in the court of Munsif Koil, Aligarh, for an injunction restraining Chunni Lal Sharma and Niranjan Prasad Parashar on the ground that both being disqualified from acting as Manager of the Committee of Management Brij Kishore Paliwal, being Assistant Secretary-cum-Manager, was entitled to assume charge of the Manager and to function as such. On these pleadings he also filed an application for interim injunction restraining defendants of his suit from interfering in the discharge of his function in his capacity of Secretary-cum-Manager. The learned Munsif on 15-1-1974 granted injunction restraining Chunni Lal Sharma and Niranjan Prasad Parashar restraining them from interfering with the discharge of duties of Brij Kishore Paliwal as the Manager. 6. Chunni Lal Sharma having felt dissatisfied by the injunction granted by the trial court filed an appeal to the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court also recorded a finding of disqualification against Chunni Lal Sharma and on that finding dismissed the appeal. A revision was thereafter preferred to the District Judge, who being of the opinion that the revision was not maintainable in its courts, rejected the same. Chunni Lal Sharma thereafter filed revision No. 249 of 1974 against the aforesaid orders in the High Court. In this way these two revisions came to the High Court and were subsequently consolidated. 7. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties in support of their respective cases. Sri V. K. Gupta, counsel for Chunni Lal Sharma, challenged the judgment of two courts below on two grounds. The first ground was that paragraph 293 of the Educational Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) did not lay down any disqualification for the election and the same has a very limited purpose of being applied only for the purposes of grant-in-aid. It was therefore urged that the courts below committed an error in applying this provision against his client and in holding that he was disqualified from being chosen as a Manager of the Committee of Management. The second ground of attack was that after the provisions of the Act were amended and a Scheme of Administration of the College was approved by the Director of Education, the Administration, for every purpose including Management has to run in accordance with the scheme laid down in the Scheme of Administration. Since the said Scheme of Administration although provided for disqualification of office bearers of the Committee of Management but did not mention the ground of relationship of member with a teacher in the College as a disqualification, therefore, the same could not be treated as such. 8. I propose to take up the first argument of the counsel for the applicant. 8. I propose to take up the first argument of the counsel for the applicant. It will be advantageous to quote relevant portion of paragraph 293 for the purposes of understanding the controversy involved in this case. Paragraph 293 is to be found in Chapter IX of the Code which reads as under : "No grant-in-aid is made to any institution unless it agree to comply with the conditions, hereinafter laid down, and every institution which applied for grant-in-aid or which receives grant-in-aid shall be deemed to have accepted the obligation to comply with these conditions. Notes: x x x x x (d) Where a teacher or head of an institution is already an employee of the school, no relation will be permitted to become a member of the Managing Committee or hold any office in it as long as the teacher or the head continues to be in the service of the school." 9. The above extract of paragraph 293 would indicate that the purpose and object of this Chapter is to provide for safeguard which the Government wanted to be observed by every recognised institution by complying with the conditions mentioned therein. Sub-para 1 of paragraph 293 is specifically clear on this point as it mentions the purpose for which this paragraph was meant. This Chapter did not have any intention of laying down the disqualifications of members or office-bearers for the purposes of being elected in the Committee of Management. The opening words of paragraph 293 "No grant is to be made" are relevant for the purposes of understanding the scope of this provision. Reading this along with the rest of the paragraph it would be found that the intention of the Government was to apply this provision for the purposes of grant-in-aid alone. The fact that this Chapter nowhere provides that any person elected in breach of note (d) referred to above would be dis-entitled to function as an office-bearer is another indication leading to the same result. This provision had limited application. It is therefore not possible to hold that the effect of paragraph 293 is more than what is intended by it. 10. It is further noteworthy that Chapter IX, which deals with the rules relating to grant-in-aid, does not have any statutory force. This provision had limited application. It is therefore not possible to hold that the effect of paragraph 293 is more than what is intended by it. 10. It is further noteworthy that Chapter IX, which deals with the rules relating to grant-in-aid, does not have any statutory force. It appears that this Chapter only contains executive instructions laid down by the State Government from time to time which were necessary to be complied with before any grant was sanctioned to any recognised institution. Counsel for the opposite party, also could not find any statute or enactment to rebut the position that these rules are merely executive instructions without having the sanction of a Statute behind them. This again is a ground which impels me to hold that any thing said relating to disqualification of a member to hold an office in the Committee of Management in this paragraph of the Code would only be relevant for the purpose for which this paragraph was meant and not for any other purpose. I therefore find sufficient force in the argument of Sri V. K. Gupta that the courts below committed an error of jurisdiction in holding that the election of Chunni Lal Sharma was void because he was disqualified due to clause (d) of paragraph 293 of Chapter IX of the Code. 11. It is the first primary duty of a court of law to look to the language of Statute or any document with a rational regard of its aim and object. It is not open to courts to unduly widen the scope of a provision either of law or any other Government instruction or executive order and to assign it a meaning which does not flow from the same. Keeping these things in mind do not find any substance in the argument of the counsel for the opposite party that paragraph 293 (d) has to be given a wide interpretation in order to give full effect to it. A court has no right to unduly enlarge the scope of a provision which may have the effect of curtailing the right of a citizen to be qualified for an election. A court has no right to unduly enlarge the scope of a provision which may have the effect of curtailing the right of a citizen to be qualified for an election. It may be true that the right to fight an election is not a right recognised by the common law of the land and it is a creature of Statute but nonetheless the rule of interpretation would not demand unnecessary stretching the language of an executive instruction or a provision of law for the purposes of bringing within its scope something which is not intended or provided therein. It therefore appears to me that provision relating to disqualification has to be strictly construed and any interpretation which interferes with the right of a citizen to be elected or to continue in office is interfered with the same, should be avoided. The Supreme Court in Ram Padarath v. Niari Sinha, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 480, dealing with a similar matter observed as follows : "It may sound technical, but in dealing with a statutory provision which imposes a disqualification on a citizen it would be unreasonable to take merely a broad and general view and ignore the essential points of distinction on the ground that they are technical." 12. It may, however, be repeated at this place that according to my interpretation of paragraph 293 and the relevant clause of the said paragraph this provision would not apply to the present case as the same clearly stands excluded from the above paragraph. 13. Counsel for the opposite party in support of his contention that the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code are statutory invited my attention to the rulings Managing Committee of Krishak Higher Secondary School, Naini v. Isham Singh, 1965 A.L.J. 1116 and Shyam Behari Lal Kapoor v. Director of Education, 1957 A.L.J. 162. It may be noted that none of these cases were concerned with the interpretation of the scope of Chapter IX of the Code. In Isham Singh's case the court was concerned with Appendix VI of the Education Code whereas in Shyam Behari Lal Kapoor's, case the High Court was required to deal with Appendix X of the said Code. It may further be noticed that in none of the two cases the High Court held that the whole of the Educational Code had the statutory force. It may further be noticed that in none of the two cases the High Court held that the whole of the Educational Code had the statutory force. Counsel for the opposite party does not derive any support from these two authorities. The last authority brought to my notice in this connection by the counsel for the opposite party was Ghulam Haqqani Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 Alld. 413. This again was a case where the High Court was not concerned with the interpretation of Chapter IX of the Education Code. 14. In my view, therefore, the courts below committed an error of jurisdiction in holding that since Chunni Lal Sharma was dis-qualified under paragraph 293(1) (j) Clause (d) of the Education Code and that it is this wrong interpretation of the aforesaid provision which resulted in the assumption jurisdiction by the courts below in granting injunction against Chunni Lal Sharma in Civil Revision No. 294 of 1974. 15. The second ground urged by the counsel for the appellant has also got sufficient force. In 1958 U. P. Intermediate Education Act was amended by U. P. Act No. 35 of 1958. By this amendment material difference was brought in by adding Secs. 16-A, 16-B, 16-C, 16-E, 16-F, 16-G and 16-H. 16-A provides for the framing of Administration by every recognised institution. This section further provided that the Scheme of Administration shall amongst other matters provide for the constitution of a Committee of Management and how that authority would manage and conduct the affairs of the Institution. By sub-Sec. 6 of Sec. 16-A of the said Amending Act it was provided that every recognised institution would be managed in accordance with the Scheme of Administration framed thereunder. The said Act also authorised the State Government to frame regulations. In exercise of this power of framing Regulation that Chapter I Part II-A was made by the State Government. In Chapter the various regulations laid down the requirements which every Scheme of Administration could incorporate in it. Regulation 14 Clause (b) provided as follows :- "The main principle on which the approval to a Scheme of Administration shall be accorded would be that at the conform (sic) to the following rules. (b) Procedure for constituting the committee of Management, qualifications and dis-qualifications of its members, term of its office, calling its meeting and conducting business threat shall be laid down. 16. (b) Procedure for constituting the committee of Management, qualifications and dis-qualifications of its members, term of its office, calling its meeting and conducting business threat shall be laid down. 16. The reading of the provisions of Sec. 16-A along with the Regulation No. 14 made therein it is clear that now the injunction of the legislature was to make the Scheme of Administration exhaustive in the matter of Management of recognised institution. It was no longer desired to leave this matter including that of qualifications and disqualifications of its members to the whim and caprice of different Managing Committees. The attempt obviously was to achieve uniformity in the matter of Management of these institutions. Sec. 16-A and its sub-Sec. 6 clearly laid down that the Management of the institution had to be run in future in accordance with the Scheme of Administration alone. It is admitted that in the instant case as well such a Scheme of Administration was framed by the Committee of Management of the College. This Scheme of Administration also provided for disqualifications but the Scheme of Administration did not mention anything like paragraph 293(1) (j) (d) in it. 17. Chapter II of the Regulation which deals with the appointment of teachers laid down the method of Constitution of the Selection Committee for the selection of Teachers, Principals and Headmaster. In paragraph 10 Clause (e) of the said Regulation the only disability which was provided for a member was in the following terms : "No member of the Selection Committee shall take part in selection if any relation of his in terms of Regulation IV, Chapter III is a candidate for the post." It is nowhere provided that a person cannot be a member of a Committee of Management simply because some one of his relation is a teacher working in the institution. 18. In view of the exhaustive provisions which govern the entire field on the subject it is not possible to accept that paragraph 293 (1) (j) 4 (d) would still be operative and would apply for the purposes of disqualifying a member to be an office bearer of the Committee of Management. Had the legislature intended to make such a provision still enforceable it would have made the same either in the Act or in the Regulation. Had the legislature intended to make such a provision still enforceable it would have made the same either in the Act or in the Regulation. In the absence of any such provision the conclusion which irresistibly follows is that disqualification of the type mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph of the Education Code could no longer be considered and taken into account for holding that Chunni Lal Sharma was not legally elected a Manager cum Secretary of the Committee of Management. 19. On the view which I have taken above there was neither occasion for Niranjan Prasad Parashar nor for Brij Lal Paliwal to assume charge of the office of Managership as there was no vacancy on the said post. It is therefore not strictly necessary for me to decide as to whether Niranjan Prasad Parashar was competent to become the Manager of the Committee of Management on the assumption that there was a casual vacancy in the office. But however out of difference to the counsel for the opposite party that I proceed to decide it. 20. Counsel for the opposite party submitted that the learned Second Additional Civil Judge committed an error of jurisdiction in holding in Civil Revision No. 937 that his client was not qualified to become the Manager of the said Committee. He, in this respect, invited my attention to Regulation No. V of Chapter III of the above Regulation which reads as follows :- "No member of the teaching staff of the Principal or Headmaster shall 1 act as an office bearer of the Committee of Management of a recognised institution." and submitted that this paragraph prohibits a teacher of a recognised institution from becoming, an office bearer of the Committee of Management and not a teacher of a degree college. He further submitted that the State Government could not frame any regulation under this Act governing the conduct of teacher employed in a degree college. 21. The aforesaid regulation is contained in Chapter III, which has been framed in pursuance of the power of Sec. 16-G of the Act. Sec. 16-G deals with the conditions of service oi teachers employed in a recognised institution. This section further empowers the State Government to make Regulations relating to their conditions of service. Neither Sec. 16-G of the Act nor any regulation prescribed thereunder deal with a teacher of a degree college. Sec. 16-G deals with the conditions of service oi teachers employed in a recognised institution. This section further empowers the State Government to make Regulations relating to their conditions of service. Neither Sec. 16-G of the Act nor any regulation prescribed thereunder deal with a teacher of a degree college. As a fact a teacher of a degree college is beyond the purview and reach of this Act. 22. It is in the light of what I have stated above that paragraph 5 of Chapter III has to be interpreted. Further the language of this paragraph also shows that a member of the teaching staff of a recognised institution, has been disqualified from becoming the office bearer of the Committee of Management of a Recognised institution. This paragraph would serve its purpose only when an interpretation suggested by me was accepted. The wider interpretation of including a teacher of a degree college is not only beyond the scope of its ambit but far from its language. The use of the words "teaching staff or the Principal or Headmaster" clearly shows that they refer to these persons employed in a recognised institution and none other. 23. I accordingly find sufficient substance in the argument of the counsel for the opposite party that Narain Prasad Parashar could not be found disqualified from assuming the charge of the office of Manager, in case a casual vacancy was found to exist. As however, I have found that Chunni Lal Sharma was entitled to function as Manager therefore there was no occasion for Niranjan Prasad Parashar to become Manager. 24. On the view taken by me find that the courts below committed an error of jurisdiction in holding that Chunni Lal Sharma was disqualified from functioning as Manager. Consequently I allow the revision No. 249 of 1974 and dismiss the revision No. 937 of 1973 with the finding that the injunction applications made in both the cases shall stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case parties to bear their own costs in both the revisions throughout.