JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This is a decree holders appeal arising out of execution proceedings. The decree-holder had put the decree into execution. On 2-9-63 an objection was filed by the judgment-debtor under Sec. 47, C. P. C. The objection was that the amount of decree had already been paid to the decree holder on 17-7-1963. This objection was dismissed in the absence of the judgment-debtor on 12-10-63. On 14-10-63 the judgment-debtor filed an application for setting aside the order of 12-10-63, and also filed another application praying for orders under O. 21, Rule 2(ii), C. P. C. The application for restoration was dismissed. Against this order the judgment-debtor went up in appeal. The appeal was dismissed on the finding that the execution court was justified in not adjourning the hearing. The court also gave another reason for its order in the form of the finding that the judgment-debtor had failed to lead any evidence of payment. The other application under O. 21, Rule 2 (ii), C. P. C. dismissed, on the ground that it was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. Judgment-debtor filed an appeal against that order. The appellate court allowed the appeal, on the ground that the application was not barred by the principle of res judicata. This order is being challenged through the present appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that as the finding of the execution court that the payment had not been made had been confirmed by the appellate court in earlier proceedings and as that finding was not challenged by the judgment-debtor in a higher court, the question about satisfaction of decree must be deemed finally decided to the effect that the decree had not been satisfied. He has contended that the principle of constructive res judicata will apply in the present case and court will be barred from deciding on merits the question whether the satisfaction of the decree should be recorded, as it will involve the decision of the same issue over again. He has contended that the principle of constructive res judicata will apply in the present case and court will be barred from deciding on merits the question whether the satisfaction of the decree should be recorded, as it will involve the decision of the same issue over again. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the application under O. 21, R. 2 of the Code was an independent application, and as the judgment-debtor had no right to prove by evidence in objections under Sec. 47, C. P. C. that the decree had been satisfied the matter cannot be deemed concluded so as to bar the present proceedings. He has relied on sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of O. 21. C. P. C. which says : "A payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid, shall not be recognised by any Court executing the decree." The contention is that as the payment or adjustment had not been certified or recorded as required by Rule 2 of Or. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the execution Court could not refuse to proceed with the execution of the decree even if the payment may have been made and the decree satisfied, and hence the observations of the court in execution proceedings could not amount to a decision on the question whether payment had in fact been made or not. The question that arises for determination in this case is whether it was within the scope of the execution Courts authority to decide if the decree had been satisfied. It appears that no specific prayer was made in objections under Sec. 47, C. P. C. that the court should issue notice to decree-holder to certify the payment. In the case of Khushal Singh v. Medai Lal, 1881 A.W.N. 168, a similar application was moved in the execution court and it held that the decree had been satisfied. Lower appellate court took the view that the application could not be deemed to be an application for recording satisfaction of the decree. This court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and held that : "The application was considered by the court as expressly treated as one made under Sec. 258 and the decree holder was called upon to show cause against it. This court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and held that : "The application was considered by the court as expressly treated as one made under Sec. 258 and the decree holder was called upon to show cause against it. Under such circumstances it would lead to a failure of justice to refuse to give effect to the application under Sec. 258 and to recognise the payment merely because the application did not, in express words, ask that notice to the respondent should issue and a formal notice had not been served." A similar matter came up for decision in the case of Akbar Ali v. Ishwar Saran, A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 622. Beg, J. agreed with the decision in Khushal Singh (supra) while Desai, J. did not agree with it. The following question was referred for decision to a third Judge : "Is the order of the executing court dated 5-1-53 correct in law ?". Mukherji, J. - to whom the question was referred, held that under the law it is not possible for the executing court to recognise an uncertified payment during the course of the execution, and that certification of such payment can only be had if there is a proper prayer to that effect, whether by means of a separate application or in the objections filed by the judgment-debtor provided such prayer is made within ninety days of the payment, but not otherwise. Finally the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. According to the decision in Akbar Ali's case, therefore, the execution court should not have gone into the matter about payment as it was beyond the scope of the authority under Sec. 47, C. P. C. in view of the clear conflict between the decisions in these two cases, I would have referred for reconsideration of the decision in Akbar Ali's case by a larger Bench, if in the present case the execution court had on merits, and after hearing the parties, given a decision that the payment had not been proved. It is clear that the judgment-debtor did not get opportunity to prove his case. On this finding of want of opportunity, the lower appellate court took the view that the principle of constructive res judicata will not bar the proceedings. This view may not be technically correct as a decision even given ex parte can operate as res judicata in further proceedings. On this finding of want of opportunity, the lower appellate court took the view that the principle of constructive res judicata will not bar the proceedings. This view may not be technically correct as a decision even given ex parte can operate as res judicata in further proceedings. However, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Akbar Ali's, it has to be held that it was not permissible for the judgment-debtor to prove satisfaction of the decree in objections under Sec. 47, C. P. C. without making specific prayer for the issue of notice to the decree-holder to certify the payment, and consequently the finding, given therein will not be sufficient to bar the proceedings under O. 21, R. 2, C. P. C. on the principle of res judicata. In these circumstances if the court below has not applied the principle of res judicata it cannot be said that it has committed any error of law. 3. According to the decision in the case of Akbar Ali (supra) a specific application under O. 21, R. 2, C. P. C. has to be made for getting a certification and that application has now been moved. Under Sec. 47, C. P. C. the execution court could strike off execution only if payment or adjustment had been certified or recorded in accordance with Rule 2 of O. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If there is a specific provision for decision of a particular issue, then its decision in collateral proceedings, in which the matter is not open for determination. will not be sufficient, to bar the decision of the issue in the subsequent proceedings on the principle of constructive res judicata. 4. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs.