Mohammad Hanif Khan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh
1974-09-04
HARI SWARUP
body1974
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This petition has been filed against the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation passed under Sec. 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the basic year the holding was entered in the name of the petitioner. Objections were filed by respondent No. 2 and one Mohammad Rashid. Respondent No. 2 claimed that he was the owner to the extent of share and the petitioner was Sirdar in respect of the remaining share, Mohammad Rashid had claimed that Sirdari belonged to the brothers of Hanif Khan and brothers of Zuber Khan. Mohammad Rashid, accordingly claimed l/4th share in the Sirdari. According to Zuber Khan a Patta had been granted by the Zamindar in favour of Hanif Khan and Zuber Khan while according to Hanif Khan the Patta had been granted only in his favour and he was the sole sirdar. 2. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objection and maintained the basic year entry. An appeal was filed by Zuber Khan. This appeal was dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Against this order Zuber Khan went up in revision. The revision has been allowed and Zuber Khan has been held to be cotenant to the extent of half share. Hanif Khan has now challenged the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 3. Both the parties had relied upon a Patta executed by the Zamindar in 1946. The Patta which was found on record by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was in favour of both the parties, but he did not rely upon it as in his opinion the ink in which it was written was new. He, however, did not give any final opinion about the allegation of the petitioner that the original Patta filed by him had been substituted by a forged Patta which now exists on the record. The Deputy Director of Consolidation did not go into the question at all. 4. The basic issue to be decided was whether the Patta was given in favour of both the parties or only in favour of one. The Deputy Director refused to go into the question simply because 17 years before the alleged Patta had been executed, the revenue records showed the holding in the name of Mohd. Hanif after the death of Mohd. Umer who was then the tenant.
The Deputy Director refused to go into the question simply because 17 years before the alleged Patta had been executed, the revenue records showed the holding in the name of Mohd. Hanif after the death of Mohd. Umer who was then the tenant. That would be no ground for not determining whether the lease had been granted by the Zamindar in favour of both Hanif Khan and Zuber Khan or only in favour of Mohd. Hanif Khan. Both the parties had relied on this Patta and it was the most relevant evidence to be considered for determining the title of the parties. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not proceed to determine on merits if the Patta was a forged one because he had already determined as a fact that lease had been given to both the parties. He has pointed out the various statements of witnesses mentioned in the order of the Deputy Director and has urged that this mention amounts to the finding of such facts which could lead to no other conclusion than the conclusion that the tenancy was a joint tenancy of both Mohd. Hanif Khan and Zuber Khan. But the Deputy Director of Consolidation dealing with the oral evidence has, himself finally said that these go to lend support to the theory of Zuber Khan that the lease had been given by the Zamindar to both the parties and not to Mohd. Hanif Khan alone. Thus it appears that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had in his mind that the basic question to be determined was the question about the terms of the Patta. But for determining the question he did not take into account the primary and the best evidence on record, viz, the Patta. It was incumbent on him to determine as a fact whether the Patta existing on record was the genuine or the forged one. If it was genuine, no better evidence was needed, and if had been substituted for the one alleged to be filed by Mohd. Hanif Khan then it would be for the Deputy Director to draw any inference he thinks proper and to rely on secondary and circumstantial evidence about the rights of parties. 5.
If it was genuine, no better evidence was needed, and if had been substituted for the one alleged to be filed by Mohd. Hanif Khan then it would be for the Deputy Director to draw any inference he thinks proper and to rely on secondary and circumstantial evidence about the rights of parties. 5. The other factors which influenced the mind of the Deputy Director of Consolidation were the refusal of the present petitioner to abide by his earlier consent to take special oath and his refusal to get the dispute adjudicated by the Panchayat called for the purpose. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has without any justification in law drawn adverse inference against the petitioner from these two circumstances. If a proceeding is going on before an authority authorised by law to determine the rights of the parties, it is not obligatory for a party to get a decision from a Panchayat. There is no provision under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for getting a binding decision from the Panchayat. Hence if a party does not get a decision from Panchayat, no inference can be drawn against him. 6. Similarly from a party's refusal to take special oath, even after having once consented to take it, no adverse inference can be drawn. Under the Oath Act, 1873 there was a provision for administering special oath and it may have been under that Act permissible to draw an inference against the person backing out. This Act was repealed by the Oath Act, 1969, and in its wisdom the legislature did away with the provisions dealing with special oath. Once the taking of special oath has ceased to be recognised by law, no inference against a party can be drawn from the fact that he refuses to take the special oath, even though he may have earlier agreed to take it. 7. It is obvious that irrelevant considerations had entered the mind of the Deputy Director of Consolidation when he recorded the findings against the petitioners. The findings cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been recorded in accordance with law. The consequent judgment cannot stand. 8. In the result the petition is allowed. The order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 20th March 1971 is quashed and he is directed to rehear the revision and decide it in accordance with law.