JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for money on the basis of a mortgage of immovable property. Plaintiffs claimed that one Chheda Lal had mortgaged this property on 3-5-1949 in plaintiffs favour. The defendants were said to be the heirs of Chheda Lal and thus liable to pay the amount of the debt. The defence on the other hand was inter alia, that Chheda Lal had no interest in the property and transferred no rights in favour of the plaintiffs by mortgage executed by him. Their case was that Kadher Mal and Ram Chandra had obtained a decree against Makhan Lal (father of Chheda Lal) and in execution of the same the share of Makhan Lal had been sold and as such the title of Makhan Lal ceased to exist thereafter. The appellants are the sons of Ram Chandra and the other non-contesting respondents are the heirs of Kadher Mal. According to the defendants, they obtained possession on the basis of the sale certificate through court and Chheda Lal s/o Makhan Lal was left with no interest in the property. 2. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs suit and the lower appellate court has dismissed the appeal. The defendants have now come up in appeal to this court. 3. The lower appellate court and the trial court held , that the auction sale was held in year 1900, and the order of delivery of possession was passed in year 1907, but actual possession was not delivered, and Makhan Lal continued in possession of the property. They applied Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1877 and held that as three years had elapsed after the sale, and possession had not been obtained, the auction purchasers lost title in the property and the property continued to remain vested in Makhanlal and after his death it came to his son Chheda Lal The courts below have obviously erred in applying Art. 178 of the Limitation Act to the facts of the present case. 4. Art. 178 of the Limitation Act provides for three years limitation for applications, for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule to the Limitation Act or by the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Art. 178 of the Limitation Act provides for three years limitation for applications, for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule to the Limitation Act or by the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, on the findings of the courts below, the application had in fact been moved for delivery of possession, the execution court had passed an order for delivery of possession and the delivery of possession had been made but Makhan Lal had not vacated the premises. The question of making a further application did not arise. 5. The Article of Limitation Act which was applicable in the circumstances of the case was not Art. 178 but Art. 138. Rights of the auction purchaser could have been lost only if he had failed to file a suit for possession within limitation provided for such a suit. Art. 188 provides 12 years period of limitation from the date of the sale when the suit is filed by a purchaser of land at a sale in execution if the decree for possession of the purchased land, when judgment debtor happens to be in possession at the date of the sale. As the sale was both of the land and the superstructure thereon, it would be Art. 138 that will be applicable, and limitation for the suit will be 12 years from the date of sale. Before 12 years had expired, the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 came into force. Sec. 28 of that Act provides : "At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property his right to such property shall be extinguished." In this Act again Art. 138 provides 12 years period of limitation from the date the sale becomes absolute, for a suit by a purchaser. 6. In Art 138 of the Limitation Act, 1908. the word "land" was deleted and the twelve years limitation was made to run from the date the sale becomes absolute. The auction purchasers right to get back the property therefore could extinguish only after expiry of 12 years from the date of sale, i.e. sometime in 1912. 7. 6. In Art 138 of the Limitation Act, 1908. the word "land" was deleted and the twelve years limitation was made to run from the date the sale becomes absolute. The auction purchasers right to get back the property therefore could extinguish only after expiry of 12 years from the date of sale, i.e. sometime in 1912. 7. From the evidence on record it is apparent that Makhan Lal had died in the year 1909, that is, before the right to sue for possession had expired and before the rights could have got revested in Makhan Lal by virtue of Sec. 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Thus, the plaintiff could succeed in this suit only if he had proved that the mortgagor Chheda Lal had acquired title by remaining in possession long enough to acquire title by , adverse possession. Although specific issue was framed on this point, no evidence was led to show that Chheda Lal had acquired any title. Both the courts below proceeded on the assumption that Chheda Lal was the owner and that burden lay on the defendants to prove that they had acquired title by long possession and Chheda Lal had lost it. This approach was erroneous. Once a sale certificate is issued in favour of the auction purchaser, burden lies on the other side to prove title. Chheda Lal could have. acquired title only by remaining in adverse possession for more than 12 years. There is no finding by the courts below that Chheda Lal had acquired any title by adverse possession. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has stated that there is no evidence on record to the effect that Makhan Lal had remained in possession for over 12 years or Chheda Lal had remained in possession for 12 years or for any period at all. According to him, evidence is to the effect that Chheda Lal was never in possession. Learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to show any evidence to the effect that Chheda Lal was ever in possession, much less in such possession as to acquire title by adverse possession. According to him, evidence is to the effect that Chheda Lal was never in possession. Learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to show any evidence to the effect that Chheda Lal was ever in possession, much less in such possession as to acquire title by adverse possession. The Courts below have also not mentioned any evidence about Chhedalal's possession except the entry in the Municipal extract for the years 1943 to 1948, which showed the name of Chheda Lal, but even if this be treated as evidence of possession, it will cover only a period of six years and will not be sufficient for acquisition of title by Chheda Lal. The other evidence considered by the courts below is to the effect that Chheda Lal and Makhan Lal had died in this house. As already seen the parties are cousins, and, hence, the circumstance that Chheda Lal and Makhan Lal had died in the house after auction sale, would be no evidence to prove that Chheda Lal was in possession of the house. 9. As the plaintiffs have failed to prove that Chheda Lal, their mortgagor, had any interest in the property, no title could vest in the plaintiffs by reason of the mortgage, and accordingly, the suit was liable to be dismissed. 10. In the result the appeal is allowed, the decree of the court below is set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs.