JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - This is an appeal by the defendants. The State of U. P. filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 3,000/- against the defendants-appellants. Defendants father Bikram Singh had embezzled Government money to the tune of Rs. 45,914/15/- by preparing false and fictitious bills and registers. On the matter being reported to the Police, Bikram Singh and one Basheswari Nandan were prosecuted and also convicted. Bikram Singh subsequently died and left assets which came to defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It was on this basis that the plaintiff claimed recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,000/- from the assets of Bikram Singh in the hands of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. In their defence, they denied the plaintiff case. They also pleaded that they had not inherited any property of their father and what was given to them was the ancestral joint Hindu Family Property. They further pleaded that this property was not liable for the debts of Bikram Singh which were in the nature of immoral debts. They also pleaded that the suit was barred by time. Defendant No. 3 Basheswar Nandan did not contest the suit. 2. The trial court held that the defendants had received assets from their father Bikram Singh and were liable to pay the amount of Rs. 3,000/- to the extent of the assets of their father received by them. The suit was held to be within time and the trial Court decreed it as prayed. An appeal was filed before the lower appellate Court which was also dismissed. 3. In this appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the debt of Bikram Singh was in the nature of an Avyavaharika debt. It was a debt incurred by their father for an immoral purpose, namely, it arose out of a criminal act of embezzlement of Government money. It is a pious obligation of every Hindu son to pay the debts of bis father. There is, however, an exception to this rule that if the debt is immoral debt, then the sons are not liable to pay the same. This view was clearly expounded in the case of Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad, I.L.R. Vol. XLVI Alld. Series 95. There is, however, an exception to this rule that if the debt is immoral debt, then the sons are not liable to pay the same. This view was clearly expounded in the case of Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad, I.L.R. Vol. XLVI Alld. Series 95. In the above case, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, upon a consideration of the authorities, laid down five propositions as regards the debts incurred by a father and the liability of the sons. For the purpose of this case, it will only be necessary to refer to the second proposition which reads as below :- "(2) If he is the father, and the other members are his sons, he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceedings upon a decree for payment for that debt." 4. The proposition of law has held the field for over fifty years now. The view was approved and reiterated in the case of Panna Lal v. Mst. Naraini, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 170, and again in Virdhachalam Pillai v. Chaldean Syrian Bank Limited, Trichur, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1425. 5. The above proposition makes it clear that if the debt is immoral, then the sons cannot be saddled with the debt nor can it be realised from them. This brings to the question as to whether in the present case the debt was `AVYAVAHARIKA'. In Mulla's Hindu Law, 13th Edition, Para 298, it is stated that the sons, grandsons and great-grand-sons are bound to pay all debts contracted by the father, grand-father or great grandfather except the debts enumerated therein. The eighth item reads as below :- "(8) Any debt which its avayavaharika, which is rendered by Colebrooke as equivalent to a debt for a cause repugnant to good morals". 6. If the debt is one which is repugnant to good Morals, it will amount to an avyavaharika debt. The question, therefore, that arises in this case is whether the amounts which were taken away by Bikram Singh was in the nature of an avayavaharika debt. The sums of money which Bikram Singh had taken away was not due to him. He had not taken them away under any legal or valid order. He had surreptitiously and illegally obtained the money by forging bills and registers. The sums of money which Bikram Singh had taken away was not due to him. He had not taken them away under any legal or valid order. He had surreptitiously and illegally obtained the money by forging bills and registers. These acts clearly come under the clause "repugnant to good morals". Consequently any sum of money which is taken away by a person either by embezzlement or by misappropriation would also come under the above clause. The recovery of this Rs. 3,000/- was in respect of an amount illegally taken away by Bikram Singh. If this amount was sought to be realised as due from Bikram Singh, it would clearly be in the nature of a debt owed by Bikram Singh. In my opinion, such an act on the part of Bikram Singh cannot be termed anything but repugnant to good morals. 7. In the case of Jagannath Prasad v. Jugal Kishore, A.I.R. 1926 Alld. 89, a Division Bench of this court had expressed an opinion that the sons were not liable for the debt of the father where the debt had its origin in embezzlement. The facts of that case are somewhat similar to the present case and in my opinion, supports the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. Their Lordships observed :- "We think that the test to be applied in a case of the kind now before us is whether or not the action of the father, which resulted in the debt, was infected with an element of criminality. Whether such an element is established or not and the degree of infection which will support a plea of "immorality" must be a question for determination on the facts of each case; and though a conviction for misappropriation of other cognate offence may be good proof of such element, proof of a previous conviction is certainly not essential." 8. As indicated above, in the present case, the monies were taken away by Bikram Singh by forging bills and registers. He was prosecuted and convicted for the same. The, money sought to be realised is part of the money so illegally and surreptitiously taken away by Bikram Singh. The act of Bikram Singh was illegal and the debt in the case, was tainted with criminality. 9. He was prosecuted and convicted for the same. The, money sought to be realised is part of the money so illegally and surreptitiously taken away by Bikram Singh. The act of Bikram Singh was illegal and the debt in the case, was tainted with criminality. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to the case of S.M. Jakati v. S.M. Borkar, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 282, and in particular to paragraphs 10 and 11 to urge that drawings of monies for unauthorised purposes, which amounted to criminal breach of trust were not binding on the sons, but a civil debt arising on account of the receipt of monies by the father which were not accounted for could not be termed Avayavaharika. The learned counsel contended that in the present case the amount of monies received by the father were not avayavaharika as he had failed to account for the same. This contention can be accepted. In this case, not only was a large sum of money misappropriated by Bikram Singh but he was also prosecuted and convicted for the same. What was sought to be realised was some of the money which he had so misappropriated. This money, as held above, was tainted with criminality and could not be termed to be a mere civil debt. I am satisfied from the material on record that in the present case the sum of money which was sought to be realised as being owned by Bikram Singh was nothing else than avayavaharika debt. Consequently it could not be realised from the sons. The sons were not liable to pay such debts incurred by their father. In this view of the matter, the decree passed by the courts below has to be set aside and the plaintiffs suit must be dismissed. No other point was argued. 10. In the result, therefore, the appeal succeeds and is decreed with costs throughout.