JUDGMENT B.N. Katju, J. - The State of Uttar Pradesh has filed this appeal against the judgment of 2nd Tempororary Sessions Judge, Banda, dated January 21. 1970 allowing the appeal of the respondent against the judgment of Magistrate 2nd class, Banda' dated Aug,it 26, 1969 and acquitting them under section 5 (3) of the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The case of the prosecution is that on November 22, 1967 at 7.55 p.m. Sultan Khan (D. W. 1) was witnessing the evening show in the Amar Talkies, Banda, in the 2nd class without purchasing a ticket and without having paid any entertainment tax. Ram Swarup respondent was the Manager and Salim respondent was the gate keeper of the 2nd class of the aforesaid Amar Talkies. 3. The prosecution examined two eye witnesses, namely S. N. Maniyar Entertainment Tax Inspector (P.W. 1) and Sri P. N. Misra, S. D. M. Baberu and Magistrate 1st class, Banda (P.W. 2). Both the respondents pleaded not guilty and stated that they were wrongly implicated. They examined Sultan Khan (D. W. 1) in defence. 4. P. N. Misra, S. D. M., Baberu and Magistrate 1st class, Banda (P.W. 2) stated that on November 22, 1967 he received an order from the District Magistrate, Banda, directing him to conduct a surprise inspection of all the cinema houses. He accordingly inspected Amar Talkies, Banda at 7.45 p.m. on November 22, 1967 while the evening show was in progress. He went to the office of the aforesaid Amar Talkies where he met the proprietor Sri 0. P. Bhardwaj and Ram Swarup Sharma respondent, the manager of the said Talkies, and found that form B regarding the statement of tickets issued was being Prepared. After it was prepared he went to the 2nd class and took the gate diary and counterfoils of the tickets from Salim respondent who was the gate keeper of the 2nd class. He found that the entry in the gate library showed that there were 27 persons witnessing the show in the said class and the counterfoils of the tickets were also 27 in number. He thereafter went inside the 2nd class and found that there were 28 persons present there and there was one person who did not have a ticket and also had not paid any entertainment tax. He wrote his comments (Ex. Ka. He thereafter went inside the 2nd class and found that there were 28 persons present there and there was one person who did not have a ticket and also had not paid any entertainment tax. He wrote his comments (Ex. Ka. 4) on form B (Ex. Ka. 3) which were as follows : "Checked. Strength in all class except in class 2nd found correct. In second class Sri Sultan Khan Munna Khan r/o Gular Naka, Banda and aged about 20 years was found without ticket. In rest of the cases tax has been recovered correctly." 5. He also wrote his note (Ex. Ka. 10) in the Inspection Book which was to the same effect. Sri Maniyar (P, W. 1) corroborated his statement and further stated that form B, the statement regarding the tickets issued, was prepared by Ram Swarup respondent. He also stated that the person who was witnessing the show in the 2nd class without purchasing a ticket and with. out having paid entertainment tax gave out his name as Sultan Khan. Both these witnesses are absolutely independent. There was, therefore, no reason for them to implicate the respondents falsely. Nothing has been brought out in their cross examination to demolish their testimony. We are of the opinion that they are wholly reliable witnesses and their evidence was correctly accepted by both the courts below. 6. Sultan Khan (D. W. I) stated that he was not caught inside the Amar Talkies witnessing the evening show without a ticket but was caught outside the said Talkies by a constable and was taken by him to the office of the said talkies. He admitted that had no ill-will against the two prosecution witnesses, namely Sri P. N. Misra and Sri Maniyar. His statement is interently improbable. It appears that he supported the defence of to respon- dents as he was being separately prosecuted under section 5 (2) of the Act. We are of the opinion that his evidence was rightly rejected by the courts below. 7. The lower appellate court after accepting the evidence of Sri Maniyar (P.W. 1) and Sri P. N. Misra (P.W. 2) held : "Under the circumstances, the proprietor Sri 0. P. Bhardwaj was primarily liable to be convicted under section 5 (3) of the Act. We are of the opinion that his evidence was rightly rejected by the courts below. 7. The lower appellate court after accepting the evidence of Sri Maniyar (P.W. 1) and Sri P. N. Misra (P.W. 2) held : "Under the circumstances, the proprietor Sri 0. P. Bhardwaj was primarily liable to be convicted under section 5 (3) of the Act. Of course, the manager and inc gate keeper can also be convicted under section 5 (3) of the Act but, in my opinion, they can be convicted only when they admit persons to the entertainment without payment of the tax without the knowledge of and in the absence of the proprietor. There is no evidence on t cord, whatsoever, to show that the proprietor Sri Bharadwaj was not present in the cinema ever since the time the tickets were begun to be sold and the show was started nor there is any evidence on record to show that Sultan Khan was admitted to the 2nd class by the manager or the gate keeper." 8. Section 5 (3) of the said Act runs as follows : "If any person liable to pay tax is admitted to a place of entertainment without payment of tax leviable under section 3, the proprietor of the entertainment to which such person is admitted shall on cony fiction before a Magistrate be liable in respect of every such contravention to a fine not exceeding Rs, 500/ 9. The word proprietor is defined in section 2 (7) of the Act which runs as follows : Proprietor in relation to any entertainment includes any per on responsible for the management thereof ;and Explanation-A person charged with the work of admission to an entertainment is for purposes of sections 4 and 5 a person responsible for*the management." 10. In the present case it has not been established that the respondents had admitted Sultan Khan in the 2nd class of the cinema hall or even had know- ledge of it but the prosecution is not required to prove this in order to establish their guilt under section 5 (3) of the Act. They would be guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act as proprietors even if Sultan Khan was admitted in the 2nd class of the cinema hall by some one else even without their knowledge. They would be guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act as proprietors even if Sultan Khan was admitted in the 2nd class of the cinema hall by some one else even without their knowledge. All that the prosecution was required to prove in order to establish the guilt of the respondents under section 5 (3) of the Act was the admission of a person in a place of entertainment without payment of tax leviable under section 3 of the Act. Once this was established all tho.e who came within the definition of proprietor given in section 2 (7) of the Act would be guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act. We are of the opinion that mens rea which is normally an essential ingredient of a criminal offence is expressly excluded by the language of section 5 (3) of the Act. The object of the Act is to impose a tax on entertainment and to prevent its evasion. If there is an evasion of tax then in our opinion all the persons who come within the definition of proprietor are guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act. It may be mentioned that the offence created by section 5 (3) is of a minor character and the punishment provided thereunder is also not severe. We are supported in our view by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hare Prasad Rao v. The State, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 204 and Nathu Lal v. State of M. P., A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 43. 11. The finding of the lower appellate court that the respondents could only be convicted under section 5 (3) of the Act when they admitted persons to the entertainment without payment of tax and without the knowledge of and in the absence of the proprietor is clearly erroneous. 12. It has been held in Om Prakash v. State, 1969 A.L.J. 104 that only the proprietor of a place of entertainment can be held guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act if the person who had actually admitted could not be found. We are unable to agree with this decision for the reasons given earlier. 13. The result, therefore, is that the respondents are guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act. Their acquittal was clearly illegal. 14. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the lower appellate court. We are unable to agree with this decision for the reasons given earlier. 13. The result, therefore, is that the respondents are guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act. Their acquittal was clearly illegal. 14. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the lower appellate court. We hold the respondents guilty under section 5 (3) of the Act and convict them thereunder and sentence them to a fine of Rs. 50/- each. In default of payment of fine they shall serve out a sentence of fifteen days simple imprisonment.