( 1 ) THE tenant of a shop has filed O. S. No. 1867 of 1972 before the First munsiff, Bangalore. He alleges that he was paying Rs. 40 per month as the rent of that shop. The defendant is the landlord. ( 2 ) THERE was some previous litigation between the parties regarding the same property. Ultimately, this Court on 16-4-1971 passed on order in CRP. No. 1479 of 1969 directing that the tenant (plaintiff in the present o. S. No. 1867 of 197) shall vacate the premises within four months from that date and that within one month thereafter the petitioner (defendant in the present suit) shall sart demolishing the building. ( 3 ) IN this suit (O. S. No. 1887 of 1972) the plaintiff has stated that the building has been demolished and the reconstruction has been made, and that he has fulfilled all the conditions for re-entry into the building as per the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Act ). In para 14 of the plaint it is alleged, that for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court fee the suit is valued as per s. 41 (c) of the Mysore Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Court Fees Act) at Rs, 480, as per the relief of occupancy, and as per S. 26 (c) for Injunction. The prayer in para 15 of the plaint is as below : the plaintiff prays for a decree directing the defendant to put back the plaintiff in possession of the shop in the new building, the description of the shop being No. 17312 (307-02) Sadar Patrappa, Road, bangalore City and on the defendant's default in doing so, to put the plaintiff in possession thereof through the agency of this Court and for a further decree restraining the defendant from delivering possession of the same, to any other person by himself or through his agency directing the grant of such other reliefs as the Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case and for the grant of all further incidental reliefs including the payment of the coats of this suit. " ( 4 ) THE landlord (defendant) alleges in para 13 of his written statement that the Court fee paid by the plaintiff is not sufficient and the valuation is not correct, that this suit is for possession by a stranger as the relationship of landlord and tenant has come to an end and that aid valorem court fee has to be paid with regard to the relief of possession. ( 5 ) THE learned Munsiff dealt with the question of Court fee as a preliminary issue and held that the suit is properly valued and the Court fee paid is sufficient. It is against this order that the defendant has come up in this Civil Revision Petition. ( 6 ) SECTION 41 (1) of the Court Fees Act raads. ( 7 ) WHILE in para 14 of the plaint Cl. (c) of Sec. 41 (1) of the Court fees Act is relied upon, the lower Court appears to have placed dependence mostly on Cl. (d) of S. 41 (l ). Ultimately Sri Venkataranga Iyengar, learned counsel for the appellant laid accent on Cl. (e) of S. 41 (l ). His contention is that, whatever be the label the matter comes within S. 41 (l) proper. In this context he rightly relies upon para 15 and 20 of Hammade beary v. Mohini (1968) 1 Mys. L. J. 336 wherein it has been observed that when an issue as to the existence or otherwise of a lease hold interest claimed by one party to the suit and denied by the other is raised, such an issue though it may be regarded as an issue of title within the meaning of S. 26 (a) of the Court fees Act, would also answer the description of an issue under which one party is trying to establish and the other to disprove a right of occupancy within tne meaning of S. 41 (1) (e), and that Court fee should be levied on the amount of rent of the property to which the suit relates, payable for the year next before the, date of presenting the plaint. ( 8 ) NO doubt, as contended by Sri L. D'silva, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent (landlord) the facts and circumstances in that case do not correspond to the facts and circumstances here. ( 8 ) NO doubt, as contended by Sri L. D'silva, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent (landlord) the facts and circumstances in that case do not correspond to the facts and circumstances here. That is bound to be as the facts and circumstances of each case are very rarely on all fours. The ratio of the abova decision, however, is wholly applicable to this case. ( 9 ) AS Sri Iyengar represents, possession claimed by the tenant, makes no difference. He ' places reliance on Bhimangouda v. Golangouda (1870) 2 Mys. L. J. 262. There the plaintiff contended that since the suit was brought on the basis of a lease, Court fee was payabla only under S. 41 (2) of the Court Fees act and that no higher Court fee was payable by him though he claimed possession also. But the Munsiff thought that since the second defendant set up an independent title in himself, Court fee should be paid as if the suit brought by the plaintiff was fqr recovery of the property on the basis of his title. Somnath Iyer, J. as he then was, has observed : what was overlooked by the Munsiff was that for purposes of quantification of the Court fee payable the Court should look into the allegations in the plaint whatever may be the allegations in the written statement. The nature of the suit should be judged by what the plaintiff says and not by what the defendant says. Looked at in that way the suit brought by the plaintiff was 'clearly one for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant governed by Sec. 41 (2) of the mysore Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. The order of the Munsiff was therefore set aside, the Court fee paid by the plaintiff held to be sufficient and the Munsiff was directed to decide the suit in accordance with law. ( 10 ) SRI Iyengar also relies on three other reported decisions. In shabeer Ahmed, v. B. Iqbal Ahmed 1965 (2) Mys. L. J. 431. The order of the Munsiff was therefore set aside, the Court fee paid by the plaintiff held to be sufficient and the Munsiff was directed to decide the suit in accordance with law. ( 10 ) SRI Iyengar also relies on three other reported decisions. In shabeer Ahmed, v. B. Iqbal Ahmed 1965 (2) Mys. L. J. 431. it is held that as regards the Court fee, payable on the plaint only the material allegations contained in the plaint are to be taken into consideration and that the Court is not right in relying on the averments made by the defendants in their written statement in deciding the question of Court fee to be paid by the plaintiff on the plaint. ( 11 ) IN Mukunda Nayak v. Sundara. Nayak 1970 (1) Mys. L. J. 33, it is observed that s. 11 (2) of the Court Foes Act does require a Court to decide questions relating to valuation and Court fee, on an objection by the defendant, first before evidence is recorded on the merits and that while the requirement of 3-11 (2) is not discretionary, the High Court will rtot interfere in revision at the instance of the defendant when no prejudice is shown to have been caused to him. ( 12 ) IN Rathna varmaraja v Smt. Vimal AIR. 1961 SC. 1209, we find the following in paragraph 2 : the Court Fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional. jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate Court fee on his plaint. Whether proper court fee is paid on the plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. How by an order relating to the adequacy of the Court fee paid by the plaintiff, the defendant may feel aggrieved it is difficult to appreciate. ( 13 ) MR. D'silva drew my attention to the last sentence in para. 3 of the above judgment, viz in our view, the High Court grievously erred in entertaining revision applications on questions of Court fee at the instance of the defendant when no question of jurisdictipn was involved. ( 13 ) MR. D'silva drew my attention to the last sentence in para. 3 of the above judgment, viz in our view, the High Court grievously erred in entertaining revision applications on questions of Court fee at the instance of the defendant when no question of jurisdictipn was involved. There is no reference to jurisdiction expressly found in the written statement of the defendant. According to Mr. D'silva, the last two sentences in para "13 of the written statement, though not expressly, yet" impliedly, hint at jurisdiction, viz , that the suit is for possession by a stranger as the relationship of landlord and tenant has come to an and land ad valorem Court fee has to be paid with regard to the relief of possession. This, I feel is a matter to be agitated in the, Court below after framing an appropriate, issue. ( 14 ) THE final Contention Mr. D'silva is that S. 41 of the Court "fees Act refers to suits between landlord and tenant in Civil Courts and that here, the, appellant is no more a tenant 33 per the definition'of 'tenant' contained in Section 3 of the Rent Control Act. ( 15 ) AS Tightly urged by Sri Iyengar, this argument has only to be stated t'o be rejected. The relationship of landlord and tenant continues, as also seen from Ss. 26 and 27 of the Rent Control Act, the only exception being that the tenant is not liable to pay the rent during the time he has been kept out of occupation of th6 premises. ( 16 ) THIS Revision Petition fails and stands dismissed. The Court below will proceed to dispose of the case in accordance with law. No order as to costs here. --- *** --- .