JUDGMENT D. S. Mathur, C. J. - This is a Special Appeal by the State of U. P. and others, respondents, against the order of a learned Single Judge of this court, allowing the writ petition of Man Bahai Lal Srivastava, and quashing the order, Annexure 4, of his premature retirement under Fundamental Rule 56-A, and at the same time holding that he continues in service as Qanungo in Tahsil Misrikh, district Sitapur. 2. The undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed a Patwari on the 26th of January, 1946 and was promoted as Assistant Teacher of the Lekhpal School in the year 1951 and as Qanungo in 1956. He also officiated as Naib-Tahsildar at several occasions. On the basis of the past record the District Magistrate, Sitapur, ordered on 15-2-1972 that the petitioner shall be retained in service upto the age of 58 years. 3. On 28-3-1972 the petitioner was caught red-handed accepting a bribe of Rs. 10/- in a trap laid by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sitapur. A criminal case under Sec. 161, I. P. C. and Sec. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against him. The District Magistrate suspended him from service on 11-4-1972 and a copy of the charge sheet was served upon him on 19-4-1972. The bribe was paid to have been accepted by the petitioner to make a favourable report on a Taqavi application. However, before the petitioner could submit his reply to the show cause notice, the impugned order dated 30-6-1972, Annexure 4, retiring him compulsorily under Fundamental Rule 56-A, was served upon him on 9-6-1972. On the same day he received another order dated 2-6-1972 Annexure I, to the writ petition, reinstating him in service and withdrawing the disciplinary proceeding pending against him. The same day the following adverse entry made in his character roll was communicated to him. "Integrity is not certified, an experienced Qanungo who was caught while accepting illegal gratification by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on 28th March, 1972". 4. Thereafter the petitioner moved a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. "Integrity is not certified, an experienced Qanungo who was caught while accepting illegal gratification by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on 28th March, 1972". 4. Thereafter the petitioner moved a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The main contention raised on his behalf is that though the order appears to be innocuous, it was passed as a matter of punishment and since there was non-compliance of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, it was illegal and deserves to be quashed. 5. From the counter affidavit, it appears that adverse remarks were given to the petitioner for the years, 1958, 1959 and 1964-1965. In the year 1958 the Sub-Divisional Officer was not satisfied with his work in sofar as the verification of Form PA-10. In the year 1959 he was warned to be careful in recording entries of possession. In the year 1965 it was mentioned that a number of complaints against his integrity had come to the notice of the District Magistrate, but the allegations could not be proved. It was contended on behalf of the State that the compulsory retirement was in public interest and hence it could not be challenged before the courts of law. The learned Single Judge was of opinion that the incident of. 28-3-1972 was the foundation of the impugned order and, therefore, it was by way of punishment and amounted to removal from service. The learned Single Judge also attached importance to the fact that departmental proceedings had been commenced against the petitioner and the order of compulsory retirement was passed while the proceedings were pending. He was further of opinion that because the order of compulsory retirement amounted to removal from service and there was non-compliance of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, it was invalid and unenforceable. The order was, therefore, quashed and the petitioner was held to be still in service. 6. As held in Union of India v. I.N. Sinha, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 40, an opinion formed by an appropriate authority in good faith that the Government servant be retired in public interest, can be challenged before the coins only on the ground that either the requisite opinion was not formed or that he order was passed arbitrarily or on collateral grounds. 7. 7. Similarly, it was held in Parshtam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 36, and the State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Misra, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 1011, that the entirety of circumstances preceding of attendant on the impugned order must be examined to determine whether the order was made by way of punishment and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order. If the misconduct is the very foundation of the order, it is by way of punishment, and not if the misconduct is a mere motive for the action taken. A similar view was expressed in Appar Ayar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1971 (S.C.) (2) 71. 8. In Moti Ram Beka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 600, it is clearly laid down that in each case the court examines the substance of the matter and if it is shown that the termination of service is no more than discharge simpliciter effected by virtue of the contract or the relevant rules, Article 311(2) is not attracted, but in other cases of termination of service, that is, termination of service not on reaching the age of superannuation or of compulsory retirement, it is a case of removal from service necessitating compliance of Article 311 of the Constitution. 9. Consequently, it has to be considered whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the order of compulsory retirement is in the exigencies of service i.e. in public interest. Such shall be the case if the alleged misconduct was a mere motive, and not the very foundation of the order of compulsory retirement. For arriving at an opinion one shall have to see the circumstances preceding or attendant on the passing of the impugned order. 10. Where the Government servant has a good past record and the order of compulsory retirement is passed on a single instance of misconduct, it can always be said that the misconduct is not merely the motive but also the foundation of the action taken but where the past record is not satisfactory and there were complaints of a similar nature, it cannot be said that the order of compulsory retirement is based upon a single incident. Naturally, it was and shall be deemed to be based on consideration of the total record, though had the last incident not taken place, no such action should have been taken. In such circumstances, the misconduct could be a mere motive of the action taken, and not the foundation thereof. Broadly speaking, therefore, it can be said that if the order of compulsory retirement is based on a single allegation of misconduct, action taken is by way of punishment and, in the eye of law, the termination of service amounts to removal from service, but where the past record of the Government servant clearly shows that it was not proper in the public interest to retain him in service, he could be compulsory retired and this would be a case of simplicitor discharge, that is, termination of service not amounting to dismissal or removal from service coming to the instant case, the petitioner had adverse remarks in 1958, and 1965 and he is alleged to have been caught red-handed accepting a bribe in March, 1972- In 1958 the Sub-Divisional Officer was not satisfied with the verification of Form P.A. 10 made by the petitioner. This would show that either the petitioner was a careless worker or that, for some ulterior motive, he was not properly verifying the entries in Form P.A. 10. In 1959 he was warned to be careful in recording the entries of posses session. This entry leads us to the same inference. It is true that in 1965 none of the complaints against the integrity of the petitioner had been proved, but the entry makes it clear that he did not enjoy a good reputation of honesty. When these three adverse annual remarks are read with the incident of the 28th March, 1972 no other opinion can be formed except that the incident of the 28th March, 1972 was a mere motive and not the foundation of the action taken against the petitioner. The District Magistrate could, therefore, in good faith form the opinion that it was in the public interest that the petitioner be retired from service. 11. The District Magistrate could, therefore, in good faith form the opinion that it was in the public interest that the petitioner be retired from service. 11. The other question for consideration is whether any inference beneficial to the petitioner can be drawn from the fact that commenced against him and on the date order of compulsory retirement was passed, he was under suspension and had been given time for submitting a reply to the show cause notice. A reference may now be made to the Supreme Court decisions material on the point brought to our notice. 12. The observations made in Parshotam Lal v. Union of India (supra), were summarised in the State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 689, and on acceptance thereof the order of termination of the probation of the Government servant and discharging him from service was held to be hit by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In this case the Government servant was asked to show cause why his probation be not terminated and he be not discharged from service; and after carefully examining the explanations submitted by him the authority competent found the explanation to be unsatisfactory and after consulting the Public Service Commission decided that he be discharged from service forthwith. It was held that the Government had the power to terminate the services of the petitioner without any inquiry, but if it was decided to hold an inquiry into the alleged misconduct or inefficiency, the termination of service was by way of punishment because it put a stigma on his competence and thus affected his future career. This view was adopted even though the notice served upon the Government servant was to show cause why he be not discharged from service. The notice was given to obtain the explanation of the Government servant before taking a decision whether his probation be or be not terminated and his service disposed with. This case was, however, distinguished in the State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 177. The material observation is as below: "In Gopi Kishore Prasad's case, the public servant was discharged from service consequent upon an enquiry into alleged misconduct, the Enquiry Officer having found that the public servant was "unsuitable" for the post. This case was, however, distinguished in the State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 177. The material observation is as below: "In Gopi Kishore Prasad's case, the public servant was discharged from service consequent upon an enquiry into alleged misconduct, the Enquiry Officer having found that the public servant was "unsuitable" for the post. The order was not one merely discharging probationer following upon an enquiry to ascertain whether he should be continued in service, but it was an order as observed by the court "clearly by way of punishment". There is in our judgment no real inconsistency between the observations made in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case and Gopi Kishore Prasad's case. Therefore, the fact of the holding of an enquiry is not decisive of the question. What is decisive is whether he order is by way of punishment, in the fight of the tests laid down in Purshotam Lal Dhingra's case.................. 13. Similarly in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 369, the Government servant was served with a notice to show cause why he be not compulsorily retired under the provisions of Article 465-A and in Champak Lal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India, 1964 (5) S.C.S. 190, only a preliminary enquiry was held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry was not made out. 14. In A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India, S.L.R. 1967 185, the Government servant was called upon to show cause why disciplinary action be not taken against him for his failure to maintain the stores and records properly. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, observed : "In other words, the appropriate authority possesses the powers to terminate the service of a temporary public servant. It can either discharge him purporting to exercise its power under the terms of contract of the relevant rule, and in that case, the provisions of Article 311 will not be applicable. The authority can also act under its power to dismiss a temporary servant and make an order of dismissal in which case the provisions of Article 311 will be applicable.................... The authority can also act under its power to dismiss a temporary servant and make an order of dismissal in which case the provisions of Article 311 will be applicable.................... Even in a case where a formal departmental enquiry is initiated against a temporary Government servant it is, we think, open to the authority to drop further proceedings in the departmental enquiry and to make an order of discharge simplicitor against the temporary Government servant. We do not accept the contentions of counsel for the appellant that once the formal departmental proceedings have been initiated it is not open to the authority concerned to drop them and to take the alternative course of discharging the temporary Government servant in terms of the contract of service or the relevant statutory rule. It is possible that the authority takes the view that stigma of the order of dismissal should be avoided in the individual case. As we have already said, the appropriate authority possesses the powers to terminate the services of a temporary Government servant. It can either discharge him purporting to exercise its power under the terms of contract or the relevant rule and in that case, the provisions of Article 311 will not be applicable. Alternatively, the authority can also act under its power to dismiss a temporary servant and make an order of dismissal in which case the provisions of Article 311 will be applicable. If, therefore, the authority decides, for some reason, to drop the formal departmental enquiry even though it had been initiated against the temporary Government servant, it is still open to the authority to make an order of discharge simplicitor in terms of the contract of service or the relevant statutory rule. In such cases the order of termination of services of the temporary Government servant which in form and in substance is no more than his discharge effected under the terms of contract or the relevant rule, cannot, in law, be regarded as his dismissal because the appointing authority was actuated by the motive that the said servant did not deserve to be continued in service for some alleged inefficiency or misconduct." 15. On a consideration of the Supreme Court decision it must be held that simply because formal departmental enquiry had been commenced against the Government servant an order of discharge simplicitor shall not amount to dismissal or removal from service, nor will the termination of service be by way of punishment. Further, even though the departmental enquiry has been commenced, the Government has the power to drop the proceedings and to take action under Fundamental Rule 56-A. The compulsory retirement of the Government servant under Fundamental Rule 56-A will thus not be by way of punishment. It will stand in the category as if no departmental enquiry had been conducted. 16. In this view of the matter, the fact that a departmental enquiry had been commenced against the petitioner, but was dropped before he could submit his reply to the show cause notice, cannot be given any importance. Subsequent action taken would be under Fundamental Rule 56-A, and cannot be deemed to be by way of punishment. 17. Considering that the order of compulsory retirement was passed on consideration of the past record along with the incident of the 28th of March, 1972, it cannot be said that the respondents had acted arbitrarily while compulsorily retiring the petitioner. The order of compulsory retirement in question is thus not invalid and cannot be quashed by the High Court in proceeding under Article 226. 18. The Special Appeal is hereby allowed and the Writ Petition moved by the petitioner, Man Bahai Lal Srivastava, is dismissed. Costs of both the courts easy.