JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for arrears of rent, damages and ejectment. The Defendants are the Appellants. During the pendency of the second appeal the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted and by Section 43 of the Act the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 was repealed. The Appellants made an application claiming the benefit of Section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act. They made an application on 10th of July 1973 for permission to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,000/- which, according to them, was the amount liable to be deposited by them trader Sections 39/40 of the Act. An order was passed on the same day permitting the said amount to be deposited within two days. The deposit was made on 11th July 1973 in this Court. In this application it was also stated that the Appellants had already deposited the amount contemplated by Sections 39/40 of the Act in the trial court within a month from 15th July 1972 which is the date on which the Act came into force. It was further stated that since the case of the Plaintiffs-Respondents was that the construction of the accommodation in question was completed on 12th June 1963, it had become necessary to make a deposit in this Court also in as much on the assertion of the Plaintiff-Respondents and in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act it could be argued that the commencement of the Act for the purposes of this case was 12th of June 1973 and a deposit had to be made within a month of that date as contemplated by Section 39 thereof. 2. The appeal came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge and in view of the various submissions made for the parties the following questions were referred for decision by a Division Bench: (i) Whether in case of an appeal or revision the deposit contemplated by Section 39 of the Act has to be made in the appellate or revisional court where the appeal or revision is pending or its deposit even in the trial court would amount to a substantial compliance of the said section? (ii) What would be the date of commencement of the Act for purposes of Section 39 of the Act namely, whether it would be 15th July 1972 or the date on which the provisions of the Act become applicable to the building in respect of which the suit for ejectment is pending? and (iii) What amount would represent the 'full cost of the suit' in respect of a pending suit and in respect of a pending appeal or revision? 3. Learned Counsel have made their submissions on question No. 2 first and accordingly we propose to deal with the said question at the outset. It would be useful to quote Sections 39 and 40 at this place: Section 39. Pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time.--In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement of this Act where the tenant within one month from such date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit whichever be later, deposits in the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to Sub-section (1) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary: Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty-five rupees per month need not deposit any interest as aforesaid." Section 40 reads: Section 40. Pending appeals in suits for eviction to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. - Where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 39, which shall mutatis mutandis apply. 4. It is not disputed that the Act came into foree on 15th July 1972. 4. It is not disputed that the Act came into foree on 15th July 1972. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act is to the effect that except as provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 24 or Sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. The explanation attached to the Sub-section is not relevant for our purpose. Question No. 2 referred to us arises in view of the conflicting arguments raised for the parties. The case of the Defendants-Appellants has been that the words 'commencement of this Act' in Section 39 referred to the date on which the provisions of the Act became applicable to the building concerned whereas the case of the Plaintiffs-Respondents has been that these words mean the date on which the Act came into force, namely, 15th July 1972. 5. A similar question arose for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Hazari Lal Vs. Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1953 All 686 . In that case interpretation of Sections 14 and 15 of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 was involved. The said sections were to the following effect: 14. Execution of pending decrees for eviction.- No decree for the eviction of tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the evict ion of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3. Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the landlord (reasonable annual rent) or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher. 15. Pending suits for eviction.- In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3. 6. In view of its Sub-section (3) of Section 1 that Act was deemed to have come into force on the first day of October 1946. In Hazari Lais' case (supra) the suit was filed on 10th May 1947 for ejectment from a shop situate in the town of Raya. 6. In view of its Sub-section (3) of Section 1 that Act was deemed to have come into force on the first day of October 1946. In Hazari Lais' case (supra) the suit was filed on 10th May 1947 for ejectment from a shop situate in the town of Raya. It was the common case of the parties that at the time when the said suit was filed the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act had not been extended by notification of the State Government to apply to the town of Raya. The question arose as to whether for purposes of the said suit the commencement of the Act would be first of October 1946 or the date on which the Act was extended to apply to the town of Raya. It was held- The whole point for decision, therefore, is whether the words "the date of the commencement of this Act" in Section 15 mean the original date when the Act came into force or the date when the Act was made applicable to a particular area.... The point was, however, carefully considered by a division bench of this Court in L. Kedar Nath Vs. L. Kishan Lal, AIR 1952 All 500 . Mr. Bind Bashni Prasad, J. after having carefully considered the pervious authorities on the point came to the conclusion that to areas to which the Act was subsequently made applicable the date of commencement of the Act within the meaning of Section 15 must be the date when the Act was so extended by notification. Learned Counsel has urged that the decision of the bench in Kedar Nath's case, (supra) should be reconsidered by a larger bench. We have, therefore, heard him at some length and we are not satisfied that there is any reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at in Kedar Nath's case. (supra) 7. The Bench took into consideration the circumstance that the aforesaid Act was intended for the benefit of tenants in view of the shortage of housing accommodation in the State and took the view that it must be interpreted so as to carry out the intention of the Legislature and to give protection to the tenants for whose ejectment decrees had either already been passed or proceedings for whose ejectment were pending either in the trial court or in a court of appeal. It was pointed out that the aforesaid object of granting protection to all the tenants could only be achieved if it was held that Sections 14 and 15 would govern the decrees already passed and all suits instituted upto the date to which Section 3 came into effect so as to govern all suits instituted thereafter and in this view of the matter the date of the commencement of the Act mentioned in Sections 14 and 15 must be the date on which Section 3 of the Act came into operation so as to govern suits instituted thereafter. The date of the commencement of the Act for purposes of Sections 14 and 15 must, therefore, be the date on which the Act became applicable. It was further held: On the interpretation sought to put on the words "Commencement of the Act" in Sections 14 and 15 by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, Section 3 would only govern suits instituted on or after the date on which the Act became applicable whereas Sections 14 and 15 would govern decrees passed before 1-10-1946 or suits pending on that day. The result would be that decrees passed between 1-10-1946 and 1-3-1947, in the case of areas to which the Act was made applicable as soon as published under Sub-section (2) of Section 1, and suits instituted after 1-10-1946, and before 1-3-1947 arising out of the said areas would not be governed by the provisions of Section 14 and 15. Similarly, in other areas to which the Act might be applied later by a subsequent notification, decrees passed between 1-10-1946, and the date on which the Act was applied as well as suits instituted between two dates would not be governed by these sections. Of course, Section 3 can, in no case, govern these decrees and suits. There might be cases where a suit might have been instituted after 1-10-1946, and decided on some day prior to the date on which the Act became applicable to the area from which that suit arose and such decrees would also not be governed by the provisions of the Act at all. There might be cases where a suit might have been instituted after 1-10-1946, and decided on some day prior to the date on which the Act became applicable to the area from which that suit arose and such decrees would also not be governed by the provisions of the Act at all. It is clear that the legislature could never have intended to create discrimination between various tenants and to grant no protection at all to those tenants against whom suits were instituted after 1-10-1946, and which were either decreed before or were still pending on the date on which the Act was applied to the area from which the suit arose. The interpretation that would create such an anomalous position must, therefore, clearly be ruled out. The words "commencement of the Act" in Sections 14 and 15 with reference to a particular area must be interpreted to mean the date on which the Act became applicable to that area. This is the only interpretation that would effectively serve the purpose of the Act. 8. In our opinion similar is the situation in the instant case too. Here again the Act is a beneficient piece of legislation and was intended for the benefit of tenants in view of the shortage of housing accommodation in the State. If the words "commencement of the Act" used in Section 39 are interpreted to mean the date on which the Act came into force i.e. 18th July 1972 the protection granted by Section 39 would be available only to the tenants of such buildings which were constructed after the 1st day of January 1951 and before 14th August 1962. It is only such tenants who could make the required deposit before 15th August 1972 namely, one month from the date on which the Act came into force. As pointed out in Hazari Lal's case there seems to be no good ground to take the view that the Legislature intended to create such a discrimination between various tenants and to grant protection only to the tenants of the class of buildings referred to above and not to those who were tenants of buildings which were constructed after 14th August 1962 and to which buildings the Act became applicable on the expiry of ten years from the date of the completion of the buildings within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act. 9. The decision in Hazari Lal's case was mainly given keeping in view the beneficent purpose of legislation. The question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in another context in M. Manickchand and Others Vs. Elias Saleh Mohamed Sait and Another, AIR 1969 SC 751 . In paragraph 18 of the report, after referring to the definition of 'commencement' as contained in Section 3(13) of the General Clauses Act, it was held: Obviously, an Act can only commence in a particular area on the date on which that Act comes into force in that area. The mere fact that it was in operation in other areas will not result in the Act having commenced in the area where it had not yet been applied. In this connection, notice may be taken of the language of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the General Clauses Act where it is laid down that "unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. This Sub-section clearly indicates that there is a distinction between an Act coming into operation, and the commencement of the Act. The date of coming into operation is not necessarily the date of commencement. In interpreting Section 2(3)(b) and (c) of the Act, we are concerned with the expression "commencement of the Act" and not with "coming into operation of the Act". In view of the definition of commencement' given in Section 3(13) of the General Clauses Act which applies to this expression as used in the Act, it has to be held that the commencement of the Act for the purposes of the present suit must be held to be the date on which the Act came into force in Bangalore Civil and Military Station and consequently, only 1st April, 1937 and not earlier. 10. The only distinction in the cases referred to above and in the instant case is that in the aforesaid cases the Act was made applicable subsequently to an area whereas in the instant case the applicability is in regard to buildings with reference to their date of construction. 10. The only distinction in the cases referred to above and in the instant case is that in the aforesaid cases the Act was made applicable subsequently to an area whereas in the instant case the applicability is in regard to buildings with reference to their date of construction. In our opinion, this distinction is of no consequence and the principles laid down in the cases referred to above squarely apply to the interpretation of the words "commencement of the Act" in Section 39 of the Act. 11. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Respondents, however, brought to our notice the fact that Section 39 as stood initially contained an explanation which reads In this section and in Section 40, the expression "date of commencement of this Act," in relation to a building, means "the date on which this Act becomes applicable to that building." It was pointed out that the aforesaid explanation was omitted by Section 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act 1972 (Act No. 37 of 1972). It was urged that in view of the explanation it was possible to give a wider meaning to Section 39 and by the circumstance that the Legislature subsequently omitted the explanation it must be inferred that its intention was not to give wider meaning to the words "commencement of this Act" in Section 39. We are, however, unable to agree with the submission. 12. In Bihta Co-operative Development Cane Marketing Union Ltd., and Another Vs. The Bank of Bihar and Others, AIR 1967 SC 389 it was held: The explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section. It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. It cannot, therefore, be said that the purpose of the Explanation was to widen the ambit of the section. Its only purpose could have been to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section. In our opinion in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manikchand's case, it cannot be said that there was any ambiguity in Section 39 which required any explanation so as to harmonise and clear up the said ambiguity. The Legislature must have considered the explanation as superfluous and omitted it on that score. In our opinion in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manikchand's case, it cannot be said that there was any ambiguity in Section 39 which required any explanation so as to harmonise and clear up the said ambiguity. The Legislature must have considered the explanation as superfluous and omitted it on that score. We perused the statement of objects and reasons contained in the Bill of the Amending Act aforesaid but it rendered no assistance on the point whatsoever. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that the explanation was subsequently omitted is not of any consequence. 13. As already pointed out above there is no ambiguity in Section 39. Even if there was an ambiguity it is a settled principle of rule of interpretation of a beneficent piece of legislation that in case there is an ambiguity the construction which advances the beneficent purpose should be accepted in preference to the one which defeats that purpose and if there is any doubt that doubt should be resolved in favour of the person for whose benefit the Act was passed. See Mahadeolal Kanodia Vs. The Administrator-general of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 and Jivabhai Purshottam Vs. Chhagan Karson and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1491 . 14. The words "commencement of this Act" in Section 39 must, therefore, mean the date on which the provisions of the Act became applicable to the building in respect of which the suit for ejectment is pending. 15. Coming to question No. 1 it would be seen that so far as the pendency of a suit is concerned there appears to be no difficulty. The required deposit has to be made within the prescribed period in the court before which the suit is pending. The difficulty arises, as has arisen in the instant case, when the suit is pending not in the trial court but in the appellate or revisional court. By virtue of Section 40 of the Act the provisions of Section 39 in regard to a suit would apply mutatis mutandis to pending appeals or revisions. What is the scope of mutatis mutandis is the real question. The expression "mutatis mutandis" means "with the necessary changes in points of details". See Bhutnath Das and Others Vs. By virtue of Section 40 of the Act the provisions of Section 39 in regard to a suit would apply mutatis mutandis to pending appeals or revisions. What is the scope of mutatis mutandis is the real question. The expression "mutatis mutandis" means "with the necessary changes in points of details". See Bhutnath Das and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, AIR 1964 Cal 552 wherever the word 'suit' occurs in Section 39 the word 'appeal' or 'revision', as the case may be, can be substituted. The words, "land-lords's full costs of the suit" would mean full costs of the suit which will include costs of appeal, second appeal or revision as the case may be. , If so construed, the amount contemplated by Section 39 would have to be deposited within one month of the commencement of the Act in cases of appeal Or revision in the court before which the appeal or revision is pending. That seems to be the correct interpretation of the plain language of the section. 16. Learned Counsel for the Appellants, however, urged that the provision in Section 39 in so far as it related, to the court in which the amount was to be deposited was not mandatory but only directory. It was urged that the purpose which is aimed at in getting the deposit made of the amounts mentioned in Section 39 is to ensure payment to the landlord of his upto date dues including interest and costs and if the said amount is deposited not in the appellate or revisional court but in the trial court, there would be substantial compliance and the purpose of the Act would not in any way be defeated. On the other hand, reliance was placed by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondents on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Bijai Bahadur v. Mahabir Prasad 1972 AWR 747 where it was held that in case of appeal or revision the deposit is to be made in the court where the appeal or revision was pending and not in any other court. As already pointed out above, the expression 'mutatis mutandis' means 'with necessary changes.' In Corporation of Calcutta Vs. As already pointed out above, the expression 'mutatis mutandis' means 'with necessary changes.' In Corporation of Calcutta Vs. Sirajuddin and Others, AIR 1957 Cal 399 it was held by Chakravarti, C.J.: When a law directs that a provision made for a certain type of case shall apply mutatis mutandis in another type of case, it means that it shall apply with such changes as may be necessary, but not that even if no change is necessary, some change shall nevertheless be made. In the same case Guha Roy, J., held: The expression 'mutatis mutandis' is an adverbial phrase qualifying the verb 'shall apply' and meaning 'those changes being made which must be made. 17. Learned Counsel for the Appellants referred to K. Kamraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar AIR 1958 SC 587 and Chandrika Prasad Tripathi Vs. Siv Prasad Chanpuria and Others, AIR 1959 SC 827 where it was held that the words "in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission" in Section 117 of Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 were directory and not mandatoy. Section 117 aforesaid is a provision relating to the deposit of security for the costs of the petition. When a Petitioner presents an election petition he is to enclose with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing that the requisite amount of security has been deposited by him either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission as security for the costs of the petition. Their Lordships in the case of K. Kamraj Nadar (supra) pointed out that if, for instance, the Petitioner made the deposit in favour of the Election Commission itself in place' of its Secretary could it be said that the requirement of Section 117 had not been complied with. In this background it was held that the words 'in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission' could not be treated as mandatory but were only directory. It would, however, be noticed that the provision that the deposit was to be made either in the Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India, was treated as mandatory. In this background it was held that the words 'in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission' could not be treated as mandatory but were only directory. It would, however, be noticed that the provision that the deposit was to be made either in the Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India, was treated as mandatory. It was held that what is the essence of the provision contained in Section 117 is that the Petitioner should furnish for the costs of the petition and should enclose along with the petition a Government receipt showing that a deposit of one thousand rupees has been made by him either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India. 18. In Chandrika Prasad's case (supra) the rule laid down in the case of K. Kamraj Nadar (supra) was followed. 19. In Senior Superintendent, R.M.S., Cochin and Another Vs. K.V. Gopinath, Sorter, AIR 1972 SC 1487 it was held that if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense. 20. In S.A. Venkataraman Vs. The State, AIR 1958 SC 107 it was held that in construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a court, in the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough. 21. In our opinion, the only changes which are necessary to be made in Section 39 in regard to its applicability to appeals or revisions are those which have already been pointed out above. It would be stretching the scope of mutatis mutandis to wide to interpret the word 'the court before which the suit is pending' with reference to the pendency of an appeal or revision to mean the trial court and not the court before which the appeal or revision is pending. The benefit of Section 39, namely, that no decree for eviction shall be passed on the deposit being made except on any of the grounds mentioned therein, can be given to the tenant only by the court before which the case is pending. If it is the stage of suit it is the trial court. The benefit of Section 39, namely, that no decree for eviction shall be passed on the deposit being made except on any of the grounds mentioned therein, can be given to the tenant only by the court before which the case is pending. If it is the stage of suit it is the trial court. If, on the other hand, the case is pending before the appellate or revisional court, it is that court on which a duty is cast not to pass a decree for eviction except in the circumstances mentioned in Section 39. No decree for eviction is to be passed only if the necessary deposit has been made within the prescribed period. Whether the necessary deposit has been made within the prescribed time would be one of the questions which the court will have to take into consideration before dismissing the suit for eviction. The court on which a duty has been cast not to pass a decree for eviction would be in a better position to ascertain whether the necessary deposit has been made within the prescribed period if the said deposit is made in that very court. This may have been the purpose of making a provision for the deposit in the court before which the suit is pending which, with reference to appeal or revision, would, as pointed out above, mean the court before which the appeal or revision is pending. 22. It was urged by learned Counsel for the Appellants that there may be cases in which the rent or damages for use and occupation contemplated by Section 39 including the costs of the suit, or of first appeal, may have been deposited in the trial court in pursuance of an order passed by the appellate or revisional court, and on the interpretation that the deposit has to be made before the appellate or revisional court the tenant would be required to deposit the same amount twice over in the appellate or revisional court. In our opinion, this apprehension has no substance. Section 39 contemplates deposits of only such amount which have not already been either paid to the landlord or deposited in a court either in pursuance of some statutory provision entitling the tenant to make such a deposit or in pursuance of an order of court. In our opinion, this apprehension has no substance. Section 39 contemplates deposits of only such amount which have not already been either paid to the landlord or deposited in a court either in pursuance of some statutory provision entitling the tenant to make such a deposit or in pursuance of an order of court. If any of the amounts mentioned in Section 39 have already been paid to the landlord that amount is not due and no question of depositing it can arise. Likewise, if any amount contemplated by Section 39 has been deposited in a court either in pursuance or some statutory provision entitling the tenant to make such deposit or in compliance with an order of Court, such amount will also not be due and will not have to be deposited again in the appellate or revisional court. Only such amount referred to in Section 39 would have to be deposited within one month of the commencement of the Act in the appellate court or revisional court, which had neither been paid to the landlord nor deposited in the manner stated above in court before the commencement of this Act and remains payable by the tenant on the date of commencement of the Act which he would be bound to deposit within one month of the commencement of the Act in the appellate or revisional court. 23. In regard to question No. 3 it was urged by learned Counsel for the Appellants that the word 'full' in the expression 'full costs of the suit' was very vague inasmuch as when the suit, appeal or revision was still pending it is not possible to ascertain as to what would be the full costs of such proceedings. Learned Counsel tried to elaborate his submission by giving an illustration. It was pointed out that suppose on the date of the commencement of the Act the suit was at the stage when not even written statement had been filed. It would not be possible to ascertain at that stage as to whether the Defendant would contest the suit or not and even if he would contest the suit how many witnesses will be examined by the Plaintiff and what would be the costs incurred by him in prosecuting the suit. It would not be possible to ascertain at that stage as to whether the Defendant would contest the suit or not and even if he would contest the suit how many witnesses will be examined by the Plaintiff and what would be the costs incurred by him in prosecuting the suit. At that stage it would be impossible to deposit any such amount which could be equated with the full costs of the suit. In our opinion, the words 'full Costs of the suit' have to be given a harmonious construction. 24. It is an axiom that the law does not seek to compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform --Lex non (sic) impossibilis. In our opinion, the expression 'full costs' in Section 39 refers to such costs as can be ascertained on the date of the deposit with reference to the material on record and the Rules of the Court. The amount of court fee paid on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal or revision and on other' documents and other taxable expenses incurred by the landlord by the date of deposit together with such amount of the Advocate's fee including the fee of his clerk as is taxable on the contested scale, whether any certificate of fee has or has not been filed by the date of deposit, would in our opinion, represent 'full costs of the suit' within the meaning of Section 39 of the Act. 25. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answers to the questions referred to us are: (i) In the case of an appeal or revision the deposit contemplated by Section 39 of the Act has to be made in the Court where the appeal or revision is pending. (ii) The date of commencement of the Act for purposes of Section 39 of the Act would be the date on which the provisions of the Act become applicable to the building in respect of which the suit for ejectment is pending. (ii) The date of commencement of the Act for purposes of Section 39 of the Act would be the date on which the provisions of the Act become applicable to the building in respect of which the suit for ejectment is pending. (iii) The expression 'full costs of the suit' in respect of a pending suit will represent the amount of court fee paid on the plaint and on other documents and other taxable expenses incurred by the landlord by the date of deposit together with such amount of the Advocate's fee and the fee of his clerk as is taxable on the contested scale whether any certificate of fee has or has not been filed by the date of deposit. In case of a first appeal or revision filed against a decree or order of the trial Court it will represent the costs awarded to the landlord in the decree or, order together with the amount paid as court fee on the memorandum of appeal or revision and other, documents and other taxable expenses incurred in the first appellate or revisional Court including the Advocate's fee and the fee of his clerk which are to be computed in the manner stated above. In case of second appeal or revision filed against a decree or order of the first appellate or revisional Court it will represent the costs awarded to the landlord in the decree or order of the trial Court as well as the first appellate or revisional Court together with the amount paid towards court fee oh the memorandum of appeal or revision and on other documents and other taxable expenses incurred in the second appellate or revisional Court including the Advocate's fee and the fee of his clerk which are to be computed in the manner stated above. 26. The appeal may now be listed before the single Judge with this opinion.