JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha, J. - These five special appeals raise common questions of law and can conveniently be disposed of together. Two writ petitions being Nos. 1805 of 1970 and 4696 of 1970 were filed challenging the imposition of octroi duty by the Municipal Board, Bareilly, on mineral oils by notification dated August 27, 1969. Bharat Oil Company and others, who are respondents in special appeal Nos. 622 of 1972 and 654 of 1972, were the petitioners in writ petition No. 1805 of 1970 whereas Messrs. Bhagwan Service Station and others, who are respondents in special appeal Nos. 623 of 1972 and 85 of 1973 were the petitioners in writ petition No. 4696 of 1970. Both these writ petitions were decided by a common judgment dated 26th of September, 1972, and were allowed. The notification dated August 27, 1969, was quashed and the Municipal Board, Bareilly, was restrained from assessing or collecting octroi duty on mineral oils classified as motor spirit, kerosene oil and diesel oil. Two special appeals in each case have been filed, one by the Municipal Board, Bareilly, and the other by the State of Uttar Pradesh, these being the four special appeals referred to above. Yet a third writ petition, being No. 4671 of 1970 was filed by Burmah Shell and others against the Municipal Board, Deoria. The prayer contained in this writ petition was to quash an order dated September 16, 1970, passed by the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Deoria to the effect that octroi duty was leviable on refined mineral oils. A further prayer was made to restrain the Municipal Board, Deoria, and its Executive Officer from levying any octroi duty on the petitioners. This writ petition too was allowed on December 8, 1972, relying on the decision in writ petition No. 1805 of 1970. The Municipal Board, Deoria, has preferred the fifth connected special appeal No. 681 of 1972. 2. Learned counsels for the parties in special appeal No. 681 of 1972 have adopted the arguments made in the four special appeals relating to Municipal Board, Bareilly, and as such we are giving the facts as emerge from the records of the writ petitions relating to the Municipal Board, Bareilly. 3. 2. Learned counsels for the parties in special appeal No. 681 of 1972 have adopted the arguments made in the four special appeals relating to Municipal Board, Bareilly, and as such we are giving the facts as emerge from the records of the writ petitions relating to the Municipal Board, Bareilly. 3. The Governor in exercise of his powers under Sec. 296 of the U. P. Municipalities Act made certain rules for the assessment and collection of octroi by the Municipalities within the State of Uttar Pradesh. These rules were notified by a notification dated October 24, 1925, and are contained in Chapter X of the Municipal Account Code (Vol. II Municipal Manual). Rule 131 of these rules makes a provision that octroi shall ordinarily be levied on commodities included in that rule subject to the exceptions contained In the proviso. One of the exceptions .contained in the proviso is mineral oils. The expression "mineral oils" was subsequently substituted by the expression "mineral oils classified as motor spirit, kerosene or diesel oils" by an amendment dated November 2, 1953. Sec. 128 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, which is the charging section, provides in its Sub-sec.(1) as follows :- "(1) Subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government in this behalf, the taxes which a Board may impose in the whole or part of a Municipality are ............ (viii) an octroi on goods or animals brought within the Municipality for consumption, use or sale therein..........." By virtue of the exception contained in the proviso to Rule 131 aforesaid which was apparently a general rule contemplated by Sec. 128, the power of the Municipal Boards to impose octroi duty, inter alia, on mineral oils was taken away. 4. In the year 1963 certain rules for assessment and collection of octroi in Bareilly Municipality were sought to be framed. The draft rules dated February 16, 1963, were published in U. P. Gazette dated February 23, 1963. The final rules were published by notification dated May 7, 1963. By a subsequent notification dated July 24, 1963, published in the U. P. Gazette dated August 3, 1963, under Secs. 135 (2) and 136 of the Municipalities Act, the Municipal Board, Bareilly, imposed octroi duty on goods and animals brought within its octroi limits. This notification was amended from time to time. By a subsequent notification dated July 24, 1963, published in the U. P. Gazette dated August 3, 1963, under Secs. 135 (2) and 136 of the Municipalities Act, the Municipal Board, Bareilly, imposed octroi duty on goods and animals brought within its octroi limits. This notification was amended from time to time. This notification contain certain items which were exempt from octroi duty and item No. 29 relates to mineral oils classified as motor spirit, kerosene oil and diesel oil. At some later stage which does not appear from the records, item No. 11 was introduced in clause 3 which provides for imposition of duty on mineral oils except motor spirit, kerosene and diesel oils. This situation continued till the 6th of January, 1968, on which date by special resolution No. 651/80 the Municipal Board proposed an amendment in the schedule for imposing octroi of one Paisa per litre on mineral oils. The proposals, according to the case of the Municipal Board, were published as contemplated by Sec. 131 of the Municipalities Act to which no objections were filed as contemplated by Sec. 132 of the Act. Final proposals were thereafter submitted to the Government for approval and the State Government, as has been stated in paragraph 16(a) of the counter affidavit of Ashraf Ali in writ petition No. 1805 of 1970, extended its approval as contemplated by Sec. 133 of the Act under. G. O. No. 1915/B/l 1/Ga. 192/68 dated June, 1969. The amendment in the schedule as approved was published in the Gazette dated August 30, 1969, under Sec. 135(2) of the Act. The notification published under Sec. 135(2) referred to above is dated August 27, 1969 and is the impugned notification. By this notification amendments were made both in the rate schedule as well as in the exemptions contained in the earlier notifications. From item No. 11, clause 3 the words "including motor spirit, petrol, kerosene oil and diesel oil" were deleted. From the list of exemptions item No. 29 was deleted. The impugned notification thus purported to take away the exemptions in favour of mineral oils and sought to subject them to octroi duty. 5. From item No. 11, clause 3 the words "including motor spirit, petrol, kerosene oil and diesel oil" were deleted. From the list of exemptions item No. 29 was deleted. The impugned notification thus purported to take away the exemptions in favour of mineral oils and sought to subject them to octroi duty. 5. This notification was challenged by the petitioners on the ground that the rules framed by the State Government in 1925 took away the power from all Municipal Boards to impose octroi duty on mineral oils, and till such power was restored to the Municipal Boards under a contrary notification issued under Set. 128 the Municipal Boards did not have any jurisdiction to assess or collect octroi duty on mineral oils. In reply two submissions were made on behalf of the Municipal Board as well as the State Government (1) that the subsequent rules contained in the notification dated July 24, 1963, published in the U. P. Gazette dated August 3, 1963, superseded the 1925 rules and thereby restorer the power of the Municipal Board, Bareilly to impose octroi duty on mineral oils, and (2) that, when the State Government accorded sanction under Sec. 133 to the proposals of the Municipal Board to impose octroi duty on mineral oils under G. O. dated June, 1969, referred to above it permitted the imposition of octroi duty on mineral oils and this should be taken as a special order contemplated by Sec. 128 of the Act. The grant of approval had the effect of superseding the earlier prohibition. 6. None of the two points canvassed for the Municipal Board and the State Government found favour with the learned single Judge and on the finding that Rule 131 as framed in 1925 did not stand superseded, he held that in view of the prohibition contained in that rule it was not open to the Municipal Board to assess or collect octroi duty on mineral oils. The writ petitions were allowed as already pointed out above. 7. Learned counsel for the Municipal Board as well as the State Government who are the appellants before us have reiterated the two submissions made on their behalf before the learned single Judge. The writ petitions were allowed as already pointed out above. 7. Learned counsel for the Municipal Board as well as the State Government who are the appellants before us have reiterated the two submissions made on their behalf before the learned single Judge. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of opinion that no exception can be taken to the view taken by the learned a single Judge and neither of the two contentions made for the appellants has any substance. In order to appreciate the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties the distinction between power to levy tax, the procedure for imposition of tax and that for collection of tax has to be kept in view. In these cases we are not concerned with the provisions relating to collection of the tax. Sec. 128 deals with the power to levy tax and may be called the charging section. If a Municipal Board is empowered to levy tax under Sec. 128 only then can it proceed to impose it. Secs. 131 to 135 deal with the procedure for imposition of tax. If the power to tax is lacking, howsoever scrupulously and minutely the procedure contemplated by Secs. 131 to 135 may have been followed, the imposition of tax would be void. 8. The distinction aforesaid with reference to the U. P. Municipalities Act itself was considered by the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra Kripal, A.I.R. 1966 S. C. 693 : 1966 A.L.J. 205. While dealing with the scope of "conclusive proof" contemplated by Sec. 135(3) of the Act it was held : "There are certain matters which, of course, cannot be established conclusively by a notification under Sec. 135(3). For example, no notification can issue unless there is a special resolution. The special resolution is the sine qua non of the notification. The State Government cannot impose a tax all by itself by notifying the imposition of the tax without a resolution by the Board. Again, the, notification cannot authorise the imposition of a tax not included in Sec. 128 of the Municipalities Act. Neither a Municipal Board nor a State Government can exercise such a power. A tax can only be said to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act, if it is contemplated by the Act. Again, the, notification cannot authorise the imposition of a tax not included in Sec. 128 of the Municipalities Act. Neither a Municipal Board nor a State Government can exercise such a power. A tax can only be said to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act, if it is contemplated by the Act. There is a difference between the tax and the imposition of the tax. The former is the levy itself and the latter the method by which the levy is imposed and collected. What the Sub-sec. does is to put beyond question the procedure by which the tax is imposed, that is to say, various steps taken to impose it. A tax not authorised can never be within the protection afforded to the procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax maybe challenged, not with reference to the manner of the imposition but as an illegal impost. In B.C. Banerji v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 517, it was reiterated that no tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition. 9. It is settled law that rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes, of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as is contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction and obligation : see State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 751. Rule 131 as framed in 1925' would thus be treated as part of Sec. 128 of the Act and because of the exception contained in regard to mineral oils, there can be no escape from the conclusion that till the said rule, was superseded no Municipal Board had power to levy tax and merely because the procedure prescribed in Secs. 131 to 135 may have been followed would not make the levy valid. It would be an illegal impost. 10. The first question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the appellants are right in saying that the rules framed in 1963 by the Municipal Board, Bareilly, referred to above had the effect of superseding the 1925 rules. 131 to 135 may have been followed would not make the levy valid. It would be an illegal impost. 10. The first question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the appellants are right in saying that the rules framed in 1963 by the Municipal Board, Bareilly, referred to above had the effect of superseding the 1925 rules. Learned counsel for the appellants in this connection first submitted that as is clear from the preamble to the rules of 1925 these rules had been framed for the assessment and collection of octroi and could not be treated as a general rule contemplated by Sec. 128 of the Act. In our opinion this submission has no substance. Sec. 128 envisages imposition of such taxes of the Board as are mentioned in the said section subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government. Such of the rules occurring in the 1925 rules as relate to the power of the Municipal Board to impose tax including the prohibition in this behalf would, necessarily be referable to the power of the State Government conferred by Sec. 128. The mere fact that the preamble mentions "assessment and collection of octroi" will not have any material bearing on this point. The mention of a wrong provision or wrong title is not decisive. It is the substance and not the form which matters and if the power which has been exercised was referable to some statutory provision, the exercise of such power would not be invalid. Reference in this connection may be made to N.B. Sanjana v. E.S. & W. Mills, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2039. 11. It was then urged that the draft rules as published in the Gazette dated February 23, 1963, clearly mentioned that those rules were "in supersession of the existing octroi rules contained in the Municipal Account Code in so far as they applied to the said Municipality" and that the final rules as published on May 11, 1963, were in continuation of the notification containing the draft rules. According to learned counsel these rules had the effect of superseding the 1925 rules. A perusal of the 1925 rules would indicate that Rule 131 contains general directions in regard to the articles which may be subjected to the imposition of octroi duty and which may not be so subjected. According to learned counsel these rules had the effect of superseding the 1925 rules. A perusal of the 1925 rules would indicate that Rule 131 contains general directions in regard to the articles which may be subjected to the imposition of octroi duty and which may not be so subjected. The list of the commodities on which octroi duty is leviable but shall be exempt from the payment thereof is to be found in Rule 132 whereas Rule 133 lays down that the goods on which and the rates at which octroi has been imposed by the Board shall be entered in a schedule and that the Board shall not collect octroi on any goods or at any rate not so entered. Rules 134 onwards, on the other hand, relate to the procedure for assessment and collection of octroi duty. Rules 131 to 133 therefore were apparently framed in the exercise of power conferred by Sec. 128 of the Act whereas Rule 134 onwards were framed in the exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 153. A perusal of the 1963 rules clearly indicates that nothing has been provided in these rules contrary to the provisions contained in Rules 131 to 133 of the 1925 rules. Rule 36 of the 1963 rules on the other hand provides that matters for which no specific provision has been made in these rules shall, until such provision is made, continue to be governed by the rules made in that behalf and contained in the U. P. Municipal Manual, Vol. II (the Municipal Account Code, 1951 edition). It is thus clear that Rule 131 does not stand superseded by the 1963 rule and the bar created in regard to imposition of octroi duty on mineral oils continued notwithstanding those rules. 12. So far as the second submission of learned counsel for the appellants is concerned namely that the prohibition contained in Rule 131 stood superseded on account of the approval given by the State Government by the Government Order of June, 1969, referred to above is concerned, we are of opinion that the said approval could not in law have the effect of superseding Rule 131. The approval a copy of which has been attached as Annexure 4 to the counter affidavit of Ashraf Ali in writ petition No. 1805 of 1970 does not anywhere indicate that Rule 131 was being superseded. The approval a copy of which has been attached as Annexure 4 to the counter affidavit of Ashraf Ali in writ petition No. 1805 of 1970 does not anywhere indicate that Rule 131 was being superseded. It was, however, urged that the approval to impose tax on mineral oils had the implied effect of superseding Rule 131. Annexure 5 clearly indicates that the said approval had been given under Sec. 133 (2). It was in respect of the proposals made by the Municipal Board under Sec. 131 for imposing octroi duty on mineral oils. The scope of the proceedings under Secs. 131 to 135, as already pointed out above, is confined to the procedure for imposition of a tax. It was in this connection that this approval was granted. In regard to the construction applicable to taxing statutes, it was held in Gursahai v. Income-tax Commissioner, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1062 : "The question thus raised is one of construction of Sub-secs. (6) and (8). The assessee relies on a rule of construction applicable to taxing statutes which has been variously stated. Rowlatt, J. put it in these words in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 1929-I K.B. 64 (71) : `In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly stated. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look barely at the language used. "The object of this rule is to prevent a taxing statute being construed" according to its intent, though not according to its words : In re.: Bethlehem Hospital : (1865) 19 Eq. 457 (459), this Court has accepted this rule. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look barely at the language used. "The object of this rule is to prevent a taxing statute being construed" according to its intent, though not according to its words : In re.: Bethlehem Hospital : (1865) 19 Eq. 457 (459), this Court has accepted this rule. Bhagwati, J. in A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, 1957 S.C.R. 837 at p. 847 : A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 657 at p. 661, said, "If .....the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter." It has even been said that if the provision is so wanting in clarity that no meaning is reasonably clear, the courts will be unable to regard it as of any effect : see Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Poss and Coulter; In Re.: Baldnoch Distillery Co. Ltd., 1948-1 All E.R. 616 (625)." It was pointed out in the aforesaid case that the rule of construction referred to above applied only to a taxing provision and not to a provision not creating the charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for its calculation or the procedure for its collection. The same principle was reiterated in Banarsi Debi v. Income-tax Officer, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1742. Sec. 128 as already pointed out above is a taxing provision and not a provision not creating a charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for its calculation or the procedure for its collection. The rule of construction laid down in the cases referred to above would, therefore, apply to the construction of Sec. 128. It is, therefore, not possible to say that since approval was granted by the State Government under Sec. 133(2) of the Act for imposition of octroi duty on mineral oils, it had the implied effect of superseding the Prohibition contained in Rule 131 which has to be treated as part of Sec. 128. 13. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. 13. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Rule 131 was framed in 1925 after following the procedure contemplated by Sec. 300 of the Act which, inter alia, lays down that the power or the State Government to make rules or regulations under this chapter is subject to the conditions of the rules or regulations being made after previous publication and of their not taking effect until they have been published in the official Gazette. Sec. 23 of the U. P. General Clauses Act contains the provision applicable to making of rules or bye-law after previous publication. Rule 131 was framed after following the procedure contemplated by Sec. 300 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and Sec. 23 of the General Clauses Act. Sec. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act provides: "Where, by any Uttar Pradesh Act, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued." In view of the provisions contained in Sec. 21, if Rule 131 of the 1925 rules was to be superseded, the same procedure was necessary to have been followed as was done in framing the said rule namely the procedure contemplated by Sec. 300 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and Sec. 23 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. It is not the case of the appellants that the procedure contemplated by either of these two sections was followed before the approval under Sec. 133(2) was granted by the State Government. It is true that the rules framed pursuant to the grant of approval under Sec. 133 (2) are published under Sec. 135(2) but the approval itself is never published in the official Gazette. The proposals under Sec. 131 are published by the Municipal Board and not by the State Government whereas Sec. 23 of the U. P. General Clauses Act requires such publication to be made by the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws which with reference to Sec. 128 would be the State Government alone. The approval granted by the State Government cannot therefore, be taken to have superseded Rule 131 on this ground also. 14. The approval granted by the State Government cannot therefore, be taken to have superseded Rule 131 on this ground also. 14. In this connection it may be observed that under Sec. 131 the Municipal Board has the power to publish proposals of only such taxes as it can validly impose by virtue of the powers conferred under Sec. 128. Publication of proposals for the imposition of a tax, which it cannot impose, is, technically speaking, without jurisdiction, and the general public can ignore such a publication. Consequently, the publication of the proposal by the Municipal Board under Sec. 131 cannot take the place of publication of such a proposal by the State Government under Sec. 300 read with Sec. 128 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. In this view of the matter the approval granted by the State Government cannot have the effect of amending the general rules framed under Sec. 300 read with Sec. 128 of the Act. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants laid much emphasis on the phrase "subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government" occurring in Sec. 128. It was urged that in view of the phraseology of Sec. 128, even a general rule framed earlier after complying with the provisions of Sec. 300 of the Municipalities Act and Sec. 23 of the General Clauses Act could be superseded just by a special order issued under Sec. 128 and if the Government chose to adopt the procedure of superseding a general rule by issuing a, special order it was not necessary to comply with the requirements either of Sec. 300 of the Municipalities Act or of Sec. 23 of the General Clauses Act. In our opinion, the provisions contained in Secs. 128 and 300 of the Municipalities Act and Secs. 21 and 23 of the General Clauses Act have to be given a harmonious construation so as to give effect to all the provisions in a reasonable manner. The phrase emphasised by learned counsel for the appellants in Sec. 128 if harmoniously construed would mean that if a provision had earlier been made by a general rule after following the required procedure it can be superseded only after following the same procedure. The phrase emphasised by learned counsel for the appellants in Sec. 128 if harmoniously construed would mean that if a provision had earlier been made by a general rule after following the required procedure it can be superseded only after following the same procedure. On the other hand, if the earlier provision had been made by a special order without complying with the procedure contemplated by Sec. 300 of the Municipalities Act and Sec. 23 of the General Clauses Act, it can be superseded by another special order in the same manner. 16. Departure from this rule may be permissible in exceptional circumstances only where it is considered necessary to stay the operation of a general rule for a specified period by issuing a special order under Sec. 128, all the more, where it is considered necessary to stay the imposition and collection of tax even though permissible under the rules. 17. In the instant case since Rule 131 was framed after following the procedure contemplated by Secs. 300 and 23 referred to above, if the prohibition contained therein was to be superseded, it could be done only by following the required procedure in view of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants in this behalf cannot be accepted on this ground too. 18. No other point has been pressed. 19. In the result, all these special appeals fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. Stay orders are vacated.