JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This is defendants appeal arising out of a suit for injunction to direct the defendants to remove the constructions made by them in the form of a Chabutra and to restore the land to its original condition and to repair the graves to make them as they were before the construction of the Chabutra. According to the plaintiffs, the land was a grave yard and the defendants were not entitled to encroach upon it by claiming it to be the land appurtenant to the temple. The defendants case was that it was a part of the land attached to the temple and was not part of any graveyard. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the trial court and the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the defendants in this appeal has primarily attacked the decree of the court below on the ground that the defendants were not afforded opportunity to contest the suit in accordance with law. It appears that plaintiffs had led some evidence in the case, the case was then adjourned to 13th November, 1961 on the defendants application. On that date plaintiffs examined some witnesses. As the senior counsel for the defendants was not available the defendants could not proceed with the hearing and prayed for adjournment. Learned Munsif, however, treated the evidence as closed, and after hearing the plaintiffs counsel, fixed 14th November for pronouncing the judgment. On the same date i.e. 13-11-1961. Later in the day, an application was moved on behalf of the defendants for fixing another date for taking defendants evidence. The judgment was then not pronounced on 14-11-1961 and the application was put up for orders on 15-11-1961. On that date the learned Munsif alloyed the application subject to payment of costs within two weeks and in the event of non-compliance the order was directed to stand vacated. The defendants could not pay the costs to the plaintiff by 22-11-1961. On 24-11-1961, the date fixed in the case, an application 57-C was moved stating that for reasons indicated therein costs could not be paid and praying that the cost may be accepted and the defendants be permitted to lead their evidence. The application was considered and rejected on 25-11-1961. The learned Munsif again did not take evidence and fixed 27th November 1961 for judgment. The application was considered and rejected on 25-11-1961. The learned Munsif again did not take evidence and fixed 27th November 1961 for judgment. The ground on which he rejected the application was firstly that the order allowing the adjournment was an order which stood automatically vacated on the cost being not paid within the time allowed and, secondly that there was not sufficient cause for non-payment costs within the time allowed. This view the court took on the finding that although one of the defendants could not come because of illness of his sons wife the other defendants could have come to pay costs within time. 3. In the appeal against the decree it was contended that the decree was bad as the defendants were denied a fair trial and it was urged that the trial court had not proceeded in accordance with law in refusing to extend time for payment of costs and permitting the defendants to lead their evidence. The appellate court did not reconsider the matter on merits, but disposed of the contention by the following observation :- "This application was rejected on 25-11-1961 and the learned Munsif assigned cogent reasons for doing so. 27-11-1961 was fixed for judgment and judgment was pronounced on that day. The order dated 15-11-1961 was conditional order and final. The learned Munsif could not have extended the time for the payment of costs under Sec. 148, C. P. C." The appellate court has clearly gone wrong on this question of law. Sec. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not limit the power of the court to extend time. This matter now stands concluded by the Full Bench decision in Goberdhan Singh v. Barsati, 1972 A.L.J. 169. The Munsif had the power to extend time for payment of costs. The lower appellate court failed to correct the error, thinking the court had no power to extend time. 4. Refusal by the learned Munsif to extend time for payment of costs was also improper. The case had already been adjourned and 24th November had been fixed for evidence. The witnesses were present and the defendants were prepared to pay costs. No prejudice had been caused to party because of non-payment of costs, within the time allowed in the order of adjournment. The case had already been adjourned and 24th November had been fixed for evidence. The witnesses were present and the defendants were prepared to pay costs. No prejudice had been caused to party because of non-payment of costs, within the time allowed in the order of adjournment. Costs are imposed to compensate the loss suffered by a party by reason of adjournment and not by way of penalty. Imposition of costs is not to carry with it penal consequences. Once the case had been adjourned, then if on the adjourned date the party was ready to pay costs, the court should have extended the time and allowed the defendants to lead their evidence. The court in not doing so acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. 5. The learned Munsif was also in error in attaching to the order of adjournment the condition that it will stand vacated if costs were not paid within a time fixed in the order. Conditions of automatic vacation are attached to matters which have a continuity, such as, orders of stay of proceedings, where the conditional order acts as a break or eclipse, and not to orders which have no continuity. An order of adjournment takes effect immediately and its subsequent vacation is hardly of any consequence because the clock cannot be put back to have the case disposed of on the day it was not disposed of due to the order of adjournment. To such cases conditions of automatic vacation cannot be affixed. 6. As the defendants did not get opportunity to lead evidence which they under law were entitled to, the decree passed by the courts below cannot be sustained. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed. The decree passed by both the courts below are set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial court for decision of the suit in accordance with law particularly after affording the defendants on opportunity to lead evidence. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs.