JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for possession after the ejectment of the defendants from the house in dispute and for recovery of Rs. 216/- by way of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. Plaintiffs case, in brief, was that the property belonged to one Roop Narain. He had executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in favour of one Beni Madho in 1931. Beni Madho thereafter allowed Roop Narain to remain in possession as tenant in the premises. Subsequently Beni Madho transferred the mortgage rights in favour of plaintiff Raja Ram. Roop Narain was said to have executed a will in favour of the plaintiff's sons who were defendants in the suit in respect of the equity of redemption. It was further alleged that even after the period of 30 years had elapsed, neither the mortgage was redeemed nor any suit filed for redemption of the mortgage. The equity of redemption thus also became vested in the mortgagee and consequently the plaintiffs became the full owners of the property. Sartaji Kuar daughter of Roop Narain had, according to the plaintiff, become the tenant in place of Roop Narain after Roop Narain died. She did not pay rent and did not accept the plaintiff as the landlord. On 15th February, 1968 the plaintiff served on Smt. Sartaji a notice of demand as well as a notice terminating her tenancy. In reply to this notice she alleged that the mortgage had already been redeemed and that she had executed a sale deed in respect of the property in favour of Hari Ram, the present defendant-appellant, Hari Ram used to live with Smt. Sartaji. Even after the notice terminating the tenancy Smt. Sartaji and defendant No. 1 did not vacate the premises. The plaintiff contemplated the filing of suit but before the suit could be instituted Smt. Sartaji died, hence the suit was instituted against Hari Ram and certain other persons who were brothers of Hari Ram. 2. Hari Ram contested the suit. He admitted that he was living in the house along with Smt. Sartaji, but denied the plaintiff's allegation that he was the owner of the property. He reiterated the same pleas which were taken by Smt. Sartaji in reply to the notice of the plaintiff. 2. Hari Ram contested the suit. He admitted that he was living in the house along with Smt. Sartaji, but denied the plaintiff's allegation that he was the owner of the property. He reiterated the same pleas which were taken by Smt. Sartaji in reply to the notice of the plaintiff. He asserted title in himself alleging that the mortgage had been redeemed and Smt. Sartaji had executed a sale deed in his favour. On these allegations it was contended that the suit was not maintainable. 3. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit. It held that the plaintiff was the owner of the house and the plea of redeemed had not been proved. It held further that the defendant was the tenant in the accommodation and notice to quit given to Smt. Sartaji was sufficient for his ejectment. 4. Against the decree passed by the trial court defendant. No. 1 went up in appeal. The appellate court dismissed the appeal. Before the appellate court only one point was convased on behalf of the appellant. The court below has observed :- "The only point raised in this appeal is whether defendant No. 1, appellant and defendants 2 to 4 are the tenants of plaintiffs-respondents or not." Dealing with this matter the appellate court came to the conclusion that the mortgage had not been redeemed and the plaintiff was the owner of the property. It held further that the defendants were tenants on behalf of the plaintiff and were liable to be ejected in the suit. The defendant No. 1 has now filed the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that the court below was in error in holding that the appellant was the tenant being the heir of Smt. Sartaji. The contention is that after the tenancy of Sm. Sartaji had been terminated she had become a statutory tenant and that the statutory tenancy being uninheritable the present appellant could not be deemed to be a tenant by inheritance. Following the, argument, he contends that because the appellant was not a tenant he could not be ejected in the present suit which was based on allegation that the defendant was the plaintiffs tenant. Following the, argument, he contends that because the appellant was not a tenant he could not be ejected in the present suit which was based on allegation that the defendant was the plaintiffs tenant. The second contention raised by the learned counsel is that notice under Sec. 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act having not been given to forfeit the tenancy of Smt. Sartaji or the present appellant, tenant, tenancy could not be deemed terminated, and, hence, the suit for ejectment was liable to be dismissed. 6. No plea about notice under Sec. 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act was, however, raised before the court below. No plea even about the suit being bad for want of a fresh notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was raised before it. The contest before the court below was on the basis only of title and it was found that the plaintiff was the owner and the defendant had no title. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gauri Shanker v. M/s. Hindustan Trust (Pvt.) Ltd., A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2091, the contention that the tenancy had not been terminated by a notice required under Sec. 111 (g) or (h) of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be allowed to be agitated in this Court as no such plea was raised either in the written statement or in arguments in the court below. Even on merits, the plea is unsustainable. 7. In support of his first plea, learned counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of this Court in Jagannath Prasad v. Smt. Chandrawati, A.I.R. 1970 Alld. 309. In that case a suit for ejectment of the tenant had been filed and the court came to the conclusion that none of the grounds contemplated by Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act existed and hence it was held that the suit for ejectment was not maintainable. The decree passed in such a suit was held unexecutable against, the heirs of the tenant. In the present case the conditions necessary for the institution of the suit did exist. Smt. Sartaji had denied title and had contended that the title vested in the present appellant by virtue of the sale deed executed by her in his favour. The decree passed in such a suit was held unexecutable against, the heirs of the tenant. In the present case the conditions necessary for the institution of the suit did exist. Smt. Sartaji had denied title and had contended that the title vested in the present appellant by virtue of the sale deed executed by her in his favour. The same pleas of redemption of mortgage and transfer of the property in his favour were raised by the appellant. He too denied the plaintiffs title. The suit was thus not barred by Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 8. The next case cited by the learned counsel is the decision of the Supreme Court in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 414. In that case it was held that after the contractual tenancy is terminated by a notice under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant has no status or interest in the premises occupied by him. Observations of the Supreme court are :- His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal; it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The right of the lessee from a landlord on the other hand is an estate or interest in the premises and in the absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the premises may be sublet by him." The ratio of this decision is that after the contractual tenancy is terminated the rights of the occupant remain only what are given to him by the Statute, which in the present case is the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 9. After Smt. Sartaji's tenancy had been terminated by a notice to quit, she had remained just a statutory tenant without any heritable tenancy rights. The courts below have of course, gone wrong in law in thinking that after Smt. Sartaji's death the appellant and his brothers had become tenants by virtue of being heirs of Smt. Sartaji, but that will not make the decree contrary to law. The courts below have of course, gone wrong in law in thinking that after Smt. Sartaji's death the appellant and his brothers had become tenants by virtue of being heirs of Smt. Sartaji, but that will not make the decree contrary to law. After the finding of the court below that the plaintiff was the owner of the property and the defendant was not, and that Smt. Sartaji was the tenant of the plaintiff because her predecessor-in-interest Roop Narain was the tenant, it has to be taken that the contractual tenancy of -Smt. Sartaji was terminable under Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act various modes are prescribed for termination of tenancy. One of the modes is given in clause (g) which is by forfeiture, the other is given in clause (h), i.e., termination by notice to quit. The tenancy could, therefore, have been validly terminated by a notice to quit and it was not necessary to give a further notice of termination on the ground of forfeiture. Admittedly Smt. Sartaji had been served with a notice to quit under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 10. Once the tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act had been terminated, the contractual status of Smt. Sartaji came to an end. The suit for ejectment could have been filed because she had denied the plaintiffs title. After the termination of the contractual tenancy, the possession of Smt. Sartaji could be saved only under provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. After her death even statutory tenancy came to an end and there was no question of inheriting the tenancy by the defendants. The present appellant was living along with Smt. Sartaji while she was a tenant. If the suit had been filed while Smt. Sartaji was alive, he would have been liable to be evicted along with Smt. Sartaji on the suit by the plaintiff as the appellant was in possession of the house only at her instance. Merely by the death of Smt. Sartaji no higher rights could accrue to the appellant. He had not obtained any order of allotment in his favour. In such circumstances his status could only be analogous to the status which Smt. Sartaji was enjoying till the time of her death, i.e. of a statutory tenant. Merely by the death of Smt. Sartaji no higher rights could accrue to the appellant. He had not obtained any order of allotment in his favour. In such circumstances his status could only be analogous to the status which Smt. Sartaji was enjoying till the time of her death, i.e. of a statutory tenant. He could be ejected in the same manner as a statutory tenant is liable to ejectment. As no fresh contractual tenancy came into existence after the tenancy of Smt. Sartaji was terminated, the question of serving a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the appellant or of terminating his tenancy in any other manner prescribed under Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act did not arise. The only protection available to the occupant in his capacity as a statutory tenant is what is given under Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. As the appellant had denied the landlords title, the suit was maintainable for his ejectment. 11. The net result of the findings of the court below is that the plaintiff is the owner of the premises, the defendant has no right or title to remain in possession and there exists no bar to the maintainability of the suit for his ejectment. The decree of ejectment passed by the court below cannot thus be deemed to be contrary to law. 12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.