JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This special appeal against the judgment of a learned single judge of this Court has been filed by the petitioner whose writ petition was dismissed by the said learned Judge. 2. The dispute arises out of consolidation proceedings. 3. The brief facts are these : One Raja Krishnapal Singh of Umri. district Pratapgarh was the original proprietor of the land in dispute. He had two sons Sant Bahadur Singh and Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. Sant Bahadur Singh as the elder brother inherited the property in dispute. He was married to Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi who shall, hereinafter, be referred to as the Rani. Sant Bahadur Singh died in 1947 and thereafter a dispute arose between the Rani and the said Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh regarding inheritance to the property left by Sant Bahadur Singh. The matter was referred to arbitration and the Arbitrators delivered the award on 26-11-1948 which was registered and then filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh for being made the rule of the court. The court sought certain clarifications from the Arbitrators and the latter submitted their clarifications to the court. The clarifications were made a part of the original award. The Rani granted one lease on 29-6-1949 in respect of some plots and another lease on 7-7-1949 in respect of certain other plots. Both the leases were in favour of the petitioners-appellants. The plots in question were admittedly either sir or or Khudkasht. The petitioners appellants entered into possession on the basis of the said leases and have admittedly continued to be in possession throughout. The Rani is admittedly still alive. 4. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh filed suit No. 675 of 1955 in the court of the Munsif, Pratapgarh seeking tile cancellation of the aforesaid two leases and also claiming injunction. The said suit came up to this Court in the shape of a second appeal and the suit and the said appeal ,both abated under Section 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 5. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh filed objections under Section 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The objections were contested by the petitioners-appellants and they were rejected by the Consolidation Officer but the settlement Officer subsequently allowed the same in the appeal. before him and the Deputy Director, Consolidation dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners-appellants. 5. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh filed objections under Section 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The objections were contested by the petitioners-appellants and they were rejected by the Consolidation Officer but the settlement Officer subsequently allowed the same in the appeal. before him and the Deputy Director, Consolidation dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners-appellants. Subsequently, the petitioners filed the writ petition questioning the legality of the appellate order passed by the S.O.C. and the revisional order passed by the D.D.C. However, as stated here-in before, the learned single judge dis-missed the writ petition and hence the petitioners filed this special appeal. 6. Before us Shri G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants, made the following contentions : (1) Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh, respondent No. 4, had no locus standi in the consolidation proceedings to question the rights of the petitioners-appellants. Only Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi, if at all, could file objections under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.' (2) After the promulgation of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951 (U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act), the award-decree lost its efficacy and Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh could not set up any claim on the basis of the said award-decree. Shri Verma placed reliance on the following authorities: (i) Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v Allahabad Bank. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790 (ii) Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath. 1968 A.L.J. 844 (3) If the award-decree continues to be effective, then during her life time at least, the transaction continued to be binding upon Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi and during her life-time, the transactions in question could not be disturbed. (4) Alternatively, if the award decree continued to be effective, the leases in question were valid transactions and Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi acted within the scope of her authority under the award decree in granting the said leases. The transactions were prudent acts on the part of the Rani in the circumstances of the case. (5) The lessee was a hereditary tenant on the eye of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and hence became a sirdar under Section 19 of the said Act on the date of vesting. The transactions were prudent acts on the part of the Rani in the circumstances of the case. (5) The lessee was a hereditary tenant on the eye of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and hence became a sirdar under Section 19 of the said Act on the date of vesting. (6) In the alternative, if the leases were not valid transactions, then, the lessee would be a trespasser and the landholder, Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi, had a period of two years to sue the trespasser for possession. In view of the failure of the land-holder to do so, the trespasser acquired legal title over the plots in question. Reliance was placed in this connection on Yeshwant v. Walchand. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 16. 7. Shri G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh, supported the judgment of the learned single Judge on the grounds contained in it. In addition, he made the following points : (1) An error cannot be said to be an error of law apparent on the face of the record when a point itself was not raised before the consolidation authorities and who, therefore, had no occasion to discuss such a point. For his contention, Shri Bhargava placed reliance on the following cases:- (2) If the interpretation of a document is a matter of deep contention, then it cannot be said that the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, committed an error apparent on the lace of the record in placing a particular interpretation in preference to another possible interpretation. Moreover, in the instant case, the interpretation placed by the said consolidation authorities has been upheld by the learned single Judge. Hence, to say the least, the interpretation of the award decree by the said consolidation authorities could not be said to be an impossible construction of the said document. Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 233, Chetkar v. Vishwanath A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1832, Jabalpur Municipality v. State of M. P. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 837, S. R. Tewari v. Distt. Board, Agra A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680, Syed Yakoob v. Radha Krishnan A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477 Bachchan Singh v. Gauri Shanker A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1531, Associated Cement Co. Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 233, Chetkar v. Vishwanath A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1832, Jabalpur Municipality v. State of M. P. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 837, S. R. Tewari v. Distt. Board, Agra A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680, Syed Yakoob v. Radha Krishnan A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477 Bachchan Singh v. Gauri Shanker A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1531, Associated Cement Co. v. P. D. Vyas A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 665, Satya narayan v. Mallikarjun A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 137, Jagannath Behera v. Harihar Singh A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 239, Dabal Singh v. S. T. A. Tribunal A.I.R. 1967 All. 266, G. D. Singh v. Sub-Div. Officer 1966 A.L.J. 631, D. G. Vidyalaya Assocn. v. State of U. P. A.I.R. 1962 All. 187 F. B., Ram Sahai v. Custodian of E. P., U. P. A.I.R. 1953 All. 117 Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581 (3) The law laid down in Ramji Dixit's case will not apply to the facts of the instant case. In that case the transfer of Bhumidhari rights was involved. Here we are concerned with the transfer of Sir lands prior to U. P. Act 1 of 1951. (4) The award-decree did not lose its efficacy with the coming into force of U. P. Act 1 of 1951. The Rani became a Bhumidhar of the plots in question but she remained subject to all the limitations under the award-decree. (5) The petitioners appellants did not acquire any title by prescription. For one thing, their possession was permissive. Further, under Section 10 of U. P. Act 1 of 1951, the petitioners-appellants could not acquire any rights. Under Section 157. Lead with Section 21(h) of the said Act, the petitioners-appellants could only become Asamis and the latter have no right to be so recorded, by the consolidation authorities. Only the Bhumidhars and the Sirdars have a right to be so recorded. (6) Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh, respondent No. 4, was a person interested and could file objections under Sec. 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Moreover, the petitioners-appellants are not entitled to raise this question as no issue was framed in the -consolidation proceedings in respect of this controversy and the same cannot be raised in this Court. For, it is not a pure question of law as it was possible that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had authority from Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to file. Moreover, the petitioners-appellants are not entitled to raise this question as no issue was framed in the -consolidation proceedings in respect of this controversy and the same cannot be raised in this Court. For, it is not a pure question of law as it was possible that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had authority from Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to file. the objections on her behalf. Shri Bhargava placed reliance in this connection on Radharaman v. Gulab Thakur A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 50 and Doongaraee Shyamji v. Tribhuwan Das A.I.R. 1947 All. 375 (7) Under Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh stood bored from challenging the entry in favour of the petitioner-appellant except by filing objections under Section 9 of the said Act. (8) A reference was made to various sections of Mulla's Hindu Law stating the legal position concerning the alienations by a limited owner e.g. by a Hindu widow or a Karta of a joint Hindu family. (9) Assistance was sought to be derived from Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which lays down as under :- "14. (2) Nothing contained in Sub-sec. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument of the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." 8. We have given our earnest consideration to the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties and we have reached the conclusion that this appeal should be allowed. 9. So far as the last contention of Shri Bhargava is concerned, it may be stated that Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be relied upon in view of Section 4(2) of the said Act which lays down as under : "4(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings." 10. The entire approach of the consolidation authorities and the learned single Judge seems to be based on the premise that the rights OT the Rani and Lal Pratap Bahadur Sine continued to be governed by the award-decree between them. They sought to determine the validity or otherwise of the transactions of lease in favour of the petitioners-appellants on an interpretation of the terms of the aforementioned award (including the clarifications thereof given by the arbitrators subsequently). But the said premise is fundamentally wrong. Section 4(1) of the U. P. Act I of 1951 (U. P: "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act) lays down as under : "4(1). As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, State Government may, by notification declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from The beginning of the date so specified (hereinafter called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand exploitation ). hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances. Section 6 of the said Act (so far as relevant for our purposes) lays down as under :- "S. - 6. Consequence of the vesting of an estate in the State. When the notification under Section 4 has been published in Gazette then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequence as hereinafter set forth shall, from the beginning of the date of vesting, ensure in the area to which the notification relates, namely : (e) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries : (i) in every estate in such area including land. (cultivable or barren) grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or groves), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water `channels, feries, path-ways, abadi sites, hats bazar and melas other than hats, bazars and inelas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-sec. (cultivable or barren) grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or groves), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water `channels, feries, path-ways, abadi sites, hats bazar and melas other than hats, bazars and inelas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Section 18 apply and (ii) in all sub-soil in such estates including right, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh from all encumbrances ; (b) all grants and confirmations and of title of or to land in any estates so acquired, or of or to any right or privilege in respect of such land or its land revenue shall whether liable to resumption or not determine;" 11. It is well known that under the notification issued under Section 4 (1), the estates in the U. P. came to vest in the State of Uttar Pradesh with effect from July 1, 1952. After the said vesting and in view of the consequences of vesting laid down in Section 6 the award-decree between the parties lost its efficacy and ceased to govern the rights between the parties. In this connection, a useful comparison may be made with the consequences which followed the enactment of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14(1) lays as under:- "14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, Whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation In this sub-section, `property' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrear of maintenance, by gift from any person,whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhansa immediately before the commencement of this Act." 12. Initially, the said provision was interpreted by this Court and the Patna High Court to mean a complete extinction of the rights of the reversioners to question an alienation made by a Hindu widow before the coming into effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, vide Hari Prasad v lndrawati, A.I.R. 1958 All. 304 , R. A. Missir v. Raghunath A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480 and Julam Missir v. Pradip Missir, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 115 However, the Patna high Court in its Full Bench decision in Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577, reversed its earlier decisions. Ultimately. the Supreme Court in Kuttarswami v. Veeravva, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 909 resolved the controversy and laid down that Section 14(1) did not have the effect of enlarging the rights of the aliences and the reversioner's even after the new act could still question the transactions made before the said Act on the grounds on. which they could question such transactions earlier. The reversioner's would inherit the property if the alienation's Court in its Full Bench decision in Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581, reversed its earlier decisions. Ultimately the Supreme Court in Kuttarswami v. Veeravva A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577 resolved the controversy and laid down that Section 14(1) did not have the effect of enlarging the rights of the aliences and the reversioner even after the new act could still question the transactions made before the said Act on the grounds on which they could question such transactions earlier. The reversioner would inherit the property if the alienations were held to be not binding even after the coming into force of the new Act. Now can the same be said to be the position under Section 4 and Section 6 of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951 ?It is not possible to argue that any reversionary rights have survived after the enactment of the said provisions. Taking the leases created by the Rani in the instant case, can it be argued that if the transaction, are held to be not binding then Lal Pritap Bahadur Singh would inherit the Sir or Khudkasht plots either as reversioner or under the award-decree. There is nothing like sir nor Kliudkasht and nothing like a reversioner or claimant on the basis of the award-decree after the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. There is nothing like sir nor Kliudkasht and nothing like a reversioner or claimant on the basis of the award-decree after the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. In this connection, a reference may be made to the following pronouncements of the Supreme Court which have fully clarified the legal position in this respect : Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790, Collector and Dy. Commissioner v. Jagdish Pratap, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 909 State of U.P. v. Trivikram Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 799 Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019 and Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath, 1968 A.L.J. 844. 13. In Ramji Dixit's case, the alienation made by a widow Bhumidhar was challenged, not on the ground of personal law, but on the basis of the provisions of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951 itself on the ground that a female Bhumidhar had a limited interest under the new Act. The alienation which was impugned was made after the said Act came into force. However, this difference in the facts of the said case from the facts of this case does not improve the claim of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. In fact, it was expressly conceded before the Supreme Court that the personal law ceased to be operative after the coming into force of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. Shah, J. observed : "It is common ground that the personal law of inheritance of the holder does not determine the nature of the estate vested in a female bhumidhar. Counsel for the appellant says, however, that the Act contains indications that the interest of a female bhumidhar extends only to a life interest in the holding held by her." At a later stage, it was observed : "There is nothing in the Act which indicates that when a female who inherits the rights of a bhumidhar, under Section 171 or Section 172 or Section 172-A, any residuary interest remains vested in any other person. Under the Act she is the owner of the property the entire estate is vested in her. It is a fundamental rule of our jurisprudence that an estate does not remain in abeyance. Under the Act she is the owner of the property the entire estate is vested in her. It is a fundamental rule of our jurisprudence that an estate does not remain in abeyance. If It was intended by the Legislature that the interest inherited by a female mentioned in Section 171 was to be life interest, there would be same indication that the reversionary or residuary interest remains vested in another person designated for that purpose. But a search in that behalf in the Act is fruitless." Therefore, the position seems to be clear that whether the alienation was made by a Hindu widow proprietress before the U. P. Act 1 of 1951 or whether it has been made by such widow after she acquired Bhumidhari rights under the said Act, it is not open to a reversioner or to any other person claiming a contingent right of succussion to challenge such a transaction. In fact, as stated earlier, the reversioner or any other person claiming a contingent right of succession on the basis of a document (e.g. the awatd-decree in the present case) lost his rights after the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. Therefore, Lal Pratap Bahadhr Singh lost his rights under the award-decree or under the Hindu Law to claim any reversionary rights in respect of the plots which were leased out to the petitioners-appellants by the Rani. 14. But could the Rani herself impugn the said lease? Any executant of a deed can repudiate the document on the ground of fraud, want of capacity, dues, coercion etc. But apart from such grounds an alienation is generally binding on the limited owner during her life time though it may not be binding upon the reversioner after her death. In the instant case, either the leases would be binding upon the Rani during her life time or they would not be so binding upon her on the ground that they were completely void transactions. At the maximum, the Rani would have acquired Bhumidhari right in respect of the said plots under 18 of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. If she were to claim such rights, she should have filed her objections under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. At the maximum, the Rani would have acquired Bhumidhari right in respect of the said plots under 18 of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. If she were to claim such rights, she should have filed her objections under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Then we would have been called upon to examine whether the lessees acquired the status of, hereditary tenants and thereafter became the sirdars under the U. P. Act 1 of 1951, whether the Rani having become the Bhumidhar of the lease-hold plots under Section 18 lost her rights under Section 210 in view of her failure to file a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. All these questions really do not arise to be answered in view of the fact that the Rani did not question the lease-they were questioned by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh who had no right to question the same. It is not necessary to decide the status of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi or of the petitioners appellants vis-a-vis the leasehold plots - whether the Rani is the Bhumidhar of the said plots or, whether the petitioners-appellants are the Sirdars or Assamis or mere licensees of the said plots. It is an admitted fact that in the basic year, the petitioners-appellants are recorded as Sirdars. Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act lays down as under "9. Issue of extracts from records and statements and publication of records mentioned in Secs. 8 and 8-A and the issue of notices for inviting objections. (1) Upon the preparation, of the records of the statements mentioned in Secs. Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act lays down as under "9. Issue of extracts from records and statements and publication of records mentioned in Secs. 8 and 8-A and the issue of notices for inviting objections. (1) Upon the preparation, of the records of the statements mentioned in Secs. `8 and 8A, the Assistant Consolidation -Officer shall - (a) correct the clerical mistakes, if any, and send, or cause to be sent, to the tenure-holders concerned and other persons interested, notice containing relevant extracts from the current annual register and such other records as may be prescribed showing- (i) their rights and liabilities in relating to the land ; (ii) mistakes and disputes discovered under Section 8 in respect thereof ; (iii) specific shares of individual tenure-holders in joint holdings for the purpose of effecting partitions, where necessary, to ensure proper consolidation; (iv) valuation of the plots; and (v) valuation of trees, wells and other improvements for `calculating compensation therefor and its appointment amongst owners, if there be more owners than one; (b) publish in the unit the cur-rent `khasra' and annual register, the `khasra chakbandi'. the Statement. of Principles prepared under Section 8-A. and any other records that may he prescribed to show inter ilia, the particulars referred to in Cl. (a). (2) Any person to whom a notice under Sub-sec. (1) has been sent, or any person interested may, within 21 days of the receipt of notice, or of the publication under Sub-sec. (1), as the I case may be, k file before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, objections, in respect thereof disputing the correct-ness or nature of the entries in the records or in the extracts furnished therefrom, or in the Statement of Principles or the need for petition." 15. The objections in the present case were filed by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh claiming his rights under the award-decree. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, while allowing his objection, directed the name of the Rani to he mutated in the Revenue Records as the Bhumidhar of the plots in question. The Deputy Director of Consolidation upheld the order of the Settlement Officer. The basic question arises as to how Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh was entitled to file objections under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act ? How can he be deemed to be a person interested under the said provisions? The Deputy Director of Consolidation upheld the order of the Settlement Officer. The basic question arises as to how Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh was entitled to file objections under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act ? How can he be deemed to be a person interested under the said provisions? We have already held that after the notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951, his rights. under the award-decree became extinct and he could not base his claim on the award-decree. There is nothing like a limited Bhumidhar under the provisions of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951, nothing like a reversioner nothing like a contingent right of succession. If the Rani claimed to be Bhumidhar, then she alone could object under Section 9 of the U. P.. Consolidation of Holdings Act as she would he the person interested to contest the entry of Sirdari existing in favour of the petitioners-appellants. 16. It may be pointed out that under Section 174 of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951, Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh is not even an heir of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi. We arc highly doubtful if a mere heir can be deemed to be a person interested when the predecessor-in-interest is still alive. However , it is not necessary to go into the said question because Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh is not even an heir of the Rani under the provisions of the U. P. Act 1 of 1951. 17. Therefore, the position which has arisen in this case is that at the instance of a mere stranger, the name of the Rani has been directed to be brought on record by the consolidation authorities. This is not permissible under Section 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. In fact, even in general law, no one can question an infirm title unless he himself has .a better title. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh was therefore, not entitled to file objections under Section 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and the consolidation `authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain such an objection from a mere stranger to the plots in question. We do not think that Radharaman v. Gulab Thakur, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 50 and Doongarsee Shyanm v. Tribhuwan Das, A.I.R. 1947 All. We do not think that Radharaman v. Gulab Thakur, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 50 and Doongarsee Shyanm v. Tribhuwan Das, A.I.R. 1947 All. 375 relied upon by Shri G. P. Bhargava give us any assistance to decide the controversy at hand. 18. It was feebly sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh might have been authorised by the Rani to file objections on her behalf. We do not think the said suggestion merits acceptance. If we go through the orders of the consolidation authorities, we shall find that there is not the least suggestion that Lat Pratap Bahadur Singh filed the objection under Section 9 on behalf of the Rani. The said authorities have discussed and decided the said objections on the footing that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had rights under the award decree and the Rani's rights were limited by the terms of the said document. In other words, the objections were filed by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh claiming to be entitled to the property after the death of the limited owner i.e. the Rani. In para 15 of the writ petition it was stated: "That the O.P. filed objection under Section 9 of Consolidation of Holdings Act alleging inter alia mainly that the leases were invalid, that the act of letting was not an act of prudent manager, that the petitioners were only licencees." The averment of this paragraph has not been denied in the counter-affidavit of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh which means that he accepted the correctness of the said averment. If the objections were on behalf of the Rani then Lal Pratap Bahadur would have said so. Moreover, if the objections were on behalf of the Rani, then an important question would have arisen as to whether in her life-time she could have questioned the document and normally there would have been a discussion of the said point in the orders of the consolidation authorities. However, as it was no body's case that the objections under Section 9 were on behalf of the Rani, therefore, there is no such discussion in the said orders and throughout Lal Pratap Bahadur has been treated as the objector and not the Rani. 19. However, as it was no body's case that the objections under Section 9 were on behalf of the Rani, therefore, there is no such discussion in the said orders and throughout Lal Pratap Bahadur has been treated as the objector and not the Rani. 19. In this connection our attention was invited to certain rules in the Consolidation of Holdings Rules which relate to the filing of objections under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The relevant rules are Rule 25, Rule 25-A and Rule 26. However, these rules do not throw much light on the controversy at hand and we have to interpret Section 9 as it stands without any aid from the Rules. 20. Under the Civil Procedure Code, the position is that under order of Rule 14, every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any); Provided that there a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. Now this rule speaks about the signature but says nothing about the frame of the suit. Order 3, Rule 2 speaks about recognised agents of parties who can appear, apply or act on behalf of a party to the suit. However, it means that the party on the record will be the principal himself, not the agent the latter will act on behalf of the former, but the suit will be in the name of the principle. Some of the old cases laid down that the agent cannot bring suits in his own name: 1882 Punj. Re No. 20 (P. 75 (76) (D.B.) and various other cases detailed in Chitale's C.P.C. Note 2 to order 3. Rule 2. 21. The position does not seem to be different under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Even if Lal Pratap Bahadur, holding a valid power of attorney from the Rani could sign the objections on her behalf the objections were bound to be in the name of the Rani herself and not in the name of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. 22. The position does not seem to be different under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Even if Lal Pratap Bahadur, holding a valid power of attorney from the Rani could sign the objections on her behalf the objections were bound to be in the name of the Rani herself and not in the name of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. 22. The position, therefore, seems to be so clear us that we do not at all feel it necessary to say anything more on the aforesaid suggestion that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh might have filed objections under Section 9 on the basis of some authority conferred on him by the Rani. Neither factually nor legally, the said suggestion has any merit. However, Shri G.N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants, sought to place on record a true copy of the objection which was filed by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The said true copy has been sought to be filed alongwith an application and affidavit of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi. The prayer in the application is as follows:- "It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that it is, therefore, but just and proper that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh's objection under Section 9 be dismissed and the order of Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Pratapgarh alleged to have been passed in favour of the deponent without hearing the deponent to set aside." This application was moved on 22-11-1973 after the arguments in the special appeal had been heard. We cannot allow a prayer as made by Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi in the application dated 22-11-1973 because she has no locus standi to make such a prayer without being first impleaded as a party to the writ petition. However, there can be no objection to the entertainment of supporting affidavit by third party. In that view of the matter if it were necessary we would have allowed the true copy of the objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to be brought on record. However, there can be no objection to the entertainment of supporting affidavit by third party. In that view of the matter if it were necessary we would have allowed the true copy of the objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to be brought on record. In this connection attention may be drawn to the following cases : Ghaio Mal and Sons v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 65 C. A. Hasan v. State of U. P., 1965 A.L.J. 991 at p. 994 and P. Joseph John v. State, A.I.R. 1953 Travancore-Cochin 363 (F.B.) The aforesaid cases clearly lay down that for issuing a writ of certiorari "The High Court is entitled to summon the entire record for the purpose of examining the regularity or the legality of the proceedings in the case as a whole." The objection on behalf of respondent No. 1 that at such a late stage we should not allow additional evidence to be brought on the record lacks substance because in allowing a true copy of the objection under Section 9 to be placed on record no additional evidence will be placed on record. The said objections are part of the record of the proceedings in which the impugned orders were passed. However, as we have held that it is not necessary to do so, we are by our separate order rejecting the application of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi. 23. Now remains the question to be considered as to whether we can allow the question of the non-maintainability of the objection under Section 9 by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh to be raised in the instant appeal. Shri G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, leaned very heavily upon the observations of Chief Jusiice Desai in 1966 A. L. J. 631 (supra). As stated hereinbefore he relied on various other decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court. It is not necessary to discuss each and every case cited at the Bar separately. It is well known that new points should not be allowed when they raise questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. As stated hereinbefore he relied on various other decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court. It is not necessary to discuss each and every case cited at the Bar separately. It is well known that new points should not be allowed when they raise questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. Whether a pure question of law on admitted facts should or should not be allowed to be raised in a writ proceeding when it was not raised before the subordinate authorities will depend upon the nature of the question sought to be raised. Whether in such a situation there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record may be a debatable. However, if the question raised touches upon the jurisdiction of the subordinate authority, then such an objection can be raised even for the first time in the writ petition or in appeals therefrom. In this connection. a reference may be made to the following cases : Raja Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Income Tax Officer 76 I.T.R. 619 (D.B.)-, Imperial Tobacco Co. v. State, A.I.R. 1971 Cal. 109 Swami Dayal v. Ram Kishore, 1970 A.L.J. 291, Vira Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1970 Punjab 525, Alembic Chemical Works v. Workmen, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 647 Badri Pd. v. Nagamal, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 559 and M. S. R. T. Corpn. v. B. G. R. Service Warora, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1926 In 1966 A. L. J. 631 Chief Justice Desai observed : "If a certain galea was not raised before the Tribunal it did not commit any ,manifest error of law by not considering it." It is obvious that these observations only relate to the question. whether there is a manifest error of law not. But it is well known that Certiorari issues also when there is a lack of jurisdiction vide Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 233. Now the question about the locus standi of an objector under Section 9 is a question which affects the very jurisdiction of the Consolidation Officer to proceed in the matter. It is only at the instance of an interested party that he can proceed to dispose of the controversy. If a party is not an interested party then no objection can be entertained under Section 9 at his instance. It is only at the instance of an interested party that he can proceed to dispose of the controversy. If a party is not an interested party then no objection can be entertained under Section 9 at his instance. It will be strange if at the instance of a complete stranger the name of the existing tenure-holder is removed and the name of another person is mutated even though the latter has himself not filed any objection. In the present case even though Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi did not claim any rights with respect to the plots in question, still, her name has been directed to be entered as bhumindhar of the plots in question at the instance of a complete stranger i.e. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. Apart from the language of Section 9 which speaks of a person interested, in general law such a course is not permissible. It will he almost compelling a person to i.e mutated as a tenure-holder even though he may not be willing to do so. In being entered as a tenure holder certain liabilities will also come into existence. The recorded tenure-holder will be bound to pay the dues of the State in respect of the plots in question. It is inconceivable that a party can he compelled to be subject to such liabilities at the instance of a rank stranger who has no interest in the plots in question and as such who has no locus standi to file objections. All these considerations lead to the conclusion that before the jurisdiction of the Consolidation Officer can be invoked under Section 9 the objector must be a person interested and only then he will have a locus standi to file objection on the basis of which the Consolidation Officer will proceed to decide the controversy between the parties. If the objections are filed at the instance of a rank stranger, the Consolidation Officer has no jurisdiction to act in the matter and to direct the name of the recorded tenure-holder to be elected. In this connection a reference may be made to the following Supreme Court cases which have laid down the law with reference to the jurisdiction of the authority under the payment of Wages Act: A.V.D. Costa v. B.C. Patel, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 412 Sri Ambika Mills Co. In this connection a reference may be made to the following Supreme Court cases which have laid down the law with reference to the jurisdiction of the authority under the payment of Wages Act: A.V.D. Costa v. B.C. Patel, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 412 Sri Ambika Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt, A.I.R. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 970 and Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. B.E.S. and I Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 590 It has been clearly laid down that the said jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act is limited by the terms of Section 15 of the said Act and that the authority has no jurisdiction to go into other questions or to exercise any other power besides what is conferred by Section 15 and matters which are incidental thereto. The position of the Consolidation Officer seeking jurisdiction under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act seems to be analogous. His jurisdiction is circumscribed by the language of Section 9 and when the said section speaks of a person who is not interested cannot give jurisdiction to the Consolidation Officer under Section 9. Therefore, we feel that we can allow the petitioners-appellants to raise the Pratap Bahadur Singh to file and maintain the objection under Section 9 even though it might not have been raised at the earlier stages. There is some dispute between the parties whether the said contention was raised by the petitioners-appellants at the earlier stages. In the writ petition the contention was undoubtedly raised as will be clear from a reference to paragraphs 32 and 33 of the said petition and to ground No. 5 thereof. The point has, however, not been discussion in the judgement of the learned single Judge. However, we do not feel that the point so vital and raising the basic question of the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities can be unavailable to the petitioner-appellants merely on the ground that there is no discussion in the judgement of the learned single Judge on the said point. 24. We, therefore, hold that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had no locus standi or competence to file the objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the consolidation authorities, therefore, had no jurisdiction to direct the name a of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to be mutated in the Revenue records. 24. We, therefore, hold that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had no locus standi or competence to file the objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the consolidation authorities, therefore, had no jurisdiction to direct the name a of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to be mutated in the Revenue records. The consolidation authorities further could not direct the names of the petitioners to be deleted from the Revenue records on the basis of the objections which were not maintainable. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to discuss the other contentions which have been raised by the learned counsel. We do not feel it necessary to interpret the terms of the award-decree including the clarifications given by the arbitrators, and similarly, we do not feel it necessary to go into the question whether the transactions in question were prudent acts on the part of the Rani. We have found much substance in the contention of Shri G. N. Verma that even if the interpretations placed by the higher consolidation authorities and by the learned single Judge on the award-decree (including its clarification) were correct, still, there were no evidence or material to show that the transactions in question were not prudent acts on the part of the Rani. The authorities concerned and the learned single Judge have only taken for granted that in view of the impending legislation seeking to abolish Zamindari in U. P., leases of Khudkasht or Sir plots in June or early July 1949 must necessary be held to be imprudent transactions. The U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Bill was introduced in the Lower House on 7-7-1949 and both the impugned transactions had been put through by the said date. No one could say with certainty as to how the bill would have faired in the Legislature. There could be changes and amendments in the Bill before it was finally enacted into a statute. Therefore, if it was ought to show that in June and early July 1949 the leases in question were imprudent acts on the part of the Rani, then further details should have been placed as to how the said transactions were described to be imprudent. That would name depended upon a variety of factors and circumstances. Therefore, if it was ought to show that in June and early July 1949 the leases in question were imprudent acts on the part of the Rani, then further details should have been placed as to how the said transactions were described to be imprudent. That would name depended upon a variety of factors and circumstances. Nothing of the kind w as done by the respondent No. 4 when he filed his objection wider Section 9. Therefore, the finding of imprudent act on the part of the Rani recorded by the appellate and the revisional authorities in the consolidation proceedings and by the learned single Judge seems to be based on no material or evidence whatsoever and it is well known that such a finding is deemed to be an error apparent on the face of the record vide H. S. and 1. E. Board, U. P. v. Bagleshwar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 875. If it were necessary we could have allowed the appeal on this ground also but as we have stated earlier, it is really not necessary to go into other Contentions raised by the learned counsel as we are disposing of the controversy on the preliminary ground raised by Shri G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants, that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh could not file objection under Section 9 and, as such the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to direct the name of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to be brought on record after deleting the names of the petitioners-appellants. 25. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. The writ petition of the petitioners-appellants is allowed and the order dated 7-11-1967 passed by the District Deputy Director, Consolidation, Pratapgarh and the order dated 20-3-1967 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Pratapgarh are quashed and set aside. 26. This order will also govern the connected special appeal No. 135 of 1969 which arose out of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45 of 1958. Both the writ petitions were identical and between the same parties and the allegations and the relief sought are also completely identical. They were disposed of by one common judgment by the learned single Judge and we are also disposing of both the special appeals by one common judgment.