JUDGMENT TULJAPURKAR J.- This appeal preferred by the State of Maharashtra against the aquittal of the respondent-accused rai3es an important question pertaining to proper contruction to be placed upon section 390 (1) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (Bombay Act III of 1388) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and since the two Division Benches of this Court have expressed conflicting views thereon the same has been referred to this Full Bench for decision. 2. The facts giving rise to the prosecution of respondent-accused were these: One Mr. P. P. Jacob, overseer of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, visited the premises of Universal Metal Refinery at Churiwadi, Goregaon (East) on December 22, 1970, at about 11.30 A. M. and noticed that the work of casting of balcony plates and moulding of plastic was going on in the said factory. He also found that five workers were actually working there and electric energy to the extent of 20 H. P. was being used. The respondent accused, a partner of the firm, could not on demand produce any written permission under section 390 (I) of the Act, inasmuch as, no such permission had been obtained. The overseer reported the matter to the higher authorities and one Mr. B. N. Mehta, Junior Municipal Prosecutor and advocate, filed a complaint against the respondent-accused in the Court of Presidency Magistrate, 26th Court, Borivli, charging him with an offence punishable under section 471 read with section 390 of the Act on the allegation that he was found to have worked his aforesaid factory with the aid of electric energy of 20 H. P. on December 22, 1970, without a valid permission as required under section 390 (1) of the Act. The respondent-accused admitted the working of the factory on the said premises and further admitted that he had not obtained any permission under section 390 of the Act. He, however, contended that the .aid factory had been established in 1949 when Goregaon (East) was not within the limits of Greater Bombay and hence no permission was required under section 390 for conducting his factory. He, however, contended that the .aid factory had been established in 1949 when Goregaon (East) was not within the limits of Greater Bombay and hence no permission was required under section 390 for conducting his factory. On the evidence led before him the learned Presidency Magistrate found as a fact that the factory was functioning on the premises in question since 1949 and he also accepted the contention of the respondent-accused that since the factory was already in existence prior to concerned area being brought within the limits of Greater Bombay, written permission under section 390 (1) of the Act was unnecessary and he therefore, acquitted the respondent-accused by his order dated November 3, 1972. In taking the above view he relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in The Bombay Municipal Corporation v. I. S Patel1 where this Court took the view that in respect of factories established in areas prior to merger of all such areas within the limits of Greater Bombay, no such permission under section 390 was required to be obtained. Against the acquittal order the State preferred the aforesaid appeal which came up for hearing before Vaidya J. and before the learned Judge reliance was placed on behalf of the State on a prior judgment of Division Bench of this Court in State v. Suryakant Chhangalal2 where a contrary view was taken, it being held that where the factory was situated in Bandra and was established before Bandra was included within the limits of Greater Bombay, such factory required a written permission under section 390 (1) of the Act for running the same after the area had merged within the Greater Bombay. Three other judgments of single Judges of this Court in which a view similar to the one taken by Gajendragadkar and Vyas JJ. was taken were cited before the learned Judge. (Vide judgment of Vimadalal J. in State of Maharashtra v. J. C. Shah3, judgment of Deshpande J. in The State of Maharashtra v. Vasanji Anandji Manik4 and judgment of Rege J. in The state of Maharashtra v. B. C. Vakil5). was taken were cited before the learned Judge. (Vide judgment of Vimadalal J. in State of Maharashtra v. J. C. Shah3, judgment of Deshpande J. in The State of Maharashtra v. Vasanji Anandji Manik4 and judgment of Rege J. in The state of Maharashtra v. B. C. Vakil5). Having regard to manifestly conflicting rulings of this Court on the point counsel for both the parties requested the learned judge to place the Appeal before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench for resolving the conflict and that is how the matter has been referred to us for our decision. 3. Since the question pertains to proper construction to be placed on the provisions of s. 390 (1) of the Act, it would be desirable to set out the provisions of s. 390 of the Act, which run as follows: "390. (1) No person shall newly establish in any premises any factory, workshop of workplace in which it is intended that steam, water or other mechanical power shall be employed, without the previous written permission of the Commissioner, nor shall any person work, or allow to be worked, any such factory, workshop or workplace without such permission. (2) The Commissioner may refuse to give such permission if he shall be of opinion that the establishment of such factory, workshop or workplace in the proposed position is objectionable by reason of the density of the population in the neighbour-hood thereof, or will be a nuisance to the inhabitants of the neighbour-hood. (3) If any written permission for the establishment of a factory, workshop or workplace granted under sub-section (1) be revoked by the Commissioner in the exercise of his powers under sub-section (3) of section 479, no person shall continue or resume the working or use of such factory, workshop or workplace until such written permission is renewed or a fresh written permission is granted by the Commissioner." 4. It was not disputed before us that in the instant case the factory of the respondent-accused had been established and was in existence in Goregaon, (East) since 1949; it was also not disputed that the concerned area of Goregaon (East) came to be merged within the limits of Greater Bombay with effect from February 1, 1957 and as such the important question arising for determination in the case is whether sub-section (1) of section 390 applies to this factory or not. It was not disputed that the first part of sub-section (1) of section 390 would not apply to the case, for, obviously that part applies to a case where a person wants to establish newly in any premises of factory, workshop or work-place in which it is intended that steam, water or other mechanical power shall be employed. The real question, therefore, is whether the second part of sub-section (1) of section 390, which was inserted by way of amendment by Bombay Act I of 1916, applies to the factory in question notwithstanding its existence at Goregaon (East) prior to inclusion of that area within the local limits of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, and it was on this disputed question that rival contentions were urged before us by counsel appearing for the parties. 5. Mr. Rajani appearing for the respondent-accused contended that 'the two parts of sub-section (1) of section 390 should be read together and so read it would be clear that latter part which was added by Bombay Act I of 1916 shall apply to a newly established factory after the area Goregaon (East) was merged within the limits of Greater Bombay, that is to say, after the provisions of section 390 (1) became applicable to such merged areas on and from February 1, 1957. He pointed out that ordinarily all legislation, which is not procedural but deals with the rights of citizen, must be regarded as prospective in operation, that the first part of sub-section (1) which was enacted on September 14, 1888, was clearly intended to apply to factories that were established, after that enactment came into force and that this aspect of the matter had been made sufficiently clear out of abundant caution by using the words 'No person shall newly establish' in the first part of sub-section (1). He, therefore, contended that even the second part of sub-section (1) which was added by Bombay Act I of 1916 should also be similarly construed to have prospective operation, that is to say, to factories which came to be established after February 12, 1916, the date on which the added portion came into effect. He further urged that if the latter part, which was added by Bombay Act I of 1916, is carefully scrutinized, it will appear clear that the expressions 'such factory' and 'such permission' have been specifically employed while enacting the said part and according to him, the expression 'such factory' must mean a factory described in the earlier part, namely, a newly established factory in which steam, water or other mechanical power is intended to be employed and the expression 'such permission' must mean permission described in the earlier part, namely, previous written permission to establish a factory. According to him, therefore, the latter part of sub-section (I), which was added by Bombay Act I of 1916, only applies to factories which have come to be established after the said provision was enacted or was extended and made applicable for the first time to areas which came to be included within the municipal limits of the Corporation under Bombay Act I of 1946 or Bombay Act 58 of 1956 and since it was admitted that the factory of the respondent-accused was in existence in Goregaon (East) since 1949 and Goregaon (East) came into Greater Bombay with effect from February I, 1957 under Bombay Act 58 of 1956, the same did not require any written permission contemplated by section 390 of the Act. In support of his contention he naturally relied upon the latest Div13ion Bench judgment of this Court delivered by Kotval C. J. and Palekar J. in The Bombay Municipal Corporation v. I. S. Patd. He pointed out that in this judgment the Division Bench had taken the view that the expression 'such factory' occurring in the latter part of sub-section (I) should be interpreted to mean a newly established factory in which it was intended to employ steam, water or other mechanical power; in other words, according to Mr. He pointed out that in this judgment the Division Bench had taken the view that the expression 'such factory' occurring in the latter part of sub-section (I) should be interpreted to mean a newly established factory in which it was intended to employ steam, water or other mechanical power; in other words, according to Mr. Rajan, the decision clearly laid down that the section was applicable to the factory, workshop or workplace of a particular description which was sought to be newly established within Greater Bombay and according to him, the Division Bench also took the view that there was nothing in the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 nor in any other provisions of the Act to show that for continuing the working of such old established factory permission under section 390 of the Act was required. There is undoubtedly considerable force in the contention urged by Mr. Rajani before us. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Pratap appearing for the State contended that on a proper interpretation of the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 it should be held that permission contemplated under section 390 was required to be obtained even in respect of factories established before the concerned area was merged within the limits of Greater Bombay for working or running the same after the merger had taken place. Hl" argued that under the latter part of sub-section (1), which was added by Bombay Act I of 1916, it was intended by the Legislature to apply the provisions pertaining to requirement of obtaining previous written permission even to factories which had been established before but were actually running of working after the Act became applicable. He urged that the expression 'such factory' occuring in latter part of sub-section (1) should be construed to mean 'the factory in which it is intended that steam, water or other mechanical power shall be employed' and not 'a newly established factory in which it is intended that steam, water or other mechanical power shall be employed; and similarly the expression 'such permission' occuring in the latter part of sub-section (1) should be construe to mean 'precious written permission for working the factary' and not 'permission to establish a new factory'. According to him, if the two expressions 'such factory' and 'such permission' were interpreted in this manner, it will be clear that the latter part of sub-section (1), which was added by Bombay Act I of 19t6, was intended to apply to the working of even old established factories after the Act wall made applicable to the areas in which such established factories were situated. In support of his contention Mr. Pratap principally relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in State v. Suryakant Chhaganlal. He pointed out that in that case identical question had arisen for consideration, inasmuch as, the owner of a factory, which was working on electric motor of 20 H. P. and was manufacturing Badami coal and which had been established in Bandra before Bandra came to be merged within the limits of Greater Bombay, was prosecuted for not having obtained the written permission from he Municipal Commissioner under section 390 (1) of the Act after the provisions of the said section were made applicable to Bandra and the Division Bench held that even such factory which had been established prior to merger of Bandra within the limits of Greater Bombay required written permission under section 390 (1) of the Act for working the same after the area had merged within Greater Bombay. He pointed out that in that case relying upon the, the expression 'such factory' and 'such permission' occuring in the latter part of sub-section (I) of section 390 similar arguments were advanced before the Court on behalf of the accused and the Division Bench took the view that the expression " 'Such factory' must, therefore, be construed as meaning a factory in which it is intended that steam, water or other n;echanical power shall be employed. That is to say, the words 'such factory' do not mean a factory which has been newly established and in which mechanical power is intended to be employed; it only means afactory in which mechanical power is intended to be employed." In adopting such construction of the expression 'such factory' that Division Bench relied upon the decision of this Court in Emperor v. Karsandas Oovindji,6 where a similar construction had been placed on the expression 'such factory' occuring in the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390. Mr. Mr. Pratap contended that Chief Justice Beaumont, who delivered the judgment in the case of Emperor v. Karsandas Govindji, observed as follow (p. 758): "….The reference in the last part of the section to working 'any such factory' must relate back to the description of the factory contained in the earlier part of the section, and. the only description of a factory is of one in which it is intended that steam, water or other mechanical power shall be employed." The Division Bench in State v. Suryakant Chhaganlal after adopting the aforesaid construction of the expression 'such factory' proceeded to observe that, "by parity of reasoning the expression 'without such permission' occuring in the same clause can, in our opinion, be reasonably construed to mean previous written permission not for establishing the factory, but for working it or allowing it to be worked." Mr. Pratap further pointed out that a similar construction had been placed on the expressions 'such factory' and 'such permission' occuring in the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 in further three judgments of this Court, though each one of them happens to be of a single Judge. He pointed out that whereas Deshpande J. and Rege J. in matters that were argued before them followed the Division Bench ruling in State v. Suryakant Chhaganlal, Vimadlal J. had independently come to the same conclusion that the expression 'such factory' must mean a factory in which it is intended that steam, water Of other mechanical power shall be employed and the expression did not mean a newly established factory in which it is intended that steam, water or other mechanical power shall be employed. He, therefore, urged that on a proper construction of the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 we should hold that the factory of the respondent-accused and its working after the Act was made applicable to Goregaon (East) would require a written permission contemplated by section 390 of the Act. 7. He, therefore, urged that on a proper construction of the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 we should hold that the factory of the respondent-accused and its working after the Act was made applicable to Goregaon (East) would require a written permission contemplated by section 390 of the Act. 7. On a careful consideration of the rival contentions urged by counsel before us and on perusal of rival views contained in two sets of decisions of the Division Benches of this Court, it becomes obvious that the provision contained in the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 is capable of yielding to two different constructions both equally possible, and in such a situation it can· not be disputed that it would be open to the Court to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Bombay Act I of 1916 under which the latter part of sub-section (1) was added to the original sub-section (1) of section 390 with a view to ascertain the intention of the Leghlature while enacting the latter part. It is stated therein as follows:- "Section 390 has been found by the executive to be inadequate. By section 514 a prosecution for breach of the provisions of section 390 must be instituted within three months of the establishment of the factory. Consequently if a newly established factory evades the notice of the Health Department for three months, not Only does the promotor escape liability but also the factory cannot be discontinued. Again, if a factory has been discontinued as the result of a successful prosecution, there is nothing in the present law to prevent the resumption of work at the factory, because resumption of work does not come within the meaning of new establishment. Also a purchaser from an establisher is beyond the reach of the law, and, finally, no provision exists for continuous punishment of an offence which is likely to be continuous. These defects have been remedied." The purpose of adding the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 has been clearly set out above and the mischiefs that were sought to be remedied by making the addition have been clearly indicated. It will thus appear cleat that the intention was not to bring within its purview factories that had been established prior to the enactment coming into force or the continued working of such old established factories. It will thus appear cleat that the intention was not to bring within its purview factories that had been established prior to the enactment coming into force or the continued working of such old established factories. Similarly, therefore, the said provision could not have been intended to apply to factories established in areas which were subsequently brought within the limits of Greater Bombay. Looked at from this angle, the contention of Mr. Rajani appears to be well-founded, that by adding latter part to sub-section (1) of section 390 it was never intended by the Legislature that old established factories should be required to obtain written permission contemplated by that section. But here again it was urged by Mr. Pratap that though it was true that the Statement of Objects and Reasons could be looked into for ascertaining the intention of the Legislature the same had very limited use for, according to him, the Legislature could enact measure going much further than what was initially indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. In other words, Mr. Pratap contended that though initially the Bill may have been put forward to achieve a limited purpose the Legislature could go further than what the movers of the Bill had initially in their mind. He urged that the present case could be regarded as an instance in point where the Legislature had gone further than what was stated to be the object in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the intention of the Legislature had to be really gathered from the enacted words themselves and the operation of enacted words could not be controlled by what was contained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons; and he urged that the enacted words have been properly construed as being applicable to the continued working of pre-merger factories after the concerned area was got merged within the limits of Greater Bombay. 8. As stated earlier, in our view, the relevant provision of sub-section (1) of section 390 is capable of two constructions, both equally possible. Mr. Pratap, therefore, urged that the construction canvassed by him as the merit of carrying out the beneficent object of the legislation. 8. As stated earlier, in our view, the relevant provision of sub-section (1) of section 390 is capable of two constructions, both equally possible. Mr. Pratap, therefore, urged that the construction canvassed by him as the merit of carrying out the beneficent object of the legislation. He also pointed out that but for the latest Division Bench ruling of Kotval C.J. and Palekar J. in The Bombay Municipal Corporation v. I. S. Patel, all along the relevant provision contained in the latter part of sub-section (1), has been construed as being applicable to even old established factories to which the enactment was made applicable later on and even the Corporation has acted on such construction all throughout and all such established factories have been required to obtain a written permission under section 390 of the Act. In that behalf an affidavit of Deputy Municipal Commissioner Mr. V. H. Gumaste has been filed on record of this appeal. It appears clear, therefore, that the construction put upon the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 by the Division Bench of this Court in Emperor v. Karsandas Govindji as well as in State v. Suryakant Chhaganlal was also the Corporation's interpretation and the same has held the field for past several years, almost right from the time the said latter part was inserted by Bombay Act I of 1916 till now to our view, therefore, though the constructiol'l sought to be placed by Mr. Rajani on behalf of the respondent-accused relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in The Bombay Municipal Corporation v. I. S. Patel is possible, we feel that the construction canvassed by Mr. Pratap and which has been accepted by this Court in Emperor v. Karsandas Govindji and in State v. Suryakanl Chhaganlal and which has held the field for the past several years should not be disturbed or deviated from. Moreover, in view of the statements contained in para. 3 of Mr. Gumaste's affidavit, we feel no hardship will be caused to owners or conductors of such old established factories if the construction that has held the field is accepted. Moreover, in view of the statements contained in para. 3 of Mr. Gumaste's affidavit, we feel no hardship will be caused to owners or conductors of such old established factories if the construction that has held the field is accepted. We, therefore, hold that the latter part of sub-section (1) of section 390 of the Act is applicable to and would cover cases of factories which have been established before the enactment came into force or before the enactment was made applicable to the areas which have since been merged within the limits of Greater Bombay arid even such factories will have to obtain written permission as contemplated by section 390 of the Act. 9. Since the question was really a debatable one and required a decision of larger Bench, we do not think it would be proper in the instant case to convict the respondent-accused and impose a sentence upon him. Mr. Rajani appearing for the respondent-accused has stated that his client is willing to make the necessary application for written permission as contemplated by section 390 of the Act and. since Me. Platap has given an assurance that the requisite permission would be granted in view of the statement contained in para. 3 of Mr. Gumaste's affidavit, the Municipal authorities should be called upon to withdraw the prosecution against his client. Mr. Pratap stated before us that his client is willing to withdraw the prosecution. The prosecution is, therefore, allowed to be withdrawn. Mr. Pratap has also made a statement to us which we would like to record. He stated that all the prosecutions presently pending under section 390 read with sections 471/472 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, in respect of factories established prior to the merger in the Suburban and extended Suburban areas which have since been merged in Greater Bombay will be withdrawn provided the accused in those cases make applications for permission under section 390 of the Act within a period of four months from the date of publication of a notification in that behalf. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Prosecution allowed to be withdrawn, appeal dismissed.