JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This appeal has been preferred by defendant No. 2 in a suit pending before the learned Company Judge filed by the Union of India against the Jwala Bank Ltd. (in liquidation) and the appellant. The appeal is directed against an order deciding issue No. 8 as preliminary issue only. 2. Issue No. 8, which has been decided by the learned Company Judge was - "Whether the permission granted to the plaintiff under Sec. 446 of the Companies Act to file the suit is bad in law" ? 3. It appears that on 22nd July, 1968, the Union of India filed an application purporting to be under Sec. 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, for leave to file a suit against the Jwala Bank Ltd., (in liquidation). Along with the application the Union of India filed a copy of the plaint proposed to be filed. In it the present appellant was arrayed as defendant No. 2 in addition to the Jwala Bank Ltd., (in liquidation). On 30th January, 1970, the learned Company Judge granted the requisite permission to file a suit by 27th March, 1970. Soon after the Union of India filed a suit in the High Court. The present appellant filed a written statement, in paragraph 28 whereof he took the plea that the permission granted to the plaintiff was bad in law, principally on the ground that he was vitally interested in the question of the grant of leave, but neither he was served with notice of the proceedings nor was he heard. 4. The learned single Judge held that learned counsel for the appellant conceded before him that Rule 117 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, was not applicable. He repelled the submission that the appellant was entitled to be heard on the principles of natural justice. It was held that the proceedings for the giant of leave did not affect the right of the appellant, and so it was not necessary to afford him an opportunity of being heard. He also repelled the submission that the present suit was really only against the appellant and not against the Company. It was found that the prayers made in the plaint clearly indicated that the plaintiff had sought a declaratory relief against the Company as well as the appellant. He also repelled the submission that the present suit was really only against the appellant and not against the Company. It was found that the prayers made in the plaint clearly indicated that the plaintiff had sought a declaratory relief against the Company as well as the appellant. On this view the issue was decided against the defendant and the validity of the permission was upheld. Aggrieved, defendant No. 2 has come up in appeal. 5. At the threshold it was urged that the order does not amount to a "judgment" within meaning of Clauses 10 of the Letters Patent read with the Rules of Court. 6. In Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1719, the question was whether an order granting amendment amounted to judgment within meaning of clauses 15 of Letters Patent. The Supreme Court held that where an amendment takes away from the defendant the defence of immunity from any liability by reason of limitation, it is a "judgment" within clause 15. It is decision affecting the merits of the question between the parties by determining the right or liability based on limitation. It is the final decision so far as the trial court is concerned. The Supreme Court observed that in finding out whether an order is a "judgment", it has to be found out that the order affects the merits of the action between the parties by determining some right or liability; the right or liability is to be found out by the court; the nature of the order will have to be examined in order to ascertain whether there has been a determination of any right or liability. The Supreme Court held that the right to claim that an introduction of a cause of action by amendment is barred by limitation is founded on immunity from a liability; a right is an avernment of entitlement arising out of legal rules. A legal right may he defined an advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law. Immunity in short is no liability; it is an immunity from legal power of some other person; the co-relative of immunity is disability. Disability means the absence of power. The appellant before the Supreme Court, because of the limitation of the cause of action, had no power to render the respondent liable for the alleged claim. Immunity in short is no liability; it is an immunity from legal power of some other person; the co-relative of immunity is disability. Disability means the absence of power. The appellant before the Supreme Court, because of the limitation of the cause of action, had no power to render the respondent liable for the alleged claim. The Supreme Court held that the respondent had acquired by reason of limitation, immunity from any liability. 7. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in that case is applicable to the present appeal. Here if the issue in question had been decided in favour of the defendant, the suit would have failed, because it is evident that the suit was primarily against the Company. If the grant of leave as against the Company was on any ground illegal, the whole suit would have failed. The decision that the grant of leave was valid and proper thus affects the liability of the appellant on the merits and in that way affects his rights on the merits of the case. 8. We are accordingly of the opinion that the order of the learned Company Judge deciding this issue was a "judgment" within meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. 9. It has not been disputed before us that in view of Sec. 647 of the Companies Act, 1966, the proceeding for the grant of leave in the present case would be governed by the Companies Act, 1913, because the winding up order was passed under that Act. It is settled that recital of a wrong source of power in an order or proceeding is not decisive. If the authority making the power has the requisite power, then the exercise of power will not fail merely because a wrong provision of law has been quoted or mentioned : see Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 334, Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1329, L. Hazari Malkuthiala v. The Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 200 and P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 232. In the present case the application undoubtedly purported to be under Sec. 446 and the learned Company Judge also purported to grant leave under that provision, but undisputably the provision of law applicable was Sec. 171 of the Companies Act, 1913 which is virtually in the same terms as Sec. 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 The learned Company Judge had the power to grant leave under the Act of 1913. The order granting the leave being within the jurisdiction of the learned Company Judge, it could not be invalid merely because the Act of 1956 was mentioned in the application. 10. Since the order will be deemed in law to have been passed under Sec. 171 of the Companies Act, 1913, the provisions of the 195G Act will not he applicable. The Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, are admittedly applicable to proceedings under the Companies Act, 1956. Rule 117 of those rules which provides for notice not only to the official liquidator but to the her parties to the suit as well was not applicable to the proceedings for the grant of leave to commence the suit against the Company under the Act of 1913. 11. In the alternative learned counsel for the appellant urged that the principles of natural justice were attracted, and the appellant was entitled to notice of those proceedings. On facts it is admitted that appellant was not given any notice of the proceedings for the grant of leave nor was he heard. The question, however, is: does the proceeding for the grant of leave affect the rights of the appellant because it is settled that the principles of natural justice are applicable only if the proceedings adversely affect vested rights of some person : see State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269. Sec. 171 of the Companies Act, 1913 provides that- "When a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed, no suit or oher legal proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the Company except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose". 12. This section creates a bar to the general right of a person to sue a company after winding up order has been passed in relation to the Company. Normally every person has a free right to sue another in the courts of law. 12. This section creates a bar to the general right of a person to sue a company after winding up order has been passed in relation to the Company. Normally every person has a free right to sue another in the courts of law. That right has been controlled by this provision in so far as a company in liquidation is concerned. In order to remove this bar the plaintiff has to apply for, and obtain, leave of the Company Judge. In such proceedings the Company Judge has to see whether the interest of the Company would be best subserved if the claim of the plaintiff is adjudicated by an independent suit or by a claim being lodged in the winding up proceedings. The question of the grant or refusal of the leave is not at all intended, or likely, to affect the rights of the plaintiff or the defendant on the merits. Even f leave is refused, the plaintiff will have right to file his claim and get adjudication of his claim made by the liquidator in the course of winding up proceedings. It cannot hence be said that if the present appellant had been heard and as a result the leave had been refused his rights would have improved in any manner, because in that event the plaintiff could have sued the appellant along with the Company in the winding up proceedings themselves. So far as the adjudication of the rights of the plaintiff as against the present appellant on the merits is concerned, the appellant could not have escaped their adjudication. In this view it is apparent that the proceedings for the grant of leave against the Company did not affect any right of the appellant much less any right vested in him. Hence the principles of natural justice were not applicable. The decision of the learned Company Judge that the grant of leave was not invalid is justified. 13. No other point was pressed. 14. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.