JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution. ( 2. ) THE petitioner is a member of the Indian Forest Service in the State of Madhya Pradesh. He was appointed Assistant Conservator of Forest with effect from 1st April 1949 in the former State of Madhya Pradesh and was confirmed on that post with effect from 1st April 1952. He was promoted as deputy Conservator of Forest for the first time with effect from 26th December 1953 and confirmed on that post with effect from 1st November 1956. On the constitution of the Indian Forest Service he was appointed a member of that service and he is now a permanent member of the said service. ( 3. ) THE petitioner has a grievance regarding his seniority. His main contention is that he should have been assigned a position above respondents nos. 3 to 13 in the combined gradation list prepared under section 115 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 and published on 12th April 1962, in view of his total length of service as computed from the date of his appointment as Assistant Conservator of Forest and his confirmation on the said post with effect from 1-4-1952. He also challenges the fixation of seniority allotted to him in the unit gradation list by the former State of Madhya Pradesh before 1-11-1956. The petitioner submitted representations to the Government regarding his seniority ; but they were rejected. He has, therefore, filed this petition praying that the orders, dated 17-8-1971 and 27-8-1971, rejecting his representations regarding seniority vide Annexures J and K be quashed and the State Government be directed to consider his representations afresh and assign him proper seniority. ( 4. ) IT appears that the petitioner had approached this Court on two previous occasions for a similar relief. He first filed a petition, which was registered as Miscellaneous Petition No. 340 of 1966. The said petition was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file another, if so advised, by order of this Court dated 11-10-1968 as reproduced in paragraph 8 of the petition. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another petition, which was registered as Miscellaneous petition No. 549 of 1968. This second petition was however, dismissed on the ground of delay vide order of this Court dated 20 12-1968 (Annexure E ). Thereafter, the petitioner filed another petition, which was registered as Miscellaneous petition No. 549 of 1968. This second petition was however, dismissed on the ground of delay vide order of this Court dated 20 12-1968 (Annexure E ). In view of the said order, a preliminary objection has been raised before us whether this petition can be entertained for a similar relief. ( 5. ) IN Daryao v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1961 SC 1457 ) their Lordships, while dealing with a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, considered the operation of the rule of res judicata in the context of decisions of the High Court on the same matters. It was held by their Lordships that if a writ petition filed by a party under Article 226 is considered on merits as a contested matter and is dismissed, the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings. Shri R. S, Dabir, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the principle of res judicata could not be invoked in this case because the earlier decision was not rendered on merits after contest, the petition having been dismissed in limine on the ground of laches. The question of dismissal on the ground of laches was also considered by their Lordships in the aforesaid case and the following observations made by them in paragraph 19 are pertinent: "if the petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32 except in case where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Article 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits, it would be a bar; if the order shows that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was guilty of laches or that he had an alternative remedy it would not be a bar, except in cases which we have already indicated. " It would thus appear that even where a petition is dismissed on the ground of laches, a second petition for a similar relief would be barred where the reasons for which the earlier petition was dismissed are relevant in the second petition. The principles laid down in the aforesaid decision were re-affirmed by their lordships in Gulabchand v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1965 SC 1153 . ). Although the aforesaid principles were laid down by their Lordships while considering the effect of the decisions of the High Court on subsequent petitions before the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution, they are equally applicable where the subsequent petition is filed in the High Court itself. ( 6. ) THE applicability of the rule of res judicata to cases where an earlier petition has been dismissed without notice to the other side was again considered by their Lordships in Virudhunagar S. R. Mills v. Madras Government ( AIR 1968 SC 1196 . ). It was held in the said case that where a writ petition is disposed of on merits by a speaking order, it would operate as res judicata and would bar a subsequent petition, irrespective of whether a notice was issued to the other side or not. It is clear from this decision that hearing of the other side or even issuing notice to the other side is not a sine qua non for the applicability of the rule of res judicata. The reason for this is obvious. It is clear from this decision that hearing of the other side or even issuing notice to the other side is not a sine qua non for the applicability of the rule of res judicata. The reason for this is obvious. Where a decision is rendered against a party after hearing it, the decision would operate as res judicata on that matter in a subsequent petition by the same party because, so far as that party is concerned, the decision was final, it being immaterial that no notice was issued to the opposite party and so there was no occasion for the other party to contest the matter. ( 7. ) IN Miscellaneous Petition No 549 of 1968 this Court, while dismissing the petition in limine, made the following observations: "this application must be dismissed on the short ground that it has been filed several years after the impugned integration lists were published. The provisional integration list was published in the Gazette dated 23rd September 1959 and the final integration list was published in the Gazette dated 12th April 1962. It was on 21st November 1968 that this petition was filed. . . . . . But this does not in any way alter the fact that the present petition has been filed several years after the impugned order of reversion was passed and the integration lists were published and is highly belated. It must be added that the petitioners remedy of filing a suit for challenging the order of reversion and the integration lists is also now barred by time. In these circumstances, there is no ground for admitting this petition. It is rejected. " ( 8. ) THE reasons given in the aforesaid order for dismissing the petition on the ground of laches are not only relevant but are fully applicable to the present petition. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi (A I K 1970 s C 898.) their Lordships, while dealing with a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, made the following pertinent observations: "the party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action tor that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action tor that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. In england a period of six months has been provided statutorily, but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where there is appearance of avoidable delay and this delay affects the merits of the claim, this Court will consider it and in a proper case hold the party disentitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. " The aforesaid observations are equally applicable to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly those relating to service matters, delay in filing a petition has always been a relevant consideration for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; and except in cases where the delay has been duly accounted for, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the party guilty of undue delay vide Bhagwat Prasad v. Government of Madhya Pradesh (1966 MPLJ 557. ). This Court had dismissed the previous petition on the ground of delay and the reasons given therefor by this Court in its earlier order being relevant, this petition is liable to be thrown out on this ground alone. We may, however, add that we have looked into the merits of the petition and we are of the view that it is liable to be dismissed even on merits. ( 9. ) THE record of the petitioner is not unblemished. Although the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Conservator of Forests with effect from 1-4-1949, he was not confirmed on the expiry of the two years period of his probation. The period of his probation was extended by one year and he was ultimately confirmed with effect from 1-4-1952 vide Annexures R-4 and R-5. He was promoted as Deputy Conservator of Forests for the first time on 26-12-1953; but he continued to officiate in that post only upto 6-9-1954. He was reverted as the Public Service Commission did not give its concurrence to his promotion vide Annexure R-6. The petitioner, therefore, worked as Assistant Conservator of Forests upto 2-1-1956 when he was again promoted as deputy Conservator of Forests. He was reverted as the Public Service Commission did not give its concurrence to his promotion vide Annexure R-6. The petitioner, therefore, worked as Assistant Conservator of Forests upto 2-1-1956 when he was again promoted as deputy Conservator of Forests. Annexure R-18 gives the necessary data in respect of the petitioner as well as respondents Nos. 3 to 13, which is relevant for the purpose of determining their seniority inter se. For purposes of seniority in the combined gradation list the length of continuous officiation in a particular cadre was the criterion. Thus, the petitioner could claim his seniority as Deputy Conservator of Forests only from 3-1-1956 and not from an earlier date. It is clear from Annexure R-18 that respondents Nos. 3 to 13 were continuously officiating as Deputy Conservator of Forests from an earlier date. ( 10. ) THE petitioner mainly relied on rule 12 (c) of the Madhya Pradesh civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules which were published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette of 4th August 1961. The said rule is to the following effect: " (c) Officiating Oovernment servants:-The inter se seniority of Government servants promoted to officiate in a higher service or a higher category of posts shall, during the period of their officiation, be the same as that in their substantive service or grade irrespective of the dates on which they began to officiate in the higher service or grade. . . . . . . . . " It is, however, clear that this rule was not at all applicable for the purpose of determining the seniority of the petitioner in the combined gradation list in view of rule 11 of the said Rules, which reads as follows : "11. Gradation Lists prepared in connection with States Re-organisation:-Nothing in these rules shall have the effect of altering the seniority of a Oovernment servant in the gradation list relating to his Service prepared in pursuance of the provisions of the States be organisation Act, 1956. " ( 11. ) APART from this, the combined gradation list was prepared by the central Government under section 115 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 after giving due opportunity to the petitioner to make a representation. The petitioner had made a representation which was rejected vide letter dated 25th April 1961, (Annexure R-14) for the reasons given therein. " ( 11. ) APART from this, the combined gradation list was prepared by the central Government under section 115 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 after giving due opportunity to the petitioner to make a representation. The petitioner had made a representation which was rejected vide letter dated 25th April 1961, (Annexure R-14) for the reasons given therein. It would appear therefrom that the petitioners seniority was counted in the combined gradation list only with effect from 3-1-1956 when he was re-appointed to the post of Deputy Conservator of Forests after his earlier reversion. No arguments were addressed to us on the question of the reversion of the petitioner. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of the petitioner that his seniority was not properly fixed. ( 12. ) THE petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. We do not, however, make any order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case. The amount of security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to him. Petition dismissed.