JUDGMENT C.P. Sen, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, against the award of the Claims Tribunal. 2. The facts in brief are that on 30-1-1970 at 8.30 a.m., the deceased Syed, aged about 12 years, was going from Badwali chowki towards his house in Bajariya, by the left side of the road, when the city bus No. MPG 4800 came from behind and knocked him down. As a result, the boy Syed was thrown on the left side and he fell unconscious and a crowd collected but the bus did not stop, and went away. A report of the incident was lodged immediately by the father of the boy in Sadar Bazar Police station, Indore. Thereafter, the boy was taken to M.Y. Hospital, where he expired at about 2 p.m. due to the injuries sustained by him. A claim for damages amounting to Rs. 30,000/- was laid by the parents of the deceased against the Appellant and the driver of bus. The defence was that the boy was hanging on the back side body of the bus, he slipped and received the injuries and there was no negligence or rashness on the part of the driver. The learned Claims Tribunal passed an award of Rs. 5000/- on account of pecuniary loss incurred by the parents on the death of the boy. Against this award, the present appeal has been preferred by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and there is no cross objection. 3. The question to be determined are; (i) whether the accident was caused by rash and negligent act of the driver and (ii) the amount of compensation, if any, payable to the claimants. 4. It is well established that a person driving a motor vehicle on a highway must drive the vehicle with reasonable care, strictly observing the traffic Regulations and the rules of the road, so as not to imperil the safety of other persons, whether they are pedestrians or cyclists or others, who have similar right to use the highway on which he drives it. The driver must keep a good lookout in all directions of the road, on the sides and on the stretch of the road in front of him. 5. The driver must keep a good lookout in all directions of the road, on the sides and on the stretch of the road in front of him. 5. Here the claimants have examined two eye witnesses, Faizulla (A.W. 3) and Sultan (A.W. 4) who were immediately behind the deceased when the accident occurred and both have stated the boy was going by the extreme left of the road, when the city bus M.P.G. 4800 came in speed from behind and the boy was knocked down by the front left side bumper of the bus and the boy was thrown on the left side and fell unconscious and the bus did not stop. The testimonies of these witnesses are assailed on the ground that (i) these witnesses are got up witnesses because they were known to the claimants, yet, their names were not disclosed in the application for compensation although the prescribed form requires the name of the witnesses to be disclosed in the application and (ii) none of these witnesses stopped at the place of accident for more than two-three minutes, inspite, of the fact that they knew the injured boy, which was most unnatural conduct on their part. It is true that names of those witnesses have not been mentioned in the application inadvertently, because, name of Faizulla (A.W. 3) is mentioned in the F.I.R. (Ex. P/1), lodged immediately after the accident, and both the witnesses are residents of the same locality and their presence at the time of the accident cannot be doubted. It is also true that these two witnesses did not stop for more than 2/3 minutes after the accident and this is quite natural because the father of the boy and others had also collected there and since no visible external injuries were on the boy, the accident was perhaps not thought to be serious. Further, the statements of these witnesses have been fully corroborated by the father of the boy, Yasin (A.W. 2), who was also near the place of accident. On the other hand, the defence is that the boy was hanging on the body from behind and he slipped and received the injuries. Dr. Bakliwal A.W. 1 admits that such injuries can be sustained by fall from a fast moving vehicle. On the other hand, the defence is that the boy was hanging on the body from behind and he slipped and received the injuries. Dr. Bakliwal A.W. 1 admits that such injuries can be sustained by fall from a fast moving vehicle. But here the driver Kashiram (N.A.W. 1) and the Cleaner (N.A.W. 2) Kartarsingh have both stated that the bus was going in slow speed. Besides, the driver and the cleaner both have not seen the boy hanging and slipping on the road but they were so informed by two cyclists. None of these cyclists have been examined nor the report said to have been lodged by the driver thereafter in the police station has been produced in the case to corroborate their story. It is also pertinent to note that Faizulla (A.W. 3) has deposed that in the bus in question there was no rear bumper or any thing to hang on and it is also common knowledge that a ladder is fixed only on the long distance buses to enable luggage etc. to be kept on the top of bus. As such the defence is an after thought. The driver of the vehicle was expected to take care of the boy, who was going by the extreme left of the road and the mere fact that he was knocked down at the extreme left by the bus coming from behind itself shows the gross rashness and negligence of the driver. The findings of the learned Claims Tribunal on this count is affirmed. 6. Under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act the Tribunal is required to fix such compensation which appears to it to be just. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sheikhpura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. 1971 ACJ 206 have held that the powers given to the Tribunal under this section are quite wide. This Court, in Gulab Devi Sahaney v. Government of M.P. 1971 ACJ 214 , he said "The expression 'just' has a wider ambit than the words in Sections 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and a Claims Tribunal while dealing with a case under the Motor Vehicles Act, has only to consider what appears to it to be just compensation on the facts and circumstances of the case before it. While deciding the 'just compensation' in a case, the Tribunal must bear in mind and apply any general principle or principles laid down in the Indian and English decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act, as far as they may promote the interests of justice, on the facts and circumstances of each particular case" Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in C.R. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair 1970 ACJ 110 while deciding a case under the Fatal Accident Act, in which a child was killed by a bus, have observed thus "Compulsory damages under Section 1A of the Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under Section 2, the measure of damages in the economic loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amounts recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority. In the matter of ascertainment of damages, the appellate Court should be slow in disturbing the findings of the Courts below, if they have taken all the relevant facts into consideration." 7. In the present case, the learned Claims Tribunal has awarded damages of Rs. 5000/- to the parents under Section 1A and none under Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, since nothing has been claimed under that section. The Tribunal has found that the boy was aged 12 years and he was just average. The Tribunal also found that the boy belonged to a lower middle class family and being a son of a kabadi, the father could not have afforded much education to the boy. According to the father, his son was studying in Vlllth class but the claimants have not filed any school certificate or progress report nor any teacher has been examined. According to the father, his son was studying in Vlllth class but the claimants have not filed any school certificate or progress report nor any teacher has been examined. The learned Claims Tribunal has relied upon a number of decisions including 1970 A.C.J. 110 of the Supreme Court (Supra) and of this Court in M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Sudhakar 1967 ACJ 90 in arriving at a figure of Rs. 5000/- as compensation. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the Appellant are that in the Supreme Court case, for a boy aged 8 years belonging to an affluent family, compensation of Rs. 6000/- only was awarded and in Sudhakar's case of this Court, the child belonged to a upper middle class family and the compensation was reduced from Rs. 7500/- to Rs. 5000/- and so in the present case the compensation ought to be much less. However, I am unable to agree with the contentions and I feel that no much distinction can be made on account of the status of the parents of the deceased child. In a poor family, the parents may expect much higher pecuniary benefits under Section 1A than the parents in an affluent family, inasmuch as due to affluent circumstances, not much contribution is expected by the parents from their children, as has been observed in the Supreme Court case. But if a child is better placed and has better chances of higher education he may have much higher prospects of leading a predominantly happy life and so larger compensation will be claimable under Section 2 of the Act. In the present case nothing has been claimed under Section 2 and taking the over all view, the amount of Rs. 5000/- awarded by the Tribunal is just and proper and is in accord with the present trend of decisions. Even if the compensation under Section 1A can be reduced to certain extent, yet, the same can be offset by adding the claim due under Section 2. Here the deceased boy had passed the risks and uncertainties of early childhood and his future became more definite and on attaining age of 18 years, he was expected to earn about Rs. 125/- per month without any further education and contribute at least Rs. 50/- per month to his parents at least for seven eight years, making the pecuniary loss at Rs. 5000/- approximately. 125/- per month without any further education and contribute at least Rs. 50/- per month to his parents at least for seven eight years, making the pecuniary loss at Rs. 5000/- approximately. As such no interference is necessary on the quantum of compensation also. 8. In support, I may cite two recent cases about compensation payable in cases of death of child. In Joginder Singh v. Punjab State 1969 ACJ 28 , it has been said that the law could not be so illogical or cruel as to give 'immunity against any damages when a child is not school going and when a child belonging to a humble family in society' is killed as a result of a tortious act like rash and negligent driving. There is always expectancy of or pecuniary benefits for the parents of a child, whatever the status or vocation of the family be and whether the child is on way to a certain career or not. In Perumal v. State of Madras 1971 ACJ 144, uniformity in payment of compensation in case of death of a child has been advocated. It has been observed that in England compensation of 400 to 500 is awarded for death of a child between 7 to 14 years and so in India, the damages can be fixed at Rs. 5000/-. Neither wealth nor status of the child should be regarded as relevant in fixing the quantum. 9. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed