JUDGMENT Gopi Nath, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It challenges an order of the State Government dated 19-6-1973 reverting the petitioner from the officiating post of Superintending Engineer to his substantive post of Executive Engineer. The order has been challenged on the ground of mala fides, as also of violation of Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner took his Honours Degree in Bachelor of Engineering (Civil) from the University of Roorkee in the year 1948. He was appointed as an officiating Assistant Engineer in the Irrigation Department in the State of U.P. in June, 1949. He was confirmed as an Assistant Engineer in April, 1957. In January, 1960 he was promoted as an officiating Executive Engineer. The Petitioner crossed the Efficiency Bar on 7-7-1968 and was confirmed as an Executive Engineer with effect from 1-8-1964. A selection thereafter was held for the post of Superintending Engineer and the petitioner was selected as an officiating Superintending Engineer in the year 1971. The selection was made by a Board consisting of (I) Nominee of Chief Secretary; (2) Irrigation Secretary, (3) Secretary to the Public Works Department; and (4) Engineer-in-Chief. It will be seen that the selection Committee was a high powered body consisting of very responsible officers of the Government. The selection was made out of confirmed Executive Engineers on the basis of their service records. This fact is admitted in the counter affidavits. No interview was held nor was any other test applied. 17 persons were selected in the selection held in the year 1971 and the petitioner ranked a serial No. 15, according to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1. According to the petitioner he ranked at serial No. 14. Thus according to the petitioner he was senior to three persons while according to the State he was senior to only two in chat section in the year 1972 selection was again held for that post and 16 or 17 persons were again selected. This batch included some of those Executive Engineers who had been rejected in the selection held in the year 1971. This batch included some of those Executive Engineers who had been rejected in the selection held in the year 1971. The second selection was again made on the basis of service record and the petitioner's case is that his service record was superior to those who were rejected in 1971 and thereafter selected in 1972, A third selection was made for the same post, in the year 1973 and 11 persons were selected this time. In all these selections the candidates selected were arranged in order of seniority. The petitioner's case is that the petitioner was senior to those who ranked lower to him in the 1971 selection and senior to all those who were selected in the years 1972 and 1973. See annexure 2 to the first rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner, which is a Government order dated August 3, 1971 By means of an amendment to the petition the petitioner claims to be superior in merit to those who were selected in the years 1972 and 1973 and to the two candidates selected in the year 1971 shown lower in ranking than the petitioner. In paragraph 2 of the amendment application he has enumerated 29 Executive. Engineers who according to the petitioner are junior to him in the grade of Superintending Engineer. Two out of them belong to 1971 selection, 16 to 1972 selection and 11 to 1973 selection. He has further asserted that, his service record was better than the 29 persons mentioned in paragraph 2 of the amendment application. No counter affidavit was filed to the assertions made in the amendment application until the case was heard finally and at some length. Time had been granted for filing counter affidavit to the amended writ petition but no counter affidavit was filed challenging the allegations made by amendment. Learned Standing Counsel, however, prayed for time for filing a supplementary counter affidavit during the course of arguments, which was granted. Time had been granted for filing counter affidavit to the amended writ petition but no counter affidavit was filed challenging the allegations made by amendment. Learned Standing Counsel, however, prayed for time for filing a supplementary counter affidavit during the course of arguments, which was granted. By the supplementary counter-affidavit, the State has taken a stand that the service record of the 29 officiating Superintending Engineers mentioned earlier who Were selected in 1971, 1972 and 1973 respectively was, better than the petitioner's. It will, however, be noticed that in paragraph 12 of the second rejoinder-affidavit of the petitioner, filed on 11-1-1974, it has been specifically stated that in the first selection, held in the year 1971, the service record of 50 eligible Executive Engineers was examined and 33 out of them were rejected; the petitioner was,one of the 17 candidates selected. Some of the candidates, rejected in the year 1971 and were after-Wards selected in the years 1972 and 1973 and promoted to the post of officiating dating Superintending Engineer. This allegation has not been denied so far, even by the last supplementary Counter-affidavit, filed on the 5th of August, 1974 There is thus no denial of the assertion made in the rejoinder-affidavit, referred to above. The fans stated in paragraph 12 of the second rejoinder-affidavit will have to be accepted arid it will have to be held that the 1972 and 1973 selections included candidates who had been rejected in the year 1971. In view of the further admission by the State that selection to the post of Superintending Engineer is made only on the-basis of service record and the suitability is judged on the basis of merit, it is apparent that those Executive Engineer; who had been rejected in 1971 and were selected in the subsequent selections of 1972 and 19-73 did not possess a better service record the in that of the petitioner and the petitioner was found better suited to the post, in view of his service record, as compared to those who were rejected in the selection of 1971. The State has filed a chart as an annexure to the supplementary counter-affidavit, filed on 5th August, 1974, shoving tho good, satisfactory and adverse entries in respect of the Superintending Engineers, selected in the years 1971, 1972 and 1973. This will be adverted to at its proper place. The State has filed a chart as an annexure to the supplementary counter-affidavit, filed on 5th August, 1974, shoving tho good, satisfactory and adverse entries in respect of the Superintending Engineers, selected in the years 1971, 1972 and 1973. This will be adverted to at its proper place. It is, however, pointed out that the position as it obtains in the chart was very well available to the Government when it made the selections in the years 1971, 1972 and 1973 and, if on the basis of the character roll entries, as they existed at the time of 1971 selection, the Government found the petitioner better as, compared to those who were rejected in that selection, It does not appear coherent now to label him, as inferior to them in so far as the selection to the post of officiating Superintending Engineer is concerned. 3. After his selection the petitioner was telegraphically directed on 12-4-1972 to take over as Superintending Engineer, Yamuna Civil Construction Circle, Dehradun. On 25-8-1972 the petitioner was transferred from Yamuna Civil Construction Circle Dehradun to Drainage Circle, Ballia. On 10-9-1972 the petitioner took over as Superintending Engineer, Drainage Circle, Ballia. 4. The petitioner's case is that after his posting at Ballia he started, supervising the work of the Overseers and Contractors with a strict hand. The strict supervision was not liked by a group of persons, which included some contractors who were related to members of Legislative Assembly. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition set out the relevant particulars of these persons with necessary details. Paragraph 13 states that "these contractors and the M.L. As. became against the petitioner as the petitioner refused to act at their dictation and the petitioner preferred to work in accordance with the rules and procedure of Irrigation Department." The petition gives instances where high rates of articles of supply were brought down, preventing loss to the public exchequer. Persons having vested interests in supplies and contracts, it is stated, got annoyed and they poisoned the ears of the Engineer-in-chief and the Minister of Irrigation, by making false complaints against the petitioner. Paragraph 14 of the petition states that pressure was brought to bear on the petitioner in the performance of his official duties which was resented by him. These allegations are not denied by the Chief Engineer, who is respondent No. 2 to the petition by name. 5. Paragraph 14 of the petition states that pressure was brought to bear on the petitioner in the performance of his official duties which was resented by him. These allegations are not denied by the Chief Engineer, who is respondent No. 2 to the petition by name. 5. The petitioner's grievance is that his reversion is the result of external pressure on the Chief Engineer as also on the Government and that the reversion actually is a reduction in rank and visits the petitioner with penal consequences, it is a punishment inflicted without affording the petitioner and opportunity of showing cause as required by law, hence invalid as being violative of Article 311 of the Constitution. The petitioner's further case is that the order is in breach of Article 16, in that his juniors have been retained while he has been reverted. 6. The case on behalf of respondent, Nos. 1 and 3 is that the order of reversion is an innocuous order and has been passed on the ground of petitioner's unsuitability to hold the post of Superintending Engineer and that it has not been passed as a measure of punishment, hence there is no breach of Article 311, and since the juniors have a better service record no violation has been made of the provisions of Article 16. 7. Four counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the State. The tenor of all the counter affidavits is that an appointment to the post of Superintending Engineer is made on on the basis of selection on merit, that the selection is made on the basis of service record of the eligible candidates; that the petitioner stood at serial no. 15 in the order of merit in the first list of 17 candidates selected in 1971; that in 1972 and 1973 sixteen and eleven candidates respectively, were selected-as Superintending Engineers; that the petitioner has no right to continue on the post of Superintending Engineer merely because some officers junior to him have been retained, that the petitioner was reverted to his substantive post of Executive Engineer of the ground of unsuitability as a result of the entries made in his character roll for the period 1960-71 onwards. The specific case pleaded in para 26 of the counter affidavit of M.A. Khau dated 28-11-1973 is that in the opinion of the Government these entries did not justify his continuance as a Superintending Engineer, which is a post of responsibility. Paragraph 29 of that counter affidavit further states that the recent adverse entries were made on the complaint of M.L.As. from Ballia. The petitioner took over at Ballia in 1972. Two adverse entries have been referred to in this paragraph against the petitioner; one is for the year 1971-72 and the other for the year 1972-73, 1971-72 entry refers to the petitioner's performance as an Executive Engineer, it states, that he has no experience of big construction job but his work has been testified as satisfactory. The entry relating to the year 1972-73 was made regarding his work as Superintending Engineer. The remarks made by the concerned officer were not sent to the Government it appears, for over an year. They were seat to the Government in the year 1973 and appear to have been approved by it in August, 1973 when a direction was issued for the communication of the adverse entry to the petitioner. The entry was communicated by a letter dated 2nd of November, 1973. These facts have been gathered on a statement made to that effect by the learned Standing counsel after perusing the relevant records. The impugned order was passed on the 19th of June, 1973. The learned Standing Counsel could not make any statement that the entries were approved by the Government on or before that date. There is nothing on record to suggest that this entry was approved by the Government on or before June 19, 1973. At the time, the impugned order was passed the State Government it appears, had not applied its mind to the remarks of the concerned Officer as it had neither approved them nor directed their communication until long after the passing of the impugned order. They were communicated nearly 5 months after the passing of the impugned order. The effect of the adverse entries in these circumstances would be considered at its proper place. They were communicated nearly 5 months after the passing of the impugned order. The effect of the adverse entries in these circumstances would be considered at its proper place. At this stage only this has to be noticed that the stand of the respondents is that on an over all assessment of the petitioner's service record he was not found suitable to be continued on his officiating post on account of the adverse entries earned by him. On the basis of the chart filed along with the last supplementary counter-affidavit it has been urged that all the 29 Superintending Engineers who are junior to the petitioner, possess a better service record and hence have been retained. The position, therefore, is that the petitioner's suitability for the post of Superintending Engineer has been judged on the basis of the entries in his service record and his reversion has been made as a result of the entries earned by him during the years 1960-73. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the main reason for the reversion of the petitioner was the annoyance of the M.L.As. Learned counsel in this connection urged that the adverse entries for the period 1960-71, if any, lose their value after the petitioner was allowed to cross the efficiency bar, was confirmed as an Executive Engineer and thereafter promoted as a Superintending Engineer. Thus the entries which relate to his performance as an Executive Engineer cannot be taken into account for his reversion. The entries from 1960-71 thus lose their value. He further submitted that un-communicated character roll entries cannot be taken into account to the prejudice of the petitioner as opportunity of representation is provided for under Government orders and he had been given no such opportunity. The order, in these circumstances, could not be sustained being in violation of the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution as also on the ground of mala fides. 9. The questions that fall for determination are (1) whether the order passed was by way of punishment and as such in violation of the provisions of Article 311; (2) whether it infringed the provisions of Articles 14 and 16; (3) whether it had been passed mala fide. 10. 9. The questions that fall for determination are (1) whether the order passed was by way of punishment and as such in violation of the provisions of Article 311; (2) whether it infringed the provisions of Articles 14 and 16; (3) whether it had been passed mala fide. 10. It seems to me that the adverse entries in the character roll of the petitioner, prior to his selection as Superintending Engineer lose their value after he was selected to that post. The selection was made strictly on merit, which was determined on the basis of service record. It is admitted to the respondents that no interview was held nor was another test applied. The petitioner was selected out of a batch of 50 Executive Engineers in the year 1971. He was placed at serial no. 15. In the opinion of the Government, therefore, he was suitable for the post of Superintending Engineer on the basis of the entries earned by him. The petitioner was promoted as an Executive Engineer in the year 1960 and was selected as a Superintending Engineer in the year. In State of Punjab v. Diwan Chunilal (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2086): 1970 S.L.R. 375, it has been held that the adverse entries after crossing of efficiency bar lose their value for purposes of departmental proceedings. The same principle applies to higher selections, if the crossing of efficiency bar condones all previous adverse entries selection to a higher post would equally do the same. See also Shri Shadi Lal v. Deputy Commissioner Gurgaon and others (1974(1) Services Law Reporter 217). In the chart appended to the last supplementary counter-affidavit five adverse entries have been mentioned against the petitioner. Two of them relate to the years 1971-72 and 1972-73 and the other three to earlier periods which have not been mentioned. The reverse entry relating to the year 1971-72 refers to the petitioner's performance as an Executive Engineer. His performance as an Executive Engineer was fully judged at the time of selection and there was his promotion made. The entry was also not communicated until after his reversion. This entry cannot lead to his reversion. The second adverse entry relating to the year 1972-73 refers to the complaint of the M.L.As. of Ballia regarding the capacity and behaviour of the petitioner. Paras 12 to 14 of the petition set out the circumstances relating to this matter. The entry was also not communicated until after his reversion. This entry cannot lead to his reversion. The second adverse entry relating to the year 1972-73 refers to the complaint of the M.L.As. of Ballia regarding the capacity and behaviour of the petitioner. Paras 12 to 14 of the petition set out the circumstances relating to this matter. The remark of the concerned officer was not approved by the Government poor to the passing of the impugned order. The entry was communicated also long after. There is no material on record either in the shape of affidavit or otherwise that the Government had either applied its mind or taken any decision in respect of the adverse entry for the year 1972-73 prior to the passing of the impugned order. If it had applied its mind there is no reason why it should not have taken a decision. So, for the purposes of the impugned order the adverse entry for the year 1972-73 can also not he looked into. In the circumstances the impugned order dated 19-6-1973 would be deemed to have been passed by the State Government on the basis of the character roll entries for the period 1960-71 only as no entries for the years 1971-72 and 1972-73 had been finalised by the Government by 19-6-1973. The position with regard to the adverse entries for the years 1960-71 has already been discussed. The effect of those entries, if any, would in law be deemed to have been wiped out by the selection of the petitioner to the higher post. Paragraph 26 of the first counter-affidavit clearly states that the character roll entries earned by the petitioner during the entire period of 1960-71 onwards which would include the entries for the years 1971-72 and 1972-73 did not justify his continuance in the higher post. Paragraph 29 further clarifies the position that the reversion order was passed as a result of the adverse entries earned by the petitioner. Two positions follow: (1) that the reversion was either the result of the two adverse entries for the years 1971-72 and 1972-73 or the result of adverse entries for the entire period of 1960-73. Paragraph 29 further clarifies the position that the reversion order was passed as a result of the adverse entries earned by the petitioner. Two positions follow: (1) that the reversion was either the result of the two adverse entries for the years 1971-72 and 1972-73 or the result of adverse entries for the entire period of 1960-73. in either case if it was the result of adverse entries the order would amount to punishment in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sughar Singh (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 423) which case 1 shall discuss in detail later, If the order was a result of the entries for the years 1971-72 and 1972-73, the earlier adverse entries, deemed to have been condoned, the order will fail on two grounds ; (1) that the state Government had awarded no such entries by the 19th of June, 1973 when the impugned order was passed; and the order as such was without any basis and (ii) that the order being based on the entries it amounted to punishment without a proper procedure having been followed. 11. We now turn to the question whether entries served only as a motive or were the basis of the order. The form of the order is inconclusive; the substance thereof has to be seen in the light of the surrounding and attending circumstances in order to find out the real nature of the order. See Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab 1974(2) SLR 701 : 1974 SLWR 643 (Civil Appeal No. 2289 of 1970 decided by the Supreme Court on 23rd August 1974), State of U.P. and others v. Sughar Singh (supra), Jagdish Prasad Shastri v. State of U.P. and others (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1224). State of Bihar and others v. Shiva Bhikshuk Misra (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1011) and K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 998) and Dr. Kulwant Singh v. Dr. D.R. Marwaha and others, 1974 (1) Services Law Reporter p. 195]. We have therefore, to find out whether the adverse character roll entries were the basis or the motive for the reversion. If a reversion order is found on misconduct, inefficiency or other such disqualification, it would amount to punishment. See Sughar Singh's case (supra). The question is whether the entries in the instant case served as a foundation or a mere motive for reversion. If a reversion order is found on misconduct, inefficiency or other such disqualification, it would amount to punishment. See Sughar Singh's case (supra). The question is whether the entries in the instant case served as a foundation or a mere motive for reversion. A motive is a state of mind which is un-discoverable, the foundation or the basis on the other and being an objective fact which is manifest. See Shamsher Singh (supra). If the facts and circumstances of a given case disclose that an order was passed as a result of a decision reached that the incumbent was inefficient or otherwise disqualified the court can come to a conclusion that the order was by way of punishment notwithstanding that it was innocuously worded. The facts and circumstances furnish the objective data. 12. In Sughar Singh's case (supra) a Sub-Inspector of Police was reverted as a result of adverse character roll entries, the Supreme Court held that the order was one of punishment. 13. The facts of that ease were as follows, Sughar Singh was a permanent Head Constable. He was deputed for training as a Cadet Sub-Inspector. He was appointed as an officiating Platoon Commander. An adverse entry was made in his character roll by the Deputy inspector General of Police. He was, thereafter, reverted from the post of officiating Sub-Inspector to his substantive post of Head Constable. Die order was challenged on the ground that the reversion of the petitioner amounted to a reduction in rank without following the proper procedure. A learned Single Judge dismissed the petition. A Special appeal therefrom was allowed. The State of U.P. preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed. Their lordships held that "If Government expressly chooses to penalise the servant for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or the like by inflicting on him the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction, the requirements of Article 311 must he complied with". In dealing with the question of punishment their lordships observed that "Sometimes again the order of reversion may bring upon the officer certain penal consequences like forfeiture of pay and allowances or loss of seniority in the subordinate rank or the stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion; in such cases also the Government servant must be regarded as having been punished and his reversion to the substantive rank must be treated as a reduction in rank. In such a case Article 311 will be attracted. In the High Court, the Standing Counsel for the State made a statement that the order of reversion was the result of an adverse entry made in the appellant's confidential character roll. Their lordships, while considering the effect of this statement observed as follows :- "Indeed, it appears from the judgment of the third learned Judge who heard the petition in the High Court that in answer to a question put by him, the Standing counsel appearing for the State clearly stated that the order of reversion was a result of the adverse entry made in the appellant's confidential character roll. If this statement of the learned Standing counsel has to be accepted, it is impossible to resist the suggestion that the respondent's order of reversion was really an order of punishment in disguise in which event the order must be struck down for non-compliance with the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution". It follows, therefore, that if an order of reversion is made as a result of adverse entries in the service record of an incumbent it would attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, reversion being founded on these entries. Learned Standing Counsel tried to distinguish the case on the ground that in Sughar Singh's ease (supra) learned Standing Counsel had conceded that the impugned order was passed on the basis of adverse entries, hence their lordships held that it amounted ,to punishment. In the instant case he made no such concession. We, however, find that the counter affidavits, filed on behalf of the State make it very plain that the impugned order was passed as a result of the adverse entries earned by the petitioner from 1960-71 and onwards. See paragraphs 26 and 29 of the counter affidavit of M.A. Khan, referred to earlier In view of the statement in that affidavit as also in the other counter affidavits filed on behalf of the State, it is apparent that the impugned order was passed only as a result of the adverse entries in the is service record and not on the ground of exigencies of service or other administrative reasons. It seems to me that the ratio of Sughar Singh's case fully applies to this case. The order seems to have been passed by way of punishment for another reason as well. It seems to me that the ratio of Sughar Singh's case fully applies to this case. The order seems to have been passed by way of punishment for another reason as well. It is admitted to the State that there are 29 officiating Superintending Engineers who are junior to the petitioner. The petitioner has been reverted while they have been retained. In such circumstances a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. V.N. Srivastava (1909 A.L.J. 1039) after considering the rules of practice held that the reversion amounted to reduction in rank. The facts of that ease were as follows : One Sri V.N. Srivastava was a confirmed Executive Engineer in the Irrigation Department. He was selected for the post of officiating Superintending Engineer. A breach occurred in Nanak Sagar Dam which was under his charge. An enquiry was set up. Sri V.N. Srivastava was reverted, while a number of officers, junior to him were retained, as Superintending Engineer. The order was challenged on the ground that it amounted to infliction of punishment. The case ralated to two persons, one was Sri V.N. Srivastava and the other was Shri Anis Ahmed Sri V.N. Srivastava was reverted from the post of Superintending Engineer while Sri Anis Ahmed from the the post of Executive Engineer. The petition was allowed, and an appeal by the State failed. One of the reasons given for holding the order as a punishment was that future prospects and chances of promotion of the petitioners were affected by their reversion. The Bench while discussing this part of the case observed. 14. From the admissions in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of U.P. and the statements made by their Chief Standing counsel before us on 27th and 28th of January, 1969, it is abundantly clear that an officer could be appointed as a permanent Superintending Engineer only if he was posted as an officiating Superintending Engineer at the time of his selection to the permanent post of a Superintending Engineer. Similarly an officer could be appointed as a permanent Executive Engineer only, if at the time of his selection, he was already working as an officiating Executive Engineer. Similarly an officer could be appointed as a permanent Executive Engineer only, if at the time of his selection, he was already working as an officiating Executive Engineer. In this view of the admitted rule of practice, the respondents in question cannot be appointed as permanent Superintending Engineer or permanent Executive Engineer as the case may be, once they have been reverted to their substantive posts of Executive Engineer and Assistant Engineer respectively. Thus they will be visited with serious and grave evil consequences in the matter of their future promotion and prospects, on account of reversion of Virendra Nath Srivastava from the post of an officiating Superintending Engineer to his substantive post of an Executive Engineer and that of Chaudhry Anis Ahmed from the officiating post of an Executive Engineer, particularly when a number of their juniors were allowed to continue to officiate as Superintending Engineers or Executive Engineers, as the case may be". It was held that the reversion jeopardised the future chances of promotion or at least resulted in postponement of future prospects. The Bench observed that even if the officer viz. Sri V.N. Srivastava was again selected as officiating Superintending Engineer he would become junior to his juniors who had continued to officiate as Superintending Engineers meanwhile. 15. The case of V.N. Srivastava (supra) fully covers the instant case. The same rule of practice applies here as well. The Bench in that case held further that the sudden reversion of the senior as against the retention of the juniors in the higher post casts a stigma on the professional ability of the reverted officer. The case of V.N. Srivastava went to the supreme Court and the judgment of this Court was upheld. Learned Standing counsel has accepted this position. Two matters were thus decided in V.N. Srivastava's case (i) that in the circumstances of that case penal consequences followed and (ii) that a stigma was cast. 16. Learned Standing Counsel invited my attention to R.S. Sial v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1971, Allahabad p. 375 F.B.) where a dissent has been expressed from the view taken in V.N. Srivastava's case. Learned Standing Counsel further invited my attention to R.S. Sial v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1317) where the Full Bench decision in R.S. Sial's case (supra) has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Learned Standing Counsel further invited my attention to R.S. Sial v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1317) where the Full Bench decision in R.S. Sial's case (supra) has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Tie position, therefore, is that the Supreme Court has upheld the Division Bench decision in V.N. Srivastava's case (supra) as also the Full Bench decision of this Court in R.S. Sial's case (supra). We shall now consider the effect of the two Supreme Court decisions. The fads and the ratio of the Full Bench decision in R.S. Siala's case will have to be examined in order to find what part of the decision in V.N. Srivastava's case has not been approved by the Full Bench. The fact of V.N. Srivastava's case are opposite to the facts of the instant case, as that was also a case of a reversion of Superintending Engineer and the rules and practice regarding promotion in the two cases are the same. R.S. Sial's case was a case of reversion of an officiating General Manager of Transport Department of the Government of U.P. to his substantive rank, of Assistant General Manager. The revision was challenged on the ground that it amounted to a reduction in rank. The, order was an innocuous one. The petitioner contended that his reversion was due to complaints made against him The Full Bench held that, the mere making of complaints would not necessarily lead, to an inference that the order was passed by wry of punishment. It might have operated as a motive but that by itself could not render the reversion a reduction in rank. In the circumstances of that case it was held that the order did not inflict any punishment. No such rule of promotion as is applicable to officiating Superintending Engineers was involved in that case. It might have operated as a motive but that by itself could not render the reversion a reduction in rank. In the circumstances of that case it was held that the order did not inflict any punishment. No such rule of promotion as is applicable to officiating Superintending Engineers was involved in that case. The full Bench considered the nature of the order and the right of the petitioner to the post and held that it entailed no punishment, the Full Bench while considering V.N. Srivastava's case observed as follows : "Merely because a person has been reverted to his substantive post from his officiating appointment by means of an innocuous order it cannot necessarily be inferred that a stigma has been cast on his professional ability or on his previous record." V.N. Srivastava's case on the other hand, laid down that "the very fact of their sudden reversion to lower substantive posts, while allowing juniors to officiate in the higher posts casts an aspersion on the professional ability and previous record of service of these reverted officers." 17. It seems to me that the Full Bench expressed its dissent from this part of the ratio in V.N. Srivastava's case. The Full Bench did not overrule the other ratio of V.N. Srivastava's case regarding the visiting of serious and grave evil consequences on the reverted officiating Superintending Engineer. That part of the decision will not be deemed to have been overruled, particularly when that decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision in R.S. Sial's case (supra) affirmed the Full Bench decision and held that the facts of that case did not attract the provisions of Article 311. It was observed this appointment to a post on an officiating basis is from the nature of employment, itself of a transitory character and in the absence of any contract or specific rule regulating the condition of service to the contrary the implied term of such an appointment is that it is terminable at any time. The Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post. The Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post. Their lordships, however, observed that if the termination order entails or provides for forfeiture of the incumbents pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in the substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then though in form the Government had purported to exercise its undoubted right to terminate the employment, in truth and reality, the termination by way of penalty. The Full Bench in R.S. Sial's case found the order to be innocuous and not entailing any such consequences and rejected the challenge on the ground that no punishment had been imposed. In V.N. Srivastava's case this Court held that the circumstances led to an inference that future chances of promotion had been adversely affected and the order was not an innocuous one but a punishment. The facts of the instant case being opposite to V.N. Srivastava's case and the conditions of service being also the same the rule laid down its V.N. Srivastava's case, regarding the visiting of evil consequences completely applies. The only part which cannot be availed of is the one dealing with the casting of stigma. In the circumstances I hold that the order of reversion amounts to punishment on the ground of its being brought with evil consequences in regard to the future chances of promotion and prospects of them petitioner in service. The order cannot be sustained, having been passed in violation of Article 311. See Sughar Singh's cate (supra) and Jagdish Prasad v. State of U.P. (1971 S.C. 1224), Dr. Kulwant Singh v. Dr. D.R. Marwaha and others (1974) (1) Services Law Reporter P. 195). 18. Learned counsel for the respondent strongly relied on Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1964) S.C. p. 1854) and urged that if the reversion was made on the ground of unsuitability it would not be treated as a punishment. Their Lordships themselves held in that case that unsuitability might lead to two courses of action by the Government. It may decide to revert an incumbent without any intention to punish him or take an action by way of punishment The real question in all such cases is whether what the Government did was by way of punishment or not. The unsuitability may furnish a motive nor a basis. It may decide to revert an incumbent without any intention to punish him or take an action by way of punishment The real question in all such cases is whether what the Government did was by way of punishment or not. The unsuitability may furnish a motive nor a basis. In the instant case the reversion was founded on the character roll entries and in view of Sughar Singh's case it amounted to punishment. 19. We may now turn to the question of discrimination. It is admitted that 29 persons, junior to the petitioner, have been retained on the post of officiating Superintending Engineer while he has been reverted, in Sughar singh's case (supra) it has been held that reversion of a senior as against the retention of his juniors without any justifiable discrimination would offend Article 16 of the Constitution, which enshrines the equal treatment guarantee in matters of employment. The article strikes at hostile discrimination and ensures fairness and equality of treatment to all similarly situate. It applies to officiating and permanent incumbents to a post alike. See Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India (A.I.R 1974 S.C. 1631) and E.P. Rayappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another (A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court, P. 55 ) 20. The petitioner's grievance is that he has been unjustifiably discriminated. He being senior, with a better record of service than his juniors could not be reverted in view of the constitutional guarantee. 21. The respondents' case, on the other hand, is that the juniors have better service record and, therefore, constitute a different class. They are thus not similarly situated. Reliance is placed on the chart annexed to the last supplementary counter affidavit. In this chart, good, satisfactory and adverse entries of the petitioner and the 29 junior officers have been enumerated. The petitioner has been awarded four good, sixteen satisfactory and live adverse entries, a large number of junior officers have been given lesser number of good and satisfactory entries. 22. As regards the adverse entries, we find that as many as five persons, mentioned at serial Nos. 11, 19, 20, 21 and 23 have been awarded five or more adverse entries. The basis of classification between the petitioner and his juniors has not been clearly pointed out. 22. As regards the adverse entries, we find that as many as five persons, mentioned at serial Nos. 11, 19, 20, 21 and 23 have been awarded five or more adverse entries. The basis of classification between the petitioner and his juniors has not been clearly pointed out. It is urged that we cannot assess the entries It is not the assessment of the entries but the basis of classification which we have to find out We have, therefore, to examine the various kinds of entries in order to find out an intelligible differentia for a valid classification. If the adverse entries are material then the persons mentioned at serial Nos. 11, 19, 20, 21 and 23 have earned the same or larger number of adverse entries. If the satisfactory entries are material then, except the persons mentioned at serial nos. 16, 19, and 28 all the rest have earned lesser number of satisfactory entries. If the good entries are taken into account persons mentioned at serial nos. 16, 19, 25 and 28 have received lesser number of good entries. The service record of the concerned officers can be divided in two pans; (i) the record prior to selection and (ii) the record after selection. The adverse entries prior to selection would be deemed to have been condoned in view of the selection. Those after selection may be material. On the basis of service record prior to selection the petitioner was considered better to those who were selected later. In any case he could not be classed as inferior. This part of the case has been dealt with the earlier part of this judgment. We are, therefore, left with the entries after selection The petitioner has been given two adverse entries after selection. The relevancy and effect of these entries have also been discussed earlier. We shall only point out the sequence hue. These entries are for the periods 1971-72 and 1972-73. Both these entries were approved by the State Government in August, 1973. The impugned order was passed on 19-6-1973. So the State Government seems to have passed the impugned order without applying its mind to the petitioner's performance after selection, otherwise it would have taken a decision in that regard and directed its communication. Adverse entries are required to be communicated and a right of representation is also provided for. Learned Standing counsel has not disputed this position. So the State Government seems to have passed the impugned order without applying its mind to the petitioner's performance after selection, otherwise it would have taken a decision in that regard and directed its communication. Adverse entries are required to be communicated and a right of representation is also provided for. Learned Standing counsel has not disputed this position. The adverse entries were communicated nearly five months after the pissing of the impugned order. Since the remarks were unapproved by the Government at the time the impugned order was passed the Government would be deemed either not to have agreed with the remarks or not to have considered them at all. In such a situation unapproved and un-communicated adverse entries could not form the basis of classification. See Anand Swarup Bhatnager v. State (A.I.R. 1966 Rajasthan P. 8), Nareshwer Lal Joshi v. State of Rajasthan (1971(1) Services Law Reporter p. 230), Mallinath Jain v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others (1973 (1) Services Law Reporter P. 413) and also Jaipal Singh Naresh v. State of U. P. and others (1974 A.W.R. 182). The impugned order was passed by the State Government and the decision of the State Government in regard to adverse entries was material. In the circumstances no reasonable basis for classification has been made out. The result, therefore, is that if the adverse entries form the basis of the impugned order it is hit by Article 311 of the Constitution, and if they are ignored the order violates Article 16. 23. The question of mala fides in view of the discussion above needs no further consideration. 24. The petition, in the circumstances, succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned order dated 19-6-1973 passed by respondent No. 1 is quashed.