JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge, dismissing a writ petition. The writ petition challenged the action of the Nagar Mahapaiika, Allahabad, in cancelling a licence held by the appellant and in re-auctioning it. 2. On October 22, 1959, the Municipal Board, Allahabad, allowed the appellant to occupy an area of 20 feet x 4 feet on the northern side of Swarup Rani Park on a monthly licence fee of Rs. 50/- for a cycle stand. This licence was granted under Sec. 293 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The appellant continued to run the cycle stand on these terms (or a number of years. On July 4, 1970, the Nagar Mahapalika informed the appellant that his licence had been cancelled by an order dated July 2, 1970. Subsequently the Nagar Mahnpalika auctioned the right to run the cycle stand at this place on July 27, 1970. One Manni Lal made the highest bid of Rs. 6,400/- for the year, which was accepted. Thereupon the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court. 3. Before the learned single Judge it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that - (1) the licence granted to him was a permanent one and could not be cancelled; (2) the licence could not be revoked without giving the licence an opportunity of being heard; and (3) the Nagar Mahapalika was not entitled to auction the right to run the cycle stand and to charge Rs. 6,400/- per year for it. 4. The learned single Judge repelled each of these submissions and dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved. the petitioner has come up in appeal. 5. At the hearing of the appeal the learned counsel raised the following questions: (a) The appellant was a lessee of the land, which was the subject-matter of the order dated October 22, 1959. (b) in the alternative, appellants licence was a permanent one; (c) the duration of the appellants licence was co-terminus with the licence granted to him under the Cinematograph Act. (d) the Nagar Mahapalika authorities are not, in law, entitled to take possession from the appellant with force; and (e) in equity the appellant was entitled to stay on the land. 6. The plea that the appellant was a lessee was taken in ground No. G in the writ petition. (d) the Nagar Mahapalika authorities are not, in law, entitled to take possession from the appellant with force; and (e) in equity the appellant was entitled to stay on the land. 6. The plea that the appellant was a lessee was taken in ground No. G in the writ petition. But from a perusal of the judgment of the learned single Judge it appears that it was not pressed at the hearing, with the result that it will be deemed to have been abandoned. Further, no such plea has been taken in the memorandum of appeal. That reinforces the view that this point has been abandoned. Learned counsel is not entitled to raise this plea for the first time at the hearing of the appeal. The question is a mixed one, involving investigation into the intention, conduct and circumstances. It is settled that a mixed question of fact and law should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal. 7. Moreover, on the materials on the record there seems to be no substance in this plea. It has not been stated that any particular portion of the lane measuring 20 feet x 4 feet was demarcated and bounded off, so that the appellant may claim to have been in exclusive possession of this area throughout the day and night. The appellant wanted to run a cycle stand. To this end he was allowed to use the aforesaid area. Apparently he could validly use it for a cycle stand during the time the cinema was running. He could not legitimately use it for any other purpose, with the result that this portion of the lane was open to use by the public at those times when the cinema show was not running. 8. In the next place, the order dated October 22, 1959, specifically says that the appellant was allowed to occupy this area under Sec. 293 : reference is to Sec. 293 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Sec. 293 provides that- "The Board may charge fees to be fixed by bye-law or by public auction or by agreement, for the use or occupation (otherwise than under a lease) of any immovable property vested in, or entrusted to the management of the Board, including any public street or place of which it allows the use or occupation whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise." 9. The permission to use a portion of the public street granted under Sec. 293 has to be otherwise than under a lease". The permission granted to the appellant was expressly under Sec. 293. It cannot be held to be a lease. 10. The submission that the licence granted to the appellant was a permanent licence and so could not be cancelled is without substance. The order dated October 22, 1959, stated:- "With reference to your letter dated 20-10-59 to the Administrator, I have been directed to inform you that you are allowed to occupy an area of 20 feet x 4 feet on the northern side of Swaroop Rani Park on monthly licence fee of Rs. 50/- per month for cycle stand u/s 293. Please note that no congestion is made and you should not occupy more than the area sanctioned for the stand." 11. This order does not indicate that the permission granted to the appellant was for any fixed period, or that it was perpetual. Seel 293 contemplates a temporary user on payment of fees by way of compensation for use and occupation. No interest whatever was created in the land in favour of the appellant. The permission granted to the appellant was not for executing any work of a permanent character on the land. It was a bare licence. Such a bare licence could be revoked at will. Ex hypothesis such a licence could not, in law, be permanent. 12. The next submission of learned counsel was that the licence granted to the appellant was to extend till his cinematograph licence continued in force. 13. It appears that the appellant had applied for a cinematograph licence. The City Magistrate, Allahabad, on October 8, 1959, required the appellant to obtain the permission of the Municipal Board for keeping a cycle stand in the lane north of the cinema building, which is essential, as required under Government orders. Thereupon the appellant, on October 20, 1959, made an application for the requisite permission. The order dated October 22, 1959, was passed by the Municipal Board of this application. These three documents do not show that the appellant applied for the licence for any particular period of time, much less for a period which was to continue till the cinematograph licence was to run. The order dated October 22, 1959, was passed by the Municipal Board of this application. These three documents do not show that the appellant applied for the licence for any particular period of time, much less for a period which was to continue till the cinematograph licence was to run. In fact, on the appellant's own case, he had not been granted a cinematograph licence on October 20, 1959, when he made the application for permission to run a cycle stand and when the Municipal Board granted this permission. 14. We asked learned counsel to produce the cinematograph licence to see if there is anything in it making the continuance of the cinematograph licence dependant upon the continued operation of the permission to run the cycle stand by the appellant. Learned counsel stated that there was nothing in the licence to that effect. We may say that there is nothing in the Cinematograph Act or the Rules framed thereunder requiring the continued running of a cycle stand by the licence for the valid continuation of the cinematograph licence. It cannot hence be said that in law the licence granted by the Municipal Board to the appellant for the cycle-stand was to continue in force till the cinematograph licence remained in operation. 15. In the end learned counsel submitted that even though the appellant's licence may have been validly cancelled, yet the Nagar Mahapalika authorities are not in law entitled to dispossess the appellant by force, and that in equity the appellant was entitled to stay on the land. As already seen, the appellant had no interest in the 20 feet x 4 feet area of the land in question. He was not in exclusive possession of this area. He was only using it for maintaining a cycle stand during the time the cinema show was on. For the rest of the day or night this portion of the lane was not even useable by the appellant. Since the appellant is not in actual possession, there is no occasion for the Nagar Mahapalika authorities to dispossess the appellant. After the cancellation of the licence the appellant is not entitled to use this portion of the lane for the purpose of running the cycle stand. Since the appellant is not in actual possession, there is no occasion for the Nagar Mahapalika authorities to dispossess the appellant. After the cancellation of the licence the appellant is not entitled to use this portion of the lane for the purpose of running the cycle stand. If he does so, he commits an unlawful act, and the Nagar Mahapalika authorities, in whom the land vests would be perfectly within their rights to prevent the appellant from committing tress pass or an unlawful act on their property. 16. Sec. 296 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, which applies to the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, provides that the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may, without notice, cause to be removed any wall, fence, rail, post, step, booth or other structure, created or set upon over any street etc., or any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale, board or shelf or any other thing whatever placed, deposited, projected, attached, or suspended in, upon, from or to any place in contravention of the Act. If the appellant uses the portion of the lane in question for running a cycle stand, he would be placing cycles in this area. Since the licence has been cancelled, he would be doing so in contravention of the Act. In this situation, the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, has ample powers under Sec. 296 to cause such obstruction by the placement of cycles to be removed. It cannot hence be said that the respondents have no power to prevent the appellant from using this part of the lane for maintaining a cycle stand after his licence has been cancelled, or to use such force as may reasonably be necessary to protect their property from illegal trespass or encroachment by the appellant. In such circumstances the appellant can claim no right to commit trespass by making an attempt to place cycles on this portion of the lane on any equitable principle. 17. The various submissions raised in support of the appeal having failed, the same is dismissed with costs.