JUDGMENT H. N. Seth, J. - Sri Gyanendra Mani Tripathi has come up in appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 19th February, 1974, dismissing writ petition No. 5209 of 1970, filed by him. 2. The petitioner, Gyanendra Mani Tripathi was working with the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Kanpur Division, since April, 1969 as a senior clerk (Proof Reader). He was an active Trade Union worker and was the Organising Secretary of the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Mazdoor Union. He had been declared as Protected Workman under Section 6-E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 29 of the U.P. Industrial Rules, 1957. Subsequently, petitioner's service was terminated with effect from 27th December, 1969. On that date 4 adjudication cases Nos. 89,90,139 and 140 of 1969, relating to the workmen of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Kanpur Division (hereinafter referred to as employer) were pending before the Industrial Tribunal. Since before terminating the service of the petitioner, the employer did not obtain the permission of the authority before which various adjudication cases were pending as required by Section 6-E (3) the petitioner moved an application under Section 6-F of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 28th April, 1970, saying that it be directed that he be reinstated with continuity of service and be paid full wages for the period of his unemployment. 3. The prayer made in the aforesaid application was resisted by the employer who claimed that the petitioner had been discharged from service at the end of his probationary period as it was found that he was not fit to be confirmed. In such circumstances, the provisions of Section 6-E (3) were not applicable, more so when the petitioner was not a workman concerned in any of the disputes relating to which the 4 adjudication cases were pending before the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, not necessary for the employer to obtain the permission of the authority concerned before terminating petitioners service at the end of the period of probation and the application under Section 6 (F) filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. 4. Relevant portion of Section 6-E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. It was, therefore, not necessary for the employer to obtain the permission of the authority concerned before terminating petitioners service at the end of the period of probation and the application under Section 6 (F) filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. 4. Relevant portion of Section 6-E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 runs thus: - Sub-section (1) '"During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a Conciliation Officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall - (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending." Sub-section (2) "During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute - (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise that workman provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has ben made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." Sub-section (3) "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceedings in respect of an industrial dispute take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute - (a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings, or (b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which proceeding is pending. Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section a `protected workman' in relation to an establishment, means a workman who. being an officer of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf." 5. Before the Industrial Tribunal, it was not disputed that the petitioner was in fact a protected workman within the meaning of Section 6-E (3) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dispute primarily centred round the question whether the petitioner was a protected workman concerned in the disputes involved in the adjudication cases Nos. 89, 90, 139 and 140 of 1969. On behalf of workman, it was contended that in order to make a `protected workman' concerned with the disputes involved in the adjudication cases pending before the Industrial Tribunal, it would be sufficient if it is shown that he is associated with and is keenly interested in those disputes. As all those disputes had been raised on behalf of all the workmen of the concern, all the workmen including the protected workmen were concerned with and were interested in the result of those disputes. On behalf of the employer, it was urged that only such workmen who had direct interest in the disputes pending before the Industrial Tribunal who alone could be said to be the workmen concerned in those disputes. Viewed in this light, the petitioner was not a workman or a protected workman, concerned with the disputes pending adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal. 6. The Industrial Tribunal accented the submission of the employer and held that having regard to plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 6-E, the expression "concerned in such dispute" means really concerned directly, personally or in such dispute, and not merely interested in such dispute. If a particular workman working in a particular department of a concern is dismissed the workers in that concern may sympathise with him and may make a common cause with his grievances. If a particular workman working in a particular department of a concern is dismissed the workers in that concern may sympathise with him and may make a common cause with his grievances. In this way, the other workers of the concern become interested in the dispute between that workman and the employers but such an interest results in much lesser degree of involvement than what the expression "concerned in such dispute" demands, merely because a workman has an indirect or altruistic interest in the result of the proceedings relating to a dispute it does not mean that he is concerned in the dispute. It pointed out that according to petitioners own case he was not directly or personally concerned with the dispute in any of the cases pending adjudication. According to the Tribunal adjudication of various disputes sending before the Industrial Tribunal, could not even indirectly or remotely affect any interest of the petitioner. In the circumstances workman's application for relief under Section 6-F was not maintainable. 7. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge did not go into the question whether or not the Industrial Tribunal was right in interpreting the expression "protected workman concerned", used in Section 6-E (3) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. According to him. the provision of Section 6-E (3) could be attracted only when the service of a protected workman was terminated for some misconduct or by way of punishment. For this he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V. A. Rebello, ( AIR 1972 SC 1343 ) : (1972 Lab IC 668) wherein the Supreme Court dealt with and interpreted the provisions of Section 33 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. The learned single Judge further observed that the provisions of Section 6-E (3) were in pari materia to the provisions of Section 33 of the Central Act. Accordingly, the observation made by the Supreme Court, while interpreting the provisions of Section 33. fully applied to the interpretation of Section 6-E (3) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as well. The learned single Judge further observed that the provisions of Section 6-E (3) were in pari materia to the provisions of Section 33 of the Central Act. Accordingly, the observation made by the Supreme Court, while interpreting the provisions of Section 33. fully applied to the interpretation of Section 6-E (3) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as well. Since in the present case, petitioners service had not been terminated for any misconduct or by was of punishment, the case did not fall under Section 6-E and the employer was not required to obtain permission of the Tribunal before which industrial disputes were pending before terminating petitioners employment at the end of his probationary period. consequently the Tribunal was right in holding that the application filed by the petitioner for relief under Section 6-F was not maintainable. 8. It is true that provisions of Section 33 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act and those of Section 6-E of the U.P. (Industrial Disputes Act are intended to cater to similar situations more or less in a similar manner. It can, therefore, be said that the provisions of Section 6-E of the U.P. Act are in pari materia to the provisions of Section 33 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of Section 6-E extracted above and Section 33 of the Central Act shows that their object is to provide for the protection of workmen concerned in a dispute, pending before the Industrial Tribunal, against victimisation by the employer on account of such pending disputes, and to ensure that those pending proceedings are brought to expeditious termination in a peaceful atmosphere undisturbed by any subsequent cause, tending to further exacerbate the already strained relations between employer and the workman. In the case of Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V. A. Rebello, ( AIR 1972 SC 1343 ) : (1972 Lab IC 668), while discussing the relative scope of the provisions contained in Section 33 (1) and (2) of the Central Act corresponding to Section 6-E (1) and (2) of the State Act and Section 33 (3) which corresponds to Section 6-E (3), the Supreme Court, at p. 1349. col. 1 observed thus: "It is noteworthy that the ban is imposed only in regard to action taken for misconduct whether connected or unconnected with the dispute. col. 1 observed thus: "It is noteworthy that the ban is imposed only in regard to action taken for misconduct whether connected or unconnected with the dispute. The employer is, therefore, free to take action against his workmen if it is not based on any misconduct on their part. In this connection reference by was of contrast may be made to sub-section (3) of Section 33 which imposes an unqualified ban on the employer in regard to action by dis-charging or punishing the workman whether by dismissal or otherwise- In this sub-section we do not find any restriction such as is contained in clause (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2). Sub-section (3) protects "protected workman" and the reason is obvious for the blanket protection of such a workman. The legislature in his case appears to be anxious for the interest of healthy growth and development of trade union movement to ensure for him complete protection against every kind of order of discharge or punishment because of his special position as an officer of a registered trade union recognised as such in accordance with the rules made in that behalf. This explains the restricted protection in sub-sections (1) and (2)." These observations make it clear that a protection similar to that contained in Section 6-E(l) and (2) is available to the workmen in general only when their services are being terminated for any misconduct whereas protection similar to that mentioned in sub-section (3) is available to a protected workman in regard to termination of his service whether it be for some misconduct or for any other reason. We are, therefore, of opinion that the learned single Judge was wrong in observing that in Air India Corporation's case, the Supreme Court has ruled that provisions like that of Section 6-E (3) would apply only in cases where the discharge of a protected workman is based on some misconduct, and the reason given by him for dismissing the writ petition cannot be upheld. 9. We have, therefore, to go into the question whether the petitioner was within the meaning of that expression as used in Section 6-E (3), a protected workman concerned in the adjudication case Nos. 89, 90, 139 and 140 of 1969, pending in the Industrial Court. 9. We have, therefore, to go into the question whether the petitioner was within the meaning of that expression as used in Section 6-E (3), a protected workman concerned in the adjudication case Nos. 89, 90, 139 and 140 of 1969, pending in the Industrial Court. In this connection learned counsel for both the parties made submissions similar to those that were made before the Supreme Court in the case of New India Motors (P.) Ltd., New Delhi v. K. T. Morris, ( AIR 1960 SC 875 ). In this case the Supreme Court, while discussing the meaning to be given to the expression `workmen concerned in such dispute' as used in Section 33 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act observed: - "Even as a matter of construction pure and simple there is no justification for assuming that the workmen concerned in such disputes must be workmen directly or immediately concerned in the said disputes. We do not see any justification for adding the further qualification of direct or immediate concern which the narrow construction necessarily assumes. In dealing with the question as to which workmen can be said to be concerned in an industrial dispute we have to bear in mind the essential condition for the raising of an industrial dispute itself and if an industrial dispute can be raised only by a group of workmen acting on their own or through their union then it would be difficult to resist the conclusion that all those who sponsored the dispute are concerned in it. As we have already pointed out this construction is harmonious with the definition prescribed by Section 2 (s) and with the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, we are not prepared to hold that the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" can be limited only to such of the workmen who are directly concerned with the dispute in question. Therefore, we are not prepared to hold that the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" can be limited only to such of the workmen who are directly concerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion, that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf the dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute." Aforesaid observations clearly bring out that in the opinion of the Supreme Court all those workmen on whose behalf dispute has been raised or who under Section 18 of the Act would be bound by the award made in pending dispute are to be treated as workmen concerned in that dispute. In order to determine this question the fact whether such workmen have any direct or immediate concern with the disputes or that they would in any manner be directly affected by the award made in that dispute would not be conclusive. Moreover, we feel that a protected workman, would also be concerned in a dispute in case the dispute has been raised or is being conducted by a union of which he happens to be an office bearer, in which capacity he has been declared to be a protected workman. Learned counsel appearing for the employer cited certain cases wherein it has been held that in Particular circumstances even though the award made in respect of a dispute may be binding on a workman. he may not be considered to be a workman concerned in that dispute. However, in view of clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case, it is not passible for us to accept and act upon the proposition laid down in those cases. 10. In this view of the matter, before deciding the application filed by the petitioner, it was necessary for the Tribunal to go into the question and to decide whether an award which might be rendered in any of the 4 pending industrial disputes would be binding on the petitioner and whether the petitioner was a protected workman concerned by virtue of his being an employee or office bearer of a union which had sponsored the industrial dispute or which on behalf of the workmen, was conducting the pending adjudication. We find that the Industrial Tribunal has not recorded necessary findings of fact on the basis of which any of the aforementioned two questions can be decided. At this stage, we may point out that according to Rule 38 an award which has become enforceable shall be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute and where such party is composed of workmen it would bind all persons, who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. Accordingly in order to decide whether the award in any of the pending industrial disputes will bind the petitioner it would also be necessary to find whether the petitioner was employed in the same establishment or part thereof in which the workmen, involved in the disputes pending adjudication were employed. What is the meaning to be given to the expression establishment has also been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Their Workmen, ( AIR 1960 SC 56 ) in these words: - "The Act not having prescribed any specific tests, for determining what is 'one establishment we must fall back on such considerations as in the ordinary industrial or business sense determine the unity of an industrial establishment, having regard no doubt to the scheme and object of the Act and other relevant provisions of the Mines Act, 1952, or the Factories Act, 1948. What then is `one establishment' in the ordinary industrial or business sense? The question of unity or oneness presents difficulties when the industrial establishment consists of parts, units, departments, branches etc. If it is strictly unitary in the sense of having one location and one unit only, there is little difficulty in saving that it is one establishment. Where however the industrial undertaking has parts, branches. departments, units etc. with different locations, near or distant the question arises what tests should be applied for determining what constitutes one establishment. Several tests were referred to in the course of arguments before us, such as, geographical proximity, unity of ownership, management and control, unity of employment and conditions of service, functional integrality, general unity of purpose etc. To most of these we have referred while summarising the evidence of Mr. Several tests were referred to in the course of arguments before us, such as, geographical proximity, unity of ownership, management and control, unity of employment and conditions of service, functional integrality, general unity of purpose etc. To most of these we have referred while summarising the evidence of Mr. Dongrav and the findings of the Tribunal thereon. It is, perhaps, impossible to lay down any one test as an absolute and invariable test for all cases. The real purpose of these tests is to find out the true relation between the parts, branches, units, etc. If in their true relation. They constitute one integrated whole we say that the establishment is one: if on the contrary. They do not constitute one integrated whole, each unit is then a separate unit. How the relation between the units will be judged must depend on the facts proved, having regard to the scheme and object of the statute which gives the right of unemployment compensation and also prescribes a disqualification therefor. Thus, in one case the unity of ownership, management and control may be the important test: in another case functional integrality or general unity may be important test: and in still another case, the important test may be the unity of employment. Indeed in a large number of cases several tests may fall for consideration at the same time. The difficulty of applying these arises because of the complexities of modern industrial organisation: many enterprises may have functional integrality between factories which are separately owned, some may be integrated in part with units or factories having the same ownership and in part with factories or Plants which are independently owned- In the midst of all those complexities it may be difficult to discover the real thread of unity. In an American decision (Donald L. Nordling v. Ford Motor Company, (1950) 28 ALR 2d 272) there is an example of an industrial product consisting of 3800 or 4000 parts about 900 of which came out of one plant: some came from other plants owned by the same Company and still others came from plants independently owned and a shutdown caused by a strike or other labour dispute at any one of the plants might conceivably cause a closure of the main plant or factory." 11. Accordingly, in the absence of necessary findings of fact it is not possible to overrule the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that as contemplated by Section 6-F (3) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, he was a protected workman concerned with the dispute pending before the labour tribunal. The matter will, therefore, have to go back to the Industrial Tribunal concerned for resolving the controversy on facts. 12. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge dated 19th February. 1974, is set aside. The writ petition filed by Sri Gyanendra Mani Tripathi is allowed. The order of the Industrial Tribunal dated 18th June 1970, is quashed and the case is sent back to the Industrial Tribunal with the direction that it should decide the application under Section 6-F filed by the petitioner in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. The petitioner would be entitled to receive the costs of the writ petition as well as that of this appeal, from respondent No. 1.