JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. has filed this appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge dated 22-4-1971 dismissing its petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The appellant runs a textile Mills at Kanpur by means of a notification dated 14th August 1962. the State Government acting under Section 3(b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act had enforced a gratuity scheme applicable to textile mills of Kanpur. Aforesaid notification issued under Section 3(b) was extended from time to time and ultimately by notification dated 18th September 1971 it was extended for a period of six months. Subsequently on 19-11-1971 the State Government issued vet another notification under Section 3(b) providing for gratuity payable to the workmen of all the industrial establishment situated within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalikas of Kanpur, Agra, Varanasi and Lucknow as well as those situated within the limits of Meerut, Gorakhpur and Bareilly Municipalities. One Mahabir, a workman employed by the petitioner Company, retired on 16-12-1971. The petitioner offered to pay him gratuity in accordance with the scheme applicable to the textile Mills under notification dated 14-8-1962 issued under Section 3(b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and extended from time to time. The workman claimed that he was entitled to receive gratuity under the new Gratuity Scheme applicable to all industrial units situated within the limits of Kanpur Mahapalika as enforced by the notification dated 19-11-1971. As the Company did not accept the claim of the workman, the workman made an application under Section 6 (h) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act before the Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur. This application was numbered as R.D. Case No. 7 of 1972. The petitioner claims that before passing an order on that application the Regional Conciliation Officer indicated that in his opinion the workman was entitled to gratuity in accordance with the scheme enforced by notification dated 19-11-1971. Accordingly, it filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notification dated 19-11-1971 and praying that the Regional Conciliation Officer be prohibited, from proceeding any further with the R.D. Case No. 7 of 1972. A learned single Judge, by his order dated 22-4-1974. dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge. 3. A learned single Judge, by his order dated 22-4-1974. dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that as held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Basti Sugar Mills, AIR 1961 SC 420 . the power under Section 3 (b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act had apparently been conferred for the purpose of arming the State Government with additional powers to deal with an emergent situation. It could thus be exercised only if there was some emergency and not otherwise. He pointed out that in paragraph 17 of the petition it had been asserted that there was neither any emergency nor was there any material before the State Government to show that there was labour unrest or danger to the production or supplies on account of the gratuity scheme, which was already in force in petitioner's concern or any other textile mill of Kanpur. Thus there was no material on which the State Government could form an opinion that it was necessary and expedient to make an order under Section 3(b) of the Act for maintaining supply and industrial peace. Learned counsel urged that in the circumstances, the notification dated 19-11-1971 was invalid and was liable to be quashed. 4. One Sri Bhola Nath Gupta, Upper Division Assistant Labour Section Civil Secretariat, who is expected to be acquainted with the Government files, has on the basis of record sworn an affidavit stating that the State Government and the Labour Commissioner, U.P. had received several strike notices in which it was mentioned that unless a gratuity scheme was enforced there would be strikes. In the circumstances an emergency had arisen and consequently the State Government issued the impugned order under Section 3(b) of the Act, by means of a supplementary affidavit Sri Bhola Nath gave the details and specific particulars of the reports made and notices given to the State Government on the basis of which it came to the conclusion that industrial peace of the State was going to be adversely affected, unless it issued an order under Section 3(b) of the Act. If the State Government apprehended that there was going to be a large scale strike in various industries in the State unless a gratuity scheme was enforced the State Government could come to a conclusion that there was an emergency and that unless a suitable order under Section 3(b) is issued maintenance of supplies essential to the community and employment are going to be affected. The case of the petitioner as taken up in his supplementary rejoinder affidavit is that some of the material indicated in the supplementary counter-affidavit of Sri Bhola Nath was such which had actually been procured by the Labour Officer for providing an excuse to the Government for issuing the impugned notification whereas some other was such on the basis of which the State Government could not have formed an opinion that there was an emergency, justifying the exercise of power under Section 3(b). In the writ petition, action of the Government in issuing the impugned notification was challenged not on the ground that it was motivated. It was challenged merely on the ground that there was no relevant material on the record on which the State could come to a conclusion that there was an emergency. That stand was very much different from the stand now taken in the rejoinder affidavit that the material which might be relevant was not genuine and had been procured by the State for ulterior purposes. Even after the material was disclosed in the supplementary counter-affidavit, the petitioner Midi not amend his petition suitably with the result the respondents did not get an opportunity to meet the fresh case taken UP by the petitioner in its supplementary rejoinder affidavit. We are therefore not prepared to countenance the argument that the material relied upon by the State Government, for coming to a conclusion that the conditions for the exercise of power under Section 3(b) existed was improperly procured by it or that in issuing the notification it was actuated by ulterior motive. It is not for this Court to consider whether on the material before the State Government it would itself come to a conclusion that the conditions for the exercise of power under Section 3(b) existed. It was for the State Government to form such an opinion. It is not for this Court to consider whether on the material before the State Government it would itself come to a conclusion that the conditions for the exercise of power under Section 3(b) existed. It was for the State Government to form such an opinion. In the circumstances, so long as such an opinion had been framed on relevant material, it would not be possible for this Court to interfere with it. In this case the Government did feel that there was an emergency in which an order under Section 3(b) was indicated. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be interfered with on the ground that the condition precedent for the exercise of the power viz. that there was no emergency did not exist. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that on the relevant date a gratuity scheme specially meant to apply to the workers of textile industry in Kanpur was already in force under the Government order dated 14-8-1968 as extended from time to time. The subsequent gratuity scheme enforced by the Government order dated 19-11-1971 was a general scheme intended to apply to workmen engaged in all commercial and industrial establishments situated within the limits of the Mahapalikas and Municipal Boards (including the limits of Kanpur Mahapalika) mentioned therein. In the circumstances, on the principle that where a special law overlaps the field covered by a general law the general law yields to the special law, as against the general gratuity scheme framed under the Government order dated 19-11-1971. the special gratuity scheme framed under the Government order dated 14-8-1968 would continue to apply to the workers belonging to the textile industry at Kanpur. The principle that a special law on the subject prevails over the general law on the same subject, admits of one exception viz. that a later general law shall prevail over the earlier special law if it clearly indicates its intention to supersede the special law. The principle that a special law on the subject prevails over the general law on the same subject, admits of one exception viz. that a later general law shall prevail over the earlier special law if it clearly indicates its intention to supersede the special law. In the case of Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. Man Mohan Dev, AIR 1966 SC 1931 , the Supreme Court approved the following quotation from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute :- "A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication, Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words, 'where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. In such cases it is presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special Act'." 6. In the instant case, there are ample indications in the Government order dated 19-11-1971. that the Government intended to supersede all gratuity schemes already in force in the area to which it applied, in case such scheme happened to be less advantageous to the workmen, concerned. The scheme under the aforesaid Government order was applicable to all workers employed or those who may be employed in future in every commercial establishment, shop, motor transport undertaking and factories, except the establishments run by the State Government. On the face of it, the scheme applies to the workers of textile industry also and does not exclude from its ambit the workmen belonging to the textile industry at Kanpur. Moreover, clause (12) of the Government Order lays down:- "If in any commercial establishment, shop factory, motor transport undertaking or establishment covered by this order, the terms of gratuity payable to the "Workmen immediately preceding the date of this order in accordance with any settlement award practise or the existing terms of employment are more favourable to the workmen, such workmen shall continue to be entitled to the same and nothing contained in this scheme shall apply to them." This clause makes it absolutely clear that the intention of Government was to supersede all the existing gratuity schemes except those which were more beneficial to the workman. Accordingly, if the gratuity scheme already in force was less beneficial to the workman it was to yield in favour of the scheme embodied in the impugned Government Order. Admittedly in the instant case, the scheme of gratuity already in force in the petitioner's Company is as compared to the scheme contained in the impugned Government Order, less beneficial to its workmen. Accordingly the scheme laid down in Government order dated 19-11-1971 would be applicable in the case of the workmen belonging to petitioner company as well. 7. In the end learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the gratuity scheme contained in the Government order dated 19-11-1971 has already been quashed by one of us in the case of India Tobacco Co. Ltd. Saharannur v. State of U.P., (1973) 27 Fac LR 235 = (1973 Lab IC 1628) (All). Once the scheme was quashed it ceased to exist for all purposes and -no question of enforcing the same against the petitioner arises. In the aforementioned case, India Tobacco Corporation Ltd. challenged the Government Order dated 19-11-1971 on the ground that the conditions precedent for making an order under Section 3(b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act did not exist and urged that in the circumstances the State Government had no jurisdiction to issue that order. In spite of opportunity being given the State did not file a proper affidavit, indicating the material which lead the State Government to feel that there was an emergency and to frame the requisite opinion mentioned in Section 3(b). In the result, this Court concluded that the impugned order was bad inasmuch as the respondents failed to show that there was any emergency justifying the making of an order under Section 3(b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. In the case before us a proper affidavit fully indicating the circumstances and the material on the basis of which the State Government thought that there was an emergency and made the impugned order, has been filed. The petitioner was not a party to the proceedings in which the judgment in the case of India Tobacco Company was given. Any observation made or point decided in that case, whether it be in support of petitioner's case or against it, could not bind the petitioner. The petitioner was not a party to the proceedings in which the judgment in the case of India Tobacco Company was given. Any observation made or point decided in that case, whether it be in support of petitioner's case or against it, could not bind the petitioner. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot, on the basis of that judgment, raise the plea that the defence taken by the State in this case is barred on the principle of res judicata. Nor would that decision be binding as a precedent as the circumstances of the present case are not the same as those in which the decision in Imperial Tobacco Company's case was made. In the present case the material on the basis on which the State formed the requisite opinion has been properly indicated which was not done in India Tobacco Company's case, 1973 Lab IC 1628 (All). If, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it be accepted that once this Court, on the basis of the material before it, held that the action of the State Government could mot be upheld, the State, even in a subsequent case instituted; by some other person, cannot justify the action taken by it by placing additional material, it will also have to be held that once the challenge to the validity of an action has been unsuccessful, the same challenge cannot be raised in a subsequent proceeding by a person who was not a party to the earlier proceedings, even if he is able to place before the Court additional material and to show that the action in question deserved to be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to indicate any principle of law which precludes the State from, producing evidence before the Court and justifying its action, in subsequent proceedings initiated by another party, which has once been struck down on the ground that in spite of opportunity being granted to it, it did not place material before the Court indicating that the condition precedent for taking such action existed. Cases are not unknown where a statute has been held to be invalid, and later, when again brought before the Court held to be valid. Vice versa there have been instances in which statute originally held valid has later been held invalid. Cases are not unknown where a statute has been held to be invalid, and later, when again brought before the Court held to be valid. Vice versa there have been instances in which statute originally held valid has later been held invalid. We are, therefore, of opinion that merely because, at the instance of another party and on the basis of the material then available it was once held that the Government order dated 19-11-1971 was invalid, this Court is not precluded from examining the same question on the basis of material subsequently made available in the case of another party. In this case we are not concerned as to what would be the effect of our decision upholding the Government order dated 16-12-1971. on the rights of the parties in Imperial Tobacco Company's case. 8. In the result, we are of opinion that the learned single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The special appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.