NATHANI SHIVANKUMAR GHANSHYAMDAS v. SHAH DHANALAL MANEKLAL
1974-06-18
S.H.SHETH
body1974
DigiLaw.ai
S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 37 of 1971 against the defendant in the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division at Dohad for recovering possession of the suit premises. In support of his claim he alleged the following four grounds:- (1) The defendant had acquired vacant possession of suitable residence within the meaning of sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rent Act. (2) The defendant had not used without reasonable cause the suit premises for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit as contemplated by sec. 13 (1) (k) of the Bombay Rent Act. (3) The defendant had erased a paramount structure on the suit premises without the plaintiffs consent in writing. (4) The defendant had committed a breach of covenant. ( 2 ) THE learned Joint Civil Judge who tried the suit did not accept the last two grounds alleged by the plaintiff in support of his claim but he accepted the first two grounds. He therefore passed against the defendant decree for possession. The defendant appealed against that decree to the District Court. The learned District Judge upheld all the findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge and dismissed the appeal. ( 3 ) IT is that appellate decree which is challenged by the defendant in this Revision Application. ( 4 ) MR. Desai who appears for the respondent-landlord has not tried to challenge the findings recorded by the Courts below on the last two grounds alleged by the landlord. In order to support the decree passed by the Courts below in favour of the plaintiff-landlord he could have done so. He however has not chosen to do so. Mr. Shah appearing for the defendant has challenged the findings recorded by the Courts below on the first two grounds alleged by the plaintiff. The learned District Judge inter alia has confirmed the decree for possession on the ground that the defendant had acquired vacant possession of suitable residence within the meaning of sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rent Act. Though he has written a very long judgment he does not appear to have discussed this aspect of the case in any satisfactory manner.
13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rent Act. Though he has written a very long judgment he does not appear to have discussed this aspect of the case in any satisfactory manner. He appears to have confused the ground of non-user of the suit premises alleged by the plaintiff with the defendants acquisition of vacant possession of a suitable residence. It could not have been done. These are two distinct grounds on the establishment of anyone of which the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the suit premises from the defendant. He not only ought to leave discussed evidence bearing on the acquisition of vacant possession by the defendant of a suitable residence but in my opinion he ought to have also gone into the question whether temporary occupation of another premises constitutes possession of those premises and whether it amounts to defendants residence therein. The treatment of this question by the learned District Judge is quite slip-shod and absolutely unsatisfactory. The facts found are that the defendant had left the suit premises in May 1970 and returned to them in February 1971. During that period he had been occupying a house belonging to Ramchandra Odhavdas and situate in Sindhi Colony at Dohad. In order to bring home to the defendant the ground of eviction specified in sec. 13 (1) (1) it is necessary to prove that he had acquired vacant possession thereof and that it was a suitable residence for him. Possession in my opinion means legal possession Any occupation by any person of any premises does not amount to possession. Possession connotes transfer of interest in the premises. A lessor may transfer his interest in the premises to his lessee. A vendor may transfer his interest in the premises to a vendee. A mortgagor may transfer his interest in the premises to his mortgagee. A donor may transfer his interest in the premises to his donee. Unless therefore there is evidence to show that there was transfer of interest from Ramchandra Odhavdas to the defendant it cannot be said that the defendant was in possession of Ramchandra Odhavdass house or bungalow. To illustrate if he occupied the bungalow as a mere licensee is would not amount to his possession of that bungalow. In my opinion for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (1) it is necessary to distinguish occupation from possession.
To illustrate if he occupied the bungalow as a mere licensee is would not amount to his possession of that bungalow. In my opinion for the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (1) it is necessary to distinguish occupation from possession. In the instant case since there is no evidence to show that there was transfer of interest by Ramchandra Odhavdas in respect of his bungalow to the defendant it is extremely difficult for me to say that the defendant had acquired possession of that bungalow. Secondly the second ingredient which is required to be proved by sec. 13 (1) (1) is that the defendant must have acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence. The question which has been argued before me turns not so much upon suitability as upon residence. Suitability of a residence may depend upon the extent of living area available the size of the family which is to be accommodated therein and the availability of facilities or amenities therein. But that is not the question which I am required to examine in the instant case. The question which Mr. Shah has raised before me is whether that bungalow was available to the plaintiff for residence. Any temporary occupation does not in my opinion amount to residence. The expression residence used in sec. 13 (1) (h) means in my opinion residence with the object of settling down. In the instant case there is no evidence to show that the defendant had shifted from the suit premises to the bungalow of Ramchandra Odhavdas for residence with the object of settling down therein. All that the evidence shows is that he had occupied it for about 9 months. Unless there is evidence to show that he had shifted there to settle down it is extremely difficult for me to say that he had shifted there for residence and obtained it for that purpose. These two important ingredients which sec. 13 (1) (1) requires the plaintiff to prove have not been proved in the instant case. Therefore the decree for possession passed by the Courts below on the ground specified in sec. 13 (1) (1) cannot be upheld. The finding recorded by the Courts below in that behalf is therefore liable to be set aside. It is therefore set aside. [rest of the Judgment is not material for the Report]. Application allowed. .