JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - Petitioner is the landlord. He has a shop house at Nimchouri crossing of Cuttack town consisting of a hall with one room adjoining it and one room near the staircase in Holding No. 442 of Ward No. 3 in Cuttack Municipality. This house was let out to opposite party No. 1 in the year 1966 on a monthly rent of Rs. 110/-. In April 1970 the Petitioner filed an application for eviction of opposite party No. 1 on the ground that he required the suit house for the business of his eldest son (p.w. 2) who was running a business in ply-wood in a rented house paying heavy rent and also on the ground that opposite party No. 1 had sublet a portion of the said house to a sub-tenant without the Petitioner's consent. Opposite party No. 1 filed a written statement admitting the tenancy. She took the plea that there were six shop rooms in the suit holding out of which only one was in her occupation; the remaining five shop rooms had been let out to different tenants. The Petitioner lets out the shop rooms and collects high rent and the application for eviction is not in good faith and the object of the Petitioner is to evict opposite party No. 1 for letting it out on higher rent. The Petitioner cannot ask opposite party No. 1 to vacate the suit premises without evicting the other tenants. Another objection was taken that p.w. 2 was carrying on his ply-wood business in another house in the same locality which was most suitable for his business and during the life time of his father he has no right to the suit house as the Petitioner belongs to the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. The case of subletting was denied. The House Rent Controller decreed the claim for eviction on both the grounds. The Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) allowed the appeal by opposite party No. 1 holding that the Petitioner did not require the house in good faith for occupation of p.w. 2 and that subletting of a part of the house had not been established. It is against this order that the writ application has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. It is against this order that the writ application has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. Pal contends that the Petitioner requires the house for the business of p.w. 2 in good faith and the finding of the appellate authority suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record in corning to the contrary conclusion and that the Petitioner's case of subletting should have been accepted. Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand, contends that the findings of the appellate authority, both regarding requirement of the house in good faith and subletting, are rare findings of fact and cannot be interfered with under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and that p.w. 2 is not a member of the family of the Petitioner and requiring the house for p.w. 2's partnership business is not a requirement for a 'member of the Petitioner's family. Each of the aforesaid contentions requires careful examination. 3. Before examining the various reasons on the basis of which the learned A.D.M.(J) held that the Petitioner did not require the house in good faith for the occupation of p. w,2, it would be profitable to clarify the 'legal position as to the expression 'requires the house in good faith'. 4. Section 7(4) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) runs thus: The landlord may, subject to the provisions of this Act, apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the house, if he requires the house in good faith for the occupation or use of himself, any member of his family or of any person or persons for whose benefit the house is held by him. This sub-section came up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. The entire legal position was summed up in Haji Ahmed Haji Ibrahim Vs. Hadu Subudhi and Another. In paragraph 5 of that case the following propositions were laid down: (i) The word 'require' involves something more than a mere wish and must at least involve some elements of need. (ii) The onus is on the landlord to show certain circumstances or facts proving some need or necessity. (iii) The statute, however, does not insist that a need must be an absolute one. (ii) The onus is on the landlord to show certain circumstances or facts proving some need or necessity. (iii) The statute, however, does not insist that a need must be an absolute one. It is not necessary for the landlord to prove that he would be thrown to the streets unless he gets the accommodation. (iv) The need of the landlord must be an honest one. It would not be the outcome of an oblique motive or false pretence. A requirement which is not capricious or unfair or absurd would be reasonable. The concept of 'good faith' takes within its sweep the absence of an idea to receive. (v) Whether the landlord requires the house in good faith is always a question of fact. The Court is entitled to look to every relevant fact or circumstance affecting the landlords and their position. The nature and character of the landlords' accommodation at the time when they are asking for the relief of possession and the scope, size and character of their requirement are all relevant factors that the Court might consider in that context. To the aforesaid summary a further element may be added that the landlord is the best Judge of his own requirement. If it is not the outcome of an oblique motive or false pretence the same is not to be tested by a very rigorous standard requiring the landlord to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. The onus would be discharged by weighing the balance of probabilities. This decision was followed in Kota Sarathi Senapati v. Kotini Narayan Murty and Sons and Anr. 1972 (2) C.W.R. 1456 and E. Sathia v. Chakradhar Mohanty and Ors. 39 (1973) C.L.T. 450. 5. In the light of the aforesaid tests the various reasons given by the appellate authority may now be examined. The gist of the reasons given by it may be enumerated for convenience of analysis. They are: (i) When p.w. 2's business was started in 1965 the Petitioner should not have let out the house to opposite party No. 1 in 1966. (ii) The Petitioner did not take any steps to evict any of the other tenants of adjoining five shop rooms for the business of p.w. 2. (iii) The Petitioner has business in gold while p.w. 2 has ply-wood business; both business have no connection. (ii) The Petitioner did not take any steps to evict any of the other tenants of adjoining five shop rooms for the business of p.w. 2. (iii) The Petitioner has business in gold while p.w. 2 has ply-wood business; both business have no connection. (iv) p.w. 2 has not indicated any special reason for having the disputed house for his ply-wood business. The disputed house fetches & monthly rent of Rs. 110/- while p.w. 2 is paying a rent of Rs. 200/- for the rented house where he carries on his business. Payment of Rs. 90/- more matters little for p.w. 2 when the turnover of his business is about Rs. 1? lakhs. All the aforesaid reasons are speculative and are not relevant to the question in issue. The first reason is wholly irrelevant. When p.w. 2 started his business in 1965 it was quite open to him to start his business in another rented house and not in the disputed house. The mere fact that opposite party No. 1 was inducted as a tenant in the suit house in 1966 does not preclude the Petitioner to exercise his option in 1970 for eviction of the tenant if the requirement is in good faith. The fact as to why the Petitioner did not exercise that option in 1966 is wholly irrelevant to the issue of existence of good faith in 1970. (v) Equally irrelevant is the second reason as to why the Petitioner did not evict any of the other tenants. As has been clearly laid down in the aforesaid propositions of law, it is open to the landlord to make his choice as to which tenant he would evict for his own purpose. If the reasoning of the appellate authority is admissible in law, then each tenant would take the plea that the other tenants should be evicted and the landlord cannot evict anyone of the tenants. This ground is, therefore, irrelevant to decide the question of good faith. Similarly, the third ground that the Petitioner's business is different from his son's business is wholly irrelevant to the question of existence of good faith. If in law the Petitioner can evict a tenant for the business of his son, then the requirement is in good faith. The fact that the Petitioner and his son have two different business has no bearing on the question in issue. If in law the Petitioner can evict a tenant for the business of his son, then the requirement is in good faith. The fact that the Petitioner and his son have two different business has no bearing on the question in issue. The fourth ground that p.w. 2 has not indicated any special reasons for choosing the disputed house for his ply-wood business is equally irrelevant. An owner has always the option of using his own house for his own purposes. p.w. 2 gives clear reasons that the rent of the house in which he was carrying on business was exorbitant and he was unable to pay the same and he has stacked some of his articles in one of the shop rooms after vacating the shop room which he had taken on rent, The reason so given is quite special. The fifth ground that when business turnover of p.w. 2 is about Rs. 1? lakhs he should have no objection in paying Rs. 200/-for a rented house is wholly unreasonable. The owner is to balance his own capacity for payment and it is not for the Court to Judge. When for the, rented house p.w. 2 is paying Rs. 200/- and only Rs. 110/- is being collected from the disputed house, the choice of p.w. 2 to use the disputed house by abandoning the rented house is very reasonable and the Court cannot compel him to continue in a rented house on payment of higher rent. Whatever may be the turnover of p.w. 2's business, the choice of the Petitioner to use his own house is clearly in exercise of good faith. Thus, all the reasons given by the learned A.D.M.(J) are wholly irrelevant and speculative and are based on surmise and have no relation to the evidence and materials on record. The ultimate conclusion being based on no admissible considerations the finding is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The conclusion is also directly contrary to the propositions laid down by this Court in Haji Ahmed Haji Ibrahim Vs. Hadu Subudhi and Another, . 6. The next question for consideration is whether the finding of the learned A.D.M.(J) is one of fact so as not to be interfered with' under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The conclusion is also directly contrary to the propositions laid down by this Court in Haji Ahmed Haji Ibrahim Vs. Hadu Subudhi and Another, . 6. The next question for consideration is whether the finding of the learned A.D.M.(J) is one of fact so as not to be interfered with' under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It was laid down in the aforesaid decision that when the finding is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law or based on misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision or on no evidence, the said conclusion can be corrected by issue of a writ of certiorari. If the finding had been based on some basis keeping the correct legal approach in view, we would have refrained from interfering with such a finding. 7. The next question for consideration is whether p.w. 2 is a member of the family of the Petitioner. Such an objection was not taken in the written statement and was raised for the first time in this Court. Ordinarily we are not inclined to entertain an objection of this type for the first time in a writ application involving the issue of a writ of certiorari. The basis of this contention is the following statement of p.w. 2 in his deposition: Myself and my father have been divided but remain jointly in mess. My business and my father's business are separate. I pay Rs. 100/- or Rs. 200/- to my father sometimes towards household expenses. Mr. Mohanty accordingly contends that p. w, 2 is a divided son of the Petitioner and he is not a member of the family of the Petitioner as envisaged in Section 7(4) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid argument suffers from a confusion of thought as to the status of a son vis-a-vis his father in a Dayabhaga family. According to Dayabhaga law, sons do not acquire any interest by birth in ancestral property. They cannot demand a partition of such property from the father as they can under the Mitakshara law. They cannot also call for an account of the management of the ancestral property from the father. The father is the absolute owner of the property; he can manage it in any way he likes see of Mulia's Hindu Law, 13th Edition, page 275. Thus, in the disputed house p.w. 2 has no interest. It wholly belongs to the Petitioner. They cannot also call for an account of the management of the ancestral property from the father. The father is the absolute owner of the property; he can manage it in any way he likes see of Mulia's Hindu Law, 13th Edition, page 275. Thus, in the disputed house p.w. 2 has no interest. It wholly belongs to the Petitioner. The statement of p.w. 2 that he is divided from his father but remains jointly in mess with his means nothing else than that he has got a separate ply-wood business in which his father has no interest and he remains under the protection of his father in joint mess on contribution of some money towards expenses. In a Dayabhaga family there can be no division between the father and the son, the son having no interest in the ancestral or self-acquired property of his father during his life time. The Dayabhaga son, continues as a member of the family of the father who can maintain the sons and look after them if he so chooses. In this case, the father wants to make some provision for the son by allowing him to use the disputed house for his ply-wood business. Clearly, p.w. 2 is a member of the family of the Petitioner. In Institute of Radio Technology and Ors. v. Pandurang Baburao AIR 1946 Bom. a Division Bench of that Court went to the extent of construing the words 'his own occupation' as meaning occupation of himself and all persons dependant on him. p.w. 2 is dependant on the Petitioner. He is a member of the Petitioner's family and occupation of the disputed house by p.w. 2 will, in the eye of law, be the occupation of the Petitioner himself. The house is thus required in good faith by the Petitioner for the occupation of his son p.w. 2. 9. The last objection raised by Mr. Mohanty is that the ply-wood business which p.w. 2 is carrying on is a partnership business and as such the requirement is not for a member of the family of the Petitioner but for the partnership firm of which p.w. 2 is a partner. This contention is based on the following statement of p.w. 2: In this ply-wood business my other partner is one Dibakar Panda. There is business accounts of the ply wood firm and this firm pays sale tax. This contention is based on the following statement of p.w. 2: In this ply-wood business my other partner is one Dibakar Panda. There is business accounts of the ply wood firm and this firm pays sale tax. Such an objection was also not raised in the Courts below and is raised for the first time in this Court. Ordinarily such a contention is not permissible to be raised. However, as an interesting point of law was raised, we gave opportunity to the learned Advocates for both the parties to take up the point. Partnership is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually "partners" and collectively "a firm" and the name under which the business is carried on is called the "firm name". Law is (sic) settled that a firm is not a separate legal entity and the firm name is a compendious way in which the business of the partners is carried on. Each partner carries on business for himself as principal and also as an agent for the other partners. Mutual agency is an essential condition of partnership. As a partner carries on the business for himself and carries on the business as an agent for other partners, p.w. 2 must be held to be carrying on the partnership business and it need not be his exclusive business. There are some authorities in support of this conclusion see Firm Rajniklal & Co. v. Vithal Pandurang AIR 1952 Nag. 312, V. Danmull Sowcar Vs. Syed Ali Mohamed, and Mohinder Kaur v. Desa Singh 1912 RCJ 258. We find no substance in this objection. 10. To sum up our conclusions: (i) p.w. 2 is a member of the family of the Petitioner, (ii) He carries on the ply-wood business for which the disputed house is required, (iii) The Petitioner requires the disputed house in good faith for the business of p.w. 2. The Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to evict opposite party No. 1 u/s 7(4) of the Act. 11. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, it is unnecessary to examine whether the finding of the appellate authority on subletting is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 12. The Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to evict opposite party No. 1 u/s 7(4) of the Act. 11. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, it is unnecessary to examine whether the finding of the appellate authority on subletting is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 12. In the result the judgment of the A.D.M. (J) is set aside and the writ application is allowed with costs. A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the order of the A.D.M. (J) (Annexure-5). Hearing fee of Rs. 100/-. P.K. Mohanti, J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Allowed