JUDGMENT R. L. Gulati, J. - The third respondent, Dharam Pal, was the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, Shivinghpur. He is alleged to have taken from the petitioner a sum of Rs. 400/- as a consideration for a patta of some Gaon Samaj land. The petitioner has alleged that no patta was executed, nor was the money returned to him. He accordingly filed a suit in Nyaya Panchayat, Bhagwala for the recovery of Rs. 400/-. The Nyaya Panchayat decreed the suit with cost on November 10, 1967. The decretal amount was not paid for a long time and the petitioner applied for execution of the decree. Thereupon Dharam Pal filed a revision in the court of the first respondent, the Munsif, Etah on 11th September, 1970. An objection was taken by the petitioner that the revision was highly belated having been filed more than three years after the decree was passed by the Nyaya Panchayat, whereas the prescribed period of limitation under Sec. 89 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act was only sixty days from the date of the order sought to be revised. The learned Munsif, however, took the view that although the limitation was of sixty days for a revision by an aggrieved party, yet there was no limitation for the exercise of quo motu power of the court. In the opinion of the learned Munsif there was a defect in the decree which led to miscarriage of justice and as such he entertained the revision in exercise of his suo motu powers and allowed the same by his order dated 14th December, 1970, and set aside the decree of the Nyaya Panchayat. The defects pointed out by the learned Munsif in the decree are two: (l) that the contract related to an immovable property and the Nyaya Panchayat could not take cognizance of such a suit by virtue of the provisions contained in Sec. 64 (la) of the Panchayat Raj Act and (2) that the petitioner had advanced Rs. 400/- to Dharam Pal in his capacity as a Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha and the Nyaya Panchayat could not take cognizance of such a suit against him as he was acting as a public servant. 2. 400/- to Dharam Pal in his capacity as a Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha and the Nyaya Panchayat could not take cognizance of such a suit against him as he was acting as a public servant. 2. It is not necessary to decide as to whether the view taken by the learned Munsif on the merit of the case is correct or not because in my opinion the view taken by him about the exercise of suo motu power in entertaining the revision petition is manifestly erroneous and perverse. The revision petition was filed after three years of the decree passed by the Nyaya Panchayat and on 14th December, 1970 when the learned Munsif set aside the decree, the limitation for filing a civil suit by the petitioner had already expired. The result of setting aside the decree has been that the petitioner has been left without any remedy at all and he has lost his money. In such circumstances, the learned Munsif was not right in saying that he could interfere in order to prevent miscarriage of justice. Miscarriage of justice, no doubt, there has been, but injustice has been caused to the petitioner and not to Dharam Pal. In fact the learned Munsif has perpetrated injustice by his intervention. The learned Munsif was also not right in believing that he was exercising suo motu power of revision. He had in fact been moved in that behalf. The revision application was palpably belated. In such circumstances the learned Munsif should never have entertained the revision petition, unless he was satisfied that the delay in filing the revision petition was explainable. The suo motu interference instead of preventing miscarriage of justice has caused injustice to the petitioner and the injustice is irreparable. 3. In the counter-affidavit an attempt has been made by Dharam Pal to show that he was not aware of the suit filed by the petitioner, nor of the decree passed by the Nyaya Panchayat. According to him, he came to know of the decree only when his property was attached and within thirty days thereafter he filed the revision application. These averments appear to me to be prima facie false. The order of the Nyaya Panchayat shows very clearly that he and the petitioner both appeared before the Nyaya Panchayat on 10th October, 1967 when the plaint was read out to Dharam Pal. These averments appear to me to be prima facie false. The order of the Nyaya Panchayat shows very clearly that he and the petitioner both appeared before the Nyaya Panchayat on 10th October, 1967 when the plaint was read out to Dharam Pal. The statements of the petitioner as also of Dharam Pal were recorded and the case was adjourned to 25th October, 1967 for evidence. On 25th October, 1967, both parties were present before the Nyaya Panchayat. The petitioner examined two witnesses and Dharam Pal refused to lead any evidence in defence. The case was then adjourned to 10th November, 1967 for judgment. The order of the Nyaya Panchayat recites that on that date also both the parties were present when the judgment was pronounced decreeing the petitioners suit with costs. In view of these recitable in the order of the Nyaya Panchayat I am not prepared to believe that Dharam Pal had no knowledge of the case before the Nyaya Panchayat. His averment in the counter-affidavit appears to me to be false and as such I have ordered a notice to be issued to him under Sec. 340, Cr. P. C. 4. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The order of the Munsif, Etah, dated 14th December, 1970 is quashed.