Order-This petition is directed against the order, dated 13th May, 1974 passed by the Sessions Judge, Chitradurga, in Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 32 of 1974 confirming the order, dated 22nd April, 1974, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, in Case No. CSD. 4 COM. 70 of 1973-74, so far as the said order of the Deputy Commissioner related to confiscation of 186 bags of paddy seized by the authorities competent to effect such seizure under clause 11 of the Karnataka Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order, 1066, (hereinafter referred to as the Order), from the premises of the mill ‘Siddalingeshwara Rice Mills, Davanagere’. 2. On seizure of considerable bags of paddy from the said mill, the mill was called upon to disclose the source from which possession of the seized bags of paddy accrued. The records of the mill disclosed that the petitioner had sent these bags of paddy to the mill for hulling. It appears that the Assistant Commissioner who seized the paddy bags, mentioned in his report, not the full address of Kalidasa Traders, but only as Kalidasa Traders. There is one firm functioning under the name and style ‘Kalidasa Traders, Davanagere,‘in Davanagere. The petitioner-firm bears the same name but is functioning in Hiriyur. In view of such a report of the Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the Davanagere firm and the Davanagere firm appeared before the Deputy Commissioner and submitted that it had nothing to do with the seized bags of paddy. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an application before the Deputy Commissioner on 4th April, 1974 claiming ownership over these paddy bags and contending that the paddy bags had been sent to Siddalingeshwara Rice Mills, by it. The claim of the petitioner was gone into by the Deputy Commissioner, as required by section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Deputy Commissioner, as already narrated, held that 1,200 bags of paddy seized from the said mill premises were to be confiscated. Out of these 1,200 bags only 1062 bags were claimed by the petitioner as belonging to it. The petitioner preferred the said appeal before the Sessions Judge, Chitradurga, and the learned Sessions Judge passed the order now impugned. 3. Out of these 1,200 bags only 1062 bags were claimed by the petitioner as belonging to it. The petitioner preferred the said appeal before the Sessions Judge, Chitradurga, and the learned Sessions Judge passed the order now impugned. 3. The learned State Public Prosecutor contended at the outset that there were no bona fides in the claim put forward by the petitioner because it had put forward its claim at a belated stage while in fact the report of the Assistant Commissioner showed that the petitioner-firm had nothing to do with the seized 1,062 bags of paddy. The material already narrated in the preceding paragraph is sufficient to show that the report of the Assistant Commissioner appeared to be vague inasmuch as the full particulars of the said owner of the paddy bags seized was not disclosed while the records maintained by the mill showed the petitioner as the firm which had sent that stock of paddy to the mill for purposes of hulling. 4. Sri C.N. Kamath, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, pointed out that the show-cause notice called upon the petitioner to meet the contention that the petitioner had not produced the clearance certificate for having surrendered levy for the stocks stored in the rice mill premises, under the order and, therefore, the petitioner had contravened the conditions mentioned in the order. He on this basis urged that the petitioner, being a trader only and he having purchased 747 bags of paddy from other traders and not from growers, was not required to be in possession of clearance certificates for having surrendered levy for the said stock and that it was not incumbent on the petitioner even to ascertain whether levy on the said stock had been surrendered or not, and, hence, the show-cause notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner was bad in law. The learned State Public Prosecutor urged that all that was averred in the showcause notice is that levy had not been surrendered as per the Order in regard to the said stock and, therefore, the petitioner had contravened the provisions of the Order. 5. It is apparent that the basis of the contention of Sri Kamath is the stress on the words “Whereas you have not produced the clearance certificate for having surrendered levy for the said stock”. 5. It is apparent that the basis of the contention of Sri Kamath is the stress on the words “Whereas you have not produced the clearance certificate for having surrendered levy for the said stock”. I am clear in my mind that the stress is not on the word ‘produced’. What the notice clearly means is that there was no clearance certificate for having surrendered levy for the said stock and, hence, there was breach of the provisions of the Order. Merely because the petitioner was called upon to produce, it does not mean that failure to produce would entail an order of confiscation. In fact that is not the ground on which the order of confiscation has been passed. Hence, I do not propose to deal further with this contention of Sri Kamath, as, in my opinion, it is unnecessary. 6. Sri Kamath vehemently urged that the claim of the petitioner being that he had purchased the said stock from other traders, it is clear that clause 8-A of the Order was not attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case and, hence, it could not be said that the petitioner had contravened any of the provisions of the Order. On the other hand, the learned State Public Prosecutor contended that clause 8-A of the Order lays down that even a trader purchasing paddy from another trader has to ascertain, before purchasing, that levy in regard to the stock intended to be purchased by him, had been surrendered according to the provisions of the Order and failure to do so led to breach of the provision in clause 8-A of the Order. 7. Clause 8-A of the Orders reads as follows: “8-A. Restriction on the purchase of paddy from a grower.-No person shall purchase any paddy from any grower who is liable to sell paddy to the State Government under clause 3 or clause 5 as the case may be, unless such grower is in possession of a certificate granted to him by the Enforcement Officer as required by clause 8.” Sri Kamath argued that the object of the Order is to see that a grower falling within its ambit compulsorily sells a portion of the paddy grown by him as regulated by Schedule I of the Order to the Government. Provision has been made in the Order to secure this object only. Provision has been made in the Order to secure this object only. He further urged that it is to achieve this object that clause 7, clause 8 and clause 8-A have been incorporated in the Order. Glauses 7 and 8 of the Order reads as follows: “7. Restrictions on the sale of paddy by grower.-No grower shall, out of the paddy grown in his holding and held in stock by him in respect of any crop, sell or otherwise dispose of any paddy unless the quantity of paddy required to be sold by him under this order has been delivered as required under clause 3 or clause 5, as the case may be. 8.Enforcement officer to grant certificate regarding paddy sold.-The Enforcement Officer shall, after verifying that the quantity of paddy requited to be sold by a grower under the provisions of this Order, has been delivered to the State Government, or its authorised agent, at the purchase point specified in the Order served under sub-clause (2) of clause 3 or under sub-clause (2) of clause 5, as the case may be, grant, a certificate to such grower indicating that the quantity of paddy required to be sold by such grower has been sold by him” The State Public Prosecutor contended that if clause 8-A of the Order is interpreted to govern purchase from the grower only, the object of the Order would be defeated and, hence, it should be interpreted to govern purchase by a trader from a trader also. 8. Clause 3 of the Order lays down that every grower shall, out of the paddy grown in his holding and held in stock by him in respect of each crop, sell to the State Government or its authorised agent at the purchase price, such quantity of paddy in accordance with the scale specified in Schedule I as may be determined by the Enforcement Officer. It is hence, clear that it is incumbent of a grower who falls within the ambit of this Order, to surrender levy to the State Government in accordance with this clause. It is nowhere provided in the Order that any trader of any person who is not a grower but who procures paddy, has to surrender levy. It is hence, clear that it is incumbent of a grower who falls within the ambit of this Order, to surrender levy to the State Government in accordance with this clause. It is nowhere provided in the Order that any trader of any person who is not a grower but who procures paddy, has to surrender levy. This shows that a trader is not required to surrender levy It, hence, follows that the Older does not contemplate a trader possessing a clearance certificate for having surrendered levy for the stock held by him. 9. In order to ensure that a grower does not dispose of the paddy grown in his holding, without surrendering the requisite levy as per the provisions of the Order, clause 7 has been incorporated in the Order. A plain reading of cause 7 which has been narrated above, discloses that to sell or otherwise dispose of any paddy, unless levy is surrendered, is to commit a breach of this provision and, therefore, breach of the conditions of the Order. In order to further ensure this object being achieved clause 8-A has been incorporated in the Order. A plain reading of that clause which has already been narrated, discloses that no person, whether he may be a dealer (wholesale or retail) or a consumer, is free to purchase paddy from a grower without ascertaining that the grower is in possession of a certificate mentioned in clause 8 of the Order. If the intendment was to bring purchases from traders within the ambit of clause 8-A, the necessary words or phrases would have been incorporated in clause 8-A. Hence to interpret clause 8-A as contended by the learned State Public Prosecutor would amount to introducing additional words or phrases into clause 8-A. The learned State Public Prosecutor contended in this regard that it would not be wrong to introduce the necessary words or phrases in clause 8-A of the Order in order to see that the object of the Order is not defeated. 10. As already pointed out, the object of the Order is to see that a grower of paddy compulsorily surrenders levy to the State Government, and does not dispose of the paddy grown by him without surrendering such levy. 10. As already pointed out, the object of the Order is to see that a grower of paddy compulsorily surrenders levy to the State Government, and does not dispose of the paddy grown by him without surrendering such levy. The contention of the learned State Public Prosecutor is that any dealer purchasing from a grower can conveniently show in his record that he had purchased from another dealer and set at naught the provisions of the Order. I do not see any force in this contention because the dealings of a dealer (wholesale or retail) are governed by other orders issued under section 3 of the Act. Those Orders are: (1) The Karnataka Food grains (Wholesale) Dealers Licensing Order, 1964, and (2) The Karnataka Food grains (Retail Dealers) Licensing Order, 1964. As per the provisions of those Orders such dealers are required to take licence which in turn contain conditions. One of the important conditions which is common to both the licences is to submit returns to the authorities mentioned therein in regard to stocks of food grains (essential commodities including paddy) procured by them, disclosing even the source from which they are procured. It is for the concerned authorities to examine the returns and find out whether breach of any of the provisions of the Orders issued under section 3 of the Act has been committed. If any such return discloses the sources of procurement of paddy as the grower of the paddy, then the authorities can very well ascertain whether clause 8-A of the Order had or had not been complied with, and take appropriate steps. Therefore, the object of the Order, as contended by the learned State Public Prosecutor, could not be defeated by not interpreting clause 8-A of the Order in the manner argued by him. 11. In view of the foregoing reasons, I hold that purchase of paddy from a trader does not at all attract the provisions of clause 8-A of the Order. There is another substantial ground which supports this conclusion. 11. In view of the foregoing reasons, I hold that purchase of paddy from a trader does not at all attract the provisions of clause 8-A of the Order. There is another substantial ground which supports this conclusion. If clause 8-A of the Order is interpreted as contended by the learned State Public Prosecutor, any consumer, also who purchases even a little quantity of paddy from any trader, would be required to ascertain whether the concerned grower was or not in possession of the certificate contemplated by clause 8 of the Order, in regard to that particular quantity of stock that he purchases. It is too difficult to contemplate such an intendment in the Order. 12. The learned Deputy Commissioner and the learned Sessions Judge have not at all investigated into the claim of the petitioner whether that 747 bags of paddy had been procured by it by purchasing them from different traders as mentioned by the petitioner in its reply to the showcause notice. Both the authorities have held that even if it is for the sake of arguments assumed that the petitioner had purchased the said stock of paddy from other traders, such purchases were governed by clause 8-A of the Order and, hence, the petitioner had contravened the provisions of the Order. This view is not, in my opinion, correct. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain whether the claim of the petitioner that the petitioner had purchased 747 bags of paddy from other traders as mentioned by the petitioner in its reply to the show-cause notice, is tenable or not. 13. The learned State Public Prosecutor contended that sections 6-A and 6-B of the Act dealt with only breach of provisions of the Order or Orders issued under section 3 of the Act and not with the aspect whether a particular owner, from whose possession essential commodities had been seized, had himself committed such breach or not. He further argued that in view of clause 11 of the Order, the burden was on the owner of the paddy to satisfy the Deputy Commissioner and consequently the Sessions Judge, that no breach of any provision of the Order had been committed-whether by him. or anyone-in regard to the stocks seized from him. 14. Clause 11 of the Order reads as follows: “11. or anyone-in regard to the stocks seized from him. 14. Clause 11 of the Order reads as follows: “11. Powers of entry, search, seizure, etc.-(1) Any officer of the Department of Food and Civil Supplies or the Revenue Department not below the rank of a Revenue Inspector may, with a view to securing compliance with this Order, or to satisfying himself that the provisions of this Order have been complied with: (a) enter into, or search any premises, vehicles, vessels or other conveyances, in which he has reason to believe that a contravention of this Order has been, is being, or is about to be committed; (b) seize the stock of paddy along with the packages, coverings or receptacles in which such paddy is found and the animals, vehicles, vessels or other conveyances used in carrying such paddy in respect of which the Officer has reason to believe that a contravention of this Order, has been, is being or is about to be committed. (2) The provisions of sections 102 and 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) relating to search and seizure shall, so far as may be, apply to searches and seizures under this clause.” It does not lay down that whenever such a seizure is effected by the authorities mentioned in the said clause, a presumption arises that breach of the provisions of the Order had been committed until shown to the contrary. It is not possible to uphold the contention of the learned State Public Prosecutor in this behalf, in the absence of such a provision in clause 11 or any of the other provisions of the Order. The contention of the learned State Public Prosecutor that as per section 6-A of the Act a owner of the seized essential commodities has to satisfy the Deputy Commissioner that no breach of any of the provisions of the Orders issued under section 3 of the Act, had been committed, is not acceptable. Section 6-B of the Act specifically lays down that an order of confiscation contemplated under section 6-A of the Act cannot be passed without a notice being issued to the owner of the essential commodity seized. Section 6-B of the Act specifically lays down that an order of confiscation contemplated under section 6-A of the Act cannot be passed without a notice being issued to the owner of the essential commodity seized. It is too much to understand these provisions to mean that the burden is on a owner of such essential commodities to satisfy the Deputy Commissioner that neither he nor anyone else, who had to deal with the seized essential commodities, even on earlier occasions, had committed breach of any of the provisions of the Orders issued under section 3 of the Act. Such a owner can, at the most, produce material to show that he had not committed breach of any of the provisions of the Orders issued under section 3 of the Act. It cannot be forgotten that by passing an order of confiscation in regard to essential commodities seized, the owner from whom the seizure has been effected would be deprived of his property. 15. In view of the fact that neither the Deputy Commissioner nor the Sessions Judge has gone into the claim of the petitioner that the said 747 bags of paddy had been purchased by it from different traders, it is necessary that the Deputy Commissioner is called upon to settle this question of fact and then dispose of the matter, applying the law as settled in the preceding paragraphs. 16. Therefore, this petition is allowed. Orders dated 13th May, 1974 and 22nd April, 1974 passed by the Sessions Judge, Chitradurga in Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 32 of 1974, and by the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, in Case No. CSD. 4. COM. 70 of 1973-74, are set aside. The case is remanded to the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, for disposal according to law. bearing in mind the observations made in the body of this order.